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To	  take	  it	  upon	  oneself	  to	  answer	  before	  mankind	  for	  every	  thought	  means	  to	  live	  in	  
that	  luminosity	  in	  which	  oneself	  and	  everything	  one	  thinks	  is	  tested.	  
~	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  “Karl	  Jaspers:	  A	  Laudatio”	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ABSTRACT	  
Hannah	  Arendt,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  political	  thinkers	  of	  the	  twentieth	  
century,	  passed	  away	  before	  finishing	  her	  final	  statement	  on	  politics.	  	  Because	  her	  
political	  theory	  is	  incomplete,	  scholars	  have	  adopted	  many	  means	  for	  interpreting	  her	  
work.	  	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  adopt	  a	  phenomenological	  approach	  to	  understanding	  
Arendt	  by	  engaging	  with	  the	  phenomenological	  method	  Arendt,	  herself,	  used—
narrative.	  	  I	  specifically	  employ	  the	  Passover	  narrative	  as	  a	  metaphorical	  framework	  
alongside	  which	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory	  is	  traced.	  	  In	  this	  approach,	  four	  elements	  of	  
Arendt’s	  theory	  emerge	  to	  distinguish	  her	  thought	  from	  the	  Western	  political	  tradition:	  	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  mental	  activities,	  the	  definition	  of	  action,	  the	  space	  of	  appearance,	  and	  
the	  concept	  of	  freedom.	  	  As	  Arendt	  separates	  herself	  from	  her	  European	  influences,	  
such	  as	  Heidegger,	  Jaspers,	  Kant,	  and	  Nietzsche,	  the	  Jewish	  aspects	  of	  her	  work	  begin	  to	  
come	  into	  focus.	  	  For	  each	  of	  the	  elements,	  the	  distinct	  influence	  of	  Arendt’s	  Jewish	  
experiences	  is	  expounded.	  	  Drawing	  from	  the	  mystical	  and	  orthodox	  traditions	  of	  
Judaism,	  novel	  and	  intriguing	  insights	  into	  Arendt’s	  work	  are	  discovered.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  
Arendt	  leaves	  us	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  politics	  that	  is	  possibly	  grounded	  in	  a	  concept	  of	  love	  
that	  is	  both	  humanist	  and	  Jewish.	  	  	  
	  
	   1	  
INTRODUCTION	  
What	  is	  important	  for	  me	  is	  to	  understand.	  	  For	  me,	  writing	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  
seeking	  this	  understanding,	  part	  of	  the	  process	  of	  understanding.	  .	  .	  .	  And	  
if	  others	  understand—in	  the	  same	  sense	  that	  I	  have	  understood—that	  
gives	  me	  a	  sense	  of	  satisfaction,	  like	  feeling	  at	  home.	  
	   ~Hannah	  Arendt,	  “‘What	  Remains?	  	  The	  Language	  Remains’”	  
	  
Hannah	  Arendt	  did	  not	  set	  out	  to	  be	  a	  political	  thinker.	  	  She	  writes,	  “I	  was	  
interested	  neither	  in	  history	  nor	  in	  politics	  when	  I	  was	  young.”1	  	  Nonetheless,	  she	  
became	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  political	  theorists	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  In	  1924,	  
she	  went	  to	  university	  where	  she	  studied	  philosophy,	  first,	  under	  the	  tutelage	  of	  Martin	  
Heidegger,	  and	  subsequently,	  Karl	  Jaspers.	  	  Her	  doctoral	  dissertation,	  completed	  in	  1929,	  
addressed	  the	  concepts	  of	  love	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Saint	  Augustine.2	  	  The	  work	  clearly	  
displays	  the	  influences	  of	  both	  teachers,	  weaving	  Heidegerrian	  concepts	  and	  language	  
together	  with	  Jaspers’s	  phenomenological	  method	  of	  understanding.	  	  After	  completing	  
her	  doctoral	  work,	  Arendt	  relocated	  to	  Berlin,	  where	  she	  was	  reacquainted	  with	  Kurt	  
Blumenfeld,	  a	  leading	  German	  Zionist.	  	  Her	  association	  with	  the	  Zionists	  in	  Berlin	  marks	  
the	  starting	  point	  of	  her	  gradual	  shift	  from	  philosophy	  to	  politics.	  	  She	  is	  careful	  to	  
maintain,	  however,	  that	  while	  she	  was	  influenced	  by	  the	  Zionists,	  politically	  she	  “had	  
nothing	  to	  do	  with	  Zionism.”	  	  By	  1931,	  indifference	  to	  the	  realities	  of	  anti-­‐Semitism	  was	  
no	  longer	  possible	  and	  she	  was	  “firmly	  convinced	  that	  the	  Nazis	  would	  take	  the	  helm.”	  
She	  was,	  of	  course,	  correct;	  by	  1933	  Hitler	  had	  ascended	  to	  power.	  	  Arendt	  notes	  a	  
specific	  moment	  in	  which	  her	  transition	  to	  politics	  was	  complete:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  The	  Jewish	  Writings,	  eds.	  Jerome	  Kohn	  and	  Ron	  H.	  Feldman	  (New	  York:	  Schocken	  Books,	  
2007),	  466.	  
2	  Hannah	  Arendt.	  	  Love	  and	  Saint	  Augustine	  (Chicago:	  	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1996).	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February	  27,	  1933,	  the	  burning	  of	  the	  Reichstag,	  and	  the	  
illegal	  arrests	  that	  followed	  during	  the	  same	  night.	  	  The	  so-­‐
called	  protective	  custody.	  	  As	  you	  know,	  people	  were	  
taken	  to	  Gestapo	  cellars	  or	  to	  concentration	  camps.	  	  What	  
happened	  then	  was	  monstrous,	  but	  it	  has	  now	  been	  
overshadowed	  by	  things	  that	  happened	  later.	  	  This	  was	  an	  
immediate	  shock	  for	  me,	  and	  from	  that	  moment	  on	  I	  felt	  
responsible.	  	  That	  is,	  I	  was	  no	  longer	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  
one	  can	  simply	  be	  a	  bystander.3	  
	  
The	  events	  of	  that	  night	  inspired	  in	  Arendt	  a	  responsibility	  to	  human-­‐ness	  that	  underlies	  
all	  of	  her	  work	  from	  that	  point	  on.	  	  
	   Arendt’s	  mode	  of	  understanding	  bears	  the	  mark	  of	  her	  intellectual	  development	  
under	  both	  Heidegger	  and	  Jaspers.	  	  From	  Heidegger,	  she	  had	  learned	  the	  “way	  of	  the	  
rebels	  who	  doubted	  philosophy’s	  traditional	  identity”;	  and	  from	  Jaspers,	  Arendt	  learned	  
an	  entirely	  new	  approach	  that	  sought	  to	  understand	  the	  connection	  between	  thinking	  
and	  acting.4	  	  Further,	  Jaspers	  exposed	  her	  to	  “a	  conception	  of	  freedom	  linked	  to	  reason,”	  
which	  she	  found	  intriguing.5	  	  These	  philosophical	  influences	  came	  to	  inform	  how	  Arendt	  
thinks	  about	  the	  political	  realm.	  	  Arendt’s	  political	  work	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  rebellion	  
against	  the	  Western	  tradition	  of	  political	  thought,	  a	  rebellion	  that	  is	  rooted	  in	  a	  desire	  to	  
understand	  how	  that	  tradition	  could	  allow	  for	  the	  development	  of	  political	  realities	  that	  
suppress	  human	  freedom.	  	  Her	  analysis	  concludes	  that	  the	  tradition	  of	  Western	  political	  
thought,	  from	  Plato	  through	  Marx,	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  action.	  	  It	  is	  in	  that	  failure	  that	  the	  
suppression	  of	  human	  freedom	  was	  brought	  to	  its	  totality	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Essays	  in	  Understanding,	  ed.	  Jerome	  Kohn	  (New	  York:	  Schocken	  Books,	  1994),	  4,	  5.	  
4	  Elisabeth	  Young-­‐Bruehl,	  Hannah	  Arendt:	  For	  Love	  of	  the	  World	  (New	  Haven:Yale	  University	  Press,	  1982),	  
45.	  
5	  Arendt,	  Essays	  in	  Understanding,	  22.	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While	  the	  philosophical	  influences	  are	  an	  important	  element	  in	  understanding	  
the	  political	  theory	  of	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  note	  that	  her	  move	  to	  a	  
consideration	  of	  politics	  was	  driven	  by	  personal	  experiences.	  	  And,	  further,	  those	  
experiences	  were	  determined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  was	  Jewish.	  	  In	  a	  famous	  letter	  to	  
Gershom	  Scholem	  she	  writes,	  “To	  be	  a	  Jew	  belongs	  for	  me	  to	  the	  indisputable	  facts	  of	  
my	  life,	  and	  I	  have	  never	  had	  the	  wish	  to	  change	  or	  disclaim	  facts	  of	  this	  kind.”6	  	  As	  Ron	  
H.	  Feldman	  writes,	  “[T]his	  fortuitous	  and	  uncontrollable	  circumstance	  of	  her	  birth	  
determined	  the	  basic	  parameters	  of	  her	  fate.”7	  	  As	  I	  shall	  argue	  in	  the	  body	  of	  this	  work,	  
it	  also	  shaped	  the	  parameters	  of	  her	  political	  thought.	  
Ron	  H.	  Feldman’s	  collection	  of	  Arendt’s	  Jewish	  writings	  in	  The	  Jew	  as	  Pariah:	  	  
Jewish	  Identity	  and	  Politics	  in	  the	  Modern	  Age	  (1978)	  largely	  exposed	  this	  significant	  
aspect	  of	  Arendt’s	  life	  and	  philosophy.8	  	  	  Indeed,	  this	  was	  the	  first	  collection	  of	  Arendt’s	  
specifically	  Jewish	  writings	  and	  included	  much	  of	  what	  Arendt	  had	  written	  on	  Jewish	  
identity,	  culture,	  history	  and	  politics.	  	  This	  text	  was	  an	  important	  addition	  to	  the	  corpus	  
of	  Arendt’s	  thought,	  providing	  access	  to	  some	  of	  Arendt’s	  Jewish	  writings.	  	  However,	  
even	  with	  this,	  not	  many	  scholars	  were	  prompted	  to	  a	  serious	  investigation	  of	  her	  
Jewishness.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  466.	  
7	  Ron	  H.	  Feldman.	  “The	  Pariah	  as	  Rebel:	  	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  Jewish	  Writings”	  in	  Thinking	  in	  Dark	  Times:	  	  
Hannah	  Arendt	  on	  Ethics	  and	  Politics,	  edited	  by	  Roger	  Berkowitz,	  et	  al.	  (New	  York:	  	  Fordham	  University	  
Press,	  2010),	  198.	  
8	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  The	  Jew	  as	  Pariah:	  Jewish	  Identity	  and	  Politics	  in	  the	  Modern	  Age,	  eds.	  Ron	  H.	  Feldman	  
(New	  York:	  The	  Grove	  Press,	  1978).	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Elisabeth	  Young-­‐Bruehl’s	  biography	  of	  Arendt,	  For	  Love	  of	  the	  World	  (1982),	  
further	  exposed	  the	  importance	  of	  Arendt’s	  Jewish	  heritage	  and	  provided	  the	  first	  real	  
glimpse	  into	  the	  life	  of	  an	  entirely	  private	  person.9	  	  The	  intellectual	  biography	  details	  the	  
private	  life	  of	  Arendt	  from	  the	  time	  she	  was	  a	  child	  in	  Konigsberg,	  through	  the	  trials	  of	  
World	  War	  II	  and	  up	  to	  her	  death	  in	  1975.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Young-­‐Bruehl	  also	  provides	  
an	  account	  of	  the	  intellectual	  development	  of	  Arendt,	  including	  the	  major	  European	  
influences	  mentioned	  previously.	  	  This	  work	  is	  essential	  to	  understanding	  Arendt	  as	  it	  
provides	  a	  thorough	  account	  of	  her	  experiences,	  noting	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Arendt’s	  
Jewishness	  determined	  many	  of	  the	  critical	  moments	  in	  her	  life.	  	  	  
Between	  the	  biographical	  sketch	  provided	  by	  Young-­‐Bruehl	  and	  the	  writings	  
collected	  by	  Feldman,	  an	  entirely	  new	  dimension	  of	  Arendt’s	  life	  and	  thought	  was	  made	  
public.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  Arendt	  was	  greatly	  influenced	  by	  her	  Jewish	  heritage	  and	  
experiences	  then	  became	  a	  valid,	  but	  still	  not	  prevalent,	  topic	  of	  scholarly	  research	  and	  
debate.	  	  In	  1990,	  Dagmar	  Barnouw	  wrote	  a	  treatise	  that	  approached	  Arendt	  from	  an	  
experiential	  point	  of	  view,	  in	  which	  her	  political	  thoughts	  were	  considered	  as	  a	  response	  
to	  her	  German-­‐Jewish	  experience.10	  	  	  Barnouw’s	  study	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  
important	  insights	  and	  publications	  of	  both	  Young-­‐Breuhl	  and	  Feldman.	  	  Furthering	  the	  
scholarship	  on	  this	  topic,	  in	  1996,	  Richard	  Bernstein	  published	  Hannah	  Arendt	  and	  the	  
Jewish	  Question,	  a	  work	  that	  illustrates	  how	  the	  Jewish	  question	  was	  central	  to	  all	  of	  
Arendt’s	  intellectual	  endeavors.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Young-­‐Bruehl,	  For	  Love	  of	  the	  World.	  
10	  Dagmar	  Barnouw,	  Visible	  Spaces:	  	  Hannah	  Arendt	  and	  the	  German-­‐Jewish	  Experience	  (Baltimore:	  	  Johns	  
Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1990).	  
	   5	  
Ron	  Feldman	  and	  Jerome	  Kohn	  further	  expanded	  the	  corpus	  of	  Arendt’s	  
published	  work	  in	  2007	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  The	  Jewish	  Writings,	  a	  collection	  of	  all	  of	  
Arendt’s	  Jewish	  writings	  from	  the	  1930s	  through	  the	  1960s.	  	  Through	  the	  various	  
newspaper	  articles,	  essays,	  and	  letters,	  one	  has	  the	  opportunity	  to	  witness	  the	  evolution	  
of	  Arendt’s	  intellectual	  concerns	  over	  a	  period	  of	  four	  decades.	  	  While	  the	  writings	  do	  
deal	  with	  political	  issues	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  present	  the	  nascent	  stages	  of	  later	  political	  
theory,	  they	  “are	  less	  exemplifications	  of	  Arendt’s	  political	  ideas	  than	  the	  experiential	  
ground	  from	  which	  those	  ideas	  grew	  and	  developed.”11	  	  The	  writings	  tell	  of	  Arendt’s	  
Jewish	  experiences,	  from	  her	  Jewish	  perspective,	  from	  which	  she	  will	  eventually	  
articulate	  the	  very	  simple	  foundation	  for	  all	  of	  her	  political	  theory:	  	  “The	  meaning	  of	  
politics	  is	  freedom.”12	  	  
The	  publication	  of	  The	  Jewish	  Writings	  prompted	  a	  deeper	  investigation	  of	  
Arendt’s	  Jewishness,	  with	  even	  more	  scholars	  taking	  note	  of	  how	  this	  aspect	  of	  Arendt’s	  
identity	  significantly	  impacted	  the	  development	  of	  her	  political	  thought.13	  These	  
scholars	  echo	  earlier	  commentaries	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  Arendt’s	  Jewishness;	  
overwhelmingly,	  they	  agree	  with	  Jerome	  Kohn	  that	  Arendt’s	  “political	  thought	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  xxviii.	  	  
12	  Arendt,	  Hannah,	  The	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  John	  Kohn,	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Schoken	  Books,	  2005),	  108.	  	  What	  
“freedom”	  means	  for	  Arendt	  will	  be	  further	  expounded	  in	  the	  first	  substantive	  chapter	  of	  the	  dissertation.	  
13	  See	  the	  following	  essays,	  all	  printed	  in	  Thinking	  in	  Dark	  Times:	  	  Hannah	  Arendt	  on	  Ethics	  and	  Politics,	  
edited	  by	  Roger	  Berkowitz,	  et	  al.	  (New	  York:	  	  Fordham	  University	  Press,	  2010):	  	  Jerome	  Kohn,	  “Hannah	  
Arendt’s	  Jewish	  Experience:	  	  Thinking,	  Acting,	  Judging”	  (179-­‐194);	  Ron	  H.	  Feldman,	  “The	  Pariah	  as	  Rebel:	  	  
Hannah	  Arendt’s	  Jewish	  Writings”	  (197-­‐205);	  Elisabeth	  Young-­‐Bruehl,	  “Hannah	  Arendt’s	  Jewish	  Identity”	  
(207-­‐210);	  Suzanne	  Vromen,	  “Jewish	  to	  the	  Core”	  (213-­‐217).	  	  Earlier	  works	  also	  acknowledge	  the	  
importance	  of	  Aredt’s	  Jewishness,	  including,	  Margaret	  Canovan,	  Hannah	  Arendt:	  	  A	  Reinterpretation	  of	  
Her	  Political	  Thought	  (New	  York:	  	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1992).	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general	  is	  anchored	  in	  her	  experience	  as	  a	  Jew.”	  	  The	  new	  material,	  however,	  afforded	  
the	  opportunity	  for	  new	  insights	  to	  be	  made,	  including	  the	  general	  consensus	  that	  the	  
“power	  of	  her	  political	  thought	  can	  be	  fully	  grasped	  if	  and	  only	  if	  her	  ideas	  strike	  chords	  
and	  resonate	  in	  the	  experiences	  of	  others,	  however	  different	  they	  may	  be	  from	  hers.”14	  	  
Further,	  Feldman	  notes,	  while	  Arendt	  writes	  about	  Jewish	  politics	  and	  concerns	  over	  a	  
forty-­‐year	  period,	  “this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  should	  categorize	  .	  .	  .	  her	  work	  as	  a	  
whole	  as	  a	  ‘Jewish’	  political	  theory.”15	  	  All	  of	  these	  scholars,	  then,	  posit	  the	  importance	  
of	  the	  Arendt’s	  Jewish	  experiences.	  	  I	  agree	  with	  these	  scholars;	  however,	  I	  will	  argue	  
that	  Arendt’s	  Jewishness	  also	  emerges	  in	  the	  content	  of	  her	  theory,	  often	  in	  subtle,	  yet	  
significant	  ways.	  	  Therefore,	  while	  it	  might	  be	  inaccurate	  to	  categorize	  Arendt	  as	  a	  
political	  theorist	  in	  the	  Jewish	  tradition,	  we	  would	  also	  be	  remiss	  if	  we	  did	  not	  recognize	  
the	  ways	  in	  which	  ideas	  and	  concepts	  central	  to	  the	  Jewish	  tradition	  manifest	  in	  her	  
political	  thought.	  	  
This	  dissertation	  is	  built	  on	  the	  premise	  that,	  as	  Benhabib	  has	  written	  so	  clearly:	  	  
“Any	  presentation	  of	  [Arendt’s]	  thought	  that	  does	  not	  emphasize	  the	  formative	  
experience	  of	  German	  philosophy	  as	  well	  as	  of	  Jewish	  politics	  would	  be	  grossly	  
inadequate	  .	  .	  .	  [they]	  are	  the	  dual	  sources	  of	  her	  philosophy.”16	  	  In	  investigating	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  Arendt's	  Jewishness	  and	  her	  political	  theory,	  it	  
became	  evident	  that	  her	  Jewishness	  does	  not	  merely	  serve	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  her	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Kohn,	  “Arendt’s	  Jewish	  Experience,”	  187.	  
15	  Feldman,	  “Pariah	  as	  Rebel,”	  205.	  
16	  Seyala	  Benhabib,	  The	  Reluctant	  Modernism	  of	  Hannah	  Arendt	  (Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  Inc.:	  	  
Lanham,	  Maryland,	  2000),	  47.	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entry	  into	  politics;	  rather,	  her	  Jewish	  experiences	  are	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  her	  political	  
formulations.	  	  Further,	  her	  Jewishness	  appears	  from	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  
Jasperian	  phenomenological	  approach,	  which	  penetrates	  particular	  experiences	  in	  order	  
to	  understand	  how	  human	  beings	  fulfill	  their	  human	  possibilities.	  	  Throughout	  Arendt’s	  
work,	  the	  narrative	  is	  often	  employed	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  understanding	  because	  it	  serves	  this	  
phenomenological	  goal.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  narrative	  is	  useful	  in	  discovering	  when	  and	  how	  
human	  potential	  is	  fulfilled.	  	  	  
A	  moderate	  amount	  of	  work	  has	  been	  done	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  Arendt	  and	  narrative;	  
however,	  Julia	  Kristeva’s	  Hannah	  Arendt:	  	  Life	  is	  a	  Narrative	  is	  the	  most	  extensive.17	  	  
Kristeva	  notes,	  “The	  missing	  link	  between	  Arendt’s	  early	  work	  and	  her	  celebrated	  
writings	  on	  totalitarianism	  may	  be	  found	  in	  her	  conception	  of	  human	  life	  as	  a	  political	  
action	  that	  is	  revealed	  to	  us	  through	  the	  language	  of	  a	  story.”18	  	  In	  this	  book,	  she	  
elucidates	  how	  Arendt	  uses	  narrative	  to	  connect	  her	  Jewish	  experiences	  and	  
philosophical	  insights.	  	  In	  essence,	  she	  finds	  that	  underlying	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory	  is	  
the	  assumption	  that	  if	  we	  want	  to	  ascribe	  meaning	  to	  life	  and	  our	  experiences,	  we	  must	  
first	  tell	  our	  stories.	  
In	  2013,	  the	  scholarship	  on	  Arendt	  was	  illuminated	  by	  the	  work	  of	  Ronald	  C.	  
Arnett,	  who	  approaches	  Arendt’s	  work	  from	  the	  field	  of	  communications	  and	  rhetoric.	  	  
In	  Communication	  Ethics	  in	  Dark	  Times:	  	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  Rhetoric	  of	  Warning	  and	  Hope,	  
Arnett	  offers	  an	  atypical	  analysis	  of	  Arendt	  that	  significantly	  contributes	  to	  the	  research	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Julia	  Kristeva,	  Hannah	  Arendt:	  	  Life	  is	  a	  Narrative	  (University	  of	  Toronto	  Press:	  	  Toronto,	  2001).	  Another	  
contribution	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  narrative	  is	  Seyala	  Benhabib’s	  The	  Reluctant	  Modernism	  of	  Hannah	  Arendt.	  
18	  Kristeva,	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  69.	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on	  narrative.	  	  A	  remarkably	  innovative	  work,	  Arnett	  “seeks	  to	  listen	  to	  a	  storyteller	  who	  
calls	  us	  out	  of	  darkness	  that	  is	  masked	  by	  the	  banality	  of	  artificial	  light.”	  	  He	  recognizes	  
that	  Arendt’s	  work	  was	  not	  analytical	  but	  “an	  existential	  intellectual	  journey	  that	  points	  
to	  an	  existential	  understanding.”	  	  He	  understands	  her	  existential	  approach	  to	  be	  the	  
telling	  of	  stories	  that	  are	  “metaphors	  of	  genuine	  darkness	  and	  genuine	  light,	  permitting	  
us	  to	  witness	  ‘holy	  sparks’	  of	  genuine	  hope.”	  	  Arnett	  also	  dedicates	  an	  entire	  chapter	  to	  
an	  analysis	  of	  The	  Jewish	  Writings,	  providing	  a	  succinct	  summary	  as	  well	  as	  a	  brief	  
analysis	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  essays	  in	  the	  collection.	  	  In	  these	  essays,	  he	  sees	  the	  
experiential	  background	  to	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory,	  much	  as	  other	  scholars	  do.	  	  He	  
adds,	  “Arendt	  worked	  within	  roots	  that	  had	  to	  meet	  the	  challenge	  of	  existence,	  not	  our	  
romantic	  demands.”	  	  He	  finds	  that	  there	  is	  no	  romanticizing	  about	  the	  past	  or	  the	  future	  
for	  Arendt,	  no	  purpose	  in	  postulating	  the	  romantic	  ideals	  of	  the	  perfect	  society.	  	  Rather,	  
there	  is	  benefit	  in	  seeking	  to	  understand	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  the	  present,	  and	  a	  useful	  
mode	  of	  understanding	  is	  to	  uncover	  the	  meaning	  of	  human-­‐ness	  that	  lies	  in	  the	  stories	  
of	  the	  past.	  	  According	  to	  Arnett,	  through	  Arendt’s	  use	  of	  narrative,	  we	  learn	  that,	  
“[p]eople	  live	  ultimately	  not	  by	  the	  signs	  of	  image	  makers	  but	  by	  stories	  that	  guide	  
when	  darkness	  attempts	  to	  crowd	  out	  all	  genuine	  light.”19	  	  	  
Rahel	  Varnhagen,	  written	  in	  1933;	  published	  in	  1957,	  is	  one	  of	  Arendt’s	  earliest	  
exercises	  in	  the	  use	  of	  narrative	  as	  a	  phenomenological	  method	  of	  understanding.	  	  She	  
did	  not	  wish	  to	  write	  a	  biography	  of	  Varnhagen,	  but	  rather,	  she	  sought	  to	  understand,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Ronald	  C.	  Arnett,	  Communication	  Ethics	  in	  Dark	  Times:	  	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  Rhetoric	  of	  Warning	  and	  Hope	  
(Carbondale:	  	  Southern	  Illinois	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  3,	  197-­‐219,	  218,	  219.	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through	  recounting	  particular	  stories,	  who	  Varnhagen	  was	  and	  what	  her	  life	  meant.	  	  
Arendt	  would	  continue	  to	  use	  narrative	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  understanding,	  recounting	  the	  
lives	  and	  stories	  of	  numerous	  individuals	  such	  as	  Henrich	  Heine,	  Bernard	  Lazare,	  Franz	  
Kafka,	  Martin	  Buber,	  and	  Chaim	  Weizmann.	  	  Perhaps	  her	  most	  well-­‐known	  exercise	  in	  
narrative	  is	  the	  collection	  of	  essays	  gathered	  under	  the	  title,	  Men	  in	  Dark	  Times.	  	  All	  of	  
Arendt’s	  narrative	  accounts	  are	  stories	  of	  what	  Arendt	  calls	  “conscious	  pariahs.”	  	  The	  
conscious	  pariah	  is	  the	  individual	  with	  “heart,	  humanity,	  humor,	  and	  disinterested	  
intelligence.”20	  	  By	  disinterested,	  she	  means	  that	  these	  individuals	  were	  driven	  by	  no	  
particular	  interest	  other	  than	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human.	  	  	  
In	  1962,	  Arendt	  wrote,	  	  
I	  have	  always	  believed	  that,	  no	  matter	  how	  abstract	  our	  
theories	  may	  sound	  or	  how	  consistent	  our	  arguments	  may	  
appear,	  there	  are	  incidents	  and	  stories	  behind	  them	  which,	  
at	  least	  for	  ourselves,	  contain	  as	  in	  a	  nutshell	  the	  full	  
meaning	  of	  whatever	  we	  have	  to	  say.21	  	  	  
	  
As	  Arendt	  develops	  her	  political	  thought,	  she	  draws	  from	  many	  personal	  incidents;	  
however,	  the	  Passover	  story	  is	  central	  to	  Jewish	  self-­‐understanding.	  	  The	  Passover	  story	  
is	  not	  simply	  a	  story	  of	  the	  liberation	  of	  an	  oppressed	  people.	  	  Rather,	  for	  Arendt,	  it	  is	  a	  
story	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human.	  	  As	  individuals	  recognized	  their	  freedom	  to	  act,	  
even	  within	  the	  bonds	  of	  slavery,	  they	  became	  a	  publicly	  appearing	  people	  with	  the	  
potential	  for	  justice.	  	  It	  holds,	  “in	  a	  nutshell,”	  the	  fullest	  expression	  of	  man	  as	  a	  publicly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  274.	  
21	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Essays	  and	  lectures-­‐-­‐-­‐"Action	  in	  the	  Pursuit	  of	  Happiness,"	  lecture,	  American	  Political	  
Science	  Association,	  New	  York,	  N.Y.-­‐-­‐-­‐1960,	  The	  Hannah	  Arendt	  Papers	  at	  the	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  (Series:	  
Speeches	  and	  Writings	  File,	  1923-­‐1975,	  n.d.),	  1.	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appearing	  being	  through	  action	  and	  freedom.	  	  This	  ancient	  story	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  Jewish	  
people;	  but,	  insofar	  as	  it	  reveals	  the	  possibilities	  of	  human	  potential,	  it	  is	  relevant	  for	  
understanding	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human	  in	  general.	  	  As	  such,	  throughout	  this	  
dissertation,	  the	  Passover	  story	  is	  used	  as	  a	  metaphorical	  framework	  for	  understanding	  
Arendt’s	  political	  theory.	  	  If	  the	  goals	  of	  narrative	  and	  phenomenology	  are	  the	  same,	  
then	  this	  quintessential	  narrative	  has	  significant	  revelatory	  value.	  	  I	  identify	  four	  
elements	  of	  the	  Passover	  story	  that	  become	  central	  to	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory:	  	  the	  
stirring	  of	  the	  mental	  activities	  (thinking,	  willing,	  and	  judging),	  a	  move	  to	  action,	  the	  
emergence	  of	  the	  space	  of	  appearance,	  and	  the	  manifestation	  of	  human	  freedom.	  	  
Further,	  within	  each	  of	  these	  elements	  specific	  connections	  to	  various	  Jewish	  traditions	  
emerge.	  	  Arendt	  had	  formative	  experiences	  with	  scholars,	  colleagues,	  and	  friends	  that	  
introduced	  her	  to	  concepts	  from	  Jewish	  mysticism,	  Rabbinic	  Judaism,	  and	  Reform	  
Judaism.	  	  As	  Arendt	  distances	  herself	  from	  the	  Western	  tradition	  these	  subtle	  influences	  
begin	  to	  appear,	  shedding	  new	  light	  on	  her	  political	  theory.	  	  	  
	   The	  task	  set	  before	  me	  is	  difficult	  for	  many	  reasons.	  	  First,	  Arendt	  speaks	  to	  
politics	  through	  the	  Greek	  and	  Western	  political	  traditions,	  which	  makes	  an	  assertion	  of	  
her	  Jewishness	  inherently	  difficult.	  	  Nonetheless,	  while	  it	  is	  true	  that	  she	  works	  from	  
within	  the	  Western	  political	  tradition,	  her	  project	  is	  largely	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	  that	  tradition,	  from	  Plato	  through	  Marx,	  failed	  to	  account	  for	  political	  action.	  	  In	  
her	  efforts	  to	  construct	  a	  political	  theory	  that	  incorporates	  the	  value	  of	  thinking	  and	  
acting,	  certain	  Jewish	  characteristics	  appear.	  	  Second,	  the	  Jewish	  aspects	  of	  her	  thought	  
are	  not	  explicitly	  stated,	  but	  they	  are	  subtly	  present.	  	  Thus,	  it	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  recognize	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the	  ways	  in	  which	  her	  key	  concepts	  of	  thinking,	  acting,	  and	  freedom	  can	  be	  situated	  in	  
the	  dialogue	  of	  the	  Western	  tradition.	  	  But,	  as	  she	  distinguishes	  herself	  from	  that	  
tradition,	  the	  Jewish	  origins	  of	  these	  ideas	  begin	  to	  appear.	  	  This	  dissertation	  seeks	  to	  
remember	  that	  Arendt	  thinks	  as	  a	  political	  theorist	  and	  as	  a	  Jew.	  	  Despite	  Arendt’s	  
distancing	  efforts,	  she	  is	  grappling	  with	  fundamental	  notions	  of	  the	  Western	  political	  
tradition.	  	  We	  shall	  see	  how,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  that	  distancing	  and	  grappling,	  the	  Jewish	  
aspects	  of	  her	  work	  often	  signify	  her	  unique	  contributions	  to	  that	  tradition.	  	  	  
Thus,	  the	  original	  aspect	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  the	  approach	  I	  will	  take	  whereby	  I	  
frame	  Arendt’s	  Jewish	  identity	  and	  experiential	  background	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  she	  herself	  
regards	  as	  critical,	  namely,	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind,	  action,	  appearance,	  and	  freedom,	  
with	  specific	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  elements	  can	  be	  understood	  through	  
the	  Passover	  story	  and	  other	  attendant	  and	  specifically	  Jewish	  concepts.	  	  Given	  the	  
importance	  of	  the	  Passover	  story,	  articulating	  Arendt’s	  theory	  of	  narrative	  is	  the	  task	  
that	  sets	  this	  project	  in	  motion	  and	  to	  which	  I	  now	  turn.	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CHAPTER	  I:	  
ARENT’S	  THEORY	  OF	  NARRATIVE	  
	  
Having	  no	  social	  position	  that	  would	  render	  an	  orientation	  self-­‐evident,	  
the	  only	  possibility	  for	  Rahel	  to	  encounter	  the	  world	  was	  in	  her	  own	  life.	  	  
That	  she	  relied	  on	  this	  life	  and	  its	  experiences	  was	  the	  precondition	  of	  
her	  eventual	  success	  in	  breaking	  through	  to	  reality.	  	  But	  hardly	  more	  than	  
the	  precondition.	  	  For	  in	  order	  to	  really	  enter	  an	  alien	  history,	  to	  live	  in	  a	  
foreign	  world,	  she	  had	  to	  be	  able	  to	  communicate	  herself	  and	  her	  
experiences.	  	  
~Hannah	  Arendt,	  “Original	  Assimilation”	  
	  
	   Hannah	  Arendt	  belongs	  to	  a	  part	  of	  modern	  Jewish	  history	  that	  is	  largely	  
forgotten	  by	  the	  Jewish	  tradition,	  a	  fate	  she	  herself	  speaks	  of	  in	  1943.	  	  In	  “We	  Refugees”	  
she	  writes,	  “Modern	  Jewish	  history,	  having	  started	  with	  court	  Jews	  and	  continuing	  with	  
Jewish	  millionaires	  and	  philanthropists,	  is	  apt	  to	  forget	  about	  this	  other	  thread	  of	  Jewish	  
tradition	  .	  .	  .	  the	  tradition	  of	  a	  minority	  of	  Jews	  who	  have	  not	  wanted	  to	  become	  
upstarts,	  who	  preferred	  the	  status	  of	  ‘conscious	  pariah.’”1	  	  Writing	  in	  a	  tone	  that	  is	  
somewhat	  disparaging	  and	  perhaps	  even	  farcical,	  she	  contends	  that	  the	  conscious	  
pariah	  has	  “all	  vaunted	  Jewish	  qualities—the	  ‘Jewish	  heart,’	  humanity,	  humor,	  
disinterested	  intelligence”	  and	  stands	  in	  contradistinction	  to	  the	  social	  parvenu,	  the	  
Jewish	  philanthropists,	  the	  millionaires,	  the	  “upstarts”	  who	  possess	  “all	  Jewish	  
shortcomings—tactlessness,	  political	  stupidity,	  inferiority	  complexes,	  and	  money-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  “We	  Refugees”	  in	  The	  Jewish	  Writings,	  eds.	  Jerome	  Kohn	  and	  Ron	  H.	  Feldman	  (New	  
York:	  Schocken	  Books,	  2007),	  274.	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grubbing.”2	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  pariahs	  do	  not	  “think	  it	  worthwhile	  to	  change	  their	  
humane	  attitude	  and	  their	  natural	  insight	  into	  reality.”3	  
	   Arendt’s	  conscious	  pariah	  is	  marked	  by	  four	  distinguishing	  elements:	  	  the	  
recognition	  of	  the	  individual	  as	  a	  being	  capable	  of	  action;	  the	  courage	  to	  will	  subjective	  
thoughts	  into	  objective	  actions;	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  disclosure	  in	  the	  public	  realm;	  and	  
an	  enduring	  resilience	  driven	  by	  a	  hope	  for	  freedom	  and	  justice.	  	  The	  pariahs	  begin	  with	  
“their	  own	  hearts	  and	  brains”	  as	  they	  seek	  to	  answer	  the	  question,	  “Who	  am	  I?”4	  	  In	  this	  
way,	  a	  pariah	  starts	  as	  an	  individual	  revolutionary,	  one	  who	  seeks	  to	  overthrow	  the	  
weak	  identity	  of	  the	  self,	  constructed	  in	  the	  mind,	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  identity	  grounded	  in	  
action,	  the	  only	  viable	  agent	  of	  disclosure.	  	  	  
	   Embracing	  the	  vaunted	  Jewish	  qualities	  and	  stepping	  into	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
conscious	  pariah,	  in	  1942,	  Arendt	  writes	  a	  biweekly	  column	  for	  Aufbau,	  a	  German	  
Jewish	  periodical	  published	  in	  New	  York.	  	  In	  these	  articles	  she	  presents	  the	  case	  that	  the	  
modern	  Jew	  has	  essentially	  died	  to	  the	  world.5	  	  She	  longs	  to	  see	  meaning	  brought	  back	  
to	  the	  life	  of	  the	  individual	  Jew	  and	  the	  longstanding	  history	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  once	  
again	  imbued	  with	  political	  significance.	  	  In	  her	  better-­‐known	  political	  writings,	  she	  
laments	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  public	  realm	  has	  grown	  lifeless	  due	  to	  the	  overwhelming	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Ibid.	  	  Seyla	  Benhabib	  summarizes	  the	  pariah-­‐parvenu	  distinction	  in	  The	  Reluctnat	  Modernism	  of	  Hannah	  
Arendt:	  	  “The	  pariah	  accepted	  the	  position	  of	  the	  outsider,	  and	  retained	  the	  otherness	  that	  bourgeoius	  
society	  continued	  to	  impose	  upon	  him	  or	  her,	  whereas	  the	  parvenu	  sought	  to	  overcome	  his	  or	  her	  
outsider	  status	  and	  otherness	  either	  by	  denying	  the	  difference	  altogether	  or	  by	  exaggerated	  identification	  
with	  the	  values	  and	  behavior	  of	  that	  ‘genteel	  Christian	  society’	  who	  recognition	  he	  or	  she	  sought”	  (37).	  	  	  
3	  Arendt,	  “We	  Refugees,”	  274.	  
4	  Ibid.	  
5	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  “The	  Jewish	  War	  That	  Isn’t	  Happening,”	  in	  The	  Jewish	  Writings,	  eds.	  Jerome	  Kohn	  and	  
Ron	  H.	  Feldman	  (New	  York:	  Schocken	  Books,	  2007),	  134-­‐185.	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emphasis	  on	  work	  and	  labor	  and	  the	  insufficient	  understanding	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  
political	  action.	  	  In	  both	  genres	  of	  her	  writings,	  she	  makes	  the	  same	  case	  for	  the	  
resuscitation	  of	  mankind	  through	  a	  newfound	  meaning	  in	  political	  existence.	  	  The	  source	  
of	  meaning	  and	  the	  mode	  of	  revival,	  both	  for	  the	  pariah	  and	  for	  the	  broader	  political	  
world,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  underlying	  theory	  of	  narrative	  present	  in	  Arendt’s	  political	  
theory.	  	  	  
In	  a	  lecture	  delivered	  in	  1960,	  Arendt	  said,	  “I	  have	  always	  believed	  that,	  no	  
matter	  how	  abstract	  our	  theories	  may	  sound	  or	  how	  consistent	  our	  arguments	  may	  
appear,	  there	  are	  incidents	  and	  stories	  behind	  them	  which,	  at	  least	  for	  us	  ourselves,	  
contain	  as	  in	  a	  nutshell	  the	  full	  meaning	  of	  whatever	  we	  have	  to	  say.”6	  	  If	  action	  is	  the	  
only	  mode	  of	  human	  disclosure,	  then	  the	  stories	  that	  recount	  particular	  actions	  
preserve	  that	  revelation,	  ensuring	  that	  the	  individual	  or	  collective	  will	  remain	  exposed,	  
viable,	  and	  distinct	  in	  the	  political	  realm.	  	  Because	  the	  narrative,	  like	  action	  itself,	  is	  
revelatory,	  it	  is	  a	  significant	  tool	  for	  understanding	  individual	  and	  collective	  identity	  alike.	  	  
While	  Arendt	  may	  draw	  from	  many	  personal	  incidents,	  the	  Passover	  story	  is	  the	  basic	  
narrative	  that	  underlies	  all	  of	  her	  works.	  	  It	  holds,	  “in	  a	  nutshell,”	  the	  fullest	  expression	  
of	  man	  as	  a	  publicly	  appearing	  being	  through	  action,	  which	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  individual	  
awareness	  of	  innate	  freedom.	  	  Thus,	  this	  chapter	  serves	  two	  purposes:	  	  first,	  to	  render	  
an	  account	  of	  Arendt’s	  theory	  of	  narrative;	  and,	  second,	  to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  the	  
Passover	  story	  by	  uncovering	  how	  Arendt	  understood	  it,	  how	  she	  experienced	  this	  
narrative	  in	  her	  own	  life,	  and	  how	  this	  experience	  manifests	  itself	  in	  her	  political	  theory.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Arendt,	  "Pursuit	  of	  Happiness,"	  1.	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Throughout	  this	  dissertation	  the	  tension	  between	  two	  modes	  of	  
conceptualization	  will	  continuously	  present	  itself.	  	  Arendt	  is	  averse	  to	  concrete	  
conceptualizations	  that	  seek	  to	  offer	  static	  definitions	  and	  favors	  a	  phenomenological	  
approach	  within	  which	  experience	  reveals	  understanding.	  	  Despite	  this,	  she	  often	  times	  
expounds	  greatly	  upon	  Greek	  concepts,	  definitions	  and	  ideas.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  
however,	  that	  these	  analyses	  are,	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  points	  of	  departure,	  ways	  in	  
which	  Arendt	  distinguishes	  herself	  from	  the	  Greek	  and	  Western	  traditions.	  	  Arendt	  is	  
phenomenological;	  she	  considers	  the	  world	  not	  to	  define	  it,	  but	  to	  understand	  it.	  	  She	  
recognizes	  that	  all	  experiences	  in	  the	  world	  are	  conditioned	  by	  the	  essential	  conditions	  
of	  time	  and	  space.	  	  Understanding	  what	  is	  manifesting	  in	  particular	  human	  experiences	  
requires	  perpetual	  consideration	  of	  the	  experiences	  themselves.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  the	  
narrative	  is	  a	  primary	  means	  for	  this	  type	  of	  consideration.	  	  This	  dissertation	  follows	  the	  
phenomenology	  of	  the	  Passover	  narrative.	  	  This	  chapter	  provides	  an	  account	  of	  the	  
value	  of	  narrative	  in	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory	  and	  concludes	  with	  an	  example	  of	  the	  
phenomenology	  of	  narrative	  as	  presented	  in	  Men	  in	  Dark	  Times.	  	  What	  a	  careful	  reading	  
of	  Arendt	  reveals	  is	  a	  conceptualization	  of	  narrative	  that	  is	  distinct,	  even	  while	  
remaining	  quite	  vague.	  	  It	  is	  this	  ill-­‐defined,	  somewhat	  amorphous	  concept	  of	  narrative	  
that	  is	  more	  concretely	  conceptualized	  here.	  	  While	  Arendt	  was	  opposed	  to	  such	  
concretizations,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  concept	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  provides	  the	  guidelines	  
within	  which	  a	  thing	  is	  identified.	  	  This	  is	  crucial	  because	  it	  will	  distinguish	  the	  narrative	  
from	  mundane	  stories	  as	  well	  as	  historical	  accounts.	  	  It	  will	  be	  shown	  that	  Arendt’s	  
concept	  of	  narrative	  is	  phenomenological	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  shares	  in	  the	  revelatory	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character	  of	  human	  experience.	  	  This	  way	  of	  conceptualizing	  narrative	  is	  not	  specific	  to	  
Arendt.	  	  Others,	  such	  as	  Stephen	  Crites,	  have	  employed	  phenomenological	  accounts	  of	  
narrative	  in	  explaining	  human	  phenomena.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  significant	  similarities	  in	  the	  
ways	  in	  which	  Crites	  and	  Arendt	  utilize	  narrative,	  Crites’	  more	  concretized	  account	  of	  
narrative	  will	  be	  instructive	  in	  formulating	  Arendt’s	  theory	  of	  narrative.	  
Arendt’s	  theory	  of	  narrative	  is	  not	  explicitly	  articulated	  in	  her	  works;	  however,	  
the	  use	  of	  narrative	  in	  her	  own	  writings	  and	  the	  cursory	  remarks	  she	  makes	  on	  the	  
power	  of	  narrative	  offer	  significant	  insight	  into	  the	  way	  in	  which	  she	  understood	  and	  
utilized	  this	  mode	  of	  expression.	  	  Further,	  the	  theory	  of	  narrative	  that	  will	  be	  expounded	  
hereafter	  is	  quite	  obviously	  drawn	  from	  her	  notion	  of	  the	  conscious	  pariah	  as	  described	  
in	  the	  introductory	  remarks.	  	  It	  is	  through	  her	  many	  narrative	  accounts	  of	  various	  
pariah-­‐types	  that	  one	  can	  see	  how	  Arendt	  casts	  the	  conscious	  pariah	  as	  the	  agent	  of	  the	  
authentic	  narrative.7	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  stories	  Arendt	  finds	  meaningful	  in	  terms	  of	  
human	  life	  all	  follow	  the	  conscious	  pariah.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  narrative	  is	  going	  to	  share	  the	  
same	  qualities	  already	  discussed	  regarding	  the	  pariah.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  relationship	  between	  
narrative	  and	  pariah	  will	  prove	  to	  be	  reciprocal,	  leaving	  one	  to	  question	  whether	  the	  
pariah	  type	  emerged	  from	  a	  latent	  understanding	  of	  narrative,	  or	  whether	  the	  
underlying	  theory	  of	  narrative	  is	  a	  byproduct	  of	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  pariah	  types.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  For	  example:	  “Soren	  Kierkegaard,”	  1932;	  “Friedrich	  von	  Gentz,”	  1932;	  “A	  Guide	  for	  Youth:	  	  Martin	  Buber,”	  
1935;	  “Dilthey	  as	  Philosopher	  and	  Historian,”	  1945;	  “Heidegger	  the	  Fox,”	  1953;	  Men	  in	  Dark	  Times,	  1955;	  
Rahel	  Varnhagen,	  1957.	  Also	  part	  of	  narrative	  expression	  are	  the	  correspondences	  that	  Arendt	  
meticulously	  maintained,	  no	  doubt	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  value	  that	  these	  documents	  bring	  to	  her	  story.	  	  
Amongst	  the	  published	  collections	  are	  the	  correspondences	  between	  Arendt	  and	  her	  husband,	  Heinrich	  
Blucher,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  very	  lengthy	  collection	  of	  letters	  between	  Arendt	  and	  her	  teacher,	  Karl	  Jaspers.	  
(Interestingly,	  the	  correspondence	  between	  Arendt	  and	  Jaspers	  is	  the	  most	  voluminous,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  
the	  fact	  that	  both	  thinkers	  had	  an	  affection	  for	  the	  phenomenological	  and	  saw	  experience	  as	  the	  primary	  
mode	  of	  understanding.)	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In	  providing	  an	  account	  of	  Arendt’s	  theory	  of	  narrative,	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  begin	  
by	  stating	  what	  is	  intended	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “narrative.”	  	  For	  Arendt,	  the	  notion	  of	  
narrative	  refers	  only	  to	  stories	  that	  meet	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  criteria.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  
authentic	  narrative	  will	  disclose	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  agent,	  have	  a	  “living	  meaning”	  that	  
awakens	  the	  will	  of	  the	  agent,	  quickens	  the	  agent	  to	  action,	  and	  manifests	  a	  universal	  
opening	  to	  inquiry	  about	  freedom	  and	  justice.	  	  This	  is	  a	  fairly	  demanding	  set	  of	  criteria,	  
which	  deliberately	  filters	  out	  those	  stories	  that	  are	  historical,	  diminutive,	  or	  destructive,	  
leaving	  them	  to	  be	  stories	  that	  are	  something	  other	  than	  narrative.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  
narrative	  of	  German	  National	  Socialism	  would	  not	  meet	  these	  requirements.	  	  The	  story	  
created	  by	  Hitler	  and	  the	  Nazi	  regime	  leads	  to	  the	  un-­‐concealment	  of	  a	  political	  world	  
that	  does	  not	  invite	  inquiry	  about	  freedom	  and	  justice,	  but	  categorically	  defines	  in	  
absolute	  terms	  what	  the	  world	  ought	  to	  look	  like.	  	  This	  story,	  like	  any	  story	  that	  posits	  
absolute	  truths,	  limits	  the	  will	  to	  what	  has	  been	  prescribed,	  effectively	  stripping	  it	  of	  its	  
inherent	  freedom.	  	  Without	  the	  freedom	  to	  choose	  one’s	  position	  in	  the	  world,	  the	  
disclosure	  of	  the	  agent	  is	  also	  impossible.	  	  	  
With	  this	  definition	  in	  place,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  note	  how	  this	  conception	  of	  narrative	  
relates	  to	  other	  important	  terms	  that	  will	  appear	  throughout	  this	  dissertation,	  
specifically,	  tradition,	  myth	  and	  history.	  	  Tradition	  is	  often	  built	  out	  of	  narrative	  and	  is	  
the	  “cumulative	  construction	  of	  belief	  and	  practice	  that	  actualizes	  the	  founding	  
revelation	  for	  the	  ongoing	  community.”8	  	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  founding	  revelation	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Micahel	  Fishbane,	  “Law,	  Story,	  and	  Interpretation:	  	  Reading	  Rabbinic	  Texts,”	  in	  The	  Jewish	  Political	  
Tradition,	  Volume	  1:	  Authority,	  ed.	  Michael	  Walzer	  et	  al.	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  xxxix.	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behavior	  of	  the	  community	  is	  the	  content	  of	  the	  narrative;	  thus,	  tradition	  is	  that	  which	  
keeps	  the	  narrative	  alive	  and	  present.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Passover	  narrative,	  for	  example,	  
the	  tradition	  of	  the	  Seder	  meal	  is	  meant	  to	  actualize	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  story	  itself,	  
which,	  for	  Arendt	  is	  the	  recognition	  that	  as	  human	  beings	  we	  are	  free.	  	  A	  myth	  is	  an	  
“imaginative	  fiction”	  created	  to	  reveal	  “what	  [is]	  thought	  to	  be	  timeless	  and	  constant	  in	  
our	  existence.”9	  	  To	  refer	  to	  the	  Passover	  narrative	  again,	  it	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  
myth	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  has	  this	  revelatory	  quality	  and	  is	  ultimately	  concerned	  with	  
meaning.	  	  Insofar	  as	  myth	  can	  have	  a	  “profound	  effect	  upon	  our	  experience	  and	  
behavior”	  it	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  Arendt’s	  notion	  of	  authentic	  narrative.	  	  Finally,	  while	  there	  
is	  certainly	  a	  connection	  between	  narrative	  and	  history,	  the	  function	  of	  authentic	  
narrative	  is	  not	  mere	  historical	  account,	  a	  characteristic	  that	  will	  be	  expounded	  further	  
in	  the	  discussion	  on	  “living	  meaning.”	  	  
In	  seeking	  to	  construct	  Arendt’s	  theory	  of	  narrative,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  turn	  to	  
Stephen	  Crites,	  who	  provides	  a	  theory	  of	  narrative	  that	  is	  also	  phenomenological.	  	  
Arendt’s	  notion	  of	  authentic	  narrative	  is	  comparable	  to	  what	  Stephen	  Crites	  calls	  
“sacred”	  narrative.10	  	  Arendt	  would	  not	  use	  this	  term,	  due	  to	  the	  implicit	  religious	  
connotation	  of	  the	  term	  “sacred.”	  	  In	  “The	  Narrative	  Quality	  of	  Experience,”	  Crites	  
makes	  the	  argument	  that	  “the	  formal	  quality	  of	  experience	  through	  time	  is	  inherently	  
narrative.”	  	  In	  this	  essay,	  Crites	  refers	  to	  narrative	  as	  one	  of	  the	  “persistent	  forms	  of	  
cultural	  expression.”	  	  The	  persistence	  of	  the	  narrative	  lies	  in	  “the	  fact	  that	  people	  speak”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Karen	  Armstrong,	  The	  Battle	  for	  God:	  A	  History	  of	  Fundamentalism	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  2000),	  xv.	  
10	  The	  discovery	  of	  the	  term	  is	  found	  in	  Stephen	  Crites,	  “The	  Narrative	  Quality	  of	  Experience,”	  Journal	  of	  
the	  American	  Academy	  of	  Religion	  39	  (1971):	  291-­‐311.	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and	  this	  speaking	  is	  “a	  necessary	  mark	  of	  being	  human.”	  	  Narrative	  is,	  for	  Crites,	  a	  
condition	  of	  human	  existence.	  	  That	  is,	  all	  human	  existence	  is	  in	  time	  and	  is	  known	  only	  
through	  action.	  	  Action,	  the	  content	  of	  narrative,	  includes	  “every	  gesture,	  every	  footstep,	  
every	  utterance”	  and	  narrative	  “gives	  it	  a	  purified	  expression.”	  	  For	  Crites,	  narrative	  is	  
not	  artifice,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  fabrication.	  	  Importantly,	  however,	  there	  are	  
fundamental	  qualities	  to	  stories	  that	  differentiate	  them	  from	  one	  another.	  	  Crites	  finds	  
that	  stories	  function	  in	  one	  of	  two	  ways	  and	  are	  therefore	  either	  “sacred”	  or	  “mundane.”	  	  
The	  sacred,	  not	  named	  so	  because	  of	  any	  religious	  or	  spiritual	  significance,	  are	  those	  
stories	  that	  “cannot	  be	  fully	  and	  directly	  told,	  because	  they	  live,	  so	  to	  speak,	  in	  the	  arms	  
and	  legs	  and	  bellies	  of	  the	  celebrant	  .	  .	  .	  they	  form	  consciousness	  rather	  than	  being	  
among	  the	  objects	  of	  which	  it	  is	  directly	  aware.”11	  	  
Crites	  also	  asserts	  that	  sacred	  narratives	  are	  mythopoeic	  stories	  wherein	  “men’s	  
sense	  of	  self	  and	  world	  is	  created.”	  	  A	  mundane	  story,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  does	  not	  have	  
this	  revelatory,	  evocative	  nature;	  rather,	  it	  is	  more	  acutely	  located	  in	  a	  particular	  time	  
and	  place.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  mundane	  stories	  are	  temporally	  bound	  to	  the	  particular	  
circumstances.	  	  Sacred	  stories,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  not	  bound	  by	  temporal	  
constraints	  and	  have	  a	  universal	  applicability	  in	  what	  they	  allow	  the	  reader/teller	  to	  
access.	  	  Mundane	  stories	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  teller,	  who	  is	  also	  part	  of	  
the	  story	  itself.	  	  Sacred	  stories	  may	  change,	  but	  do	  so	  through	  time	  in	  an	  evolutionary	  
manner	  that	  reflects	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  collective	  itself.	  	  Thus,	  “People	  do	  not	  sit	  down	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Ibid.,	  291,	  293,	  295.	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on	  a	  cool	  afternoon	  and	  think	  themselves	  up	  a	  sacred	  story.	  	  They	  awaken	  to	  a	  sacred	  
story.”12	  
Arendt’s	  narrative	  is	  an	  awakening	  as	  well,	  which	  is	  evidenced	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  
the	  conscious	  pariah.	  	  It	  is	  that	  awakening/sacred	  narrative,	  or	  as	  I	  have	  earlier	  called	  it	  
“authentic	  narrative,”	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  conscious	  pariah	  that	  will	  be	  
expounded	  hereafter.	  	  The	  following	  subsections	  individually	  address	  each	  of	  the	  
qualities	  of	  narrative.	  	  There	  will	  be	  obvious	  overlap	  as	  the	  elements	  exist	  coevally	  and	  
with	  no	  logical	  linear	  or	  sequential	  character.	  	  The	  disclosure	  of	  the	  agent	  will	  be	  
discussed	  first,	  although,	  it	  could	  very	  well	  have	  been	  discussed	  last,	  as	  the	  general	  
purpose	  of	  narrative	  is	  to	  disclose	  knowledge	  of	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  self.	  	  It	  is	  a	  useful	  
starting	  point,	  however,	  as	  this	  characteristic	  holds,	  in	  a	  nutshell,	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  
theory	  of	  narrative	  and	  leads	  directly	  to	  the	  space	  of	  politics.	  	  
For	  Arendt,	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  the	  authentic	  narrative	  is	  to	  generate	  an	  
understanding	  of	  one’s	  self	  that	  will	  motivate	  further	  disclosure.	  	  What	  is	  revealed	  is	  not	  
only	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  story,	  but,	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  re-­‐teller	  
of	  the	  story.	  	  It	  is	  as	  if	  in	  telling	  a	  story,	  by	  engaging	  the	  experiences	  of	  another,	  one	  
receives	  the	  benefit	  of	  participation—knowledge	  of	  self.	  	  Thus,	  Arendt’s	  moments	  of	  
narrative	  exploration,	  as	  much	  as	  they	  are	  stories	  about	  other	  pariahs,	  are	  also	  Arendt’s	  
stories	  about	  herself:	  	  these	  stories	  tell	  us	  how	  she	  understood	  herself	  and	  human	  being	  
in	  general.	  	  If	  the	  narrative	  is	  revelatory,	  then	  a	  keen	  reader	  must	  look	  at	  Arendt’s	  
stories	  to	  see	  what	  it	  is	  she	  is	  disclosing	  about	  herself.	  	  Further,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Arendt	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Ibid.,	  295,	  296.	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describes	  the	  Passover	  story	  and	  the	  function	  of	  this	  narrative	  in	  the	  collective	  identity	  
of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  is	  significant.	  	  Because	  narrative	  is	  revelatory,	  it	  opens	  up	  the	  world	  
of	  action,	  which	  is	  implicitly	  political.	  	  The	  Passover	  story,	  because	  it	  teaches	  the	  
difference	  between	  freedom	  and	  slavery,	  disclosed	  to	  Arendt	  a	  political	  philosophy.	  	  
This	  is	  why	  this	  story	  can	  rightly	  be	  used	  as	  the	  centerpiece	  for	  understanding	  Arendt’s	  
political	  theory.	  	  It	  is	  the	  story	  that	  discloses	  to	  the	  reader	  of	  Arendt	  the	  fundament	  of	  
her	  political	  theory.	  	  
While	  the	  narrative	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  foster	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  individuals	  who	  
participate	  in	  it,	  it	  also	  evokes	  powerful	  communal	  associations.	  	  It	  provides	  a	  sense	  of	  
continuity	  in	  collective	  identity,	  which	  allows	  individuals	  to	  locate	  themselves	  in	  time	  
and	  space.	  	  As	  one	  identifies	  with	  the	  stories	  of	  one’s	  past,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  move	  
forward	  by	  acting	  as	  a	  character	  in	  that	  narrative.	  	  The	  problem	  in	  modernity	  is	  that	  
narrative	  is	  being	  isolated,	  trapped,	  in	  an	  historical	  moment,	  of	  a	  time	  gone	  by,	  making	  
it	  appear	  distant	  and	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  meaning	  and	  purpose	  of	  individual	  or	  communal	  
life.	  	  According	  to	  Arendt,	  this	  results	  in	  telling	  stories	  about	  the	  Jewish	  people	  as	  
opposed	  to	  participating	  in	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people.13	  	  The	  knowledge	  that	  was	  
disclosed	  in	  the	  action	  of	  the	  story	  is	  then	  re-­‐concealed	  and	  confined	  to	  a	  past	  that	  can	  
only	  account	  for	  what	  was.	  	  With	  this	  veil	  in	  place,	  the	  story	  is	  no	  longer	  capable	  of	  
disclosing	  the	  identity	  of	  who	  the	  agents	  are;	  that	  can	  emerge	  only	  in	  action	  and	  speech.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  This	  is	  explained	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  section	  that	  discusses	  the	  “living	  meaning.”	  	  Simply	  stated,	  
Arendt	  criticizes	  the	  way	  the	  reform	  Rabbis	  transformed	  Judaism,	  claiming	  they	  removed	  the	  life	  from	  the	  
tradition	  and	  made	  it	  an	  historical	  account.	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In	  essence,	  the	  once	  powerful	  content	  of	  narrative	  has	  faded	  into	  distant	  memory	  and	  
has	  become	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  dim	  recollection	  of	  a	  past	  far	  gone.	  	  	  
The	  capacity	  for	  disclosure,	  then,	  is	  largely	  dependent	  upon	  participation	  in	  the	  
narrative	  as	  an	  act	  of	  re-­‐membrance	  and	  re-­‐collection.	  	  The	  narrative	  allows	  one	  to	  
connect	  to	  the	  past	  through	  memory	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  propelling	  oneself	  into	  the	  
future	  through	  present	  action.	  	  By	  participating	  in	  the	  narrative,	  the	  individual	  is	  able	  to	  
engage	  with	  the	  revealed	  entities	  of	  the	  story.	  	  This	  participation	  is	  also	  self-­‐revealing	  as	  
it	  helps	  individual	  human	  beings	  to	  understand	  themselves	  as	  well	  as	  the	  conditions	  of	  
the	  world	  in	  which	  they	  live.	  	  This	  understanding	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  actualization	  of	  the	  
individual’s	  un-­‐concealment.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  then,	  the	  narrative	  is	  a	  mimetic	  catalyst	  for	  
the	  disclosure	  of	  human	  being.	  	  Mythos	  allows	  human	  beings	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  great	  
power	  of	  the	  collective	  memory,	  where	  the	  power	  lies	  in	  what	  it	  bequeaths	  to	  us,	  the	  
heirs.	  Through	  remembrance	  men	  are	  bound	  together	  by	  self-­‐identification.	  	  In	  order	  for	  
the	  myth	  to	  maintain	  its	  value,	  for	  tradition	  to	  be	  more	  than	  acts	  but	  meaningful	  rituals,	  
the	  story	  must	  be	  told	  to	  an	  audience	  who	  will,	  eventually,	  become	  the	  disseminators	  of	  
the	  story.	  	  The	  power	  of	  the	  myth	  lies	  in	  the	  memory	  of	  the	  people	  and	  the	  re-­‐collection	  
that	  passes	  it	  on	  through	  history.	  	  	  
In	  her	  essay	  “The	  Gap	  between	  Past	  and	  Future,”	  Arendt	  writes,	  
Without	  testament	  or,	  to	  resolve	  the	  metaphor,	  without	  
tradition—which	  selects	  and	  names,	  which	  hands	  down	  
and	  preserves,	  which	  indicates	  where	  the	  treasures	  are	  
and	  what	  their	  worth	  is—there	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  willed	  
continuity	  in	  time	  and	  hence,	  humanly	  speaking,	  neither	  
	   23	  
past	  nor	  future,	  only	  sempiternal	  change	  of	  the	  world	  and	  
the	  biological	  cycle	  of	  living	  creatures	  in	  it.14	  	  	  
	  
Published	  in	  1954,	  her	  stance	  on	  tradition	  is	  clearly	  presented	  in	  this	  essay	  and	  in	  the	  
collection	  of	  essays	  it	  prefaces.	  	  This	  mature	  articulation	  is	  foreshadowed	  in	  her	  earlier	  
writings	  wherein	  she	  points	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  tradition,	  and	  even	  specifically	  the	  
myth	  of	  the	  Passover	  story.	  	  In	  “What	  is	  Authority,”	  published	  in	  1954,	  she	  further	  
articulates	  this	  the	  following	  way:	  	  	  
With	  the	  loss	  of	  tradition	  we	  have	  lost	  the	  thread	  which	  
safely	  guided	  us	  through	  the	  vast	  realms	  of	  the	  past,	  but	  
this	  thread	  was	  also	  the	  chain	  fettering	  each	  successive	  
generation	  to	  a	  predetermined	  aspect	  of	  the	  past…We	  are	  
in	  danger	  of	  forgetting,	  and	  such	  an	  oblivion—quite	  apart	  
from	  the	  contents	  themselves	  that	  could	  be	  lost—would	  
mean	  that,	  humanly	  speaking,	  we	  would	  deprive	  ourselves	  
of	  one	  dimension,	  the	  dimension	  of	  depth	  in	  human	  
existence.	  	  For	  memory	  and	  depth	  are	  the	  same,	  or	  rather	  
depth	  cannot	  be	  reached	  by	  man	  except	  through	  
remembrance.15	  
	  
From	  all	  of	  this	  we	  get	  the	  notion	  that	  for	  Arendt	  authentic	  human	  life	  is	  the	  continuity	  
of	  the	  past	  in	  the	  present	  moment	  leading	  to	  an	  uncertain	  future.	  	  This	  means	  that	  
remembrance,	  or	  memory,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  myth,	  is	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  human	  life.	  	  
In	  remembering,	  one	  removes	  the	  veil,	  the	  concealing	  agent.	  	  The	  power	  of	  narrative	  is	  
that	  it	  nurtures	  and	  maintains	  the	  revelation,	  it	  keeps	  the	  space	  of	  the	  community	  and	  
the	  possibility	  of	  action	  open	  to	  further	  participation.	  	  With	  further	  action	  will	  come	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Between	  Past	  and	  Future	  (New	  York:	  The	  Penguin	  Group,	  1954),	  5.	  	  This	  passage	  also	  
seems	  to	  be	  responsive	  to	  Nietzsche’s	  concept	  of	  Eternal	  Recurrence.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  the	  myth	  tells	  the	  story	  
of	  is	  the	  rectilinear	  moment	  that	  breaks	  into	  the	  cyclical	  pattern	  of	  nature	  but	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  creates	  a	  
continuity	  of	  human	  activity.	  	  Further,	  the	  indeterminate	  nature	  of	  human	  activity	  does	  not	  negate	  cause	  
and	  effect	  but	  highlights	  both	  the	  limits	  of	  human	  knowledge	  and	  the	  necessity	  for	  continuity,	  ie.,	  the	  
myth.	  	  	  
15	  Ibid.,	  94.	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further	  disclosure.	  	  The	  process	  itself	  is	  recursive:	  	  but,	  one	  does	  not	  participate	  in	  the	  
tradition	  to	  go	  to	  the	  past,	  but	  to	  maintain	  the	  space	  of	  the	  present	  that	  moves	  forward	  
only	  through	  continued	  action.	  	  There	  must	  be	  this	  “willed	  continuity”	  that	  comes	  from	  
tradition,	  which	  is	  known	  through	  the	  narrative,	  the	  story	  that	  maintains	  the	  presence	  
of	  the	  tradition.	  	  Without	  it,	  there	  may	  be	  an	  historical	  account	  of	  an	  ancient	  people,	  but	  
with	  the	  loss	  of	  continuity	  there	  is	  loss	  of	  life.	  
Deeply	  affected	  by	  the	  loss	  of	  life	  that	  defined	  the	  atrocities	  of	  the	  twentieth	  
century,	  Arendt	  rails	  against	  the	  veils	  of	  modernity.	  	  She,	  like	  the	  pariahs	  she	  writes	  
about,	  is	  aware	  of	  and	  awakened	  to	  the	  veils	  that	  conceal	  that	  which	  has	  appeared	  in	  
the	  past.	  	  Her	  project	  of	  understanding	  is	  a	  task	  of	  revival:	  	  the	  veils	  must	  be	  lifted	  for	  
human	  being	  to	  emerge	  full	  of	  life	  once	  again.	  	  The	  notion	  of	  storytelling,	  and	  the	  
process	  of	  un-­‐concealment	  that	  occurs	  in	  narrative,	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Arendt’s	  
biographical	  work,	  Rahel	  Varnhagen.16	  	  The	  epigraph	  to	  the	  text,	  a	  poem	  by	  Edwin	  
Arlington	  Robinson,	  an	  American	  Pulitzer	  Prize	  winning	  poet,	  begins:	  
We	  tell	  you,	  tapping	  our	  brow,	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  story	  as	  it	  should	  be,—	  
As	  if	  the	  story	  of	  a	  house	  
	  	  	  	  	  Were	  told	  or	  ever	  could	  be;	  
We’ll	  have	  no	  kindly	  veil	  between	  
	  	  	  	  	  Her	  visions	  and	  those	  we	  have	  seen,—	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  The	  un-­‐concealment	  in	  Arendt’s	  theory	  of	  narrative	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  analogous	  to	  the	  Heidegerrian	  
notion	  of	  the	  concealment	  and	  un-­‐concealment	  of	  Being.	  	  For	  Heidegger,	  the	  Truth	  of	  Being	  and	  the	  
Meaning	  of	  Being	  are	  the	  same.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  truth	  and	  meaning	  are	  wholly	  different	  and	  pursued	  by	  
different	  mental	  faculties.	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  along	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  Arendt	  does	  not	  admit	  to	  any	  notion	  
of	  Truth,	  the	  un-­‐concealment	  here	  cannot	  be	  confused	  with	  Heidegger’s	  concept.	  	  That	  being	  said,	  the	  
simple	  fact	  that	  un-­‐concealment	  is	  necessary	  for	  human	  actualization	  certainly	  prompts	  one	  to	  consider	  a	  
Heidegerrian	  influence.	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As	  if	  we	  guessed	  what	  hers	  have	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  Or	  what	  they	  are	  or	  would	  be.17	  	  
Working	  from	  within	  her	  own	  experiences,	  one	  veil	  of	  concealment	  that	  troubles	  Arendt	  
is	  that	  which	  covers	  the	  Passover	  story.	  	  While	  the	  reform	  movement	  was	  successful	  in	  
changing	  various	  aspects	  of	  Judaism,	  Arendt	  contends	  that,	  detrimentally,	  it	  turned	  the	  
Passover	  tradition	  into	  an	  historical	  account	  that	  speaks	  about	  the	  Jewish	  identity	  
without	  drawing	  one	  into	  participatory	  membership	  in	  the	  community.	  	  She	  writes,	  
“This	  ‘reform,’	  which	  ruthlessly	  and	  nonchalantly	  removed	  all	  national,	  all	  political	  
meaning	  from	  the	  tradition,	  did	  not	  reform	  that	  tradition…it	  merely	  robbed	  it	  of	  its	  living	  
meaning.”	  	  ⁠Thus,	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  political	  meaning,	  the	  foundational	  myth	  became	  
“dead	  and	  mute	  to	  no	  one	  more	  than	  the	  very	  people	  who	  once	  wrote	  it.”18	  	  	  
Julia	  Kristeva,	  in	  Hannah	  Arendt:	  	  Life	  is	  a	  Narrative,	  notes	  that	  Arendt’s	  concern	  
with	  the	  narrative	  is	  the	  quality	  of	  experience	  it	  provides.	  	  Indeed,	  while	  the	  Jewish	  
historical	  account	  of	  the	  Passover	  story	  has	  been	  preserved,	  what	  is	  missing	  in	  the	  
foundational	  myth	  is	  its	  living	  meaning,	  what	  Kristeva	  calls	  the	  “praxis	  of	  the	  
narrative.”19	  	  The	  narrative	  is	  useful	  only	  insofar	  as	  the	  recollecting	  of	  it	  evokes	  a	  deeper	  
level	  of	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human,	  which,	  for	  Arendt,	  implies	  a	  
certain	  move	  toward	  action.	  	  Without	  the	  action,	  the	  praxis,	  the	  story	  is	  an	  historical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  As	  written	  in	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  Rahel	  Varnhagen:	  The	  Life	  of	  a	  Jewess	  (Baltimore:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  
University	  Press,	  1997),	  73.	  
18	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  149,	  150,	  emphasis	  mine.	  
19	  Kristeva,	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  8.	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account,	  lacking	  the	  necessary	  qualities	  of	  an	  authentic	  narrative.	  	  Arendt	  articulates	  
this	  more	  clearly	  in	  The	  Human	  Condition:	  
The	  chief	  characteristic	  of	  this	  specifically	  human	  life,	  
whose	  appearance	  and	  disappearance	  constitute	  worldly	  
events,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  itself	  always	  full	  of	  events	  which	  
ultimately	  can	  be	  told	  as	  a	  story,	  establish	  a	  biography;	  it	  is	  
of	  this	  life,	  bios	  as	  distinguished	  from	  mere	  zoe,	  that	  
Aristotle	  said	  that	  it	  “somehow	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  praxis.”20	  
	  
If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  the	  critique	  of	  modernity	  as	  “dehumanizing”	  would	  mean	  that	  
the	  narrative,	  the	  bios	  as	  praxis	  able	  to	  be	  told,	  is	  gone.	  	  This	  is	  Arendt’s	  point	  exactly	  
when	  she	  addressed	  the	  Jewish	  people	  in	  1942	  in	  “The	  Jewish	  War	  the	  Isn’t	  Happening.”	  	  
Her	  constant	  cries	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  Jewish	  army	  were	  calls	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  and	  
solidarity	  in	  Jewish	  identity.	  	  She	  writes,	  	  
One	  truth	  that	  is	  unfamiliar	  to	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  though	  
they	  are	  beginning	  to	  learn	  it,	  is	  that	  you	  can	  only	  defend	  
yourself	  as	  the	  person	  you	  are	  attacked	  as.	  	  A	  person	  
attacked	  as	  a	  Jew	  cannot	  defend	  himself	  as	  an	  Englishman	  
or	  a	  Frenchman.	  	  The	  world	  would	  only	  conclude	  that	  he	  is	  
simply	  not	  defending	  himself.21	  
	  
	  The	  failure	  to	  connect	  to	  the	  past,	  to	  remember	  through	  narrative,	  is	  depriving	  the	  
Jewish	  people	  of	  their	  very	  identity.	  	  	  
Gershom	  Scholem	  is	  instructive	  in	  this	  matter.	  	  Scholem	  highlighted	  the	  
importance	  of	  narrative	  in	  the	  mystical	  Jewish	  tradition,	  claiming	  that	  “the	  documents	  
of	  religion	  are	  .	  .	  .	  not	  conceived	  as	  expressing	  a	  separate	  and	  distinct	  world	  of	  religious	  
truth	  and	  reality	  .	  .	  .	  The	  [stories].	  .	  .are	  simply	  descriptions	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  The	  Human	  Condition	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1958),	  97.	  
21	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  137.	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matter	  and	  form,	  spirit	  and	  matter,	  or	  the	  faculties	  of	  the	  mind.”22	  	  As	  a	  secular	  Jew,	  like	  
Scholem,	  Arendt	  sees	  the	  religious	  tradition	  in	  the	  same	  way;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  value	  of	  
the	  narrative	  is	  its	  ability	  to	  articulate	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  society,	  
or	  between	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  active	  life.	  	  This	  “living	  meaning”	  of	  the	  
stories	  is	  only	  sustained	  through	  active	  participation	  in	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  story,	  
which	  entails	  a	  continued	  engaging	  in	  the	  narrative	  through	  action	  and	  speech.	  	  For	  
European	  Jewry	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  problem	  is	  not	  the	  Passover	  narrative,	  
rather	  it	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  reform	  movement	  removed	  the	  living	  meaning	  from	  
that	  narrative.	  	  
	   One	  may	  question	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  Arendt’s	  argument	  here,	  noting	  that	  the	  
Passover	  meal,	  the	  Seder,	  has	  always	  been	  celebrated	  annually.	  	  Arendt	  would	  claim,	  
however,	  that	  no	  amount	  of	  ritualistic	  activity	  can	  replace	  the	  living	  meaning	  of	  the	  
story.	  	  People	  could	  gather	  together	  and	  tell	  the	  story,	  but	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  
revelatory	  character	  of	  the	  narrative	  the	  ritual	  becomes	  lifeless,	  as	  well.	  	  The	  practice	  of	  
retelling	  the	  story	  was	  no	  longer	  an	  exercise	  in	  disclosure,	  removing	  the	  veils	  of	  
concealment	  on	  identity;	  it	  no	  longer	  invited	  participation	  in	  the	  narrative	  but	  merely	  
told	  a	  story	  about	  a	  time	  long	  past.	  	  To	  wit,	  because	  Arendt	  asserts	  that	  the	  reform	  
movement	  diminished	  the	  political	  relevance	  of	  the	  Passover	  story,	  the	  ritual	  enactment	  
of	  the	  story	  also	  lost	  its	  revelatory	  capacity.	  	  The	  ritual	  could	  not	  reveal	  what	  the	  reform	  
movement	  had	  concealed.	  	  This	  collapse	  of	  meaning	  is	  not	  specific	  to	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  
it	  is	  an	  innate	  threat	  to	  the	  living	  meaning	  of	  any	  narrative	  because	  “The	  moment	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Gershom	  Scholem,	  Major	  Trends	  in	  Jewish	  Mysticism	  (New	  York:	  Schocken	  Books,	  1995),	  26.	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want	  to	  say	  who	  somebody	  is,	  our	  very	  vocabulary	  leads	  us	  astray	  into	  saying	  what	  he	  
is.	  .	  .with	  the	  result	  that	  his	  specific	  uniqueness	  escapes	  us.”	  	  The	  stories	  themselves	  
may	  be	  reified,	  converted	  into	  objects	  and	  historical	  artifacts.	  	  Regardless,	  “They	  
themselves,	  in	  their	  living	  reality,	  are	  of	  an	  altogether	  different	  nature	  than	  these	  
reifications.”23	  	  The	  stories	  are	  of	  a	  different	  nature	  than	  the	  reifications	  insofar	  as	  they	  
are	  in	  essence	  the	  revelation	  of	  the	  agents	  or	  the	  actors	  in	  them.	  	  The	  objective	  
documents,	  monuments,	  moments	  they	  may	  honor	  form	  that	  which	  is	  really	  not	  
objective	  at	  all,	  and	  that	  is	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  agent.	  	  
For	  the	  Israelites,	  the	  wandering	  through	  the	  wilderness	  is	  the	  compositional	  
ground	  of	  the	  narrative	  that	  begins	  with	  the	  Passover.	  	  In	  the	  wilderness,	  there	  can	  be	  
no	  end,	  simply	  new	  places	  and	  new	  times	  within	  which	  to	  compose	  our	  own	  narratives.	  	  
And	  because	  there	  is	  no	  end	  to	  the	  narratives,	  we	  are	  participating	  in	  those	  narratives	  
that	  came	  before	  us.	  	  Arendt	  is	  making	  the	  case	  that	  modern	  man	  should	  not	  merely	  
reify	  the	  past	  and	  in	  that	  way	  remove	  the	  living	  meaning	  of	  the	  stories.	  	  Rather,	  self-­‐
identity	  demands	  that	  human	  beings	  continue	  to	  act,	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  narratives	  in	  
such	  a	  way	  that	  stories	  are	  able	  to	  perform	  the	  function	  of	  disclosure.	  	  That	  disclosure	  is	  
the	  revelation	  of	  life.	  	  	  
Stories	  that	  reify	  the	  past,	  for	  Arendt,	  are	  historical	  in	  nature.	  	  They	  are	  valuable	  
as	  history,	  but	  do	  not	  hold	  the	  seeds	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  authentic	  
narrative	  does.	  	  A	  narrative	  without	  living	  meaning	  in	  many	  instances	  is	  history.	  	  History	  
is	  an	  account	  of	  past	  moments,	  an	  account	  that	  does	  not	  supercede	  the	  bounds	  of	  time	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and	  space.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  history	  is	  confined	  by	  the	  temporality	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  
story.	  	  Both	  history	  and	  narrative	  rely	  in	  some	  way	  upon	  memory	  and	  are	  concerned	  
with	  action.	  	  This	  deep	  relationship	  between	  memory	  and	  action	  is	  clearly	  articulated	  in	  
“The	  Concept	  of	  History,”	  an	  essay	  found	  in	  Between	  Past	  and	  Future.	  	  Arendt	  starts	  
with	  a	  discussion	  of	  Herodotus,	  a	  Greek	  historian	  and	  the	  father	  of	  Western	  history,	  
who	  understands	  the	  task	  of	  history	  to	  be	  “to	  save	  human	  deeds	  from	  the	  futility	  that	  
comes	  from	  oblivion.”	  The	  Greek	  notion	  of	  immortality	  held	  that	  all	  natural	  things	  are	  
ever-­‐present,	  or	  immortal,	  and	  man	  is	  a	  natural	  being.	  	  “All	  living	  creatures,	  man	  not	  
excepted,	  are	  contained	  in	  this	  realm	  of	  being-­‐forever	  .	  .	  .	  man,	  insofar	  as	  he	  is	  a	  natural	  
being	  and	  belongs	  to	  the	  species	  of	  mankind,	  possesses	  immortality.”	  	  With	  the	  idea	  
that	  man	  is	  immortal,	  the	  role	  of	  history	  is	  to	  save	  the	  great	  moments,	  the	  great	  deeds,	  
from	  being	  forgotten	  in	  the	  abyss	  of	  what-­‐always-­‐is.	  	  The	  modern	  concept	  of	  
immortality	  is	  in	  great	  distinction	  from	  this	  ancient	  one,	  however.	  	  This	  eternal	  
recurrence	  of	  natural	  things	  “does	  not,	  of	  course,	  make	  individual	  men	  immortal.”	  	  
Moreover,	  it	  is	  the	  mortality	  of	  man	  that	  marks	  human	  existence.	  	  To	  wit,	  man	  moves	  
along	  a	  rectilinear	  course	  of	  movement,	  from	  birth	  toward	  death,	  writing	  the	  story	  of	  his	  
bios,	  the	  historical	  narrative	  of	  mortal	  existence.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  purpose	  of	  narrative,	  
for	  Arendt,	  is	  not	  merely	  to	  save	  man	  from	  the	  oblivion	  of	  the	  eternally	  recurring	  natural	  
world,	  but	  to	  remember	  the	  instances	  in	  which	  the	  actions	  and	  deeds	  of	  man	  cut	  into	  
the	  cyclical	  nature	  of	  the	  world	  and	  bring	  to	  light	  the	  beauty	  of	  mortality.	  	  Arendt	  says,	  
thus:	  
When	  Sophocles	  (in	  the	  famous	  chorus	  of	  Antigone)	  says	  
that	  there	  is	  nothing	  more	  awe-­‐inspiring	  than	  man,	  he	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goes	  on	  to	  exemplify	  this	  by	  evoking	  purposeful	  human	  
activities	  which	  do	  violence	  to	  nature	  because	  they	  disturb	  
what,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  mortals,	  would	  be	  the	  eternal	  
quiet	  of	  being-­‐forever	  that	  rests	  or	  swings	  within	  itself.24	  
	  
What	  Herodotus	  did	  for	  historiography	  was	  a	  great	  contribution	  to	  the	  continuity	  
of	  human	  being.	  	  He	  recognized,	  “The	  mortality	  of	  man	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  individual	  life,	  
a	  bios	  with	  a	  recognizable	  life-­‐story	  from	  birth	  to	  death…is	  distinguished	  from	  all	  other	  
things	  by	  the	  rectilinear	  course	  of	  its	  movement.”	  	  Embracing	  the	  concept	  seen	  in	  
Sophocles,	  Herodotus	  saw	  the	  unique	  power	  of	  mortality	  which	  “[moves]	  along	  a	  
rectilinear	  line	  in	  a	  universe	  where	  everything,	  if	  it	  moves	  at	  all,	  moves	  in	  a	  cyclical	  
order.”	  	  History	  is	  the	  account	  of	  the	  extra-­‐ordinary	  moments	  of	  mortal	  interruption	  and	  
historical	  accounts	  can	  become	  authentic	  narratives	  when	  they	  evoke	  disclosure,	  
motivate	  the	  will	  of	  the	  reader/teller,	  and	  result	  in	  volition.	  	  Indeed,	  narrative	  is	  
historical,	  but,	  again,	  it	  is	  not	  merely	  history.	  	  As	  narrative,	  the	  purpose	  of	  maintaining	  
these	  historical	  accounts	  is	  so	  that	  “mortals	  themselves	  would	  find	  their	  place	  in	  the	  
cosmos,	  where	  everything	  is	  immortal	  except	  men.”25	  	  And	  Arendt	  says,	  the	  faculty	  used	  
for	  this	  recollection	  and	  placement	  in	  the	  universe	  is	  memory.	  	  The	  narrative	  exercises	  
the	  human	  faculty	  of	  remembrance	  so	  that	  man	  can	  find	  himself	  in	  the	  great	  abyss	  of	  
the	  ever-­‐present.	  	  	  
	   The	  narrative	  is	  essential	  to	  political	  identity,	  however,	  it	  is	  plagued	  by	  the	  threat	  
that	  its	  very	  articulation	  will	  in	  fact	  diminish	  its	  capacity	  to	  fulfill	  its	  purpose.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Arendt,	  Past	  and	  Future,	  41,	  42.	  
25	  Ibid.,	  42,	  43.	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This	  frustration	  has	  the	  closest	  affinity	  with	  the	  well-­‐
known	  philosophic	  impossibility	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  definition	  of	  
man,	  all	  definitions	  being	  determinations	  of	  
interpretations	  of	  what	  man	  is,	  of	  qualities,	  therefore,	  
which	  he	  could	  possibly	  share	  with	  other	  human	  beings,	  
whereas	  his	  specific	  difference	  would	  be	  found	  in	  a	  
determination	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  a	  “who”	  he	  is.26	  
	  
Participation	  in	  the	  narrative	  reveals	  an	  understanding	  that	  contributes	  to	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  one	  understands	  one’s	  self,	  the	  particular	  identity	  of	  “who”	  one	  is.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
participating	  in	  the	  Passover	  narrative,	  in	  the	  modern	  world	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  place	  
blood	  on	  the	  lintels,	  there	  is	  a	  new	  lintel	  and	  a	  new	  blood,	  a	  new	  circumstance	  and	  a	  
new	  action.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  writing	  in	  the	  early	  40s,	  the	  narrative	  is	  now	  about	  the	  political	  
persecution	  of	  Jews	  and	  the	  proper	  action	  is	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Jewish	  army.27	  	  Thus,	  
the	  participation	  in	  the	  narrative	  allows	  the	  individual	  to	  reveal	  himself,	  and	  the	  
collective	  to	  emerge	  into	  the	  dynamic	  web	  of	  human	  action.	  	  The	  action	  does	  not	  
mitigate	  the	  impossibility	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  man,	  but	  “the	  living	  essence	  of	  the	  person	  
as	  it	  shows	  itself	  in	  the	  flux	  of	  action	  and	  speech,	  has	  great	  bearing	  upon	  the	  whole	  
realm	  of	  human	  affairs,	  where	  we	  exist	  primarily	  as	  acting	  and	  speaking	  beings.”28	  
	   The	  narrative	  helps	  us	  to	  identify	  ourselves	  so	  that	  we	  can	  reveal	  ourselves	  
through	  our	  own	  actions	  in	  the	  present	  moment.	  	  It	  helps	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  who	  that	  
we	  wish	  to	  reveal	  so	  that	  our	  actions	  and	  words	  can	  continue	  the	  revelatory	  task.	  	  “The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  181.	  
27	  Interestingly,	  as	  the	  war	  continued,	  Arendt	  extended	  the	  pariah	  status	  of	  the	  Jews	  to	  all	  of	  Europe.	  	  She	  
recognizes	  that	  not	  just	  the	  Jews,	  but	  all	  European	  countries	  are	  being	  challenged	  by	  the	  “mundane”	  story	  
of	  Hitler’s	  National	  Socialist	  regime.	  	  She	  writes:	  	  “All	  European	  nations	  have	  become	  pariah	  people,	  all	  
are	  forced	  to	  take	  up	  the	  battle	  anew	  for	  freedom”	  	  (Jewish	  Writings,	  141).	  
28	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  181.	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disclosure	  of	  the	  ‘who’	  through	  speech,	  and	  the	  setting	  of	  a	  new	  beginning	  through	  
action,	  always	  fall	  into	  an	  already	  existing	  web	  where	  their	  immediate	  consequences	  
can	  be	  felt.”	   ⁠	  Understanding	  narrative	  becomes	  more	  complex	  because	  all	  that	  is	  
revealed	  is	  part	  of	  an	  already	  existing	  story,	  which	  Arendt	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  “web	  of	  human	  
relationships.”	  This	  web	  has	  been	  constructed	  by	  “innumerable,	  conflicting	  wills	  and	  
intentions”	  and	  it	  is	  because	  of	  this	  “that	  action	  almost	  never	  achieves	  its	  purpose.”	  It	  is	  
because	  of	  the	  plurality	  of	  human	  existence	  that	  all	  actions	  and	  words	  are	  
indeterminate,	  “but	  it	  is	  also	  because	  of	  this	  medium,	  in	  which	  action	  alone	  is	  real,	  that	  
it	  ‘produces’	  stories	  with	  or	  without	  intention	  as	  naturally	  as	  fabrication	  produces	  
tangible	  things.”	  	  Action	  is	  meant	  to	  reveal	  identity,	  but	  we	  are	  always	  moving,	  changing,	  
wandering.	  	  The	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  the	  world	  does	  not	  obviate	  the	  role	  of	  action,	  but	  
reinforces	  its	  necessity.	  	  Because	  time	  and	  space	  are	  in	  constant	  motion	  the	  individual	  
and	  the	  collective	  must	  continuously	  act	  and	  speak	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  a	  presence	  in	  
the	  world	  of	  appearance;	  otherwise,	  they	  will	  fall	  into	  the	  despair	  of	  meaninglessness,	  
the	  loss	  of	  self,	  the	  concealment	  of	  identity.	  	  Because	  we	  live	  in	  the	  world	  that	  is	  
constantly	  being	  reconditioned	  by	  labor,	  work	  and	  action,	  we	  must	  continue	  to	  act	  and	  
speak	  to	  be	  present	  in	  it.	  	  The	  story	  cannot	  end	  and	  the	  narrative	  cannot	  die.	  	  Action	  
may	  never	  achieve	  its	  purpose,	  but	  that	  is	  because	  it	  is	  always	  achieving	  its	  purpose!	  	  
That	  is,	  it	  is	  always	  producing	  the	  narrative,	  so	  long	  as	  human	  beings	  are	  acting	  and	  
speaking.	  	  This	  is	  important	  because	  together	  action	  and	  speech	  “start	  a	  new	  process	  
which	  eventually	  emerges	  as	  the	  unique	  life	  story	  of	  the	  newcomer”	  to	  the	  web	  of	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things	  and	  affects	  uniquely	  “the	  life	  stories	  of	  all	  those	  with	  whom	  he	  comes	  into	  
contact.”29	  
Interestingly,	  it	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  action,	  there	  is	  no	  “end”	  
to	  any	  story.	  	  However,	  what	  the	  Passover	  story	  gives	  us	  is	  a	  definitive	  beginning.	  	  Even	  
within	  the	  perplexity	  of	  the	  web	  of	  actions,	  “in	  any	  series	  of	  events	  that	  together	  form	  a	  
story	  with	  a	  unique	  meaning	  we	  can	  at	  best	  isolate	  the	  agent	  who	  set	  the	  whole	  process	  
into	  motion.”	  	  The	  Passover	  story	  is	  the	  foundational	  myth	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  because	  
it	  is	  the	  moment	  that	  can	  be	  isolated	  as	  the	  beginning,	  which	  does	  not	  give	  it	  any	  more	  
significance	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  story,	  but	  it	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  power	  of	  natality.	  	  
Without	  the	  power	  of	  this	  moment,	  there	  is	  no	  natality,	  no	  moment	  of	  birth.	  	  So,	  the	  
meaning	  of	  the	  Passover	  story	  is	  dead	  to	  those	  who	  refuse	  to	  see	  the	  story	  beyond	  the	  
reification,	  to	  those	  who	  cannot	  see	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  life	  that	  was	  born	  in	  the	  story,	  
not	  simply	  the	  product	  of	  an	  external	  author.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  Passover	  story	  cannot	  
be	  understood	  as	  the	  workings	  of	  God,	  or	  of	  an	  invisible	  hand.	  	  If	  we	  simply	  attribute	  
this	  story	  to	  God	  then	  we	  are	  killing	  the	  meaning;	  that	  is,	  we	  are	  stripping	  the	  actors	  of	  
their	  task	  of	  acting	  and	  giving	  that	  power	  to	  God,	  in	  which	  case	  it	  would	  be	  a	  story	  that	  
reveals	  God	  as	  the	  agent.	  	  But,	  we	  can	  rightly	  assume	  that	  this	  story,	  for	  Arendt,	  does	  
not	  reveal	  God,	  but	  man,	  and	  more	  specifically	  that	  this	  story	  only	  exists,	  as	  all	  stories	  
only	  exist,	  as	  the	  revelation	  of	  the	  acting	  agent.	  	  As	  Arendt	  writes,	  	  
The	  invisible	  actor	  behind	  the	  scenes	  is	  an	  invitation	  
arising	  from	  a	  mental	  perplexity	  but	  corresponding	  to	  no	  
real	  experience.	  	  Through	  it,	  the	  story	  resulting	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Ibid.,	  184.	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action	  is	  misconstrued	  as	  a	  fictional	  story,	  where	  indeed	  
an	  author	  pulls	  the	  strings	  and	  directs	  the	  play.	  	  
	  
The	  Jewish	  story	  is	  not	  fictional;	  it	  is	  a	  political	  reality.	  	  Therefore,	  any	  means	  of	  
understanding	  that	  deny	  this	  are	  detrimental	  to	  the	  Jewish	  identity	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  the	  
Jewish	  experience	  in	  the	  world	  because	  what	  Arendt	  and	  the	  Jewish	  people	  experience	  
is	  real.	  	  “The	  distinction	  between	  a	  real	  and	  a	  fictional	  story	  is	  precisely	  that	  the	  latter	  
was	  ‘made	  up’	  and	  the	  former	  not	  made	  at	  all.”30	  
The	  disclosure	  of	  one’s	  own	  narrative	  is	  daunting	  because	  it	  will	  put	  up	  
boundaries	  implicit	  in	  definition.	  	  It	  means	  that	  one	  cannot	  remain	  in	  the	  interminably	  
malleable	  world	  of	  the	  mind,	  free	  to	  construct	  and	  deconstruct	  oneself	  as	  one	  wills.	  	  Nay,	  
action	  defines	  and	  one	  can	  never	  undo	  what	  one	  has	  done.	  	  This	  is	  why	  “The	  
connotation	  of	  courage,	  which	  we	  now	  feel	  to	  be	  an	  indispensable	  quality	  of	  the	  hero,	  is	  
in	  fact	  already	  present	  in	  a	  willingness	  to	  act	  and	  speak	  at	  all,	  to	  insert	  one’s	  self	  into	  the	  
world	  and	  begin	  a	  story	  of	  one’s	  own.”	  	  Or,	  stated	  again,	  “Courage	  and	  even	  boldness	  
are	  already	  present	  in	  leaving	  one’s	  private	  hiding	  place	  and	  showing	  who	  one	  is,	  in	  
disclosing	  and	  exposing	  one’s	  self.”31	  
These	  ideas	  are	  further	  bolstered	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  Seder	  meal	  as	  it	  is	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  annually	  participate	  in	  the	  Jewish	  narrative.	  	  The	  theater	  or	  performance	  
of	  the	  story	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  inserting	  one’s	  self	  into	  the	  history	  or	  into	  that	  web.	  	  “Only	  the	  
actors	  and	  speakers	  who	  re-­‐enact	  the	  story’s	  plot	  can	  convey	  the	  full	  meaning,	  not	  so	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Ibid.,	  185,	  186.	  
31	  Ibid.,	  186.	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much	  of	  the	  story	  itself,	  but	  of	  the	  ‘heroes’	  who	  reveal	  themselves	  in	  it.”32	  	  The	  theater	  
of	  the	  Seder	  meal	  consists	  in	  performing	  the	  actions	  themselves	  and	  thereby	  inserting	  
one’s	  self	  into	  that	  particular	  revelation	  of	  that	  particular	  agent:	  	  I	  am	  a	  Jew.	  	  Of	  course,	  
the	  disclosure	  of	  such	  an	  identity	  is	  only	  possible	  if	  the	  ritual,	  like	  the	  living	  narrative,	  
quickens	  the	  agents	  to	  action	  and	  thereby	  ushers	  forth	  the	  space	  of	  politics	  wherein	  
human	  beings	  innately	  inquire	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  freedom	  and	  justice.	  	  
Through	  action	  human	  beings	  emerge	  in	  what	  Arendt	  calls	  the	  space	  of	  
appearance,	  the	  political	  realm	  where	  human	  beings	  exist	  as	  men	  in	  plurality.	  	  Thus,	  
because	  the	  purpose	  of	  narrative	  is,	  like	  action,	  the	  disclosure	  of	  the	  human	  being,	  both	  
action	  and	  narrative	  deposit	  the	  agents	  into	  the	  polis.	  	  In	  the	  polis,	  man	  is	  located	  in	  the	  
web	  of	  action.	  	  Because	  every	  action	  affects	  other	  human	  beings,	  the	  question	  emerges:	  	  
how	  are	  we	  to	  maintain	  our	  freedom?	  	  Indeed,	  freedom	  is	  the	  only	  means	  by	  which	  
human	  beings	  can	  act	  and	  therefore	  all	  of	  the	  political	  realm	  is	  dependent	  upon	  this	  
freedom.	  	  Also	  emerging	  in	  this	  space	  is	  the	  question	  of	  justice,	  where	  what	  is	  just	  is	  
that	  which	  maintains	  freedom.	  	  Arendt	  often	  uses	  the	  two	  terms	  together	  because	  
justice	  is	  the	  preservation	  of	  freedom.	  	  This	  means,	  then,	  that	  just	  human	  beings	  will	  not	  
use	  their	  innate	  freedom	  to	  inhibit	  the	  freedom	  of	  other	  human	  beings.	  	  To	  reiterate,	  for	  
Arendt,	  the	  meaning	  of	  politics	  is	  freedom,	  where	  freedom	  is	  manifested	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  
create	  anew	  through	  action,	  and	  the	  narrative	  that	  teaches	  this	  is	  the	  Passover	  story.	  	  So,	  
the	  loss	  of	  this	  narrative	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  historical	  loss,	  but	  a	  human	  one.	  	  Furthermore,	  
the	  Passover	  narrative	  is	  more	  than	  a	  Jewish	  story:	  	  insofar	  as	  it	  teaches	  freedom	  and	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justice,	  it	  is	  the	  quintessential	  story	  of	  human	  being.	  	  This	  is	  why	  even	  a	  secular	  Jewess	  
can	  learn	  from	  this	  narrative,	  and	  why	  it	  is	  applicable	  not	  just	  to	  Jews,	  but	  to	  all	  people.	  	  	  
As	  Michael	  Walzer	  points	  out,	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Exodus	  	  “is	  a	  common	  reference	  
point”	  that	  has	  been	  used	  by	  many	  people	  in	  many	  different	  ways.	  	  For	  example,	  	  
[It]	  figures	  prominently	  in	  medieval	  debates	  over	  the	  
legitimacy	  of	  crusading	  warfare.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  the	  
political	  argument	  of	  the	  radical	  monk	  Savonarola	  .	  .	  .	  It	  is	  
cited	  in	  the	  pamphlets	  of	  the	  German	  peasants’	  revolt.	  	  
John	  Calvin	  and	  John	  Knox	  justified	  their	  most	  extreme	  
political	  positions	  by	  quoting	  from	  Exodus	  .	  .	  .	  The	  text	  
underpins	  the	  radical	  contractualism	  of	  the	  Huguenot	  
Vindiciae	  Contra	  Tyrannos	  and	  then	  of	  Scottish	  
Presbyterians.	  	  It	  is	  crucial	  .	  .	  .	  to	  the	  self-­‐understanding	  of	  
the	  English	  Puritans	  .	  .	  .	  Benjamin	  Franklin	  proposed	  that	  
the	  Great	  Seal	  of	  the	  United	  States	  should	  show	  Moses	  
with	  his	  rod	  lifted	  and	  the	  Egyptian	  army	  drowning	  in	  the	  
sea	  .	  .	  .33	  	  	  
	  
Arendt	  moves	  a	  step	  further	  from	  Walzer;	  she	  considers	  it	  to	  be	  THE	  political	  narrative	  
par	  excellence—a	  story	  that	  highlights	  the	  human	  condition	  of	  plurality	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	  the	  human	  essence	  of	  freedom	  is	  brought	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  world	  through	  
action	  in	  order	  eventually	  to	  create	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  and	  ultimately	  to	  establish	  
justice.	  	  The	  central	  focus	  of	  the	  story,	  for	  Arendt,	  is	  the	  Passover	  event,	  wherein	  one	  
can	  see	  Arendt’s	  understanding	  of	  human	  nature,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  of	  man	  as	  
political	  being.	  	  For	  her,	  this	  historic	  Jewish	  narrative	  contains	  the	  requisite	  elements	  to	  
the	  human	  experience	  of	  reality,	  namely	  self-­‐disclosure,	  an	  active	  will,	  and	  concern	  for	  
freedom	  and	  justice.	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  Michael	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  and	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  (USA:	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Arendt	  makes	  reference	  to	  the	  Passover	  story	  in	  many	  of	  her	  Jewish	  writings	  and	  
claims	  that	  this	  narrative	  teaches	  “the	  difference	  between	  freedom	  and	  slavery”	  and	  
calls	  to	  mind	  “the	  eternal	  rebellion	  of	  the	  heart	  and	  mind	  against	  slavery.”34	  	  The	  
Passover	  narrative	  is	  an	  invitation	  to	  recognize	  the	  inherent	  freedom	  to	  experience	  
existence	  by	  moving	  to	  action.	  	  Freedom	  is	  a	  value	  that	  resides	  in	  the	  “heart	  and	  mind”	  
of	  the	  individual;	  it	  exists	  from	  birth	  and	  always	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  express	  itself	  in	  the	  
public	  realm.	  	  However,	  freedom	  is	  first	  innate,	  individual,	  and	  private.	  	  Freedom	  
becomes	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  interest	  only	  after	  the	  polis	  is	  established.	  	  The	  polis	  works	  
to	  maintain	  “the	  function	  of	  the	  public	  realm”	  which	  is	  “to	  throw	  light	  on	  the	  affairs	  of	  
men	  by	  providing	  a	  space	  of	  appearances	  in	  which	  they	  can	  show	  in	  word	  and	  deed	  …	  
who	  they	  are	  and	  what	  they	  can	  do.”35	  	  The	  narrative,	  as	  the	  account	  of	  words	  and	  
deeds,	  is	  inherently	  political	  insofar	  as	  its	  living	  meaning	  necessarily	  manifests	  in	  the	  
space	  of	  appearance,	  the	  polis.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  reiterate	  that	  this	  entire	  project	  rests	  on	  the	  assertion	  that	  the	  
power	  of	  the	  Passover	  story,	  while	  a	  Jewish	  story	  and	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  part	  
of	  Jewish	  history,	  lies	  in	  its	  application	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  life	  as	  Arendt	  understands	  it.	  	  
This	  understanding	  is	  not,	  therefore,	  specific	  to	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  Arendt	  understands	  the	  Jewish	  narrative	  does	  not	  serve	  to	  place	  her	  in	  a	  
Jewish	  context	  explicating	  only	  the	  Jewish	  experience;	  but	  rather	  it	  is	  her	  entry	  point,	  
through	  her	  own	  particularly	  Jewish	  experiences,	  to	  understanding	  human	  life	  in	  general	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  150.	  
35	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Men	  in	  Dark	  Times	  (New	  York:	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and	  political	  life	  in	  particular.	  	  Thus,	  to	  a	  Jewish	  woman,	  as	  a	  human	  being	  connected	  to	  
this	  particular	  historical	  story,	  the	  Passover	  narrative	  is	  more	  palpable	  and	  more	  
appropriate	  than	  any	  other	  story.	  	  It	  at	  once	  recognizes	  her	  political	  identity	  and	  gives	  
access	  to	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  primary	  concern	  of	  all	  of	  her	  works,	  an	  
understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human	  in	  a	  world	  of	  appearances.	  	  
The	  Jewish	  historical	  narrative	  is	  full	  of	  many	  “interruptive”	  moments,	  with	  the	  
Passover	  being	  the	  single	  most	  defining	  moment	  in	  that	  story.	  	  Accordingly,	  it	  is	  in	  this	  
moment	  that	  one	  sees	  the	  great	  deeds	  and	  works	  of	  which	  man	  in	  general,	  and	  Jewish	  
peoples	  in	  particular,	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  their	  own	  narrative,	  are	  capable.	  	  In	  
other	  words,	  it	  is	  this	  moment	  that	  clearly	  illustrates	  all	  aspects	  of	  human-­‐ness	  as	  
Arendt	  understands	  it.	  	  As	  she	  writes	  regarding	  these	  moments,	  	  
These	  single	  instances,	  deeds	  or	  events,	  interrupt	  the	  
circular	  movement	  of	  daily	  life	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  that	  the	  
rectilinear	  bios	  of	  the	  mortals	  interrupts	  the	  circular	  
movement	  of	  the	  biological	  life.	  	  The	  subject	  matter	  of	  
history	  is	  these	  interruptions—the	  extraordinary,	  in	  other	  
words.	  
	  
The	  moments	  are	  extra-­‐ordinary	  insofar	  as	  they	  highlight	  specific	  human-­‐ness	  of	  human	  
being:	  	  essentially,	  the	  unique	  ability,	  as	  mortals,	  to	  create	  something	  new	  within	  the	  
constant	  churning	  of	  the	  universal	  order	  of	  things.	  	  It	  is,	  further,	  the	  recollection	  of	  
these	  moments	  that	  connects	  man	  to	  man	  through	  time.	  	  “If	  mortals	  succeeded	  in	  
endowing	  their	  works,	  deeds,	  and	  words	  with	  some	  permanence	  and	  in	  arresting	  their	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perishability,	  then	  these	  things	  would,	  to	  a	  degree	  at	  least,	  enter	  and	  be	  at	  home	  in	  the	  
world	  of	  everlastingness.”36	  	  	  
As	  has	  been	  seen,	  for	  Arendt	  authentic	  narrative	  is	  essential	  first	  because	  it	  
preserves	  a	  collective	  identity,	  second	  because	  it	  allows	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  whole	  to	  
recognize	  their	  place	  in	  time	  as	  they	  draw	  on	  the	  past	  and	  contribute	  to	  the	  future	  by	  
continuing	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  story.	  	  The	  Passover	  narrative,	  as	  the	  foundational	  narrative	  of	  
the	  Jewish	  people,	  takes	  on	  these	  tasks	  for	  the	  Jewish	  people	  specifically.	  	  Thus,	  to	  
understand	  Arendt’s	  political	  thought,	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  look	  at	  the	  founding	  myth	  of	  
her	  own	  political	  identity.	  	  As	  Arendt,	  herself,	  notes,	  all	  we	  have	  of	  her	  life	  is	  her	  literary	  
contributions,	  her	  own	  stories,	  if	  you	  will.	  	  Thus,	  and	  as	  she	  puts	  the	  matter,	  it	  is	  equally	  
important	  to	  note	  that	  not	  only	  her	  political	  existence,	  that	  is,	  those	  experiences	  
occurring	  with	  regard	  to	  her	  “existence	  as	  a	  member	  of	  society”,	  but	  also	  her	  literary	  
existence	  is	  marked	  by	  two	  things:	  	  “First,	  thanks	  to	  my	  husband,	  I	  have	  learned	  to	  think	  
politically	  and	  see	  historically;	  and,	  second,	  I	  have	  refused	  to	  abandon	  the	  Jewish	  
question	  as	  the	  focal	  point	  of	  my	  historical	  and	  political	  thinking.”37	  	  From	  this	  passage,	  
written	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Jaspers	  in	  1946,	  Arendt	  claims	  that	  her	  thought	  is	  political,	  meaning	  
concerned	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  human	  beings	  exist	  (or	  live)	  with	  one	  another,	  and	  
historical,	  meaning	  it	  looks	  at	  the	  moments,	  comprised	  of	  actions	  and	  deeds,	  that	  
constitute	  the	  stories	  that	  can	  be	  told,	  the	  bios	  that	  is	  praxis.	  	  And	  all	  of	  this	  is,	  as	  she	  
claims,	  focused	  on	  the	  Jewish	  question,	  which	  I	  assert	  is	  her	  general	  crisis	  of	  existence:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Arendt,	  Past	  and	  Future,	  42,	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37	  Hannah	  Arendt	  and	  Karl	  Jaspers,	  Correspondence:1926-­‐1969,	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how	  am	  I	  to	  be	  human	  in	  this	  world	  that	  recognizes	  me	  as	  Jewish?	  	  If	  political	  and	  
historical	  circumstances	  point	  to	  my	  Jewishness,	  then	  how	  am	  I	  to	  perpetuate	  a	  
meaningful	  life,	  that	  is,	  a	  life	  among	  other	  human	  beings	  that	  is	  driven	  by	  action	  and	  
maintained	  by	  memory?	  	  If	  either	  of	  these	  things,	  memory	  or	  action,	  disintegrate,	  then	  
with	  it	  goes	  my	  own	  human-­‐ness,	  my	  own	  life.	  
To	  summarize	  briefly,	  the	  Passover	  story	  is	  told	  in	  Exodus	  and	  is	  the	  account	  of	  
the	  liberation	  of	  the	  Israelites	  from	  slavery	  in	  Egypt.	  	  Moses	  was	  divinely	  chosen	  to	  be	  
the	  mediator	  between	  the	  Israelites	  and	  Pharaoh.	  	  He	  was	  told,	  “You	  shall	  soon	  see	  
what	  I	  will	  do	  to	  Pharaoh:	  	  he	  shall	  let	  them	  go	  because	  of	  a	  greater	  might;	  indeed,	  
because	  of	  a	  greater	  might	  he	  shall	  drive	  them	  from	  his	  land.”38	  	  Repeatedly,	  Moses	  and	  
Pharaoh	  engage	  in	  a	  series	  of	  negotiations.	  	  Each	  time,	  Moses	  requests	  the	  freedom	  of	  
the	  Israelites,	  and	  each	  time,	  Pharaoh	  refuses.	  	  Upon	  each	  refusal,	  the	  Egyptian	  people	  
are	  struck	  down	  by	  a	  plague,	  which	  causes	  Pharaoh	  to	  plead	  with	  Moses	  to	  relieve	  the	  
burden	  from	  his	  people.	  	  The	  final	  plague	  to	  befall	  the	  Egyptians	  is	  the	  death	  of	  every	  
firstborn	  child	  in	  all	  of	  Egypt.	  	  Moses	  gives	  the	  Israelites	  specific	  instructions	  on	  this	  day	  
to	  slaughter	  a	  lamb	  and	  apply	  some	  of	  the	  lamb’s	  blood	  to	  the	  lintel	  and	  doorposts	  of	  
their	  homes	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  sign	  for	  the	  Lord.	  	  When	  the	  Lord	  sees	  the	  blood	  he	  will	  pass	  
over	  the	  home	  and	  “not	  let	  the	  Destroyer	  enter”	  and	  smite	  any	  in	  the	  household.39	  	  
	   This	  story	  of	  liberation	  from	  the	  oppression	  of	  Pharaoh	  in	  Egypt	  came	  to	  hold	  a	  
significant	  place	  in	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  Jewish	  people	  throughout	  history,	  eventually	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  Exodus	  6:1,	  JPS	  Hebrew-­‐English	  Tanakh,	  2nd	  ed.	  (Philadelphia:	  The	  Jewish	  Publication	  Society,	  1999),	  
122.	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evolving	  into	  a	  political	  symbol	  of	  national	  redemption.	  	  For	  many	  years	  the	  Passover	  
festival	  (Pesach)	  was	  celebrated	  in	  individual	  homes,	  bringing	  together	  small	  bands	  of	  
Jews	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  remembering	  the	  story	  of	  their	  deliverance.	  	  The	  
Passover	  festival	  was	  celebrated	  at	  the	  start	  of	  spring,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as,	  but	  in	  a	  
different	  manner	  than,	  the	  Festival	  of	  Matsos	  (Unleavened	  Bread).	  	  “The	  Feast	  of	  
Unleavened	  Bread	  was	  observed	  by	  the	  entire	  community	  gathered	  in	  a	  holy	  place,	  
while	  Pesach	  was	  celebrated	  in	  the	  home	  as	  a	  family	  festival.”	  	  The	  two	  festivals	  were	  
combined	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  Josiah,	  when	  Jerusalem	  became	  the	  one	  sanctuary	  for	  all	  
Jews	  and	  the	  location	  of	  all	  festivals.	  	  The	  exodus	  occurred	  in	  the	  first	  spring	  month	  of	  
the	  year;	  thus,	  it	  was	  natural	  to	  adapt	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  spring	  festivals	  to	  the	  newer,	  
more	  significant	  event	  in	  Jewish	  history.	  	  “Spring,	  the	  time	  of	  liberation	  for	  nature,	  and	  
the	  idea	  of	  human	  freedom	  seemed	  to	  fit	  very	  well	  together;	  in	  this	  way	  Pesach	  became	  
the	  festival	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  its	  deliverance	  from	  slavery,	  and	  its	  
awakening	  to	  a	  new	  life.”	  	  Thus,	  Pesach	  was	  moved	  out	  of	  the	  house	  (the	  private	  realm)	  
and	  into	  society	  (the	  public	  realm)	  when	  the	  festival	  was	  celebrated	  at	  one	  central	  place,	  
the	  Temple	  in	  Jerusalem.	  	  People	  were	  literally	  united	  in	  time	  and	  space	  at	  this	  festival	  
and	  Passover	  became	  “a	  symbol	  of	  the	  striving	  of	  the	  people	  toward	  national	  
freedom.”40	  
After	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  Second	  Temple,	  Pesach	  underwent	  further	  changes	  
and	  “the	  importance	  of	  the	  festival	  grew	  and	  .	  .	  .	  it	  became,	  in	  time,	  the	  greatest	  Jewish	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  Hayyim	  Schauss,	  Pesach:	  A	  Jewish	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  (Whitefish,	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  Publishing,	  2010),	  43-­‐45,	  
emphasis	  mine.	  
	  
	   42	  
national	  holiday.”	  	  The	  activities	  of	  Passover,	  including	  those	  carried	  over	  from	  the	  
Festival	  of	  Matsos	  were	  assigned	  new	  symbolic	  meanings	  and	  interpretations	  whereby	  
“the	  freeing	  of	  Jerusalem	  from	  foreign	  rule	  became	  the	  main	  item.”	  	  The	  festival	  no	  
longer	  concerned	  individual	  liberation	  or	  redemption,	  but	  celebrated	  the	  collective	  
freedom	  of	  the	  entire	  nation.	  	  “Pesach	  now	  attained	  still	  greater	  importance	  as	  the	  
anniversary	  of	  the	  deliverance	  from	  the	  first	  exile.”41	  	  Thus,	  the	  Passover	  narrative	  and	  
the	  Passover	  festival	  underwent	  changes	  as	  the	  Jewish	  people	  evolved	  and	  history	  
unfolded.	  	  While	  the	  Passover	  story	  as	  a	  religious	  narrative	  is	  arguably	  a	  story	  of	  
responding	  in	  faith	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  YHWH,	  the	  Passover	  experience	  came	  to	  be	  an	  
annual	  remembrance	  of	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  freedom	  that	  allowed	  the	  Israelites	  to	  
reemerge	  as	  a	  nation.	  	  No	  longer	  necessarily	  faith	  based,	  but	  national-­‐identity	  oriented,	  
the	  secular	  understanding	  of	  the	  Passover	  story	  is	  one	  in	  which	  reality	  and	  phenomenal	  
existence	  have	  replaced	  a	  life	  in	  relationship	  with	  YHWH.	  	  One	  can	  see	  in	  the	  evolution	  
of	  the	  meaning	  of	  Passover	  the	  move	  from	  the	  spiritual	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  world;	  this	  is	  
similar	  to	  Arendt’s	  move	  from	  philosophy	  to	  politics	  and	  further	  supports	  the	  argument	  
presented	  here.	  
The	  metaphorical	  use	  of	  the	  Passover	  narrative	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  
understanding	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory	  necessitates	  a	  more	  thorough	  investigation	  into	  
her	  Jewishness.	  	  As	  a	  secular	  Jew,	  Arendt	  participated	  in	  the	  festival	  of	  remembrance.	  	  
While	  it	  would	  be	  speculative	  to	  assume	  that	  she	  participated	  in	  the	  festival	  every	  year,	  
it	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  she	  celebrated	  the	  holiday	  as	  a	  child,	  while	  under	  the	  influence	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of	  her	  paternal	  grandparents	  and	  under	  the	  tutelage	  of	  Rabbi	  Vogelstein.42	  	  It	  did	  not	  
lose	  its	  significance	  when	  she	  became	  an	  adult.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  1975,	  the	  year	  she	  died,	  
Arendt	  celebrated	  Pesach	  with	  a	  professor	  at	  the	  Jewish	  Theological	  Seminary	  of	  
America,	  Louis	  Finkelstein.	  	  Dr.	  Finkelstein	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  Arendt	  in	  February	  of	  1975	  
inviting	  her	  to	  celebrate	  Pesach,	  “I	  wonder	  whether	  it	  would	  be	  convenient	  for	  you	  to	  
come	  to	  the	  seder	  at	  my	  home	  this	  year	  again,	  as	  you	  did	  last	  year.”	  Arendt	  replied,	  “I’ll	  
come	  with	  great	  pleasure.”43	  	  Whether	  she	  consistently	  participated	  in	  the	  annual	  
celebration	  of	  Passover,	  recalling	  the	  experience	  of	  freedom,	  is	  not	  clear;	  what	  is	  clear	  is	  
that	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  her	  life	  and	  at	  the	  end	  of	  her	  life	  the	  Passover	  experience	  was	  
present.	  	  	  
As	  a	  secular	  Jew,	  Arendt’s	  “Jewishness”	  is	  not	  a	  faith-­‐based	  quality,	  but	  is	  a	  social	  
and	  moral	  concern.	  	  She	  wrote,	  regarding	  the	  “pariahs”	  and	  “intellectuals”	  of	  European	  
Jewry,	  “their	  own	  Jewishness,	  which	  played	  hardly	  any	  role	  in	  their	  spiritual	  household,	  
determined	  their	  social	  life	  to	  an	  extraordinary	  degree	  and	  therefore	  presented	  itself	  to	  
them	  as	  a	  moral	  question	  in	  the	  first	  order.”	  	  These	  pariah	  Jews,	  and	  Arendt	  as	  a	  pariah	  
in	  her	  own	  right,	  were	  living	  under	  conditions	  that	  readily	  relate	  to	  the	  Passover	  story:	  	  
like	  the	  Israelites	  of	  Pharaoh’s	  Egypt,	  their	  social/political	  reality	  was	  oppressive	  and	  
ultimately	  dehumanizing.	  	  They	  could	  remain	  inactive,	  dissembled,	  effectively	  concealed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  “Neither	  of	  Hanah	  Arendt’s	  parents	  was	  religious.	  	  But	  they	  sent	  their	  daughter	  to	  the	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  with	  
her	  Arendt	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  Vogelstein	  and	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Young-­‐Bruehl,	  For	  Love	  of	  the	  World,	  9.	  
43	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  The	  Hannah	  Arendt	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  Library	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  Congress,	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individuals	  living	  in	  “lying	  denial”	  of	  their	  “isolation	  from	  reality.”44	  	  If	  they	  desired	  to	  
exist	  in	  reality,	  they	  would	  have	  to	  embrace	  the	  essential	  human	  capability,	  freedom,	  
and	  from	  this	  freedom	  choose	  to	  act.45	  	  Their	  Jewishness,	  then,	  was	  the	  remembrance	  
of	  their	  human-­‐ness	  as	  it	  exists	  in	  the	  recognition	  that	  man	  is	  innately	  free.	  	  This	  return	  
was	  embodied,	  for	  Arendt,	  in	  the	  resuscitation	  of	  the	  Passover	  story,	  the	  fundamental	  
narrative	  of	  the	  Jewish	  experience	  and	  symbol	  of	  freedom	  and	  liberation.	  	  These	  
concepts	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Jewishness	  as	  a	  cultural	  and	  ethical	  quality.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  relevance	  of	  her	  Jewishness	  and	  the	  Passover	  story	  to	  
Arendt’s	  political	  theory,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  turn	  to	  her	  collection	  of	  essays	  entitled,	  Men	  in	  
Dark	  Times.	  	  The	  text	  is	  a	  narrative	  practice	  in	  which	  Arendt	  accounts	  the	  lives,	  qualities,	  
and	  actions	  of	  various	  pariah	  types	  and	  through	  which	  she	  discloses	  an	  understanding	  of	  
her	  own	  Jewishness.	  	  Allen	  Speight	  notes	  the	  remarkable	  congruence	  between	  the	  
“thematic	  content	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  narrative	  in	  this	  collection”	  and	  her	  developed,	  albeit	  
brief,	  discussion	  of	  narrative	  in	  The	  Human	  Condition.	  	  Speight	  also	  notes	  that	  Arendt	  
“appears	  to	  be	  using	  her	  narrative	  praxis	  to	  think	  through	  the	  theoretical	  claims	  about	  
narrative	  from	  [The	  Human	  Condition].”46	  	  	  
Speight’s	  presentation	  of	  Arendt’s	  narrative	  theory	  is	  insightful	  and	  articulate.	  	  
However,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  to	  the	  collection	  of	  essays	  in	  Men	  In	  Dark	  Times	  than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Arendt,	  Men	  in	  Dark	  Times,	  183,	  186,	  emphasis	  mine.	  
	  
45	  In	  her	  reply	  to	  Eric	  Voegelin’s	  review	  of	  her	  work	  The	  Origins	  of	  Totalitarianism	  in	  The	  Review	  of	  Politics,	  
Hannah	  Arendt	  presents	  freedom	  as	  an	  essential	  capability	  of	  human	  beings.	  	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  “A	  Reply	  to	  
Eric	  Voegelin,”	  in	  Essays	  in	  Understanding,	  ed.	  Jerome	  Kohn	  (New	  York:	  	  Schocken	  Books,	  1994),	  401-­‐408.	  
46	  Allen	  Speight,	  “Arendt	  on	  Narrative	  Theory	  and	  Practice,”	  College	  Literature,	  Vol.	  38,	  No.	  1	  (Winter	  
2011),	  122,	  123.	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he	  purports,	  and	  more	  than	  Arendt	  explicitly	  states.	  	  There	  are	  eleven	  chapters	  
dedicated	  to	  ten	  different	  pariah-­‐types	  (Karl	  Jaspers	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  two	  essays),	  each	  
of	  whom	  challenge	  their	  political	  identity	  in	  some	  way.	  	  Arendt	  sets	  out	  to	  tell	  the	  
stories	  of	  these	  men	  and	  women,	  “how	  they	  lived	  their	  lives,	  how	  they	  moved	  in	  the	  
world,	  and	  how	  they	  were	  affected	  by	  the	  historical	  time.”	  	  She	  chooses	  for	  her	  exercise	  
a	  sampling	  of	  individuals	  who	  “could	  hardly	  be	  more	  unlike	  each	  other”	  except	  for	  the	  
fact	  that	  “they	  share	  with	  each	  other	  the	  age	  in	  which	  their	  life	  span	  fell,”	  with	  the	  
exception	  of	  Lessing,	  who	  is	  treated	  as	  a	  contemporary,	  nonetheless.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  
contemporaneity	  of	  these	  subjects	  is	  quite	  significant,	  however,	  because	  the	  historical	  
time	  they	  shared	  was	  filled	  with	  catastrophe,	  moral	  disaster	  and	  unprecedented	  
scientific	  developments.	  	  The	  stories	  she	  tells	  are	  of	  lives	  deeply	  affected	  by	  this	  age	  that	  
“killed	  some	  of	  them	  and	  determined	  the	  life	  and	  work	  of	  others.”47	  	  	  
However,	  all	  the	  protagonists	  in	  this	  collection	  are	  woven	  together	  by	  a	  thread	  
much	  more	  interesting	  than	  mere	  contemporaneity:	  	  association	  with	  and	  involvement	  
in	  20th	  century	  European	  Jewry.	  	  More	  specifically,	  all	  of	  the	  individuals	  in	  this	  collection	  
were	  at	  the	  very	  least	  personally	  threatened	  and	  persecuted	  due	  to	  some	  connection	  
with	  Jews	  in	  Europe	  or	  the	  position	  they	  took	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  treatment	  of	  Jews	  by	  
the	  Nazi	  regime.	  	  Lessing,	  while	  not	  Jewish,	  had	  a	  significantly	  close	  relationship	  with	  
Moses	  Medelssohn,	  the	  18th	  century	  leader	  of	  the	  Jewish	  reform	  movement,	  a	  
movement	  that	  Arendt	  speaks	  at	  length	  about	  in	  The	  Jewish	  Writings.	  	  During	  his	  life,	  
Lessing	  took	  a	  firm	  stance	  against	  conservative	  religious	  notions,	  wrote	  various	  plays	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Arendt,	  Men	  In	  Dark	  Times,	  vii.	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and	  poems,	  and	  was	  a	  staunch	  literary	  critic.	  	  Holding	  fast	  to	  a	  universal	  understanding	  
of	  human	  being,	  Lessing	  advocated	  a	  tolerance	  toward	  Jews	  during	  a	  time	  when	  they	  
were	  still	  relegated	  to	  the	  ghetto,	  a	  stance	  neither	  popular,	  nor	  familiar	  among	  non-­‐
Jews	  in	  Germany	  in	  the	  18th	  century.	  	  Angello	  Giuseppe	  Roncalli	  (Pope	  John	  XXIII)	  was,	  
clearly,	  not	  Jewish;	  however,	  his	  contributions	  to	  Jewish-­‐Christian	  relations	  are	  well	  
known.	  	  Moreover,	  as	  the	  apostolic	  delegate	  to	  Turkey	  during	  WWII,	  Roncalli	  was	  
instrumental	  in	  providing	  escape	  and	  asylum	  for	  thousands	  of	  European	  Jews.	  	  Karl	  
Jaspers,	  beyond	  the	  obvious	  connection	  with	  Arendt	  and	  other	  Jewish	  intellectuals,	  was	  
married	  to	  a	  Jewish	  woman.	  	  For	  his	  liberal	  attitude	  toward	  human	  beings,	  his	  
willingness	  to	  see	  people	  as	  they	  exposed	  themselves	  to	  be,	  Jaspers	  suffered	  
persecution	  under	  the	  National	  Socialist	  regime	  and	  was	  removed	  from	  his	  position	  at	  
the	  university.	  	  Isak	  Dinesen,	  adored	  by	  Arendt,	  not	  only	  wrote	  wonderful	  stories,	  but	  
she,	  too,	  exhibited	  heroic	  activity	  during	  WWII,	  opening	  her	  home	  in	  Denmark	  as	  part	  of	  
a	  passage	  to	  Sweden.	  	  She	  was	  instrumental	  in	  facilitating	  the	  escape	  of	  tens	  of	  
thousands	  of	  Jews.	  	  Bertolt	  Brecht	  was	  a	  fearless	  critic	  of	  the	  Nazi	  movement	  who	  wrote	  
plays	  and	  poems	  distinct	  in	  their	  anti-­‐Nazi	  sentiments.	  	  He	  fled	  from	  Germany	  in	  1933	  
after	  Hitler	  came	  to	  power,	  but	  his	  vehement	  criticism	  of	  the	  regime	  never	  faltered.	  	  
Randall	  Jarrell	  was	  a	  poet	  who	  impressed	  Arendt	  with	  some	  of	  his	  poems	  written	  during	  
and	  about	  WWII.	  	  The	  two	  shared	  commonalities	  too	  complex	  to	  expound	  here;	  but,	  
they	  enjoyed	  an	  intimate	  friendship	  of	  respect	  until	  he	  died	  in	  1965.	  	  	  
The	  other	  four	  subjects,	  Rosa	  Luxemburg,	  Hermann	  Broch,	  Walter	  Benjamin,	  and	  
Waldemar	  Gurian,	  were	  born	  into	  Jewish	  families,	  although	  Broch	  and	  Gurian	  converted	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to	  Catholicism.	  	  Luxemburg	  is	  well	  known	  for	  her	  defiance	  of	  authority	  and	  her	  anti-­‐war	  
demonstrations.	  	  Her	  vehement	  activism	  was	  driven	  by	  a	  strong	  belief	  in	  the	  power	  of	  
the	  masses	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  revolution.	  	  It	  was	  her	  unrestrained	  fervor	  for	  political	  
action	  that	  drew	  Arendt	  to	  her	  and	  why	  she	  must	  be	  included	  among	  the	  pariahs	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century.	  	  Broch	  and	  Gurian	  shared	  more	  than	  a	  religious	  conversion;	  both	  
were	  writers	  and	  both	  were	  deeply	  concerned	  with	  phenomenal	  reality.	  	  Broch	  was	  
motivated	  to	  an	  active	  life	  by	  an	  ethical	  imperative:	  	  he	  believed	  human	  beings	  had	  to	  
help	  one	  another.	  	  Gurian	  was	  a	  realist	  who	  was	  deeply	  moved	  by	  his	  experiences	  and	  a	  
recognition	  that	  he	  could	  act	  to	  change	  circumstances.	  	  Finally,	  Benjamin	  was	  gifted	  
with	  poetic	  thinking,	  a	  faculty	  of	  the	  mind	  requisite	  for	  political	  action.	  	  
If	  one	  takes	  Arendt	  at	  her	  word,	  the	  various	  narratives	  are	  stories	  of	  pariahs	  who	  
have	  nothing	  in	  common	  other	  than	  the	  time	  they	  happened	  to	  be	  thrown	  into	  this	  
world.	  	  However,	  if	  one	  carefully	  considers	  the	  accounts	  themselves,	  the	  stories	  as	  they	  
disclosed	  the	  individual	  actors,	  one	  cannot	  help	  but	  notice	  the	  specific	  types	  of	  people	  
she	  chose	  for	  this	  exercise.	  	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  her	  conscious	  pariahs,	  while	  not	  
necessarily	  Jewish,	  are,	  due	  to	  the	  historical	  circumstances,	  inextricably	  connected	  to	  
the	  Jewish	  story.	  	  As	  Speight	  notes,	  she	  uses	  the	  practice	  of	  writing	  narrative	  to	  better	  
understand	  her	  theory	  of	  narrative,	  but	  she	  also	  uses	  the	  stories	  themselves	  to	  better	  
understand	  life.	  	  Men	  In	  Dark	  Times	  is	  an	  exercise	  in	  discovering	  the	  living	  meaning	  of	  
ten	  narratives.	  	  The	  experience	  of	  engaging	  in	  these	  diverse	  stories	  informs	  her	  
understanding	  of	  human	  being	  and	  life,	  in	  many	  ways	  reflecting	  the	  sophisticated	  
articulation	  of	  political	  theory	  given	  in	  The	  Human	  Condition	  some	  ten	  years	  prior.	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What	  these	  stories	  hold	  fundamentally	  is	  an	  exposition	  on	  freedom	  and	  justice,	  
the	  very	  task	  she	  sees	  as	  the	  purpose	  of	  narrative,	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  Passover	  story,	  in	  
particular.	  	  The	  lives	  of	  these	  20th	  century	  pariah	  types	  are	  powerful	  because	  they	  call	  to	  
mind	  the	  type	  of	  activity	  necessary	  for	  honest	  un-­‐concealment	  of	  identity.	  	  The	  stories	  
of	  these	  people	  do	  exactly	  what	  the	  Passover	  story	  does:	  	  teach	  the	  difference	  between	  
slavery	  and	  freedom.	  	  Thus,	  the	  Passover	  story,	  while	  particular	  to	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  
has	  a	  broader	  context	  for	  application.	  	  The	  living	  meaning	  of	  the	  story,	  of	  all	  authentic	  
narratives,	  is	  the	  same:	  	  in	  the	  revelation	  of	  action,	  the	  political	  space	  of	  appearance	  
emerges,	  a	  space	  that	  Arendt	  believes	  is	  equivalent	  to	  freedom.	  	  Action	  is	  political,	  and	  
the	  meaning	  of	  politics	  is	  freedom;	  therefore,	  the	  living	  meaning	  of	  any	  authentic	  
narrative	  as	  it	  conveys	  actions	  is	  innately	  political	  and	  must	  reveal	  some	  notion	  of	  
freedom	  and	  justice.	  	  	  
The	  interruptive	  moments	  that	  create	  the	  content	  of	  narrative	  are	  driven	  by	  
something	  that	  occurs	  in	  “the	  hearts	  and	  brains”	  of	  individual	  human	  beings.	  	  That	  is	  to	  
say,	  it	  has	  the	  power	  to	  interrupt	  whatever	  is	  occurring	  and	  activate	  the	  faculties	  of	  the	  
mind.	  	  As	  Jerome	  Kohn	  writes	  in	  his	  introductory	  remarks	  to	  The	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  
“What	  is	  crucial	  for	  Arendt	  is	  that	  the	  specific	  meaning	  of	  an	  event	  that	  happened	  in	  the	  
past	  remains	  potentially	  alive	  in	  the	  reproductive	  imagination.”48	  	  The	  Passover	  story,	  
and	  the	  stories	  of	  those	  individuals	  who	  have	  acted	  in	  word	  and	  deed,	  are	  “living”	  when	  
they	  spur	  the	  mind	  to	  consider	  the	  world	  and	  its	  infinite	  possibilities.	  	  This	  capacity	  to	  
look	  at	  the	  world	  from	  a	  multitude	  of	  perspectives	  is,	  for	  Arendt,	  “thinking.”	  	  The	  activity	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  The	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  ed.	  John	  Kohn	  (New	  York:	  Schocken	  Books,	  2005),	  p.xxi.	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of	  thinking	  culls	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  world	  through	  action,	  
which	  motivates	  the	  mental	  activity	  of	  willing.	  	  Kohn	  points	  out	  that	  the	  power	  of	  
narrative	  lies	  in	  its	  reproductive	  capacity.	  	  Thus,	  remembrance	  itself	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  
create	  the	  volition	  to	  do;	  the	  will	  is	  the	  faculty	  that	  looks	  to	  the	  future,	  by	  drawing	  from	  
the	  past,	  and	  creates	  a	  present,	  that	  is	  an	  entirely	  new	  moment.	  	  Finally,	  thinking	  and	  
willing	  manifest	  a	  third	  mental	  capacity—judging.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  judging	  is	  the	  most	  
political	  activity	  of	  the	  mind	  because	  it	  assesses	  particulars	  and	  is	  the	  manifestation	  of	  
thought.	  	  While	  the	  mental	  faculties	  are	  inherent	  in	  all	  human	  beings,	  they	  must	  be	  
active	  in	  order	  for	  human	  beings	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  world	  via	  action.	  	  Thus,	  the	  
subsequent	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  explain	  the	  vita	  contemplativa	  and	  its	  part	  in	  the	  political	  
realization	  of	  the	  plurality	  of	  men	  that	  live	  in	  the	  world.	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CHAPTER	  II:	  
THE	  ACTIVITIES	  OF	  THE	  MIND:	  	  THINKING,	  WILLING,	  JUDGING	  
The	  business	  of	  thinking	  is	  like	  the	  veil	  of	  Penelope:	  	  
it	  undoes	  every	  morning	  what	  it	  had	  finished	  the	  night	  before.	  
~	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Responsibility	  and	  Judgment	  
	  
Arendt	  wrote	  The	  Human	  Condition	  as	  an	  investigation	  into	  “what	  we	  are	  doing.”	  	  
As	  such,	  the	  work	  focuses	  on	  the	  vita	  activa,	  a	  realm	  of	  existence	  that	  is	  distinguished	  
from	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  vita	  contempletiva.	  	  These	  terms	  are	  Latin	  translations	  of	  ideas	  
and	  concepts	  that	  were	  originally	  Greek.	  	  Simply	  translated,	  they	  mean	  the	  “active	  life”	  
and	  the	  “contemplative	  life.”	  	  Arendt	  traces	  these	  Latin	  words	  back	  to	  the	  Greek	  terms	  
bios	  askholia	  and	  bios	  theoretikos,	  the	  “unquiet	  life”	  and	  the	  “quiet	  life.”	  	  For	  the	  Greeks,	  
starting	  with	  Aristotle,	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  quiet	  and	  unquiet	  life	  is	  “between	  an	  
almost	  breathless	  abstention	  from	  external	  physical	  movement	  and	  activity	  of	  every	  
kind.”1	  	  This	  distinction	  is	  more	  decisive	  than	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  bios	  
theoretikos	  and	  the	  bios	  politikos,	  “the	  political	  life,”	  because	  all	  human	  activity	  is	  
included	  in	  the	  term	  bios	  askholia.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  unquiet	  life	  and	  the	  quiet	  life	  exist	  in	  
absolute	  exclusivity,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  “[e]very	  movement,	  the	  movements	  of	  body	  and	  
soul	  and	  well	  as	  of	  speech	  and	  reasoning,	  must	  cease	  before	  truth.”2	  	  For	  the	  ancient	  
Greeks,	  the	  two	  realms	  of	  human	  existence,	  the	  world	  of	  quiet	  and	  the	  world	  of	  unquiet,	  
are	  altogether	  separate.	  	  Arendt,	  steeped	  in	  the	  Greek	  and	  Western	  traditions	  of	  
thought,	  considers	  the	  two	  worlds	  and	  determines	  that,	  in	  fact,	  they	  are	  not	  exclusive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  15.	  
2	  Ibid.	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realms	  of	  existence.	  	  Rather,	  they	  are	  both	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  human	  experience	  
insofar	  as	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  physical	  body	  are	  both	  
conditioned	  by	  the	  terms	  of	  human	  existence.	  	  Further,	  she	  notes	  that	  the	  active	  life	  “is	  
neither	  superior	  nor	  inferior	  to	  the	  central	  concern	  of	  the	  vita	  contemplativa.”3	  	  What	  
we	  find	  in	  The	  Human	  Condition	  is	  that	  her	  inquiry	  into	  the	  active	  life,	  the	  world	  of	  
human	  experience,	  effectively	  reinforced	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  “what	  are	  we	  
doing?”	  involves	  both	  realms	  of	  existence,	  the	  active	  and	  the	  contemplative.	  	  Coming	  
from	  the	  Greek	  tradition,	  with	  a	  bifurcated	  framework	  of	  understanding,	  Arendt	  asserts,	  
that	  contrary	  to	  the	  Greek	  position,	  “all	  thinking	  in	  two	  worlds	  suggests	  that	  these	  two	  
are	  inseparably	  connected	  with	  each	  other.”4	  	  Thus,	  she	  concludes	  The	  Human	  Condition	  
“with	  a	  curious	  sentence	  that	  Cicero	  ascribed	  to	  Cato,	  who	  used	  to	  say	  that	  ‘never	  is	  
man	  more	  active	  than	  when	  he	  does	  nothing,	  never	  is	  he	  less	  alone	  than	  when	  he	  is	  by	  
himself.’”5	  	  	  	  
Cato’s	  strange	  observation	  leads	  to	  the	  inquiry	  found	  in	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind	  
where	  Arendt	  ponders,	  “What	  are	  we	  ‘doing’	  when	  we	  do	  nothing	  but	  think?	  	  Where	  
are	  we	  when	  we,	  normally	  always	  surrounded	  by	  our	  fellow-­‐men,	  are	  together	  with	  no	  
one	  but	  ourselves?”	  	  Like	  The	  Human	  Condition,	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind	  is	  an	  inquiry	  into	  
the	  conditions	  of	  being	  human.	  	  While	  rejecting	  the	  classical	  notion	  that	  the	  two	  realms	  
are	  separate	  from	  one	  another,	  Arendt	  must	  confront	  the	  aspect	  of	  humanness	  that	  she	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Ibid.,	  17.	  
4	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind	  (New	  York:	  Harcourt,	  Inc.,	  1978),	  11.	  
5	  Ibid.,	  7-­‐8.	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specifically	  did	  not	  address	  in	  The	  Human	  Condition	  if	  she	  is	  going	  to	  present	  a	  
comprehensive	  theory	  of	  the	  human	  experience.	  	  Thus,	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind	  is	  an	  
exercise	  built	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  “one	  could	  look	  at	  this	  matter	  from	  an	  altogether	  
different	  viewpoint,”	  one	  that	  includes	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  praxis	  not	  only	  what	  man	  does,	  
but	  also	  what	  man	  thinks.6	  
Early	  on	  in	  her	  works,	  Arendt	  identifies	  the	  faculty	  of	  reason	  and	  its	  activity,	  
thinking.7	  	  In	  “Some	  Questions	  of	  Moral	  Philosophy,”	  written	  in	  1965-­‐66,	  she	  clearly	  
proposes	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  altogether	  separate	  faculty	  of	  the	  mind,	  namely,	  the	  will.8	  	  
While	  she	  was	  certain	  that	  this	  faculty	  existed,	  she	  was	  uncertain	  about	  the	  activities	  
particular	  to	  it.	  	  Specifically,	  she	  was	  perplexed	  by	  the	  activity	  of	  judging,	  which	  seemed	  
to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  will.	  	  Of	  this,	  however,	  she	  was	  not	  convinced:	  	  
“Whether	  this	  faculty	  of	  judgment,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  mysterious	  faculties	  of	  the	  human	  
mind,	  should	  be	  said	  to	  be	  the	  will	  or	  reason	  or	  perhaps	  a	  third	  mental	  capacity,	  is	  at	  
least	  an	  open	  question.”9	  	  This	  passage	  tells	  us	  three	  things:	  	  1)	  at	  this	  point	  in	  1966	  
Arendt	  was	  certain	  of	  at	  least	  two	  distinct	  mental	  faculties,	  reason	  and	  will;	  2)	  she	  was	  
still	  deciphering	  the	  particular	  activity/ies	  of	  the	  will;	  3)	  she	  was	  uncertain	  whether	  
judging	  was	  an	  activity	  of	  the	  will	  or	  of	  an	  altogether	  separate	  faculty	  of	  the	  mind.	  	  In	  
the	  end,	  she	  determines	  that	  there	  is	  indeed	  a	  third	  mental	  faculty,	  to	  which	  the	  activity	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Ibid.,	  7,	  8.	  
7	  In	  The	  Human	  Condition	  (1958)	  the	  faculty	  of	  thought	  and	  the	  activity	  of	  thinking	  are	  discussed	  
throughout.	  
8	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  “Some	  Questions	  of	  Moral	  Philosophy”	  in	  Responsibility	  and	  Judgment,	  ed.	  Jerome	  Kohn	  
(New	  York:	  Schocken	  Books,	  2003):	  49-­‐146.	  
9	  Ibid.,	  131.	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of	  judging	  belongs.	  	  In	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind	  (1971)	  the	  faculties	  of	  the	  mind	  are	  clear:	  	  
“Thinking,	  willing,	  and	  judging	  are	  the	  three	  basic	  mental	  activities;	  they	  cannot	  be	  
derived	  from	  each	  other	  and	  though	  they	  have	  certain	  common	  characteristics	  they	  
cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  common	  denominator.”10	  	  	  
In	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind	  Arendt	  planned	  to	  carefully	  investigate	  the	  activities	  of	  
the	  vita	  contemplativa.	  	  The	  text,	  accordingly,	  was	  broken	  into	  into	  three	  parts:	  	  
Thinking,	  Willing,	  and	  Judging.	  	  She	  completed	  manuscripts	  for	  both	  “Thinking”	  and	  
“Willing”;	  however,	  due	  to	  Arendt’s	  untimely	  death	  in	  1975,	  the	  third	  part,	  “Judging,”	  
was	  never	  written.	  	  A	  discussion	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  necessarily	  depends	  heavily	  
upon	  this	  text,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  incomplete.	  	  As	  I	  progress	  though	  the	  three	  
elements	  of	  the	  vita	  contemplativa	  I	  will	  acknowledge	  and	  examine	  her	  dialogue	  with	  
Socrates,	  Plato,	  Augustine,	  Kant,	  and	  Heidegger.	  	  It	  is	  in	  her	  divergence	  from	  each	  of	  
these	  sources,	  with	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  Socrates,	  wherein	  her	  Jewishness	  becomes	  
apparent.	  	  Admittedly,	  in	  this	  area	  of	  her	  philosophy,	  the	  Jewish	  experiential	  and	  
intellectual	  influences	  may	  not	  be	  the	  most	  important;	  however,	  recognizing	  her	  
Jewishness	  adds	  subtle	  but	  significant	  nuances	  to	  her	  thinking.	  	  The	  conversation	  she	  
has	  with	  the	  Plato	  and	  thinkers	  in	  the	  Western	  tradition	  is	  far	  more	  prominent	  in	  her	  
works,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  that	  we	  not	  leave	  her	  Jewishness	  behind	  even	  when	  it	  seems	  
to	  be	  cursory	  or	  insignificant.	  
Discerning	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  Jewish	  tradition	  in	  this	  particular	  area	  of	  Arendt’s	  
thought	  is	  difficult.	  	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  discover	  if	  Arendt’s	  notion	  of	  thinking	  does,	  in	  fact,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  69.	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have	  any	  affinity	  with	  the	  Jewish	  tradition,	  I	  turn	  to	  The	  Jewish	  Political	  Tradition,	  a	  
multivolume	  work	  that	  presents	  the	  texts	  and	  arguments	  that	  comprise	  the	  history	  of	  
Jewish	  political	  discourse.	  	  In	  his	  introductory	  remarks,	  Michael	  Fishbane	  offers	  
instructive	  and	  important	  commentary	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  thinking	  in	  the	  Jewish	  tradition.	  	  
Specifically,	  he	  addresses	  the	  ongoing	  and	  cross-­‐referencing	  commentaries	  of	  the	  
Talmud	  and	  he	  notes	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Talmud	  is	  that	  of	  one	  mind,	  so	  to	  speak.	  	  
He	  says	  that	  this	  ‘mind’	  “thinks	  through	  the	  traditions	  .	  .	  .	  criticizing	  them	  .	  .	  .	  and	  
deliberating	  their	  implications	  with	  respect	  to	  religious	  actions.”11	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  
Talmudic	  tradition	  is	  one	  that	  uses	  the	  authoritative	  texts	  and	  commentaries	  to	  
continuously	  interpret	  correct	  action	  according	  to	  the	  revelation.	  	  Because	  Arendt	  was	  
secular,	  the	  tradition	  has	  a	  different	  bearing	  on	  her.	  	  However,	  her	  work,	  specifically	  her	  
view	  of	  thinking,	  stands	  firmly	  in	  this	  tradition:	  	  she	  refers	  to	  the	  tradition	  (of	  freedom	  
and	  justice)	  to	  deliberate,	  criticize,	  and	  understand	  the	  possibilities	  for	  action	  in	  the	  
world.	  	  Thinking,	  like	  the	  communal	  mind	  of	  the	  Talmud,	  is	  always	  considering	  the	  world,	  
inquiring	  into	  its	  value,	  and	  pondering	  the	  possibilities	  of	  action.12	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Michael	  Fishbane,	  “Law,	  Story,	  and	  Interpretation:	  Reading	  Rabbinic	  Texts”	  in	  The	  Jewish	  Political	  
Tradition,	  Volume	  One:	  Authority,	  eds.	  Michael	  Walzer,	  Menachem	  Lorberbaum,	  and	  Noam	  J.	  Zohar	  (New	  
Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  xlv.	  
12	  Michael	  Walzer	  also	  wrote	  an	  introductory	  essay	  to	  The	  Jewish	  Political	  Tradition	  entitled,	  
“Introduction:	  The	  Jewish	  Political	  Tradition.”	  	  In	  this	  essay,	  he	  notes	  the	  specific	  qualities	  that	  denote	  
members	  of	  the	  Jewish	  tradition.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  Jewish	  tradition	  emphasizes	  a	  set	  of	  texts	  (the	  Hebrew	  
Bible	  and	  its	  commentaries)	  and	  an	  event	  (political	  exile).	  	  While	  Arendt	  does	  not	  emphasize	  any	  religious	  
texts	  in	  her	  works,	  she	  does	  revere	  the	  living	  meaning	  of	  the	  Passover	  and	  the	  consequent	  exodus	  from	  
Egypt.	  	  Furthermore,	  Arendt	  shares	  an	  experience	  of	  exile	  with	  many	  European	  Jews,	  an	  experience	  that	  
resonates	  with	  the	  Passover	  event.	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The	  tradition	  retrieved,	  integrated,	  and	  criticized	  in	  The	  Jewish	  Political	  Tradition	  
is	  one	  built	  upon	  thinking.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  one	  that	  constantly	  refines,	  interprets,	  and	  
comments	  on	  its	  experiences	  in	  the	  world.	  	  The	  works	  and	  writers	  that	  are	  included	  in	  
the	  tradition	  are	  categorized	  by	  an	  “engagement	  with	  a	  set	  of	  issues”	  that	  creates	  a	  
“continuing	  argument.”	  	  The	  Jewish	  tradition	  is	  one	  that	  perpetually	  thinks	  about	  the	  
world	  to	  address	  the	  issues	  at	  hand.	  	  It	  has	  a	  point	  of	  reference,	  the	  Exodus	  story,	  and	  it	  
has	  an	  experiential	  basis.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  things	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Arendt’s	  concept	  of	  
thinking.	  	  In	  her	  discussion	  of	  thinking,	  her	  Jewishness	  is	  highlighted	  by	  the	  simple	  fact	  
that	  thinking,	  like	  the	  tradition	  itself,	  never	  ends.	  	  It	  is	  a	  continuing	  process.	  	  So	  long	  as	  
human	  beings	  live	  in	  the	  word	  it	  is	  necessary.	  	  The	  writers	  included	  in	  the	  tradition,	  
“expose	  the	  tradition	  (as	  it	  was	  regularly	  exposed	  in	  the	  past)	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  
contemporary	  understandings	  and	  convictions.”13	  	  Arendt’s	  method	  of	  investigating	  the	  
world	  is	  quite	  similar;	  she	  challenges	  the	  Western	  tradition	  and	  exposes	  the	  political	  and	  
moral	  formulations	  of	  its	  writers	  with	  her	  phenomenological	  approach	  to	  understanding.	  	  
Many	  of	  the	  conceptions	  do	  not	  stand	  under	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  her	  approach;	  and	  it	  is	  there	  
that	  many	  Jewish	  influences	  are	  revealed	  	  
Before	  moving	  into	  an	  exposition	  on	  the	  activities	  involved	  in	  the	  life	  of	  the	  mind,	  
it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  subject	  matter.	  	  While	  Arendt	  breaks	  down	  
the	  life	  of	  the	  mind	  into	  these	  three	  separate	  activities,	  they	  are	  very	  intricately	  
connected.	  	  Thus,	  to	  discuss	  them	  as	  wholly	  separate	  is	  difficult	  and	  at	  certain	  points	  
even	  problematic.	  	  The	  reason	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  are	  impossible	  to	  reduce	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Walzer,	  “The	  Jewish	  Political	  Tradition,”	  xxxi.	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because	  each	  one	  corresponds	  to	  a	  specific	  condition,	  which	  in	  turn	  necessitates	  its	  
function.	  	  For	  example,	  thinking,	  performed	  by	  the	  faculty	  of	  reason,	  corresponds	  to	  the	  
condition	  of	  freedom;	  willing	  corresponds	  to	  the	  condition	  of	  natality;	  and,	  judging	  
corresponds	  to	  the	  condition	  of	  responsibility.	  	  Together,	  these	  three	  activities	  of	  the	  
mind	  greatly	  affect	  the	  way	  an	  individual	  moves	  in	  the	  world.	  	  Thus,	  to	  understand	  the	  
vita	  activa,	  one	  must	  also	  understand	  the	  mental	  faculties	  as	  they	  determine	  not	  only	  if	  
men	  act,	  but	  also	  how.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  show	  how	  these	  faculties	  
operate	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  how	  they	  are	  relevant	  to	  action.	  	  It	  will	  also	  be	  shown	  
that	  the	  catalytic	  power	  of	  the	  narrative	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  mind	  and	  that	  no	  action	  (as	  
Arendt	  understands	  it)	  is	  possible	  without	  thinking,	  willing,	  and	  judging.	  	  Before	  we	  can	  
understand	  the	  realm	  of	  action,	  the	  polis	  itself,	  Arendt	  gives	  an	  account	  of	  how	  we	  
move	  from	  the	  subjective	  individual	  to	  the	  plurality	  of	  human	  experience.	  	  This	  is	  the	  
basis	  of	  her	  phenomenology;	  it	  explains	  how	  consciousness	  appears	  in	  the	  world.	  	  This	  
chapter,	  then,	  explains	  the	  faculties	  of	  the	  mind	  as	  well	  as	  the	  significance	  they	  have	  in	  a	  
phenomenological	  understanding	  of	  the	  world.	  	  	  
	   The	  mental	  activity	  of	  thinking	  plays	  a	  primary	  role	  in	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory	  
because	  it	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  how	  we	  understand	  the	  world	  as	  we	  experience	  it.	  	  It	  allows	  us	  
to	  prescribe	  meaning	  to	  our	  experiences	  and	  through	  it	  we	  determine	  what	  is	  generally	  
good	  and	  bad.	  	  Note,	  Arendt	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  thinking	  produces	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
Good	  or	  any	  other	  absolute	  form:	  	  “The	  need	  of	  reason	  is	  not	  inspired	  by	  the	  quest	  for	  
truth	  but	  by	  the	  quest	  for	  meaning.	  	  And	  truth	  and	  meaning	  are	  not	  the	  same.”14	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  15.	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Further,	  this	  is	  a	  capacity	  that	  is	  common	  to	  all	  men,	  not	  just	  the	  privileged	  few.	  	  And,	  
finally,	  it	  is	  a	  task	  that	  is	  based	  in	  freedom	  and,	  as	  such,	  is	  riddled	  with	  implicit	  dangers.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  fundamentally	  necessary	  that	  we	  think	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  our	  
human-­‐ness.	  	  	  
The	  modern	  influence	  on	  Arendt’s	  conception	  of	  thinking	  will	  be	  noted	  shortly,	  
particularly	  the	  debt	  she	  owes,	  and	  acknowledges,	  to	  Kant.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  first	  
important	  to	  note	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Arendt’s	  notion	  of	  thinking	  is	  influenced	  by	  Greek	  
ideas.	  	  It	  is	  Greek	  not	  in	  a	  Platonic	  sense,	  as	  she	  is	  careful	  to	  reject	  the	  idea	  that	  thinking	  
is	  for	  the	  privileged	  few	  or	  that	  it	  results	  in	  Knowledge.	  	  Part	  of	  her	  project	  is	  the	  
grounding	  of	  the	  activity	  as	  a	  capacity	  common	  to	  all	  and	  necessary	  for	  the	  fullest	  
expression	  of	  human-­‐ness.	  	  She	  does,	  however,	  turn	  to	  Socrates,	  who	  “seems	  indeed	  to	  
have	  held	  that	  talking	  and	  thinking	  about	  piety,	  justice,	  courage,	  and	  the	  rest	  were	  liable	  
to	  make	  men	  more	  pious,	  more	  just,	  more	  courageous,	  even	  though	  they	  were	  not	  
given	  either	  definitions	  or	  ‘values’	  to	  direct	  their	  further	  conduct.”	  	  Like	  him,	  Arendt	  
posits	  that	  thinking	  about	  things	  will	  affect	  how	  one	  acts	  and	  appears	  in	  the	  world	  
despite	  the	  lack	  of	  absolute	  values,	  Truths,	  or	  doctrines.	  	  Socrates	  claimed	  not	  
knowledge	  and	  he	  taught	  not	  facts.	  	  Rather,	  he	  merely	  sought	  to	  inquire	  with	  other	  
people	  because	  he	  “felt	  the	  urge	  to	  check	  with	  his	  fellowmen	  if	  his	  perplexities	  were	  
shared	  by	  them—and	  this	  urge	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  inclination	  to	  find	  solutions	  
for	  riddles	  and	  then	  to	  demonstrate	  them	  to	  others.”15	  	  The	  process	  of	  inquiry	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Arendt,	  Responsibility	  and	  Judgment,	  173,	  174.	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Socrates	  was	  unending	  because	  there	  was	  nothing	  definitive	  to	  attain.	  	  Thinking,	  for	  
Arendt,	  shares	  this	  Socratic	  element	  of	  inquiry.	  	  
	   	  To	  understand	  the	  mental	  faculties	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  active	  life,	  three	  
texts	  will	  be	  examined:	  	  The	  Human	  Condition,	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  and	  Responsibility	  
and	  Judgment.	  	  In	  these	  works,	  Arendt	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  thought	  by	  
comparing	  it	  with	  the	  faculty	  of	  cognition.	  	  To	  begin,	  in	  Responsibility	  and	  Judgment,	  
Arendt	  credits	  Kant	  for	  establishing	  “the	  distinction	  between	  thinking	  and	  knowing,	  
between	  reason,	  the	  urge	  to	  think	  and	  to	  understand,	  and	  the	  intellect,	  which	  desires	  
and	  is	  capable	  of	  certain,	  verifiable	  knowledge.”16	  	  In	  her	  discussions	  of	  thought,	  she	  
carefully	  maintains	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  Kantian	  urgent	  need	  to	  think	  and	  the	  
desire	  to	  know.	  	  In	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  she	  notes	  that	  in	  modernity,	  philosophers	  have	  
constructed	  a	  new	  ‘science’	  that	  blurs	  the	  line	  between	  thinking	  and	  knowing:	  	  
“Pursuing	  the	  Cartesian	  ideal	  of	  certainty	  as	  though	  Kant	  had	  never	  existed,	  they	  
believed	  in	  all	  earnest	  that	  the	  results	  of	  their	  speculations	  possessed	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  
validity	  as	  the	  results	  of	  cognitive	  processes.”17	  	  The	  equivalency	  between	  meaning	  and	  
truth	  is	  poignantly	  displayed	  by	  Heidegger	  in	  Being	  and	  Time.	  	  He	  writes,	  “‘Meaning	  of	  
Being’	  and	  ‘Truth	  of	  Being’	  say	  the	  same.’”18	  	  Arendt	  categorically	  rejects	  this	  assertion:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Ibid.,	  163.	  
17	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  "Einleitung	  zu	  'Was	  ist	  Metaphysik?'"	  Wegmarken	  (Frankfurt	  am	  Main,	  Vittorio	  
Lkostermann	  Verlag,	  1967).	  206.	  	  Translation	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  16.	  
18	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  15,	  emphasis	  mine.	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“The	  need	  of	  reason	  is	  not	  inspired	  by	  the	  quest	  for	  truth	  but	  by	  the	  quest	  for	  meaning.	  	  
And	  truth	  and	  meaning	  are	  not	  the	  same.”19	  	  	  	  
Arendt	  refers	  to	  the	  intellect	  as	  the	  cognitive	  faculty	  driven	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  
know	  and	  it	  is	  fulfilled	  when	  an	  answer	  to	  a	  question	  is	  determined.	  	  The	  process	  of	  
acquiring	  knowledge	  is	  limitless	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  will	  always	  be	  questions	  that	  
positive	  science	  can	  penetrate.	  	  However,	  the	  questions	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  intellectual	  
pursuit	  of	  knowledge	  are	  seeking	  a	  definitive	  answer.	  	  Arendt	  does	  not	  deny	  the	  
importance	  or	  relevance	  of	  the	  intellect.	  	  Indeed,	  intellect	  and	  its	  product,	  knowledge,	  
“concern	  most	  intimately	  our	  ways	  of	  thinking.”	  	  The	  products	  of	  the	  intellect	  have	  an	  
objective,	  observable	  impact	  on	  the	  artifice	  of	  the	  world	  itself,	  which	  is	  why	  knowing	  “is	  
no	  less	  a	  world-­‐building	  activity	  than	  the	  building	  of	  houses.”20	  	  Knowledge	  manifests	  in	  
the	  making	  of	  things	  that	  comprise	  the	  world	  in	  which	  we	  live.	  	  It	  is	  responsible	  for	  some	  
of	  the	  most	  world-­‐changing	  developments	  in	  modernity	  such	  as	  factories,	  satellites,	  and	  
the	  atomic	  bomb.	  	  Knowing,	  a	  mental	  capacity,	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  activity	  of	  work	  
insofar	  as	  work	  is	  predicated	  by	  the	  condition	  of	  worldliness.	  	  Both	  knowledge	  and	  work	  
contribute	  to	  the	  artifice	  of	  the	  world	  and	  thereby	  structure	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  
operate	  within	  the	  world.	  	  
Arendt	  posits	  the	  existence	  of	  thinking	  and	  knowing	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
maintaining	  the	  careful	  distinction	  between	  the	  two.	  	  Further,	  the	  connection	  between	  
the	  activities	  of	  thinking	  and	  knowing,	  both	  being	  mental	  faculties,	  in	  no	  way	  supposes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Ibid.	  
20	  Arendt,	  Responsibility	  and	  Judgment,	  163.	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their	  equivalence.	  	  The	  capacities	  cannot	  be	  subsumed	  within	  one	  another	  because	  both	  
come	  from	  different	  human	  conditions:	  	  the	  urge	  to	  understand,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  
the	  desire	  to	  know,	  on	  the	  other.	  	  Thus,	  the	  end	  of	  these	  activities	  is	  not	  and	  cannot	  be	  
the	  same.	  	  The	  end	  of	  knowing	  is	  knowledge	  of	  things	  that	  are	  verifiable;	  thinking	  “has	  
neither	  an	  end	  nor	  an	  aim	  outside	  itself,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  even	  produce	  results.”21	  	  
Because	  thinking	  is	  not	  in	  search	  of	  truth,	  it	  is	  an	  ongoing	  process	  of	  comprehension.	  	  
Therefore,	  any	  framework,	  including	  those	  that	  propose	  a	  definitive	  understanding	  of	  
the	  world,	  must	  be	  continuously	  pondered	  and	  questioned.	  	  	  
As	  noted,	  Arendt	  draws	  upon	  the	  Socratic	  method	  of	  inquiry.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Jewish	  tradition	  also	  recognizes	  the	  perpetual	  need	  for	  
inquiry	  and	  investigation.	  	  Interestingly,	  Maimonides,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  well-­‐known	  
Medieval	  Jewish	  thinker	  and	  an	  unquestionable	  part	  of	  the	  Jewish	  political	  tradition,	  
goes	  against	  that	  very	  tradition	  in	  his	  Mishneh	  Torah,	  as	  it	  is	  an	  attempt	  at	  a	  definitive	  
codification	  of	  the	  law.	  	  That	  is,	  Maimonides	  attempted	  to	  define,	  in	  a	  very	  Platonic	  
manner,	  what	  the	  law	  has	  determined	  to	  be	  Right.	  	  Because	  the	  tradition	  does	  not	  seek	  
final	  answers,	  but	  rather,	  seeks	  always	  to	  question	  how	  the	  law	  applies	  to	  particular	  
instances,	  his	  code	  was	  not	  accepted	  as	  a	  final	  statement	  on	  the	  topic.	  	  It	  was,	  however,	  
questioned,	  synthesized	  when	  appropriate	  and	  abandoned	  when	  necessary.	  	  Thus,	  
despite	  writing	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  tradition	  of	  inquiry	  and	  continuity,	  the	  
work	  was	  maintained	  by	  the	  tradition.	  	  Maimonides	  might	  have	  intended	  for	  his	  work	  to	  
provide	  the	  definitive	  understanding	  of	  the	  law.	  	  In	  actuality,	  it	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  one	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  170.	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of	  many	  commentaries	  on	  the	  law,	  definitive	  only	  in	  that	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  a	  significant	  
contribution	  to	  the	  tradition	  of	  inquiry.22	  	  The	  Jewish	  tradition	  can	  incorporate	  and	  
maintain	  the	  value	  of	  a	  work	  like	  the	  Mishneh	  Torah,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  
Maimonides’	  goal	  in	  the	  work	  ran	  contrary	  to	  the	  Jewish	  tradition.	  	  Similarly,	  Arendt	  can	  
distill	  value	  from	  thinkers	  in	  the	  Western	  tradition	  who	  also	  posit	  statements	  of	  
certainty.	  	  Further,	  in	  her	  insistence	  that	  thinking	  never	  cease	  and	  absolutes	  never	  be	  
assigned,	  she	  aligns	  herself	  more	  closely	  with	  the	  Socratic	  method	  of	  inquiry	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  Jewish	  political	  tradition.	  	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  thinking	  does	  not	  accept	  “its	  own	  results”	  as	  axioms	  has	  a	  further	  
implication.	  	  Namely,	  due	  to	  its	  endless	  nature,	  “we	  cannot	  expect	  any	  moral	  
propositions	  .	  .	  .	  no	  final	  code	  of	  conduct	  from	  the	  thinking	  activity,	  least	  of	  all	  a	  new	  
and	  now	  allegedly	  final	  definition	  of	  what	  is	  good	  and	  what	  is	  evil.”	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  imply	  
that	  thinking	  is	  not	  involved	  in	  moral	  sensibility;	  but	  rather,	  that	  morality,	  too,	  is	  subject	  
to	  the	  endless	  process	  of	  thinking	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  definitively	  codified.	  	  If	  
anything,	  thinking	  is	  the	  activity	  that	  provides	  the	  hope	  for	  morality	  given	  the	  ever-­‐
changing	  world	  of	  phenomenal	  reality.	  	  Thinking	  is	  implicitly	  concerned	  with	  possibilities	  
over	  determinations.	  	  It	  considers	  the	  world	  and	  never	  ceases	  to	  look	  for	  a	  meaning	  in	  a	  
world	  that	  has	  no	  inherent	  meaning.	  	  The	  conflation	  of	  thinking	  into	  knowing	  limits	  the	  
human	  experience	  because	  it	  removes	  the	  very	  faculty	  by	  which	  we	  understand	  our	  
experience	  as	  human	  beings.	  	  Final	  solutions	  are	  predetermined	  answers	  “which	  
prevent	  thinking	  by	  suggesting	  that	  we	  know	  where	  we	  not	  only	  don’t	  know	  but	  cannot	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Walzer,	  “The	  Jewish	  Political	  Tradition,”	  xxiv-­‐xxv.	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know.”	  	  Any	  worldview	  that	  asserts	  a	  definitive,	  unchanging	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  
can	  only	  be	  overcome	  by	  thinking	  what	  we	  are	  doing.	  	  Thinking	  is	  both	  unending	  and	  
irresolute	  due	  to	  the	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  the	  world	  about	  which	  the	  thinking	  activity	  is	  
concerned.	  	  Because	  the	  world	  is	  constantly	  changing,	  thinking	  is	  always	  relevant,	  
appropriate,	  and	  necessary.	  	  If	  there	  is	  a	  prescription	  to	  what	  that	  world	  ought	  to	  be,	  
then	  the	  individual	  is	  “freed”	  from	  considering	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is	  experienced	  and	  
focuses	  on	  how	  to	  create	  the	  world	  that	  ought	  to	  be.	  	  This	  is	  fundamentally	  impossible	  
on	  many	  grounds.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  action,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3	  in	  more	  
detail,	  is	  such	  that	  every	  action	  is	  limitless	  and	  unpredictable.	  	  Therefore,	  regardless	  of	  
the	  thought	  that	  goes	  into	  any	  action,	  further	  contemplation	  is	  always	  necessary	  once	  
the	  consequences	  of	  that	  action	  begin	  to	  appear.	  	  This	  is	  why,	  “The	  business	  of	  thinking	  
is	  like	  the	  veil	  of	  Penelope:	  	  it	  undoes	  every	  morning	  what	  it	  had	  finished	  the	  night	  
before.”23	  	  	  
In	  a	  very	  concise	  definition,	  Arendt	  writes	  that	  thinking	  is	  “the	  habit	  of	  examining	  
whatever	  happens	  to	  come	  to	  pass.”	  	  By	  describing	  thinking	  as	  a	  habit,	  Arendt	  is	  
suggesting	  that	  it	  is	  an	  activity	  that	  one	  chooses	  to	  engage	  in	  repeatedly	  until	  it	  becomes	  
an	  unconscious	  pattern.	  	  It	  is	  a	  capacity	  common	  to	  all;	  however,	  there	  is	  the	  underlying	  
sense	  of	  freedom	  attached	  to	  thinking.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  all	  human	  beings,	  by	  virtue	  of	  
being	  capable	  of	  thought,	  are	  free	  to	  think,	  if	  they	  so	  choose.	  	  It	  is	  in	  consistently	  
choosing	  to	  think	  that	  the	  activity	  becomes	  a	  habit.	  	  As	  a	  habit	  that	  has	  been	  formed	  
through	  practice,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  changed.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  thinking	  person	  can	  become	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thoughtless.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  capacity	  to	  think	  is	  disconnected	  from	  any	  
notion	  of	  intelligence.	  	  This	  is	  significant	  because	  it	  is	  in	  this	  distinction	  that	  thinking	  can	  
be	  demanded	  of	  all	  human	  beings.	  	  The	  habit	  of	  thinking	  does	  not	  presume	  any	  
intellectual	  development;	  therefore	  it	  cannot	  be	  reserved	  for	  the	  capable,	  elite	  few.	  	  
Rather,	  “we	  must	  be	  able	  to	  ‘demand’	  its	  exercise	  from	  every	  sane	  person,	  no	  matter	  
how	  erudite	  or	  ignorant,	  intelligent	  or	  stupid,	  he	  may	  happen	  to	  be.”	  Likewise,	  the	  lack	  
of	  thought	  is	  not	  indicative	  of	  intellectual	  capacity.	  	  This	  is	  why	  Arendt	  can	  say,	  “Absence	  
of	  thought	  is	  not	  stupidity;	  it	  can	  be	  found	  in	  highly	  intelligent	  people.”24	  	  Thinking,	  not	  
intelligence,	  determines	  how	  we	  understand	  the	  world	  and,	  therefore,	  how	  we	  act	  in	  it.	  	  	  
Because	  “wickedness	  may	  be	  caused	  by	  absence	  of	  thought”	  the	  potential	  
dangers	  of	  thoughtlessness	  cannot	  be	  ignored.	  	  First	  and	  foremost	  
By	  shielding	  people	  against	  the	  dangers	  of	  examination,	  it	  
teaches	  them	  to	  hold	  fast	  to	  whatever	  the	  prescribed	  rules	  
of	  conduct	  may	  be	  at	  a	  given	  time	  in	  a	  given	  society.	  	  What	  
people	  get	  used	  to	  is	  .	  .	  .	  the	  possession	  of	  rules	  under	  
which	  to	  subsume	  particulars.	  	  
	  
If	  a	  society	  is	  filled	  with	  nonthinking	  people	  who	  accept	  the	  rules	  and	  live	  by	  them,	  then	  
any	  new	  set	  of	  rules	  or	  conduct	  is	  easily	  implemented.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  a	  society	  
where	  people	  have	  not	  cultivated	  the	  habit	  of	  thinking,	  where	  they	  are	  not	  perplexed	  by	  
a	  set	  of	  rules	  that	  determines	  conduct,	  new	  rules	  are	  easily	  put	  in	  their	  place	  because	  no	  
one	  is	  there	  to	  question	  the	  value	  of	  the	  new	  set	  of	  rules.	  	  The	  non-­‐thinker	  is	  the	  person	  
who	  has	  committed	  to	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  or	  code	  of	  conduct,	  which	  allows	  him	  to	  not	  think	  
what	  he	  is	  doing,	  but	  rather	  to	  follow	  the	  code	  wholeheartedly.	  	  These	  people	  “get	  used	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to	  never	  making	  up	  their	  minds”	  and	  effectively	  cultivate	  the	  habit	  of	  thoughtlessness.	  	  
They	  never	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  perplexities	  and	  therefore	  never	  have	  to	  decide	  what	  
is	  good	  or	  bad,	  right	  or	  wrong.	  	  Because	  the	  code	  has	  determined	  the	  value	  of	  things,	  
then	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  code	  is	  valuable.	  	  This	  does	  not	  require	  thought.	  	  This	  
is	  also	  why	  “The	  sad	  truth	  of	  the	  matter	  is	  that	  most	  evil	  is	  done	  by	  people	  who	  never	  
made	  up	  their	  mind	  to	  be	  either	  bad	  or	  good.”25	  
Two	  notes	  must	  be	  made	  here.	  	  First,	  anyone	  who	  is	  familiar	  with	  Arendt’s	  work	  
on	  Eichmann	  must	  be	  curious	  as	  to	  why	  Eichmann	  in	  Jerusalem	  has	  not	  been	  mentioned	  
here.	  	  In	  that	  text,	  Arendt	  charges	  that	  Eichmann	  is	  “thoughtless”	  and	  comes	  to	  the	  
further	  conclusion	  that	  evil	  is	  banal.	  	  While	  these	  two	  issues	  are	  certainly	  relevant	  here,	  
they	  will	  be	  addressed	  at	  a	  later	  point.	  	  In	  Chapter	  5,	  which	  speaks	  to	  Arendt’s	  notion	  of	  
freedom,	  the	  charges	  of	  thoughtlessness	  and	  banality	  will	  be	  far	  more	  clear	  and	  
therefore	  an	  explanation	  at	  that	  point	  will	  not	  only	  be	  more	  accessible,	  but	  also	  more	  
powerful.	  	  Second,	  there	  is	  a	  glaring	  problem	  with	  Arendt’s	  theory	  that	  appears	  here	  
and	  throughout	  her	  work.	  	  Namely,	  she	  posits	  that	  there	  is	  no	  definitive	  nature	  to	  
human	  existence,	  only	  conditions	  that	  inform	  how	  we	  exist	  in	  the	  world.	  	  Yet,	  she	  
consistently	  speaks	  in	  moral	  language,	  asserting	  the	  presence	  of	  good/bad,	  right/wrong,	  
and	  most	  poignantly,	  evil.	  	  This	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  underlies	  the	  whole	  of	  her	  political	  
theory;	  it	  will	  be	  dealt	  with	  more	  completely	  in	  Chapter	  5	  after	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  
polis	  has	  been	  explained	  and	  within	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  politics.	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To	  continue,	  Arendt	  warns	  that	  although	  thinking	  is	  absolutely	  necessary	  for	  the	  
fullest	  expression	  of	  our	  human-­‐ness,	  it,	  too,	  is	  dangerous.	  	  First,	  thinking,	  like	  acting,	  is	  
interruptive.	  	  Its	  “chief	  characteristic	  is	  that	  it	  interrupts	  all	  doing,	  all	  ordinary	  activities	  
no	  matter	  what	  they	  happen	  to	  be.”	  	  The	  moment	  one	  engages	  in	  the	  mental	  activity	  of	  
thinking,	  of	  considering	  the	  world,	  one	  necessarily	  stops	  acting	  in	  the	  world.	  	  There	  is	  a	  
paralysis	  that	  “is	  inherent	  in	  the	  stop	  and	  think,	  the	  interruption	  of	  all	  other	  activities.”	  	  
What	  is	  most	  detrimental,	  perhaps,	  is	  that	  this	  stopping	  to	  think	  about	  the	  world	  “may	  
have	  a	  paralyzing	  effect	  when	  you	  come	  out	  of	  it,	  no	  longer	  sure	  of	  what	  had	  seemed	  to	  
you	  beyond	  doubt	  while	  you	  were	  unthinkingly	  engaged	  in	  whatever	  you	  were	  doing.”26	  	  
Because	  thinking	  is	  consideration	  of	  the	  world,	  one	  can	  only	  think	  after	  or	  before	  an	  
activity	  is	  performed	  in	  the	  world.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  mind	  is	  not	  somehow	  
engaged	  during	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  vita	  activa.	  	  However,	  the	  specific	  activity	  that	  
Arendt	  calls	  thinking	  cannot	  occur	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  an	  activity	  of	  the	  vita	  activa	  is	  
being	  performed.	  	  While	  thinking	  and	  acting	  are	  both	  necessary	  elements	  of	  the	  human	  
condition,	  they	  cannot	  be	  performed	  simultaneously.	  	  	  
Second,	  thinking	  can	  be	  dangerous	  when	  the	  urge	  to	  know	  is	  confounded	  with	  
the	  desire	  to	  understand.	  	  Faced	  with	  the	  uncomfortable	  awareness	  that	  all	  existence	  is	  
inherently	  value-­‐less,	  the	  thinking	  mind	  may	  decide	  to	  seek	  an	  ultimate	  value	  of	  things,	  
turning	  on	  its	  very	  nature.	  	  Arendt	  writes,	  “The	  quest	  for	  meaning,	  which	  relentlessly	  
dissolves	  and	  examines	  anew	  all	  accepted	  doctrines	  and	  rules,	  can	  at	  every	  moment	  
turn	  against	  itself,	  as	  it	  were,	  produce	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	  old	  values,	  and	  declare	  these	  as	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‘new	  values.’”	  	  Thinking,	  then,	  is	  a	  fragile	  enterprise	  that	  must	  be	  chosen	  and	  carefully	  
employed	  so	  as	  not	  to	  fall	  prey	  to	  any	  idea	  that	  “would	  make	  further	  thinking	  
unnecessary.”27	  	  Thinking,	  human	  beings	  must	  always	  consider	  the	  world,	  inquire	  into	  its	  
value,	  and	  ponder	  the	  possibilities	  of	  action.	  	  These	  possibilities	  for	  action	  prompt	  the	  
question	  of	  how	  thinking	  manifests	  in	  action.	  	  Arendt’s	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  lies	  in	  
the	  activity	  of	  willing.	  
	   Arendt	  admits	  that	  there	  are	  “perplexities	  inherent	  in	  the	  human	  faculty	  of	  
willing.”28	  	  In	  grappling	  with	  the	  innate	  difficulties	  present	  in	  this	  faculty,	  she	  looks	  to	  
the	  various	  ways	  that	  is	  has	  been	  conceived.	  	  Thus,	  Part	  II	  of	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind	  is	  
largely	  an	  historical	  account	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  will.	  	  In	  this	  text,	  Arendt	  tells	  us	  that	  
there	  are,	  generally,	  two	  options	  for	  understanding	  the	  faculty	  of	  the	  will:	  	  either,	  the	  
will	  is	  a	  faculty	  of	  choice,	  and,	  as	  such,	  is	  an	  arbiter	  between	  two	  things,	  most	  often	  
reason	  and	  desire;	  or,	  the	  will	  is	  a	  faculty	  of	  creation,	  the	  task	  of	  which	  is	  to	  
spontaneously	  begin	  new	  things.29	  	  Modernity,	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  progress,	  has	  taken	  
the	  two	  options	  for	  the	  faculty	  of	  the	  will,	  conflated	  them,	  and	  left	  the	  will	  impotent.	  	  To	  
wit,	  the	  notion	  of	  progress	  necessarily	  implies	  that	  the	  will	  is	  moving	  humanity	  along	  a	  
predetermined	  path,	  thus	  destroying	  the	  defining	  element	  of	  choice,	  namely,	  freedom.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  progress	  destroys	  the	  creative	  element	  of	  the	  will,	  characteristic	  of	  
the	  second	  option	  for	  understanding	  this	  faculty,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  creating	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  Ibid.,	  177,	  178.	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  of	  the	  Mind,	  158.	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spontaneously	  but	  according	  to	  some	  developed	  plan	  of	  things.	  	  The	  will,	  for	  Arendt,	  is	  
both	  free	  and	  creative;	  it	  is	  the	  faculty	  that,	  precisely	  because	  it	  is	  free,	  allows	  human	  
beings	  to	  create	  the	  world	  anew	  at	  any	  moment.	  	  The	  tendency	  of	  modern	  philosophers	  
to	  fear	  the	  uncertainty	  implicit	  in	  freedom	  has	  destroyed	  it,	  leaving	  the	  will	  to	  be	  an	  
instrument	  of	  implementation	  rather	  than	  a	  faculty	  of	  choice.	  	  Arendt	  insists	  that	  to	  be	  
human	  we	  must	  be	  free;	  the	  will	  must	  be	  free	  to	  choose	  from	  the	  options	  presented	  by	  
thinking	  and	  thereby	  maintain	  the	  essence	  of	  freedom	  in	  action.	  	  	  
One	  of	  the	  primary	  reasons	  Western	  philosophy	  has	  had	  such	  a	  difficult	  time	  
with	  this	  faculty	  is	  because	  it	  “was	  unknown	  to	  Greek	  antiquity”	  and	  only	  discovered	  in	  
the	  Christian	  era,	  leaving	  later	  thinkers	  to	  “reconcile	  this	  faculty	  with	  the	  main	  tenets	  of	  
Greek	  philosophy.”	  	  While	  the	  faculty	  of	  the	  will	  was	  not	  discovered	  until	  the	  first	  
century	  of	  the	  Common	  Era,	  Arendt	  sees	  Aristotle’s	  concept	  of	  deliberation	  (proairesis)	  
as	  “a	  kind	  of	  forerunner	  of	  the	  Will.”	  	  This	  faculty	  of	  choice	  “opens	  up	  a	  first,	  small	  
restricted	  space	  for	  the	  human	  mind”	  which	  is	  the	  “space	  left	  to	  freedom”	  and	  is	  
characteristically	  “very	  small.”30	  	  In	  Aristotle’s	  concept	  of	  deliberation,	  Arendt	  sees	  the	  
space	  necessary	  for	  human	  deliberation,	  the	  space	  in	  which	  the	  individual	  can	  choose	  to	  
act.	  	  The	  choice	  is	  necessarily	  not	  compulsory.	  	  Like	  Arendt’s	  notion	  of	  willing,	  it	  is	  free	  in	  
its	  potential	  to	  perform	  its	  task.	  	  This	  is	  the	  space	  of	  individual	  freedom	  that	  belongs	  to	  
the	  life	  of	  the	  mind;	  therefore,	  it	  is	  private	  and	  subjective,	  meaning	  it	  is	  conducted	  
entirely	  within	  the	  mind	  of	  an	  individual.	  	  What	  comes	  from	  willing,	  namely	  the	  action,	  is	  
certainly	  public,	  but	  that	  is	  yet	  to	  come.	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The	  will	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  separate	  from	  reason	  because	  its	  function	  is	  
different;	  however,	  as	  parts	  of	  the	  collective	  life	  of	  the	  mind,	  the	  two	  faculties	  work	  
together.	  	  Reason	  does	  not	  command	  the	  will.	  	  It	  does,	  however,	  inform	  it.	  	  In	  order	  for	  
the	  will	  to	  remain	  free	  to	  choose	  it	  cannot	  be	  controlled	  by	  any	  other	  faculty.	  	  This	  
follows	  logically	  from	  what	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned	  regarding	  thinking.	  	  If	  thinking	  
were	  capable	  of	  coming	  to	  knowledge	  it	  would	  have	  the	  coercive	  power	  to	  control	  the	  
will.	  	  To	  wit,	  any	  knowledge	  of	  truth	  would	  be	  an	  imperative	  force	  upon	  the	  will.	  	  But,	  
because	  reason’s	  task,	  thinking,	  is	  to	  ponder	  the	  possibilities,	  “Reason	  can	  only	  tell	  the	  
will:	  	  this	  is	  good,	  in	  accordance	  with	  reason;	  if	  you	  wish	  to	  attain	  it	  you	  ought	  to	  act	  
accordingly.”31	  	  The	  ought	  presented	  by	  reason	  is	  not	  a	  command.	  	  The	  will	  does	  not	  
move	  from	  a	  notion	  of	  I-­‐ought,	  but	  I-­‐can.	  	  The	  will	  acts	  not	  because	  there	  is	  an	  
imperative	  in	  the	  Kantian	  sense,	  but	  because	  it	  is	  free	  to	  choose.	  	  	  
The	  problem	  of	  the	  freedom	  to	  deliberate	  arises	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  Christianity	  
and	  the	  belief	  in	  an	  omniscient	  God	  whose	  will	  is	  far	  more	  powerful	  than	  any	  human	  will.	  	  
The	  problem	  is	  confounded	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  causality	  that	  is	  attached	  to	  will,	  albeit	  
mistakenly.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  will,	  in	  its	  deliberative	  choice-­‐making,	  causes	  things	  to	  be	  
as	  they	  are	  is	  problematic	  for	  Christianity,	  and	  it	  is	  untrue	  for	  Arendt.	  	  The	  mental	  
faculty,	  itself	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  causing	  anything	  in	  the	  phenomenal	  world.	  	  In	  trying	  to	  
understand	  particular	  circumstances	  and	  experiences,	  the	  mind	  confuses	  willing	  and	  
acting.	  	  Interestingly,	  this	  conflation	  is	  primarily	  done	  in	  the	  process	  of	  making	  
narratives:	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The	  will	  first	  causes	  volitions,	  and	  these	  volitions	  then	  
cause	  certain	  effects	  which	  no	  will	  can	  undo.	  	  The	  intellect,	  
trying	  to	  provide	  the	  will	  with	  an	  explicatory	  cause	  to	  quiet	  
its	  resentment	  at	  its	  own	  helplessness,	  will	  fabricate	  a	  
story	  to	  make	  the	  data	  fall	  into	  place.	  	  Without	  an	  
assumption	  of	  necessity	  the	  story	  would	  lack	  all	  
coherence.32	  
	  
And	  this	  is	  the	  paradox	  of	  the	  free	  will:	  	  it	  is	  indeed	  free	  to	  will	  as	  it	  does,	  but	  the	  mind,	  
in	  looking	  to	  comprehend	  actual	  experiences,	  things	  as	  they	  appear,	  looks	  for	  causality	  
that	  is	  necessary,	  not	  contingent.	  	  The	  story,	  then,	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  process	  of	  assigning	  
meaning.	  	  While	  the	  narrative	  will	  tell	  a	  particular	  story	  with	  events	  links	  together	  by	  
causal	  factors,	  the	  story	  itself	  would	  not	  exist	  without	  the	  will	  that	  chose	  the	  volitions.	  	  
In	  understanding	  the	  freedom	  characteristic	  of	  willing,	  Arendt	  is	  careful	  to	  point	  
out	  that	  this	  is	  different	  from	  political	  freedom.	  	  Specifically,	  she	  says,	  “Philosophic	  
freedom,	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  will,	  is	  relevant	  only	  to	  people	  who	  live	  outside	  political	  
communities,	  as	  solitary	  individuals.”33	  	  It	  is	  the	  cognizance	  that	  I-­‐will	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  I-­‐
do.	  The	  doing	  is	  political	  by	  nature	  insofar	  as	  it	  no	  longer	  involves	  only	  the	  individual,	  
but	  the	  plurality	  of	  human	  being.	  	  The	  freedom	  characteristic	  of	  being	  members	  of	  
community	  is	  political	  freedom,	  which	  is	  concerned	  with	  something	  altogether	  different	  
than	  the	  will	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  	  The	  philosophic	  freedom	  
that	  accompanies	  the	  will	  is	  what	  allows	  individual	  human	  beings	  to	  freely	  choose	  to	  act	  
in	  a	  particular	  way.	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While	  it	  will	  be	  shown	  that	  the	  judging	  activity	  has	  a	  strong	  role	  in	  how	  an	  
individual	  acts,	  the	  willing	  activity	  is	  responsible	  for	  determining	  that	  an	  action	  is	  chosen	  
at	  all.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  willing	  is	  the	  activity	  that	  throws	  the	  thought	  into	  action.	  	  Arendt	  
writes,	  “We	  deliberate	  only	  about	  means	  to	  an	  end,”	  where	  the	  means	  is	  manifest	  in	  the	  
action,	  but	  willing	  is	  the	  deliberating	  task.	  34	  	  At	  this	  point	  it	  seems	  a	  natural	  question	  
arises	  out	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  this	  concept:	  	  how	  does	  one	  actually	  get	  from	  willing	  to	  
acting?	  	  How	  do	  we	  get	  from	  the	  inner	  experience	  to	  the	  outer	  experience?	  	  The	  
question	  is	  one	  of	  motivation	  or	  volition.	  	  If	  one	  is	  motivated	  to	  act,	  then	  we	  must	  
consider	  whether	  the	  motivation	  is	  simply	  the	  willing	  or	  if	  it	  is	  a	  desired	  outcome	  that	  
drives	  the	  action.	  	  If	  it	  is	  a	  desired	  outcome	  that	  forces	  the	  willing	  to	  transform	  into	  
acting	  then	  there	  is	  an	  inherent	  problem:	  	  namely,	  the	  insistence	  by	  Arendt	  that	  the	  end	  
of	  any	  act	  can	  never	  actually	  be	  known.	  	  Willing,	  the	  deliberative	  task	  of	  choosing	  to	  act,	  
cannot	  be	  driven	  by	  a	  particular	  end	  because	  the	  end	  of	  action	  cannot	  be	  known.	  	  The	  
end,	  then,	  is	  not	  the	  impetus	  for	  the	  action;	  the	  deliberation	  chooses	  the	  means	  and	  
willing	  is	  the	  volition	  to	  the	  means	  decided	  upon.	  	  Remember	  that	  for	  Arendt	  “action	  
almost	  never	  achieves	  its	  purpose”	  because	  there	  are	  “innumerable,	  conflicting	  wills.”35	  	  
Thus,	  as	  with	  thinking,	  willing	  is	  the	  end	  in	  itself.	  	  As	  thinking	  does	  not	  seek	  knowledge,	  
but	  options,	  so	  too	  willing	  does	  not	  seek	  a	  particular	  end,	  but	  in	  choosing	  is	  able	  to	  
manifest	  itself.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  presume	  that	  human	  beings	  do	  not	  have	  an	  end	  in	  mind	  
when	  they	  choose	  particular	  actions.	  	  The	  end	  is	  what	  gives	  the	  intellect	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	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  of	  the	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  62.	  
35	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  184.	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“assumption	  of	  necessity”	  without	  which	  the	  action	  “would	  lack	  all	  coherence.”36	  	  The	  
formulating	  of	  ends	  seems	  to	  be	  both	  a	  product	  of	  the	  intellect,	  which	  is	  concerned	  with	  
knowledge,	  not	  understanding,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  calming	  of	  the	  intellect.	  	  The	  intellect’s	  
domain	  is	  the	  collection	  of	  verifiable	  facts.	  	  Thus,	  the	  notion	  that	  one	  can	  choose	  to	  act	  
and	  calculate	  the	  consequences	  of	  that	  act	  is	  particularly	  comforting	  to	  the	  intellect	  
despite	  it	  being	  altogether	  useless	  for	  the	  will.	  
In	  her	  investigation	  into	  the	  concept	  of	  will	  as	  conceived	  by	  Augustine	  she	  marks	  
the	  startling	  difference	  and	  interdependence	  of	  willing	  and	  acting.	  	  It	  is	  here	  that	  the	  
problem	  of	  causality	  in	  the	  connection	  between	  willing	  and	  acting	  is	  articulated:	  	  “What	  
is	  it	  then	  that	  causes	  the	  will	  to	  will?	  	  What	  sets	  the	  will	  in	  motion?	  	  The	  question	  is	  
inevitable,	  but	  the	  answer	  turns	  out	  to	  lead	  into	  an	  infinite	  regress.”	  	  And	  this	  is	  because	  
“the	  Will	  is	  a	  fact	  which	  in	  its	  sheer	  contingent	  factuality	  cannot	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  
causality.”	  	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  faculty	  of	  the	  will	  in	  itself	  is	  not	  causal	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  
fact	  that	  it	  “experiences	  itself	  as	  causing	  things	  to	  happen	  which	  otherwise	  would	  not	  
have	  happened.”	  	  Therefore,	  perhaps	  the	  will	  “lurks	  behind	  our	  quest	  for	  causes—as	  
though	  behind	  every	  Why	  there	  existed	  a	  latent	  wish	  not	  just	  to	  learn	  and	  to	  know	  but	  
to	  learn	  the	  know-­‐how.”37	  	  This	  understanding	  of	  the	  will	  does	  not	  remove	  the	  infinite	  
regress,	  per	  se,	  because	  the	  question	  will	  still	  be	  raised	  as	  to	  what	  causes	  the	  will.	  	  The	  
point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  will,	  despite	  its	  apparent	  causal	  nature,	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  nutritive	  
element	  that	  brings	  acting	  to	  life	  but	  is	  itself	  not	  the	  causal	  element.	  	  Indeed,	  one	  may	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Arendt,	  Responsibility	  and	  Judgment,	  140.	  
37	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  89.	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be	  tempted	  to	  say	  that	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  will,	  namely	  willing,	  is	  the	  causal	  element	  
insofar	  as	  the	  willing	  of	  the	  will	  brings	  action	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  objective	  reality.	  	  This	  is	  
to	  say:	  actions,	  deeds	  and	  words,	  are	  the	  causal	  elements	  of	  the	  objective	  world	  and	  
willing	  is	  the	  causal	  element	  of	  the	  subjective	  mind	  whose	  activity,	  willing,	  has	  the	  
significant	  role	  of	  connecting	  the	  life	  of	  the	  mind	  with	  the	  life	  of	  the	  public	  world.	  	  
Understood	  this	  way,	  willing	  underlies	  all	  human	  action	  and	  is	  created	  out	  of	  
deliberation	  and	  somehow	  stokes	  some	  form	  of	  volition.	  
Perhaps	  even	  though	  the	  end	  is	  not	  known	  the	  choice	  made	  by	  the	  will	  
determines	  certain	  possibilities.	  	  For,	  if	  one	  does	  not	  will	  to	  act	  then	  no	  end	  is	  possible;	  
but,	  if	  one	  chooses	  A	  then	  possibly	  X,	  Y,	  or	  Z,	  for	  example.	  	  In	  this	  sense	  willing	  is,	  indeed,	  
motivated	  by	  an	  end,	  albeit,	  one	  that	  is	  not	  determined.	  	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  
even	  though	  a	  particular	  end	  cannot	  be	  known,	  the	  will	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  very	  
possibility	  for	  an	  end.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  subjective	  individual	  can	  emerge	  
in	  the	  world	  of	  appearances,	  contributing	  to	  it,	  affecting	  it,	  altering	  it,	  provides	  the	  
volition	  whereby	  the	  deliberate	  choice	  motivates	  the	  will	  and	  is	  actualized	  in	  action.	  	  
This	  is	  a	  categorically	  hopeful	  idea	  rooted	  in	  the	  knowledge	  that	  what	  can	  be	  may	  in	  fact	  
not	  be.	  	  As	  human	  beings,	  subject	  to	  the	  volitions	  of	  those	  we	  live	  in	  the	  world	  with,	  this	  
hope	  is	  essential	  for	  action,	  appearance,	  and	  self-­‐understanding.	  	  As	  human	  beings	  we	  
will	  to	  act	  and	  in	  this	  we	  embrace	  our	  innate	  natality	  and	  create	  anew	  in	  the	  world	  of	  
appearance.	  	  Willing	  is	  not	  only	  the	  inner	  experience,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  connection	  between	  
the	  life	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  political	  realm	  of	  human	  plurality.	  	  We	  use	  our	  reason	  to	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determine	  how	  we	  can	  act	  and	  our	  will	  to	  choose;	  our	  choices	  determine	  that	  we	  create.	  	  
Thus,	  we	  move	  from	  thinking	  to	  willing	  to	  acting.	  	  	  
The	  connection	  between	  willing	  and	  acting	  reveals	  the	  second	  characteristic	  
element	  of	  the	  will:	  	  it	  is	  creative.	  	  Arendt’s	  understanding	  of	  willing	  is	  the	  mental	  faculty	  
associated	  with	  the	  condition	  of	  natality,	  where	  natality	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  create	  anew.	  	  
Because	  the	  will	  moves	  an	  individual	  to	  action	  it	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  root	  of	  
natality.	  What	  Arendt’s	  concept	  of	  natality	  implicitly	  borrows	  from	  Augustine,	  although	  
in	  a	  different	  context	  (one	  that	  does	  not	  involve	  the	  Creator-­‐God),	  is	  this:	  	  “that	  there	  
may	  be	  novelty,	  a	  beginning	  must	  exist.”	  	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  order	  for	  new	  things	  to	  
emerge	  (actions)	  there	  must	  be	  a	  beginning,	  and	  for	  her	  this	  beginning,	  this	  natality,	  is	  
willing.	  	  This	  notion	  of	  a	  beginning	  must	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  a	  linear	  point	  of	  reference	  
from	  which	  all	  things	  proceed.	  	  Rather,	  the	  beginning-­‐ness	  of	  the	  willing	  activity	  lies	  in	  
the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  required	  for	  all	  voluntary	  actions.	  	  Arendt	  writes,	  “The	  freedom	  of	  
spontaneity	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  human	  condition.	  	  Its	  mental	  organ	  is	  the	  Will.”38	  	  
The	  will	  is	  free	  to	  deliberate	  and	  motivate	  the	  spontaneous	  appearance	  of	  men	  in	  the	  
political	  realm.	  
Arendt	  addresses	  the	  Heideggerian	  conception	  of	  the	  will,	  noting	  that	  it	  does	  not	  
recognize	  and	  fails	  to	  remember	  its	  role	  in	  creating	  new	  beginnings.	  	  She	  rejects	  this	  
understanding	  of	  the	  will.	  	  It	  is	  through	  the	  faculty	  of	  the	  will	  that	  there	  is	  a	  beginning	  
and	  the	  narrative	  is	  what	  allows	  the	  mind	  to	  remember	  the	  will	  and	  keep	  it	  willing.	  	  
According	  to	  Arendt,	  when	  Heidegger	  merges	  thinking	  and	  acting,	  he	  ends	  up	  in	  the	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  Ibid.,	  108,	  110.	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mind,	  with	  thinking	  being	  the	  activity	  “in	  which	  man	  opens	  himself	  to	  the	  authentic	  
actuality	  of	  being	  thrown.”39	  	  Whereas	  in	  Arendt’s	  understanding,	  thought	  and	  activity	  
are	  separate	  yet	  connected.	  	  Action	  is	  not	  subsumed	  within	  thinking;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  in	  
order	  for	  man	  to	  understand	  himself	  as	  an	  existing	  being	  he	  does	  not	  simply	  engage	  in	  
the	  activity	  of	  thinking.	  Rather	  by	  willing,	  the	  thinking	  man	  engages	  the	  very	  condition	  
of	  his	  being	  born,	  namely	  natality,	  and	  acts	  in	  the	  phenomenological	  realm	  of	  other	  
existing	  beings,	  and	  thereby	  emerges	  in	  the	  plurality	  of	  human	  existence.	  	  Thus,	  thinking	  
and	  willing	  are	  both	  necessary	  for	  acting	  and	  as	  mental	  activities	  they	  are	  prior	  to	  the	  
objective	  activity	  itself.	  	  	  
Thus	  far,	  the	  analysis	  has	  moved	  through	  a	  perspective	  on	  thinking	  and	  willing	  in	  
which	  Arendt	  is	  using,	  responding	  to,	  and	  criticizing	  the	  traditional	  sources	  of	  Western	  
political	  thought,	  among	  them	  Plato,	  Socrates,	  Augustine,	  Kant	  and	  Heidegger.	  	  It	  is	  at	  
this	  point	  of	  willing,	  forming	  volitions,	  that	  her	  Jewishness	  begins	  to	  re-­‐emerge	  and	  
inform	  her	  own	  thinking.	  	  Arendt,	  persistent	  in	  her	  pursuit	  of	  understanding,	  seeks	  to	  
find	  “what	  experiences	  caused	  men	  to	  become	  aware	  of	  their	  capability	  of	  forming	  
volitions.”	  	  She	  finds	  that	  the	  experiences	  were	  “Hebrew	  in	  origin,	  were	  not	  political	  and	  
did	  not	  relate	  to	  the	  world	  of	  appearances	  and	  man’s	  position	  within	  it	  or	  to	  the	  realm	  
of	  human	  affairs,	  whose	  existence	  depends	  upon	  deeds	  and	  actions,	  but	  were	  
exclusively	  located	  within	  man	  himself.”	  	  The	  “Hebrew	  origin”	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  
will	  lies	  in	  the	  understanding	  that	  “we	  are	  dealing	  with	  experiences	  that	  men	  have	  not	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only	  with	  themselves,	  but	  also	  inside	  themselves.”40	  	  In	  the	  Passover	  story,	  the	  Israelites	  
were	  told,	  “Go,	  pick	  out	  lambs	  for	  your	  families,	  and	  slaughter	  the	  Passover	  offering.	  	  
Take	  a	  bunch	  of	  hyssop,	  dip	  it	  in	  the	  blood	  that	  is	  in	  the	  basin,	  and	  apply	  some	  of	  the	  
blood	  that	  is	  in	  the	  basin	  to	  the	  lintel	  and	  to	  the	  two	  doorposts.”41	  	  The	  command	  was	  
directed	  to	  families,	  not	  to	  the	  Israelites	  as	  a	  collective.	  	  This	  is	  because	  each	  family,	  and	  
presumably	  one	  member	  of	  the	  family,	  the	  father,	  had	  the	  freedom	  to	  choose	  whether	  
he	  would	  partake	  in	  this	  specific	  action.	  	  The	  act	  was	  not	  an	  attempt	  to	  attain	  freedom;	  
the	  act	  was	  done	  in	  complete	  freedom.	  	  And,	  it	  was	  done	  in	  the	  household.	  	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  
not	  political	  but	  private.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  this	  is	  a	  prelude	  to	  political	  community	  insofar	  as	  
free	  actions	  create	  the	  polis.	  	  Once	  the	  polis	  is	  established	  within	  the	  space	  of	  
appearance	  a	  tribal	  identity	  can	  be,	  and	  many	  times	  is,	  established,	  however,	  the	  
primary	  result	  of	  free	  action	  is	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  polis.	  	  She	  says	  that	  the	  Passover	  
story	  is	  meant	  to	  teach	  freedom	  and	  that	  the	  space	  in	  which	  the	  individual	  privately	  
deliberates	  is	  the	  small	  space	  of	  freedom.	  	  Thus,	  one	  may	  conclude	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  
freedom	  in	  the	  Passover	  story	  is	  meant	  to	  teach	  us	  this	  faculty;	  ultimately,	  the	  Passover	  
story	  has	  within	  it	  the	  power	  to	  teach	  that	  as	  human	  being	  we	  have	  the	  capacity,	  
through	  the	  primacy	  of	  choice,	  deliberation	  and	  thence	  volition,	  to	  create	  anew;	  that	  as	  
human	  beings	  we	  are	  natal,	  or	  have	  the	  capacity	  for	  natality.	  	  
In	  the	  Jewish	  Writings,	  Arendt	  attempts	  to	  awaken	  the	  Jewish	  world	  to	  the	  
freedom	  of	  willing.	  	  In	  “The	  Jewish	  War	  That	  Isn’t	  Happening”	  Arendt	  pleads	  for	  Jews	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Ibid.,	  63,	  emphasis	  mine.	  
41	  Exodus	  12:21-­‐22,	  JPS,	  emphasis	  mine.	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recognize	  that	  “our	  freedom	  and	  our	  honor	  hang	  in	  the	  balance”	  just	  as	  much	  as	  the	  
freedom	  and	  honor	  of	  the	  nations	  that	  had	  been	  conquered	  by	  Nazi	  Germany.	  	  The	  
freedom	  she	  speaks	  of	  is	  both	  philosophic	  and	  political.	  	  It	  was	  her	  call	  to	  solidarity	  and	  
it	  had	  one	  central	  purpose:	  	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  Jewish	  army.	  	  This	  army	  could	  only	  be	  
formed,	  however,	  if	  individual	  wills	  chose	  this	  particular	  action.	  	  Just	  as	  Moses	  called	  the	  
Israelites	  to	  act	  together	  by	  coating	  their	  doorposts	  with	  blood	  and	  to	  walk	  out	  of	  Egypt	  
as	  a	  people,	  Arendt	  called	  the	  Jews	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world	  to	  “coat	  their	  doorposts	  with	  
blood”	  and	  act	  together	  by	  forming	  an	  army	  and	  to	  either	  die	  or	  survive	  as	  a	  people.	  	  
She	  makes	  the	  case	  “that	  you	  can	  only	  defend	  yourself	  as	  the	  person	  you	  are	  attacked	  
as.	  	  A	  person	  attacked	  as	  a	  Jew	  cannot	  defend	  himself	  as	  an	  Englishman	  or	  Frenchman.”	  
Unless	  the	  Jewish	  people	  gathered	  under	  one	  flag,	  a	  Jewish	  flag,	  they	  would	  never	  
experience	  the	  freedom	  that	  is	  the	  fundamental	  basis	  of	  political	  action	  and	  human	  
being.	  	  The	  formation	  of	  the	  Jewish	  army	  would	  be	  the	  first	  step	  in	  establishing	  the	  
Jewish	  people	  as	  a	  people	  once	  again.	  	  Palestine	  would	  remain	  a	  refugee	  asylum	  until	  
the	  Jewish	  people	  recognized	  that	  “the	  defense	  of	  Palestine	  is	  part	  of	  the	  struggle	  for	  
the	  freedom	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people.”42	  	  This	  action	  would	  manifest	  the	  will	  of	  the	  
individual	  Jew	  and	  unite	  all	  Jews	  together	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  defense.	  	  Her	  articles	  are	  
meant	  to	  stoke	  the	  fire	  of	  volition	  in	  Jewish	  people	  everywhere	  so	  that,	  recognizing	  that	  
small	  space	  of	  freedom	  to	  deliberate,	  they	  would,	  in	  fact,	  choose	  to	  act.	  	  
	   Arendt	  concludes	  “Willing”	  with	  a	  blithe	  acceptance	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  human	  
beings	  are	  “doomed	  to	  be	  free	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  born.”	  	  She	  refuses	  the	  impulse	  “to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  137.	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escape	  its	  awesome	  responsibility	  by	  electing	  some	  form	  of	  fatalism.”	  	  Instead,	  she	  
appeals	  to	  another	  mental	  faculty	  “no	  less	  mysterious	  than	  the	  faculty	  of	  beginning,	  the	  
faculty	  of	  Judgment,	  an	  analysis	  of	  which	  at	  least	  may	  tell	  us	  what	  is	  involved	  in	  our	  
pleasures	  and	  displeasures.”43	  	  Judging	  is,	  arguably,	  the	  most	  difficult	  mental	  faculty	  to	  
discuss	  because	  Arendt’s	  own	  thoughts	  on	  the	  matter	  were	  never	  fully	  articulated.	  	  As	  
mentioned,	  the	  final	  portion	  of	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  “Judging,”	  was	  not	  completed	  
when	  she	  died	  abruptly.	  	  She	  does	  discuss	  judging,	  to	  some	  degree,	  in	  Responsibility	  and	  
Judgment	  and	  the	  edited	  work,	  Lectures	  on	  Kant’s	  Political	  Philosophy,	  brings	  together	  
the	  main	  texts	  that	  speak	  to	  the	  topic.	  	  However,	  the	  absence	  of	  her	  final	  statement	  
cannot	  be	  understated	  because	  it	  seems	  that	  judging,	  of	  all	  the	  mental	  faculties,	  is	  the	  
most	  significant	  for	  politics.	  	  While	  willing	  is	  connected	  to	  natality	  and	  the	  freedom	  to	  
appear	  in	  the	  world,	  judging	  makes	  thinking	  “manifest	  in	  the	  world	  of	  appearances.”44	  	  	  
	   The	  faculty	  of	  judging	  is,	  indeed,	  a	  mysterious	  thing.	  	  In	  the	  Postscriptum	  to	  
“Thinking”	  Arendt	  writes	  that	  one	  of	  the	  main	  difficulties	  one	  faces	  when	  analyzing	  the	  
faculty	  of	  judgment	  is	  “the	  curious	  scarcity	  of	  sources	  providing	  authoritative	  testimony.”	  	  
It	  was,	  in	  fact,	  not	  until	  Kant	  wrote	  the	  Critique	  of	  Judgment	  that	  judgment	  became	  “a	  
major	  topic	  of	  a	  major	  thinker.”45	  	  As	  with	  every	  other	  concept	  that	  will	  be	  covered	  in	  
this	  dissertation,	  Arendt	  uses	  the	  Western	  tradition	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  her	  
considerations,	  but	  she	  will	  decisively	  break	  from	  that	  tradition	  and	  in	  that	  break	  her	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  217.	  
44	  Arendt,	  Responsibility	  and	  Judgment,	  189.	  
45	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  215.	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Jewishness	  appears.	  	  She	  admires	  Kant’s	  work,	  however	  her	  admiration	  does	  not	  
prevent	  her	  disagreement	  and	  the	  development	  of	  her	  own	  pronouncements	  on	  the	  
topic.	  	  	  
It	  was	  noted	  that	  willing	  takes	  us	  from	  the	  inner	  world	  of	  the	  mind	  to	  the	  
phenomenal	  world	  via	  an	  evocation	  of	  volition.	  	  Judging,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  takes	  us	  
from	  the	  world	  of	  the	  senses	  back	  into	  the	  inner	  sense	  of	  the	  mind.	  	  This	  sounds	  
contrary	  to	  what	  was	  previously	  stated,	  that	  judging	  manifests	  thinking;	  however,	  this	  is	  
not	  the	  case.	  	  Thinking	  considers	  the	  world,	  willing	  motivates	  emergence	  in	  the	  world,	  
and	  judging	  determines	  whether	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  the	  world	  is	  pleasurable	  or	  not.	  	  
This	  notion	  of	  “pleasure”	  is	  what	  Arendt	  calls	  the	  “silent	  sense.”	  	  Often,	  she	  notes,	  it	  has	  
been	  referred	  to	  as	  “taste,”	  which	  is	  problematic	  due	  to	  the	  connection	  it	  draws	  to	  the	  
realm	  of	  aesthetics.	  	  The	  silent	  sense	  is	  the	  means	  through	  which	  the	  mind	  makes	  
judgments,	  conclusions	  that	  “are	  not	  arrived	  at	  by	  either	  deduction	  or	  induction,	  in	  
short,	  they	  have	  nothing	  in	  common	  with	  logical	  operations.”46	  	  Arendt	  says	  that	  it	  is	  
this	  silent	  sense,	  the	  capacity	  to	  judge,	  that	  she	  is	  in	  search	  of.	  	  	  
For	  Kant,	  judgment	  is	  ultimately	  dependent	  upon	  reason.	  	  Reason	  “comes	  to	  the	  
help	  of	  judgment.”47	  	  And	  this	  is	  where	  Arendt	  sees	  a	  significant	  flaw	  in	  his	  analysis.	  	  
Namely,	  Arendt	  sees	  the	  faculties	  of	  reason	  and	  judgment	  as	  separate	  from	  one	  another.	  	  
This	  means	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  particular	  reason	  why	  both	  faculties	  exist.	  	  If	  judging	  
were	  dependent	  upon	  reason	  in	  the	  way	  Kant	  suggests,	  then	  judging	  would	  be	  an	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  Ibid.,	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operation	  performed	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  reason.	  	  But,	  if	  the	  two	  faculties	  are	  indeed	  
separate,	  “then	  we	  shall	  have	  to	  ascribe	  to	  [judgment]	  its	  own	  modus	  operandi,	  its	  own	  
way	  of	  proceeding.”48	  	  Arendt	  is	  clear	  in	  the	  distinction	  between	  thinking	  and	  judging.	  	  
“The	  faculty	  of	  judging	  particulars	  .	  .	  .	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  the	  faculty	  of	  
thinking	  .	  .	  .judging	  always	  concerns	  particulars	  and	  things	  close	  at	  hand.”49	  	  With	  the	  
certainty	  that	  judging	  is	  a	  distinct	  activity,	  Arendt	  wrestles	  with	  articulating	  what	  exactly	  
the	  faculty	  of	  judgment	  is	  concerned	  with	  and	  how	  it	  connects	  to	  the	  other	  activities	  of	  
the	  mind.	  	  
The	  “actual	  activity	  of	  judging	  something”	  is	  an	  “operation	  of	  reflection”	  wherein	  
what	  is	  affecting	  you	  in	  the	  phenomenal	  world	  of	  sensory	  awareness	  “is	  removed	  from	  
your	  outward	  senses”	  and	  “becomes	  an	  object	  for	  your	  inward	  senses.”50	  	  Judging,	  then,	  
applies	  a	  value	  to	  particular	  sense	  perceptions	  and	  emotional	  responses.	  	  Arendt	  seems	  
to	  imply	  that	  there	  are	  two	  possible	  values	  that	  can	  be	  ascribed	  to	  any	  phenomenal	  
experience:	  	  pleasurable	  or	  not	  pleasurable.	  	  Judging	  whether	  experiences	  in	  the	  world	  
are	  “pleasurable”	  informs	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  think	  about	  the	  world.	  	  Arendt	  does	  not	  
explicitly	  explain	  what	  she	  means	  by	  the	  term	  “pleasurable.”	  	  However,	  from	  what	  she	  
does	  say,	  one	  can	  assume	  that	  pleasure	  is	  a	  natural	  response	  to	  particular	  experiences	  
and	  that	  the	  memory	  of	  that	  response	  informs	  the	  activity	  of	  thinking.	  	  This	  is	  not	  
reason	  commanding	  judgment,	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Kant	  would	  suggest.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  the	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49	  Arendt,	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50	  Arendt,	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  Mind,	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idea	  that	  what	  an	  individual	  experiences	  as	  “pleasurable”	  speaks	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  he	  
considers	  the	  world	  and,	  therefore,	  comes	  to	  understand	  what	  is	  right	  and	  what	  is	  
wrong.	  	  Judging	  particulars	  as	  we	  experience	  them	  is	  the	  only	  means	  by	  which	  we	  can	  
claim	  that	  thinking	  has	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  tell	  right	  from	  wrong.	  	  In	  
thinking	  we	  remember	  the	  particulars	  and	  the	  judgments	  made	  regarding	  them,	  
whether	  they	  were	  pleasurable	  or	  not,	  and	  these	  judgments	  inform	  both	  how	  we	  
understand	  the	  world	  and	  what	  it	  is	  our	  will	  drives	  into	  action.	  	  It	  is	  on	  this	  ground,	  then,	  
that	  judging	  is	  the	  most	  political	  of	  all	  mental	  activities.	  
In	  a	  world	  where	  knowledge	  claims	  to	  know	  how	  men	  ought	  to	  interact	  with	  one	  
another,	  there	  is	  a	  standard	  against	  which	  all	  experiences	  are	  measured.	  	  In	  this	  kind	  of	  
world,	  what	  is	  good	  or	  bad,	  notions	  which	  thinking	  would	  otherwise	  determine,	  has	  
already	  been	  decided.	  	  Thus,	  if	  one	  need	  not	  consider	  what	  is	  good/bad,	  right/wrong,	  
then	  the	  precursory	  role	  of	  judging,	  wherein	  one	  determines	  whether	  a	  particular	  
experience	  was	  pleasurable	  or	  not,	  has	  been	  altogether	  removed.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  the	  
task	  of	  judging	  is	  to	  determine	  what	  is	  pleasurable	  and	  those	  determinations	  inform	  
how	  we	  understand	  the	  world	  as	  we	  think	  about	  it,	  then	  they	  are	  all	  but	  useless	  in	  
circumstances	  where	  one	  is	  not	  thinking.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  a	  world	  where	  Arendt’s	  
notion	  of	  thinking	  is	  present,	  frameworks	  are	  challenged,	  final	  solutions	  are	  dissolved,	  
and	  judging	  is	  necessary	  to	  evaluate	  particular	  experiences.	  	  This	  is	  why,	  	  
The	  purging	  element	  in	  thinking	  .	  .	  .	  that	  brings	  out	  the	  
implications	  of	  unexamined	  opinions	  and	  thereby	  destroys	  
them—values,	  doctrines,	  theories,	  and	  even	  convictions—
is	  political	  by	  implication.	  	  For	  this	  destruction	  has	  a	  
liberating	  effect	  on	  .	  .	  .	  the	  faculty	  of	  judgment,	  which	  one	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may	  call,	  with	  some	  justification,	  the	  most	  political	  of	  
man’s	  mental	  abilities.51	  	  
	  
	   So,	  Arendt	  undoubtedly	  rejects	  the	  Kantian	  notion	  that	  reason	  informs	  judgment	  
and	  asserts	  that	  judgments	  are	  non-­‐logical	  conclusions	  about	  particular	  experiences	  
regarding	  whether	  the	  experiences	  are	  pleasurable	  or	  not.	  	  In	  order	  to	  better	  
understand	  the	  faculty	  of	  judgment,	  and	  particularly	  this	  notion	  of	  pleasure,	  it	  is,	  again,	  
useful	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  Jewish	  tradition.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  judgment	  has	  something	  to	  do	  with	  
pleasure	  is	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  the	  Jewish	  tradition.	  	  Perhaps	  nowhere	  is	  this	  illustrated	  
more	  clearly	  than	  in	  Leviticus	  chapter	  19:	  	  “Judge	  your	  kinsman	  fairly”	  and	  	  “Love	  your	  
fellow	  as	  yourself.”52	  	  To	  judge	  your	  kinsman	  fairly	  is	  to	  love	  him	  as	  yourself.	  	  Hermann	  
Cohen,	  a	  19th	  century	  German-­‐Jewish	  philosopher	  wrote	  that	  perhaps	  the	  “correct	  
translation	  should	  read:	  	  ‘Love	  him;	  he	  is	  like	  you.’”53	  	  It	  is	  this	  sense	  of	  likeness	  that	  
Arendt	  implicitly	  relies	  on	  in	  her	  conception	  of	  judging.	  	  That	  human	  beings	  are	  alike,	  
fundamentally,	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  underlying	  assumption.	  	  It	  is	  only	  with	  that	  assumption	  
that	  she	  can	  make	  claims	  about	  judging,	  that	  it	  regards	  what	  is	  pleasurable,	  in	  the	  way	  
that	  she	  does.	  	  It	  is	  as	  if	  she	  is	  saying	  that	  what	  is	  pleasurable	  is	  pleasurable	  for	  all	  and	  
therefore	  it	  correctly	  informs	  the	  moral	  valuations	  prescribed	  by	  the	  thinking	  activity.	  	  
This	  is	  a	  difficult	  interpretation	  to	  accept,	  given	  Arendt’s	  aversion	  to	  defining	  anything,	  
particularly	  human	  nature.	  	  If	  what	  is	  pleasurable	  to	  one	  is	  pleasurable	  to	  all,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Arendt,	  Responsibility	  and	  Judgment,	  188.	  
52	  Leviticus	  19:	  15	  and	  19:18,	  JPS.	  
53	  Hermann	  Cohen,	  “Affinities	  Between	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Kant	  and	  Judaism”	  in	  The	  Jewish	  Political	  
Tradition,	  Volume	  One:	  Authority,	  eds.	  Michael	  Walzer,	  Menachem	  Lorberbaum,	  and	  Noam	  J.	  Zohar	  (New	  
Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  92.	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therefore	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  how	  we	  understand	  the	  world,	  then	  is	  she	  not	  positing	  both	  a	  
human	  nature	  and	  a	  definitive	  truth?	  
	   The	  notion	  of	  pleasure	  must	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  happiness.	  	  One	  
must	  recognize	  that	  what	  is	  pleasurable	  is	  not	  equivalent	  with	  what	  brings	  happiness.	  	  
Hermann	  Cohen	  points	  out	  that	  this	  “rejection	  of	  eudaimonism	  and	  all	  its	  variations”	  
charactizes	  Kant’s	  ethics	  and	  that	  “Jewish	  philosophy	  also	  unequivocally	  rejects	  the	  
principle	  of	  happiness.”54	  	  Arendt’s	  thought,	  which	  was	  clearly	  influenced	  by	  Kant,	  also	  
has	  this	  affinity	  to	  the	  Jewish	  tradition.	  	  Kant	  and	  the	  Jewish	  philosophers,	  however,	  
posit	  a	  criterion	  by	  which	  views	  and	  actions	  can	  be	  judged.	  	  Kant	  asserts	  the	  categorical	  
imperative;	  Jewish	  philosophy	  always	  has	  the	  Law	  and	  the	  Prophetic	  tradition.	  	  What	  
source,	  then,	  does	  Arendt	  have?	  	  If	  she	  rejects	  the	  Kantian	  notion	  of	  judgment	  being	  
determined	  by	  reason	  and	  is	  admittedly	  not	  one	  who	  would	  turn	  to	  the	  Torah	  and	  the	  
law,	  then	  what	  is	  the	  ultimate	  criterion	  for	  judgment?	  	  Perhaps	  the	  questions	  arise	  here	  
more	  than	  in	  any	  other	  place	  because	  her	  thoughts	  on	  the	  matter	  were	  not	  complete.	  	  
The	  absence	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  work	  on	  the	  topic	  forces	  one	  to	  speculate.	  
	   It	  seems	  out	  of	  character	  for	  Arendt	  to	  posit	  here	  that	  there	  is	  either	  a	  human	  
nature	  or	  that	  there	  is	  some	  inherent	  source	  by	  which	  all	  experiences	  are	  judged,	  that	  is,	  
understood	  to	  be	  pleasurable	  or	  not.	  	  She	  parts	  with	  Kant	  over	  the	  determination	  of	  a	  
universal	  law	  that	  is	  derived	  by	  reason,	  and	  is	  imposed	  upon	  both	  judgment	  and	  the	  will.	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  some	  complementarity	  between	  Judaism	  and	  Kant	  in	  
terms	  of	  positing	  a	  universal	  law,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  small	  space	  in	  which	  Arendt	  draws	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Ibid.	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nearer	  the	  Jewish	  tradition	  than	  Kant.	  	  If	  Kant’s	  premise	  were	  to	  hold	  in	  the	  Jewish	  
framework,	  if	  reason	  were	  responsible	  for	  establishing	  the	  universal	  law	  anew,	  then	  God	  
“would	  become	  a	  useless	  machine.”55	  In	  Judaism	  the	  source	  for	  moral	  law	  is	  God	  and	  
that	  law	  is	  revealed	  in	  the	  Torah	  and	  also	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  human	  reason.	  	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  
a	  more	  useful	  understanding	  of	  Arendt	  to	  posit	  that	  the	  source	  for	  morality	  is	  human	  
experience.	  	  And	  while	  human	  beings	  do	  not	  have	  a	  fixed	  nature,	  human	  beings	  do	  
share	  the	  same	  conditions.	  	  And	  it	  is	  due	  to	  the	  likeness	  of	  conditions	  that	  human	  
experiences	  have	  the	  same	  revelatory	  value.	  	  Ultimately,	  what	  revelatory	  experiences	  
teach	  is	  freedom.	  	  And	  it	  is	  that	  sense	  of	  freedom	  that	  provides	  the	  “quiet	  sense”	  of	  
pleasure.	  	  	  
	   There	  is	  yet	  another	  thread	  of	  Jewish	  thought	  that	  has	  explanatory	  value	  as	  well	  
as	  plausible	  influence	  on	  Arendt.	  	  The	  school	  of	  Jewish	  mysticism	  understands	  judgment	  
as	  the	  “imposition	  of	  limits.”	  	  Further,	  the	  “quality	  of	  judgment	  is	  inherent	  in	  everything	  
insofar	  as	  everything	  wishes	  to	  remain	  what	  it	  is,	  to	  stay	  within	  its	  boundaries.”56	  	  The	  
Kabbalistic	  notion	  of	  judgment	  is	  something	  Arendt	  was	  definitely	  aware	  of,	  particularly	  
as	  it	  is	  articulated	  in	  Gershom	  Scholem’s	  Major	  Trends	  in	  Jewish	  Mysticism,	  a	  text	  we	  
know	  Arendt	  read	  and	  was	  very	  familiar	  with.57	  	  An	  individual	  constructs	  an	  identity	  in	  
the	  mind.	  	  That	  identity,	  however,	  is	  purely	  subjective.	  	  In	  order	  for	  the	  human	  being	  to	  
really	  answer	  the	  question,	  “Who	  am	  I?”	  the	  self-­‐constructed	  identity	  must	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Ibid.	  	  
56	  Scholem,	  Major	  Trends,	  263,	  emphasis	  mine.	  
57	  The	  relationship	  between	  Arendt	  and	  Scholem	  as	  well	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  using	  this	  text	  as	  evidence	  of	  
Jewish	  influence	  is	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  1	  and	  is	  fully	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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challenged	  by	  the	  uncertainty	  and	  unpredictability	  of	  the	  world	  of	  appearances.	  	  Only	  in	  
phenomenal	  experience	  is	  one’s	  identity	  authentically	  revealed.	  	  If	  judgment	  is	  the	  
faculty	  that	  considers	  particular	  experiences,	  specifically,	  whether	  they	  were	  
pleasurable,	  then,	  perhaps,	  pleasure	  is	  determined	  by	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  self	  revealed	  
in	  the	  particular	  experience	  is	  congruent	  with	  the	  hidden	  self	  that	  was	  already	  
constructed	  in	  the	  mind.	  	  If	  one	  understands	  oneself	  in	  a	  particular	  way,	  but	  experiences	  
deny	  that	  reality,	  then	  the	  experience	  is	  unpleasurable,	  it	  does	  not	  reveal	  an	  identity	  
acceptable	  to	  the	  individual.	  	  If,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  experience	  reveals	  the	  identity	  
of	  the	  individual	  as	  the	  individual	  already	  understands	  herself	  to	  be,	  then	  the	  experience	  
allows	  the	  individual	  to	  remain	  who	  she	  is,	  and	  is	  therefore	  considered	  pleasurable.	  	  
Rooting	  Arendt’s	  concept	  of	  judging	  in	  the	  Jewish	  tradition,	  particularly	  in	  the	  mystical	  
Jewish	  tradition,	  helps	  not	  only	  to	  understand	  the	  faculty	  of	  judgment,	  but	  also	  how	  it	  
relates	  to	  the	  other	  two	  mental	  faculties.	  	  Understanding	  judging	  as	  the	  internalization	  
of	  an	  outward	  experience	  of	  revelation	  creates	  consistency	  and	  is	  more	  coherent	  than	  a	  
conception	  of	  judging	  that	  is	  more	  Kantian.	  	  	  
In	  looking	  into	  the	  life	  of	  the	  mind,	  the	  interrelatedness	  of	  the	  three	  faculties	  
makes	  their	  individual	  explication	  difficult.	  	  The	  attempt	  here	  has	  further	  reinforced	  a	  
significant	  aspect	  of	  Arendt’s	  Jewishness.	  	  Namely,	  the	  life	  of	  the	  mind	  is	  undetermined,	  
uncoerced,	  and	  cannot	  be	  understood	  in	  linear	  terms.	  	  Rather,	  looking	  into	  the	  life	  of	  
the	  mind	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  these	  activities	  are	  circular	  with	  no	  determined	  starting	  
point	  and	  no	  prescription	  regarding	  direction	  of	  travel	  as	  if	  there	  were	  a	  cause	  and	  
effect.	  	  The	  activities	  that	  comprise	  the	  life	  of	  the	  mind	  are	  what	  we	  are	  doing	  when	  we	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are	  doing	  nothing	  in	  the	  world	  of	  appearances.	  	  And	  yet,	  not	  only	  do	  they	  have	  the	  
power	  to	  change	  the	  world	  of	  appearances,	  they	  are	  necessary	  for	  its	  very	  manifestation.	  	  	  
Below,	  Figure	  I	  illustrates	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind,	  which	  occur	  in	  the	  subjective	  
space	  of	  the	  individual,	  and	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  physical	  body	  that	  comprise	  the	  world	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Figure	  1:	  	  The	  activities	  of	  vita	  contemplativa	  and	  the	  vita	  activa	  and	  the	  spaces	  in	  which	  
they	  exist.	   	  
	  
The	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  are	  thinking,	  willing,	  and	  judging.	  	  All	  of	  these	  activities	  are	  
necessary	  because	  they	  all	  have	  a	  different	  function.	  	  Thinking	  regards	  generalities	  and	  
determines	  what	  is	  good	  and	  bad;	  willing	  and	  judging	  both	  deal	  with	  particulars	  and	  
“concern	  matters	  that	  are	  absent	  either	  because	  they	  are	  not	  yet	  or	  because	  they	  are	  
no	  more.”58	   	  	  While	  the	  function	  of	  each	  faculty	  is	  distinct,	  the	  product	  of	  each	  faculty	  
affects,	  but	  does	  not	  command,	  the	  others.	  	  The	  physical	  world	  is	  the	  space	  into	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  213.	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human	  beings	  are	  born.	  	  Upon	  birth,	  certain	  biological	  activities	  are	  necessary	  for	  
survival,	  thus	  the	  conditions	  for	  labor.	  	  Work	  is	  conditioned	  by	  worldiness,	  that	  we	  exist	  
in	  a	  created	  artifice	  and	  continue	  to	  contribute	  to	  that	  artifice.	  	  Both	  work	  and	  labor	  can	  
be	  performed	  in	  solitude	  or	  in	  the	  plurality	  of	  men.	  	  Action,	  however,	  is	  the	  only	  activity	  
that	  exclusively	  occurs	  between	  human	  beings	  and	  is	  necessitated	  by	  the	  fact	  of	  our	  
plurality.	  	  Thus,	  the	  space	  in	  which	  action	  occurs	  is	  altogether	  different	  than	  work	  and	  
labor	  and	  it	  is	  what	  Arendt	  call	  the	  space	  of	  appearance,	  or	  the	  polis.	  	  This	  implicitly	  
political	  activity	  is	  inherently	  connected	  to	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind.	  	  For	  it	  is	  only	  in	  
thinking,	  willing,	  and	  judging	  that	  action	  can	  occur.	  	  As	  Arendt	  writes,	  “The	  
manifestation	  of	  the	  wind	  of	  thought	  is	  no	  knowledge;	  it	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  tell	  right	  from	  
wrong,	  beautiful	  from	  ugly.	  	  And	  this	  indeed	  may	  prevent	  catastrophes,	  at	  least	  for	  
myself,	  in	  the	  rare	  moments	  when	  the	  chips	  are	  down.”59	  	  It	  is	  thinking,	  willing	  and	  
judging	  that	  “prevent	  catastrophes.”	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  it	  is	  the	  life	  of	  the	  mind,	  in	  concert	  
with	  the	  vita	  activa	  that	  determines	  the	  world	  in	  which	  we	  live.	  	  And	  it	  is	  to	  that	  action	  
that	  we	  must	  now	  turn	  our	  attention.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Arendt,	  Responsibility	  and	  Judgment,	  189.	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CHAPTER	  III:	  
ON	  ACTION	  
Although	  nobody	  knows	  whom	  he	  reveals	  when	  he	  discloses	  himself	  in	  
deed	  or	  word,	  he	  must	  be	  willing	  to	  risk	  the	  disclosure.	  
~Hannah	  Arendt,	  The	  Human	  Condition	  
	  
	   The	  relationship	  between	  thought	  and	  action	  is	  one	  that	  Arendt	  is	  constantly	  
working	  out.	  	  It	  is	  present	  in	  two	  of	  her	  most	  significant	  works,	  The	  Human	  Condition	  
and	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  as	  well	  as	  most	  of	  her	  other	  works.	  	  Her	  thoughts	  on	  the	  
matter	  were	  discussed	  in	  a	  less	  formal	  way	  in	  her	  correspondences	  with	  her	  husband,	  
Heinrich	  Blucher.	  	  Arendt	  and	  Blucher	  were	  very	  close	  and	  there	  is	  general	  consensus	  
that	  they	  had	  a	  reciprocity	  of	  thought,	  contemplating	  shared	  experiences	  and	  working	  
through	  ideas	  together.	  	  In	  the	  introductory	  remarks	  to	  their	  published	  correspondence	  
it	  is	  written,	  “What	  had	  become	  clearer	  to	  [Heinrich	  Blucher]	  was	  the	  relationship	  
between	  the	  two:	  	  the	  indispensability	  of	  advancing	  from	  words	  to	  actions,	  moving	  from	  
theoretical	  contemplation	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  interpersonal	  relationships.”⁠1	  	  This	  is	  a	  point	  
that	  Blucher	  and	  Arendt	  clearly	  shared:	  	  both	  thought	  and	  action	  are	  important,	  and	  
neither	  is	  more	  important;	  both	  must	  occur.	  	  The	  “true	  world”	  of	  the	  mind	  is	  only	  “true”	  
insofar	  as	  it	  brings	  to	  life	  the	  phenomenal	  world	  of	  experience.	  	  Further,	  while	  the	  mind	  
can	  contemplate	  actions	  infinitely,	  the	  only	  way	  to	  learn	  and	  to	  experience	  is	  to	  act.	  	  
This	  is	  why	  Lotte	  Kohler,	  author	  of	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  correspondence,	  writes,	  “The	  
answers	  to	  the	  question	  ‘What	  should	  we	  do?’—the	  human	  rules	  of	  conduct	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Hannah	  Arendt	  and	  Heinrich	  Blucher,	  Within	  Four	  Walls:	  The	  Correspondence	  between	  Hannah	  Arendt	  
and	  Heinrich	  Blucher,	  1936-­‐1968,	  ed.	  Lotte	  Kohler,	  trans.	  Peter	  Constantine	  (New	  York:	  Harcourt,	  Inc.,	  
2000),	  xvi.	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individuals—can	  be	  found	  and	  determined	  only	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  dialogic	  
praxis.”2 ⁠	  	  In	  The	  Human	  Condition,	  Arendt	  states	  it	  thus,	  “What	  I	  propose	  in	  the	  
following	  is	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  the	  human	  condition	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  our	  
newest	  experiences	  and	  our	  most	  recent	  fears.”	  	  This	  task	  “is	  nothing	  more	  than	  to	  think	  
what	  we	  are	  doing.”3	  	  Considering	  action,	  then,	  is	  not	  a	  negation	  of	  the	  place	  or	  
importance	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind,	  it	  is	  simply	  another	  necessary	  component	  of	  
the	  human	  experience	  of	  freedom.	  	  
Further	  distilling	  the	  two	  worlds	  of	  human	  experience,	  Arendt	  writes,	  “The	  active	  
one	  goes	  on	  in	  public,	  the	  contemplative	  one	  in	  the	  ‘desert.’”4	  	  She	  is	  careful	  to	  
articulate	  that	  thinking	  is	  an	  activity	  that	  occurs	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  individual	  that	  
creates	  a	  “	  mode	  of	  existence”	  in	  a	  “silent	  dialogue	  of	  myself	  with	  myself”	  that	  she	  “now	  
shall	  call	  solitude.” ⁠	  Solitude	  is	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  that	  is	  internal	  to	  the	  individual,	  
that	  is,	  it	  emerges	  in	  the	  mind	  via	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind.	  	  “The	  main	  distinction,	  
politically	  speaking,	  between	  Thought	  and	  Action	  lies	  in	  that	  I	  am	  only	  with	  my	  own	  self	  
or	  the	  self	  of	  another	  while	  I	  am	  thinking,	  whereas	  I	  am	  in	  the	  company	  of	  the	  many	  the	  
moment	  I	  start	  to	  act.”5	  	  Thus,	  action	  occurs	  amongst	  the	  plurality	  of	  men,	  while	  the	  
contemplative	  activities	  comprise	  the	  solitary	  life	  of	  man.	  	  The	  solitude	  of	  the	  thinking	  
person	  “can	  become	  loneliness,”	  which	  occurs	  when	  “all	  by	  myself	  I	  am	  deserted	  by	  my	  
own	  self.”	  	  The	  solitude	  of	  thinking	  is	  valuable	  insofar	  as	  it	  prompts	  the	  eventual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Ibid.,	  xvii.	  
3	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  5.	  
4	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  6.	  
5	  Arendt,	  Responsibility	  and	  Judgment,	  98,	  106.	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emergence	  of	  the	  self	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  appearances	  through	  action.	  	  Loneliness,	  
however,	  fosters	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  self	  in	  the	  insistence	  that	  the	  self	  cannot	  be	  understood	  
by	  anyone.	  	  It	  is	  a	  solitude	  that	  cannot	  be	  broken	  because	  the	  self	  cannot	  emerge	  in	  the	  
space	  of	  appearance	  where	  it	  can	  be	  “confirmed	  in	  its	  identity.”	  	  The	  danger	  of	  
loneliness,	  then,	  is	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  “company	  of	  equals”	  amongst	  whom	  the	  identity	  of	  
the	  self	  is	  revealed.	  	  In	  this	  state,	  man	  loses	  the	  self	  and	  the	  world	  loses	  its	  significance	  
as	  the	  realm	  in	  which	  actions	  reveal	  the	  self.	  	  Thus,	  “Self	  and	  world,	  capacity	  for	  thought	  
and	  experience	  are	  lost	  at	  the	  same	  time.”	  	  Loneliness	  was	  “once	  a	  borderline	  
experience”	  suffered	  by	  those	  marginalized	  by	  society;	  however,	  in	  the	  twentieth	  
century,	  amidst	  the	  growth	  of	  totalitarian	  regimes,	  it	  “has	  become	  an	  everyday	  
experience	  of	  the	  evergrowing	  masses.”6	  
It	  is	  well	  known	  that	  Arendt’s	  critique	  of	  totalitarianism	  is	  largely	  centered	  on	  the	  
idea	  of	  thoughtlessness.	  	  It	  is	  the	  thoughtlessness	  of	  human	  beings	  that	  allow	  for	  the	  
atrocities	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  and	  that	  create	  what	  she	  termed	  the	  banality	  of	  evil.	  	  In	  
her	  articulation	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  thinking	  and	  acting,	  she	  is	  draws	  upon	  
Nietzsche	  and,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  Heidegger.	  	  From	  Nietzsche	  she	  gains	  the	  notion	  that	  
the	  suprasensory	  world	  and	  the	  sensory	  world	  are	  comingled	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  
destruction	  of	  one	  necessarily	  entails	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  other.	  	  Nietzsche	  writes,	  
“We	  have	  abolished	  the	  true	  world.	  	  What	  has	  remained?	  	  The	  apparent	  one	  perhaps?	  	  
Oh	  no!	  	  With	  the	  true	  world	  we	  have	  also	  abolished	  the	  apparent	  one.”7	  	  For	  Arendt,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  The	  Origins	  of	  Totalitarianism	  (New	  York:	  Harcourt,	  Inc.,	  1968),	  467,	  477,	  478.	  
7	  Friedrich	  Nietzsche,	  Twilight	  of	  the	  Idols	  (written	  1888),	  in	  The	  Portable	  Nietzsche,	  ed.	  and	  trans.	  Walter	  
Kaufmann	  (New	  York:	  The	  Viking	  Press,	  1968),	  486.	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this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  with	  the	  impotence	  of	  the	  vita	  contemplativa,	  the	  vita	  activa	  can	  have	  
no	  hope	  of	  expression.	  	  Nietzsche’s	  “true	  world”	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  apparent	  world	  
through	  the	  activity	  of	  willing,	  and	  thus,	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  necessarily	  
entails	  a	  loss	  of	  those	  activities	  that	  are	  dependent	  upon	  them.	  	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  
previous	  chapter,	  without	  thinking	  there	  can	  be	  no	  willing;	  and,	  without	  willing	  there	  
can	  be	  no	  action.	  	  Thus,	  while	  action	  is	  certainly	  distinct	  from	  thinking,	  both	  activities	  are	  
necessary	  for	  the	  fullness	  of	  humanity	  insofar	  as	  both	  correspond	  to	  the	  human	  
condition.	  	  	  
The	  idea	  of	  thoughtlessness,	  then,	  has	  significant	  political	  implications	  because	  
the	  political	  world	  is	  the	  world	  of	  appearances—the	  apparent	  world	  that	  is	  manifested	  
only	  through	  action.	  	  As	  pointed	  out	  in	  chapter	  2,	  the	  connection	  between	  these	  “two	  
worlds”	  is,	  for	  Arendt,	  so	  obvious	  that	  “all	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  two	  worlds	  implies	  that	  
these	  two	  are	  inseparably	  connected	  with	  each	  other.”8	  	  Her	  work	  on	  the	  vita	  activa	  in	  
The	  Human	  Condition	  and	  her	  work	  on	  the	  vita	  contemplativa	  in	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind	  
seek	  to	  explain	  the	  activities	  that	  are	  conditioned	  by	  the	  material	  world	  and	  those	  that	  
are	  specific	  to	  the	  subjective	  realm	  of	  the	  mind	  with	  the	  underlying	  recognition	  that	  the	  
activities	  are	  wholly	  dependent	  upon	  one	  another.	  	  It	  is	  useful	  to	  filter	  the	  activities	  out,	  
to	  distinguish	  the	  two	  worlds	  from	  one	  another,	  but	  one	  must	  not	  forget	  that	  together,	  
both	  worlds	  comprise	  the	  human	  experience.	  	  	  
As	  noted	  in	  the	  Introduction,	  Arendt	  criticizes	  the	  Western	  political	  tradition	  for	  
its	  failure	  to	  account	  for	  action.	  	  Arendt	  defines	  action	  phenomenologically,	  stipulating	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  11.	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that	  actions	  are	  the	  words	  and	  deeds	  that	  pass	  between	  human	  beings.	  	  She	  limits	  what	  
can	  rightly	  be	  considered	  action	  by	  specifying	  certain	  criteria.	  	  First,	  action	  always	  occurs	  
in	  the	  plurality	  of	  men.	  	  Second,	  action	  inherently	  involves	  natality;	  the	  words	  and	  deeds	  
that	  constitute	  action	  necessarily	  create	  something	  new.	  	  Further,	  it	  is	  unpredictable	  
insofar	  as	  the	  end	  of	  any	  action	  cannot	  possibly	  be	  known	  prior	  to	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	  
word	  or	  deed.	  	  Finally,	  action	  is	  responsible	  for	  creating	  an	  entirely	  new	  public	  space,	  
the	  space	  of	  appearance.	  	  When	  human	  beings	  act	  in	  this	  sense,	  something	  entirely	  new	  
and	  inherently	  political	  emerges.	  	  Insofar	  as	  thinkers	  in	  the	  Western	  tradition	  failed	  to	  
account	  for	  action,	  “they	  have	  found	  no	  valid	  philosophical	  answer	  to	  the	  question:	  	  
What	  is	  politics?”	  Arendt	  finds	  that	  most	  political	  thought	  has	  come	  from	  philosophers	  
who	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  adequately	  address	  the	  topic	  of	  politics,	  lamenting,	  “what	  is	  
remarkable	  among	  all	  great	  thinkers	  is	  the	  difference	  in	  rank	  between	  their	  political	  
philosophies	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  their	  works—even	  in	  Plato.”9	  	  The	  root	  of	  this	  discrepancy	  is	  
the	  failure	  of	  these	  great	  thinkers	  to	  recognize	  that	  politics	  and	  philosophy	  consider	  two	  
different	  subjects.	  	  The	  philosopher	  considers	  man,	  and	  this	  has	  little	  to	  do	  with	  the	  
subject	  of	  politics,	  that	  is,	  men.	  	  The	  tradition	  of	  political	  and	  philosophical	  thought	  
offers	  little	  to	  political	  understanding	  because	  these	  thinkers	  failed	  to	  recognized	  that	  in	  
which	  politics	  is	  ontologically	  rooted:	  	  action.	  	  Because	  of	  this	  vacancy	  in	  the	  Western	  
tradition,	  this	  chapter	  differs	  from	  all	  of	  the	  other	  chapters	  in	  that	  there	  is	  little	  
discussion	  of	  Arendt’s	  European	  and	  Greek	  influences.	  	  She	  simply	  cannot	  start	  from	  the	  
Western	  tradition	  in	  her	  considerations	  on	  action	  because	  the	  discourse	  is	  not	  there.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Arendt,	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  93.	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A	  note	  regarding	  terminology	  is	  appropriate	  here.	  	  In	  The	  Human	  Condition,	  
Arendt	  posits	  that	  the	  term	  vita	  activa	  refers	  to	  three	  fundamental	  human	  activities:	  	  
labor,	  work,	  and	  action.	  	  Action,	  then,	  is	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  activity.	  	  And,	  while	  labor	  
and	  work	  are	  activities,	  they	  are	  not	  actions.	  	  Likewise,	  thinking,	  willing,	  and	  judging	  are	  
mental	  activities,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  actions.	  	  Throughout	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  
“activity	  of	  action”	  in	  order	  to	  reiterate	  that	  action,	  for	  Arendt,	  is	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  
activity	  (with	  the	  aforementioned	  characteristics)	  amongst	  various	  other	  activities.	  	  In	  
many	  ways,	  Arendt’s	  meticulous	  distinction	  between	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  vita	  activa	  is	  
what	  allows	  the	  activity	  of	  action	  to	  be	  revealed.	  	  Indeed,	  because	  previous	  thinkers	  
lacked	  such	  clarity,	  action	  was	  obscured	  and	  the	  political	  was	  concealed.	  	  
As	  this	  chapter	  explores	  the	  phenomenological	  nature	  of	  action,	  the	  Passover	  
narrative	  becomes	  even	  more	  useful	  as	  a	  metaphorical	  framework	  of	  understanding.	  	  It	  
poignantly	  illustrates	  what	  Arendt	  has	  determined	  is	  lacking	  in	  the	  Western	  tradition.	  	  
Since	  the	  Israelites	  put	  blood	  on	  their	  lintels,	  since	  they	  acted,	  they	  emerged	  as	  political	  
beings.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  they	  participated	  in	  the	  human	  activity	  that	  is	  the	  most	  humanizing	  
because	  it	  is	  the	  only	  human	  activity	  that	  answers	  the	  question,	  “Who	  am	  I?”	  	  The	  way	  
in	  which	  Arendt	  conceives	  of	  action	  fully	  differentiates	  her	  political	  thought	  from	  the	  
Western	  tradition.	  	  With	  this	  significant	  departure	  from	  Athens,	  she	  enters	  Jerusalem	  
and	  the	  Jewish	  tradition.	  	  Thus,	  the	  chapter	  begins	  with	  a	  lengthy	  description	  of	  the	  
concept	  of	  action	  as	  a	  necessary	  foundation	  from	  which	  the	  link	  to	  the	  Jewish	  tradition	  
can	  then	  be	  emphasized.	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   Arendt	  makes	  the	  case	  that	  the	  various	  human	  conditions	  “never	  condition	  us	  
absolutely.” ⁠10	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  caveat	  because	  it	  makes	  the	  case	  that	  the	  various	  
human	  conditions	  do	  not	  coerce	  the	  corresponding	  activities.	  	  The	  conditions	  
necessitate	  certain	  activities	  for	  the	  fullness	  of	  the	  human	  experience,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  
guarantees	  of	  anything	  at	  all	  in	  the	  world.	  	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  individuals	  act	  in	  
correspondence	  with	  these	  conditions	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  expand	  to	  the	  bounds	  
of	  their	  humanity.	  	  When	  action	  is	  absent	  an	  individual	  is	  not	  responding	  to	  the	  human	  
condition	  of	  plurality	  and,	  therefore,	  lacks	  any	  political	  identity.	  	  In	  action,	  an	  individual	  
articulates	  a	  definition	  of	  self,	  ascribing	  meaning	  and	  identity.	  	  Without	  this	  articulation,	  
the	  self	  remains	  veiled.	  	  And	  with	  the	  veil	  in	  place,	  human	  beings	  can	  be	  utilized	  in	  
various	  ways	  through	  work	  and	  labor,	  neither	  of	  which	  require	  thought	  or	  action.	  	  Just	  
as	  the	  narrative	  loses	  its	  living	  meaning	  when	  it	  does	  not	  stir	  the	  will	  and	  motivate	  
action,	  the	  human	  being	  becomes	  meaning-­‐less	  without	  action.	  	  The	  meaninglessness	  
inherent	  in	  concealment	  is	  mitigated	  only	  through	  the	  combined	  efforts	  of	  the	  activities	  
of	  the	  mind	  and	  action.	  
	   It	  is	  explicitly	  stated	  in	  The	  Human	  Condition	  that	  the	  condition	  that	  corresponds	  
to	  action	  is	  plurality:	  	  “Action,	  the	  only	  activity	  that	  goes	  on	  directly	  between	  men	  
without	  the	  intermediary	  of	  things	  or	  matter,	  corresponds	  to	  the	  human	  condition	  of	  
plurality,	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  men,	  not	  Man,	  live	  on	  the	  earth	  and	  inhabit	  the	  world.”11	  	  It	  is	  
also	  clearly	  stated	  that	  action	  is	  rooted	  in	  natality,	  the	  ability	  to	  create	  anew	  (as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  11.	  
11	  Ibid.,	  7.	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discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter),	  and	  it	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  unlimited	  and	  
unpredictable.	  	  This	  is	  all	  connected	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  men,	  not	  man,	  live	  in	  the	  world.	  	  
Thus,	  “Power	  for	  human	  beings	  who	  are	  not	  omnipotent	  can	  only	  reside	  in	  one	  of	  the	  
many	  forms	  of	  human	  plurality,	  whereas	  every	  mode	  of	  human	  singularity	  is	  impotent	  
by	  definition.”12	  	  Action,	  as	  necessitated	  by	  the	  condition	  of	  plurality,	  is	  the	  most	  
political	  activity	  because	  it	  manifests	  the	  inherent	  power	  of	  human	  beings,	  that	  is,	  the	  
power	  to	  create	  anew.	  	  	  
	   Action	  is	  the	  only	  activity	  that	  is	  dependent	  upon	  other	  human	  beings.	  	  Man	  can	  
labor	  in	  solitude;	  man	  can	  work	  and	  build	  a	  world	  alone	  as	  well.	  	  Work	  is	  further	  
differentiated	  from	  action	  in	  that	  it	  has	  “a	  definite	  beginning	  and	  a	  definite,	  predictable	  
end.”	  	  Moreover,	  “every	  thing	  produced	  by	  human	  hands	  can	  be	  destroyed	  by	  them.”	  	  It	  
is	  this	  power	  over	  the	  product	  of	  fabrication	  that	  makes	  man	  immortal,	  that	  is,	  it	  gives	  
the	  impression	  of	  control	  and	  power.	  	  The	  human	  being	  who	  makes	  things	  out	  of	  matter,	  
the	  homo	  faber,	  “Is	  indeed	  a	  lord	  and	  master,	  not	  only	  because	  he	  is	  the	  master	  or	  has	  
set	  himself	  up	  as	  the	  master	  of	  all	  nature	  but	  because	  he	  is	  master	  of	  himself	  and	  his	  
doings.”	  	  This	  type	  of	  creating	  is	  different	  than	  what	  is	  created	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  of	  
action.	  	  The	  homo	  faber	  is	  the	  “lord	  and	  master”	  of	  the	  materials	  that	  are	  being	  used	  to	  
wield	  the	  artifice	  of	  the	  world.	  	  The	  materials	  at	  hand	  are	  fully	  malleable	  because	  they	  
have	  no	  creative	  capacity	  of	  their	  own.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  materials	  that	  go	  into	  building	  the	  
artifice	  of	  the	  world	  are	  predictable	  and	  limited	  and	  therefore	  the	  master	  can	  determine	  
how	  they	  are	  to	  be	  used.	  	  This	  type	  of	  control	  is	  not	  possible	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  action	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Arendt,	  Responsibility	  and	  Judgment,	  106,	  emphasis	  mine.	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because	  the	  only	  way	  to	  maintain	  this	  role	  while	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  other	  human	  beings	  
is	  to	  turn	  other	  human	  beings	  into	  matter	  that	  can	  be	  molded.	  	  And,	  if	  human	  beings	  are	  
like	  raw	  materials	  useful	  for	  the	  production	  of	  things,	  then	  the	  other	  activities,	  those	  of	  
the	  mind	  and	  action,	  are	  not	  only	  unnecessary	  but	  also	  highly	  dangerous.	  	  The	  instant	  
that	  human	  beings	  are	  not	  merely	  objects	  comprising	  the	  artifice	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  
moment	  we	  act,	  the	  homo	  faber	  who	  created	  that	  world	  loses	  his	  power.	  	  As	  individuals	  
act,	  then,	  they	  gain	  the	  specifically	  human	  quality,	  which	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  contribute	  new	  
words	  and	  deeds	  to	  the	  world.	  	  “No	  human	  life,	  not	  even	  the	  life	  of	  the	  hermit	  in	  
nature’s	  wilderness,	  is	  possible	  without	  a	  world	  which	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  testifies	  to	  
the	  presence	  of	  other	  human	  beings.”13	  Actions	  are	  powerful	  because	  they	  manifest	  the	  
potency	  of	  the	  human	  capacity	  to	  create.	  	  However,	  what	  is	  powerful	  is	  not	  the	  product	  
but	  the	  activity	  itself.	  	  	  
	   The	  connection	  between	  action,	  willing,	  and	  natality,	  has	  been	  discussed	  in	  the	  
second	  chapter.	  	  The	  argument	  was	  made	  that,	  for	  Arendt,	  the	  mental	  activity	  of	  willing	  
is	  what	  connects	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  with	  the	  phenomenal	  world	  by	  motivating	  
particular	  actions.	  Indeed,	  the	  case	  was	  made	  that	  willing	  is	  the	  activity	  that	  
corresponds	  to	  the	  condition	  of	  natality.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  awareness	  that	  one	  is	  
capable	  of	  creating	  something	  new	  is	  what	  activates	  the	  will	  altogether.	  	  Because	  action	  
is	  driven	  by	  the	  will,	  Arendt	  states	  that	  action	  is	  “ontologically	  rooted”	  in	  natality.	  	  The	  
essence	  of	  action	  is	  natality.	  	  It	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  human	  beings	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  create	  
new	  things,	  this	  natality,	  that	  makes	  willing	  necessary.	  	  That	  is,	  willing,	  as	  “the	  total	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  143,	  144,	  22.	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cause	  of	  volition,”	  is	  necessary	  for	  any	  action	  at	  all.14	  	  Natality	  is	  ultimately	  significant	  
because	  it	  motivates	  the	  will	  to	  manifest	  actions,	  the	  words	  and	  deeds	  that	  reveal	  the	  
identity	  of	  the	  actor.	  	  This	  is	  why,	  in	  The	  Human	  Condition	  Arendt	  writes,	  
The	  miracle	  that	  saves	  the	  world,	  the	  realm	  of	  human	  
affairs,	  from	  its	  normal,	  ‘natural’	  ruin	  is	  ultimately	  the	  fact	  
of	  natality,	  in	  which	  the	  faculty	  of	  action	  is	  ontologically	  
rooted.	  	  It	  is,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  birth	  of	  new	  men	  and	  the	  
new	  beginning,	  the	  action	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  by	  virtue	  of	  
being	  born.15	  	  	  
	  
The	  “world”	  is	  not	  only	  the	  objective	  artifice,	  but,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  it	  is	  
the	  space	  of	  appearance.	  	  The	  artifice	  of	  the	  world	  is	  created	  by	  work,	  the	  activity	  that	  
creates	  material	  things	  out	  of	  raw	  materials;	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  is	  created	  by	  
action,	  the	  activity	  that	  creates	  things	  by	  the	  interaction	  of	  human	  beings	  through	  
words	  and	  deeds.	  	  Action	  is	  the	  “miracle”	  of	  human	  experience:	  	  
Man	  himself	  evidently	  has	  a	  most	  amazing	  and	  mysterious	  
talent	  for	  working	  miracles.	  	  The	  normal,	  hackneyed	  word	  
our	  language	  provides	  for	  this	  talent	  is	  ‘action.’	  	  Action	  is	  
unique	  in	  that	  it	  sets	  in	  motion	  processes	  that	  in	  their	  
automatism	  look	  very	  much	  like	  natural	  processes,	  and	  
action	  also	  marks	  the	  start	  of	  something,	  begins	  something	  
new,	  seizes	  the	  initiative,	  or,	  in	  Kantian	  term,	  forges	  its	  
own	  chain.16	  
	  
Action	  is	  unique	  because	  it	  is	  the	  creator;	  through	  action	  human	  beings	  have	  the	  power	  
to	  create,	  sustain,	  and	  dissolve	  the	  space	  of	  appearance.	  	  Action	  is	  unique	  because	  when	  
it	  ceases,	  the	  space	  it	  creates	  also	  ceases	  to	  exist.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  69.	  
15	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  247,	  emphasis	  mine.	  
16	  Arendt,	  The	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  113.	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   Action,	  which	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  create	  anew,	  is	  not	  only	  miraculous,	  but	  it	  
is	  responsible	  for	  the	  unpredictable,	  spontaneous	  character	  of	  the	  world.	  	  “[W}ithout	  
action	  and	  speech,	  without	  the	  articulation	  of	  natality,	  we	  would	  be	  doomed	  to	  swing	  
forever	  in	  the	  ever-­‐recurring	  cycle	  of	  becoming.”	  	  Furthermore,	  action	  is	  the	  human	  
faculty	  by	  which	  we	  are	  able	  to	  “undo	  what	  we	  have	  done	  and	  to	  control	  at	  least	  
partially	  the	  processes	  we	  have	  let	  loose,”	  without	  which	  “we	  would	  be	  the	  victims	  of	  an	  
automatic	  necessity	  bearing	  all	  the	  marks	  of	  the	  inexorable	  laws,”	  a	  necessity	  that	  “can	  
only	  spell	  doom.”	  	  This	  doom,	  then,	  is	  thwarted	  only	  with	  action:	  	  	  
The	  life	  span	  of	  man	  running	  toward	  death	  would	  
inevitably	  carry	  everything	  human	  to	  ruin	  and	  destruction	  
if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  the	  faculty	  of	  interrupting	  it	  and	  
beginning	  something	  new,	  a	  faculty	  which	  is	  inherent	  in	  
action	  like	  an	  ever-­‐present	  reminder	  that	  men,	  though	  
they	  must	  die,	  are	  not	  born	  in	  order	  to	  die	  but	  in	  order	  to	  
begin.	  
	  
Man	  does	  not	  become	  immortal	  with	  action,	  but	  rather,	  becomes	  alive,	  fully	  
empowered	  as	  the	  miracle-­‐worker	  of	  the	  world.	  	  Action,	  then,	  is	  not	  only	  miraculous,	  
but	  it	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  unpredictable,	  spontaneous	  character	  of	  the	  world.	  	  “The	  
fact	  that	  man	  is	  capable	  of	  action	  means	  that	  the	  unexpected	  can	  be	  expected	  from	  him,	  
that	  he	  is	  able	  to	  perform	  what	  is	  infinitely	  improbable.”17	  
To	  this	  point,	  it	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  that	  action	  is	  ontologically	  rooted	  in	  
natality	  and	  its	  condition	  is	  plurality.	  	  What,	  then,	  does	  Arendt	  mean	  when	  she	  writes	  of	  
action	  that	  it	  is	  the	  “articulation	  of	  natality?”18	  	  Natality	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  willing:	  	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  246,	  178,	  emphasis	  mine.	  
18	  Ibid.,	  246.	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human	  beings	  we	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  create	  new	  things.	  	  Plurality	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  
action:	  	  as	  human	  beings	  we	  speak	  and	  move	  amongst	  other	  human	  beings.	  	  However,	  
insofar	  as	  actions	  are	  manifested	  through	  the	  faculty	  of	  the	  will,	  then	  action	  can	  be	  said	  
to	  be	  the	  articulation	  of	  natality.	  	  Actions	  breathe	  life	  into	  what	  otherwise	  would	  remain	  
dormant	  in	  the	  confines	  of	  one’s	  mind.	  	  These	  two	  conditions	  are	  inseparably	  
interconnected	  because	  it	  is	  the	  fact	  of	  natality	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  capacity	  for	  action.	  	  
And,	  if	  we	  were	  not	  plural	  our	  natality	  would	  be	  of	  no	  consequence.	  	  But,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	  human	  beings	  live	  in	  the	  world	  together,	  the	  newness	  manifested	  through	  action	  
has	  inherent	  political	  consequences.	  	  	  
	   In	  action,	  the	  self	  that	  the	  thinking	  mind	  creates	  in	  solitude	  is	  revealed	  to	  the	  
world	  of	  plurality.	  	  Arendt	  discovers	  two	  modes	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  action	  can	  exist:	  	  
words	  and	  deeds.	  	  Words	  and	  deeds	  are	  the	  particular	  means	  by	  which	  an	  individual	  
expresses	  the	  self	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  others.	  	  Action,	  then,	  functions	  to	  disclose	  the	  self:	  	  
words	  and	  deeds	  bring	  individuals	  face	  to	  face	  with	  one	  another	  and,	  thereby,	  mark	  
each	  person	  as	  a	  “distinct	  and	  unique	  being	  among	  equals.”	  	  The	  individual	  is	  only	  fully	  
human	  in	  the	  disclosure	  of	  the	  self,	  which	  is	  possible	  only	  in	  the	  plurality	  of	  the	  
collective.	  	  Action	  is	  the	  revelation	  of	  who	  we	  are,	  which	  is	  why,	  in	  The	  Human	  Condition,	  
Arendt	  asks	  what	  we	  are	  doing.	  	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  important	  because	  it	  also	  
answers	  the	  more	  pressing	  question,	  “Who	  am	  I?”	  	  It	  is	  the	  activity	  of	  disclosure;	  it	  
permits	  the	  individual	  to	  see	  and	  be	  seen,	  enabling	  the	  individual	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  
world	  of	  appearances.	  	  She	  writes,	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In	  acting	  and	  speaking,	  men	  show	  who	  they	  are,	  reveal	  
actively	  their	  unique	  personal	  identities	  and	  thus	  make	  
their	  appearance	  in	  the	  human	  world,	  while	  their	  physical	  
identities	  appear	  without	  any	  activity	  of	  their	  own	  in	  the	  
unique	  shape	  of	  the	  body	  and	  sound	  of	  the	  voice.19	  	  	  
	  
This	  notion	  of	  disclosure	  has	  deep	  roots	  in	  Arendt’s	  Jewish	  experiential	  and	  intellectual	  
background.	  	  In	  The	  Jewish	  Writings,	  she	  speaks	  of	  a	  profound	  friendship	  and	  
intellectual	  relationship	  with	  two	  Jewish	  intellectuals,	  Gershom	  Scholem	  and	  Walter	  
Benjamin.	  	  In	  this	  context,	  she	  speaks	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  two	  men	  contribute	  to	  
Jewish	  history	  in	  general,	  and	  also	  the	  way	  in	  which	  she	  was	  personally	  affected	  by	  their	  
lives	  and	  scholarship.	  	  Indeed,	  Scholem	  was	  already	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  one	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  narrative	  in	  Jewish	  identity	  and	  in	  the	  discussion	  on	  
judgment	  in	  chapter	  two.	  	  Here,	  the	  mystical	  ideas	  presented	  in	  Scholem’s	  Major	  Trends	  
in	  Jewish	  Mysticism	  and	  Benjamin’s	  thoughts	  on	  action	  and	  time	  presented	  in	  his	  
“Theses	  on	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  History”	  will	  be	  considered.	  	  	  
	   Hannah	  Arendt	  and	  her	  husband,	  Heinrich	  Blucher,	  together	  with	  Walter	  
Benjamin	  studied	  Scholem’s	  Major	  Trends	  together.	  	  “During	  the	  winter	  of	  1939/40,	  the	  
Bluchers	  and	  [Walter]	  Benjamin	  spent	  many	  hours	  discussing	  the	  book	  on	  Jewish	  
mysticism	  which	  Scholem	  had	  sent	  to	  Benjamin	  from	  Palestine.”20	  	  In	  this	  text,	  they	  read	  
about	  and	  studied	  the	  mystical	  emphasis	  on	  action	  as	  the	  only	  medium	  through	  which	  
man	  can	  experience	  reality.	  	  And,	  in	  this	  way,	  they	  came	  to	  respect	  this	  form	  of	  
mysticism.	  	  Arendt	  wrote,	  “Jewish	  mysticism	  alone	  [of	  all	  mystical	  trends]	  was	  able	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Ibid.,	  178,	  179.	  
20	  Young-­‐Bruehl,	  For	  Love	  of	  the	  World,	  161.	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bring	  about	  a	  great	  political	  movement	  and	  to	  translate	  itself	  directly	  into	  real	  popular	  
action.”21	  	  Walter	  Benjamin	  was	  also	  deeply	  indebted	  to	  Scholem,	  as	  he	  constructed	  a	  
view	  of	  history	  that	  was	  markedly	  action-­‐oriented,	  so	  as	  to	  understand	  the	  present,	  in	  
its	  dynamic	  and	  unpredictable	  nature,	  more	  fully.	  	  Elisabeth	  Young-­‐Bruehl	  says,	  
“[Benjamin’s]	  ‘Theses	  on	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  History’	  were	  written	  against	  historicism,	  
against	  attempts	  to	  isolate	  and	  reconstruct,	  or	  even	  relive,	  a	  past	  time,	  without	  regard	  
to	  what	  came	  after	  it.”	  	  And,	  Arendt	  was	  in	  turn	  influenced	  by	  Benjamin:	  	  “While	  they	  
waited	  for	  their	  ship	  in	  Lisbon,	  the	  Bluchers	  read	  Benjamin’s	  ‘Theses’	  aloud	  to	  each	  
other	  and	  to	  the	  refugees	  who	  gathered	  around	  them.”	  	  Of	  particular	  importance	  for	  
Arendt	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  Benjamin	  rejected	  historical	  materialism	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  
created	  “false	  hopes	  for	  the	  future”	  by	  “engaging	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  soothsaying	  prohibited	  
by	  Judaism.	  	  He	  accepted	  the	  prohibition	  against	  soothsaying,	  but	  he	  interpreted	  it	  in	  
light	  of	  a	  Jewish	  messianism	  he	  had	  read	  about	  in	  Scholem’s	  account⁠.”22	  	  	  
	   The	  Jewish	  messianism	  presented	  by	  both	  Scholem	  and	  Benjamin	  is	  also	  present	  
in	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory.	  	  In	  this	  messianism	  there	  is	  a	  pervasive,	  albeit	  
underlying,	  sense	  of	  hope.	  	  Benjamin	  says,	  “For	  every	  second	  of	  time	  was	  the	  straight	  
gate	  through	  which	  the	  Messiah	  might	  enter.”23	  	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  the	  hope	  that	  is	  inherent	  
in	  Arendt’s	  concept	  of	  natality.	  	  It	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  nothing	  is	  certain	  in	  the	  web	  of	  
experiential	  reality	  because	  all	  actions	  are	  unlimited	  and	  unpredictable.	  	  The	  messiah,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  311.	  
22	  Young-­‐Bruehl,	  For	  Love	  of	  the	  World,	  162.	  
23	  Walter	  Benjamin,	  “Theses	  on	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  History,”	  in	  Illuminations,	  ed.	  Hannah	  Arendt	  (New	  York:	  	  
Harcourt,	  Brace	  &	  World,	  1968),	  264,	  emphasis	  mine.	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the	  thing	  that	  enters	  the	  world	  and	  changes	  it,	  may	  in	  fact	  enter	  at	  any	  moment	  and	  in	  
any	  way	  because	  the	  improbable,	  in	  this	  view,	  cannot	  be	  counted	  as	  impossible.	  	  While	  
Arendt,	  in	  her	  secular	  Jewishness,	  does	  not	  posit	  the	  messianic	  hope	  in	  the	  traditional	  
sense,	  she	  very	  much	  espouses	  its	  message:	  	  action	  is	  the	  miracle	  that	  saves	  the	  world	  
from	  doom.	  	  	  
	   Arendt	  praises	  Scholem’s	  Major	  Trends	  and	  accounts	  for	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  
contributes	  to	  Jewish	  history.	  	  She	  writes,	  “Scholem’s	  new	  presentation	  and	  
appreciation	  of	  Jewish	  mysticism	  not	  only	  fills	  a	  gap,	  but	  actually	  changes	  the	  whole	  
picture	  of	  Jewish	  history.”	  	  The	  gap	  she	  is	  speaking	  of	  is	  the	  distance	  between	  Jewish	  
Orthodoxy	  and	  the	  modern	  movements	  that	  broke	  away	  from	  Orthodoxy,	  most	  
importantly,	  the	  Reform	  movement.	  	  Scholem	  discusses	  the	  Reform	  movement,	  noting	  
the	  contradicting	  tendencies	  within	  the	  movement	  to	  both	  assimilate	  into	  new	  cultures	  
and	  environments,	  to	  seemingly	  “liquidate”	  Judaism,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  preserve	  the	  
tradition.	  	  He	  says	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  not	  the	  Reform	  movement,	  that	  this	  movement	  
did	  not	  remove	  the	  life	  from	  the	  tradition	  (as	  Arendt	  claimed).	  	  Rather,	  Scholem	  
contends	  that	  the	  Reform	  movement	  was	  in	  fact	  “an	  outgrowth	  of	  the	  debacle	  of	  the	  
last	  great	  Jewish	  political	  activity,	  the	  Sabbatian	  movement,	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  messianic	  
hope,	  and	  of	  the	  despair	  about	  the	  ultimate	  destiny	  of	  the	  people.”24	  	  Thus,	  while	  the	  
Reform	  movement	  certainly	  signifies	  a	  loss,	  according	  to	  Scholem,	  it	  was	  a	  
manifestation	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  messianic	  hope	  that	  began	  a	  century	  earlier.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  303.	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The	  loss	  of	  the	  messiah	  was	  remarkably	  disastrous	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Jewish	  
people	  because	  it	  halted	  the	  process	  of	  reality.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  without	  the	  Messiah	  or	  
the	  messianic	  hope	  the	  Jewish	  people	  no	  longer	  knew	  how	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  very	  
story	  that	  they	  were	  responsible	  for	  writing.	  	  And	  thus,	  Arendt	  writes,	  “Jewish	  nihilism	  
grew	  out	  of	  the	  despair	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  men	  ever	  to	  discover	  the	  hidden	  law	  of	  God	  and	  
to	  act	  accordingly.”25⁠	  	  The	  idea	  that	  anything	  is	  possible	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  notion	  
that	  something	  new	  can	  come	  to	  be	  in	  the	  world.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  this	  is	  action	  itself,	  the	  
recursive	  progenitor	  of	  miraculous	  improbabilities.	  	  For	  the	  Jewish	  mystics,	  this	  is	  the	  
hope	  of	  the	  Messiah.	  	  	  
	   In	  response	  to	  this	  loss,	  heterodox	  forms	  of	  Jewish	  thought	  sought	  to	  revive	  the	  
tradition,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  the	  members	  of	  that	  tradition.	  	  As	  is	  the	  case,	  the	  
various	  forms	  of	  heterodox	  thought	  were	  grouped	  together	  and	  called	  Kabbalah,	  “a	  
name	  that	  covers	  a	  great	  variety	  of	  doctrines,	  from	  early	  Gnostic	  speculations	  through	  
all	  kinds	  of	  magical	  practices	  up	  to	  the	  great	  and	  genuine	  philosophical	  speculation	  of	  
the	  Book	  of	  Zohar.”26	  	  However	  disparate	  and	  broad	  the	  term,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  
underlying	  foundation	  to	  all	  of	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  Jewish	  mystical	  thought.	  	  In	  Major	  
Trends	  Scholem	  writes,	  
In	  [the	  Kabbalists]	  interpretation	  of	  the	  religious	  
commandments	  these	  are	  not	  represented	  as	  allegories	  of	  
more	  or	  less	  profound	  ideas,	  or	  as	  pedagogical	  measures,	  
but	  rather	  as	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  secret	  rite	  .	  .	  .	  	  this	  
transformation	  of	  the	  Halakhah	  into	  a	  sacrament	  .	  .	  .	  by	  
this	  revival	  of	  myth	  in	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  Judaism	  .	  .	  .	  raised	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Ibid.,	  304.	  
26	  Ibid.	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the	  Halakhah	  to	  a	  position	  of	  incomparable	  importance	  .	  .	  .	  
The	  religious	  Jew	  became	  a	  protagonist	  in	  the	  drama	  of	  
the	  world;	  he	  manipulated	  the	  strings	  behind	  the	  scene	  .	  .	  .	  
Or,	  to	  use	  a	  less	  extravagant	  simile,	  if	  the	  whole	  universe	  is	  
an	  enormous	  complicated	  machine,	  then	  man	  is	  the	  
machinist	  who	  keeps	  the	  wheels	  going	  by	  applying	  a	  few	  
drops	  of	  oil	  here	  and	  there.27	  
	  
The	  relevance	  and	  importance	  of	  this	  statement	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  development	  and	  
articulation	  of	  Arendt’s	  theory	  of	  action	  cannot	  be	  overstated.	  	  Here,	  in	  the	  religious	  
history	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  an	  abstract	  idea	  is	  transformed	  into	  participatory	  actions	  
that	  both	  bring	  to	  life	  the	  myth	  of	  their	  foundation	  and	  humanize	  them	  through	  the	  
articulation	  of	  natality.	  	  Arendt	  secularizes	  these	  ideas	  in	  her	  political	  theory;	  all	  actions	  
are	  performed	  by	  thinking	  and	  willing	  individuals,	  whereby	  they	  emerge	  as	  actors	  in	  the	  
“drama	  of	  the	  world.”	  	  The	  great,	  interconnected	  web	  of	  action	  is	  the	  complicated	  
machine	  and	  every	  action	  has	  the	  power	  of	  recursion	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  “the	  drops	  of	  
oil	  here	  and	  there”	  that	  sustain	  the	  world.	  
	   The	  final	  connection	  to	  Scholem	  and	  Jewish	  mysticism	  that	  must	  be	  expounded	  
is	  directly	  related	  to	  disclosure,	  one	  of	  the	  characteristic	  elements	  of	  action.	  	  The	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  law	  as	  sacrament,	  or	  ritual,	  was	  “based	  on	  the	  new	  doctrine	  of	  the	  
‘hidden	  God’	  who,	  in	  sharp	  opposition	  to	  the	  God	  of	  the	  revelation,	  is	  impersonal	  .	  .	  .	  a	  
force	  instead	  of	  a	  person,	  revealing	  itself	  only	  to	  the	  ‘chosen	  few’	  but	  concealed	  rather	  
than	  revealed	  in	  the	  revelation	  of	  the	  Bible.”	  	  Thus,	  there	  is	  esotericism	  in	  mystic	  
thought;	  the	  truth	  is	  not	  actually	  revealed	  in	  revelation.	  	  And,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  
concealment,	  mysticism	  offers	  a	  necessary	  justification	  for	  action:	  	  “The	  main	  mystical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Scholem,	  Major	  Trends,	  29-­‐30,	  emphasis	  mine.	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organon	  of	  cognition	  is	  experience,	  and	  never	  reason,	  or	  faith	  in	  revelation.”28	  	  Because	  
the	  revelation	  of	  the	  Bible	  does	  not	  reveal	  God,	  but	  conceals	  God,	  then	  man	  must	  act	  if	  
the	  revelation	  is	  to	  have	  any	  meaning	  at	  all.	  	  It	  is	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  man	  that	  revelation	  
and	  meaning	  are	  possible.	  
	   This	  religious	  idea	  of	  revelation	  serves	  a	  significant	  function	  for	  Arendt,	  as	  well.	  	  
The	  basic	  foundation	  of	  Jewish	  mysticism	  is	  that	  the	  only	  source	  of	  revelation	  is	  in	  
experience	  and	  this	  is	  gained	  through	  action.	  	  Arendt	  makes	  the	  same	  claim:	  	  the	  only	  
way	  for	  an	  individual	  to	  reveal	  who	  he	  is,	  is	  to	  act.	  	  For	  the	  Kabbalists,	  action	  is	  what	  
gives	  them	  access	  to	  an	  “investigation	  of	  a	  sphere	  of	  religious	  reality	  which	  lies	  quite	  
outside	  the	  orbit	  of	  mediaeval	  Jewish	  philosophy;	  their	  purpose	  is	  to	  discover	  a	  new	  
stratum	  of	  the	  religious	  consciousness.”29	  	  Stated	  simply,	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  mystic	  is	  new	  
experience,	  and	  the	  only	  way	  to	  attain	  this	  experience	  is	  through	  some	  form	  of	  human	  
action	  and	  participation.	  	  Or,	  as	  Arendt	  states,	  Jewish	  mysticism	  “merely	  wants	  man	  to	  
become	  part	  of	  the	  higher	  reality	  and	  to	  act	  accordingly.”30	  	  	  
	   The	  mystical	  emphasis	  on	  action	  and	  experience	  is	  directly	  connected	  to	  the	  way	  
in	  which	  the	  Kabbalists	  understand	  the	  creation	  story.	  	  In	  Kabbalah,	  as	  explained	  by	  
Scholem	  in	  Major	  Trends,	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  world	  comes	  from	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  
God	  withdrew	  or	  contracted	  from	  the	  vast	  expanse	  of	  eternality.	  	  Thus,	  the	  entire	  world	  
is	  in	  essence	  a	  divine	  exile,	  a	  place	  wherein	  God	  cannot	  be	  at	  home.	  	  As	  creatures	  made	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  304-­‐305,	  307,	  emphasis	  mine.	  
29	  Scholem,	  Major	  Trends,	  24.	  
30	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  307.	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in	  the	  image	  of	  God,	  our	  divine	  nature	  is	  constantly	  in	  a	  state	  of	  exile,	  constantly	  seeking	  
an	  Exodus	  whereby	  we	  can	  return	  home.	  	  The	  reason	  we	  are	  not	  at	  home	  in	  this	  world	  is	  
because	  the	  world	  is	  innately	  a	  place	  of	  exile.	  	  The	  very	  first	  act	  of	  God	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  
the	  world	  via	  an	  act	  of	  restriction,	  contraction,	  or	  limitation	  called	  the	  Tsimtsum.	  	  Prior	  
to	  this	  act,	  God	  existed	  without	  any	  boundaries	  of	  limitation—non-­‐corporeal,	  non-­‐
spatial,	  non-­‐temporal.	  	  But,	  the	  act	  of	  Tsimtsum	  imposed	  the	  boundaries	  of	  limitation;	  in	  
the	  creation	  of	  the	  world—matter,	  space,	  and	  time—God	  became	  bound.	  	  The	  second	  
act	  of	  God,	  however,	  is	  one	  of	  revelation—the	  faint	  light	  that	  appears	  and	  seeks	  to	  
reveal	  that	  which	  has	  been	  limited.	  	  Scholem	  writes,	  “The	  idea	  of	  Tsimtsum	  is	  the	  
deepest	  symbol	  of	  Exile	  that	  could	  be	  thought	  of	  .	  .	  .	  The	  first	  act	  of	  all	  is	  not	  an	  act	  of	  
revelation	  but	  one	  of	  limitation.	  	  Only	  in	  the	  second	  act	  does	  God	  send	  out	  a	  ray	  of	  His	  
light	  and	  begin	  his	  revelation,	  or	  rather	  his	  unfolding	  as	  God	  the	  Creator,	  in	  the	  
primordial	  space	  of	  His	  own	  creation.”31	  
	   To	  secularize	  this,	  Arendt	  makes	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  first	  act,	  like	  the	  Tsimtsum,	  is	  
not	  a	  revelatory	  act.	  	  Rather,	  in	  being	  born	  man	  is	  placed	  in	  the	  world,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  
yet	  appear	  to	  the	  world	  in	  birth.	  	  In	  birth,	  man	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  conditions	  of	  corporeal	  
existence,	  flesh	  and	  bone,	  time	  and	  space.	  	  The	  only	  way	  for	  man	  to	  reveal	  himself,	  or	  
appear	  to	  others,	  in	  the	  world	  is	  by	  the	  second	  act,	  that	  is,	  action	  as	  Arendt	  understands	  
it	  in	  The	  Human	  Condition.	  	  In	  action	  man	  is	  the	  creator,	  just	  as	  God	  is	  the	  creator	  in	  the	  
religious	  story.	  	  In	  action	  man	  reveals	  himself	  in	  the	  space	  of	  appearance,	  which	  is	  the	  
world,	  and	  the	  world	  is	  only	  that	  which	  has	  been	  made	  by	  man.	  	  The	  secularization	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Scholem,	  Major	  Trends,	  261.	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the	  Tsimtsum	  is	  the	  removal	  of	  God	  from	  the	  notion	  of	  creation	  and	  revelation.	  	  Further,	  
the	  Tsimtsum,	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  limitation,	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  very	  conditions	  that	  
Arendt	  expounds	  in	  her	  works.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  human	  beings	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  
conditions	  of	  their	  existence;	  for	  example,	  the	  active	  life	  is	  conditioned	  by	  biological	  
needs,	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  live	  in	  the	  world	  (“worlidness”),	  and	  plurality.	  	  The	  revelation	  is	  
what	  results	  when	  we	  act	  within	  those	  limitations	  to	  expand	  our	  experiences	  and	  
thereby	  our	  knowledge	  of	  ourselves	  and	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  	  	  
	   Finally,	  in	  mystical	  thought,	  the	  process	  of	  contraction	  and	  revelation	  is	  recursive.	  	  
“The	  cosmic	  process	  becomes	  two-­‐fold	  .	  .	  .	  The	  light	  which	  streams	  back	  into	  God	  and	  
that	  which	  flows	  out	  of	  Him,	  and	  but	  for	  this	  perpetual	  tension,	  this	  ever	  repeated	  effort	  
with	  which	  God	  holds	  Himself	  back,	  nothing	  in	  the	  world	  would	  exist.”32	  	  The	  notion	  that	  
“God	  holds	  himself	  back”	  is	  drawn	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  first	  act	  of	  God	  in	  creation	  is	  
the	  contracting.	  	  In	  secular	  terms,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  first	  act,	  the	  limitations,	  or	  for	  
Arendt,	  the	  conditions,	  cannot	  be	  removed.	  	  The	  human	  being	  cannot	  extricate	  himself	  
from	  the	  conditions	  of	  his	  existence	  just	  as	  God	  cannot	  remove	  the	  element	  of	  
concealment	  in	  the	  world.	  	  The	  only	  mechanism	  whereby	  God,	  for	  the	  Jewish	  mystics,	  or	  
man,	  for	  Arendt,	  can	  be	  revealed	  is	  through	  the	  action	  that	  comes	  after	  creation,	  or	  
after	  birth.33	  	  Man,	  then,	  is	  caught	  in	  the	  tension	  between	  his	  conditions	  and	  his	  
appearance	  in	  the	  world.	  	  And,	  because	  the	  conditions	  will	  always	  exist,	  in	  some	  form,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Ibid.	  
33	  This	  is	  not	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  in	  the	  mystical	  tradition	  human	  action	  does	  not	  have	  a	  place.	  	  However,	  in	  
the	  mystical	  tradition,	  human	  beings,	  as	  the	  likeness	  of	  God,	  act	  to	  reveal	  God;	  whereas,	  for	  Arendt,	  
human	  beings	  act	  to	  reveal	  themselves.	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man	  must,	  if	  he	  is	  to	  reveal	  himself,	  must	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  those	  conditions.	  	  
Action	  is	  disclosure	  of	  the	  individual	  as	  a	  human	  being	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
	   Bringing	  this	  understanding	  into	  the	  Passover	  story	  only	  reiterates	  the	  reason	  
why	  Arendt	  championed	  it	  as	  the	  foundational	  myth	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  	  If	  action	  is	  
disclosure,	  then,	  the	  Israelites	  disclosed	  who	  they	  were	  by	  what	  they	  did.	  	  By	  putting	  
blood	  on	  the	  lintel	  they	  transformed	  their	  political	  identity	  from	  what	  they	  were	  (slaves)	  
to	  who	  they	  were	  (Israelites).	  	  That	  is,	  the	  Passover	  story	  moved	  the	  Israelites	  out	  of	  the	  
what	  of	  slavery	  (work)	  and	  into	  the	  who	  of	  humanity	  (action).	  	  This	  is	  significant	  because	  
it	  highlights	  the	  specific	  function	  of	  action:	  	  “Without	  the	  disclosure	  of	  the	  agent	  in	  the	  
act,	  action	  loses	  its	  specific	  character	  and	  becomes	  one	  form	  of	  achievement	  among	  
others.”34	  
	   The	  role	  of	  disclosure	  distinguishes	  action	  from	  work	  and	  labor	  even	  further.	  	  
The	  case	  has	  already	  been	  made	  that	  both	  work	  and	  labor	  are	  possible	  in	  isolation,	  
whereas	  action	  is	  not.	  	  If	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  activity	  is	  disclosure,	  then	  it	  is	  impossible	  
for	  action	  to	  achieve	  this	  in	  isolation.	  	  As	  Arendt	  notes,	  disclosure	  is	  not	  merely	  another	  
achievement	  or	  accomplishment,	  it	  is	  not	  another	  day	  lived,	  it	  is	  not	  another	  building	  
erected,	  it	  is	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  oneself	  as	  it	  locates	  the	  individual	  in	  time	  and	  
space	  and	  is	  the	  moment	  where	  the	  individual	  is	  not	  simply	  in	  the	  world	  but	  is,	  
legitimately,	  a	  part	  of	  the	  world.	  	  Action	  is	  the	  appearance	  amongst	  the	  plurality	  of	  men;	  
it	  is	  the	  articulation	  of	  both	  “It	  is	  I”	  and	  “Here	  I	  am.”35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  180.	  
35	  Reference	  to	  Isaiah	  6:8	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The	  Passover	  story	  indicates	  disclosure	  in	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  those	  who	  
participated	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  placing	  blood	  on	  the	  lintels	  were	  not	  smote	  by	  God.	  	  In	  
other	  words,	  we	  know	  that	  the	  marking	  on	  the	  lintel	  is	  a	  disclosure	  because	  it	  has	  direct	  
relevance	  to	  affairs	  that	  occur	  in	  the	  public	  realm.	  	  This	  action	  has	  direct	  political	  
consequence.	  	  The	  action	  of	  putting	  blood	  on	  the	  doorpost	  does	  not	  mark	  the	  Israelites	  
as	  slaves,	  this	  was	  already	  known	  through	  their	  work.	  	  The	  action	  of	  placing	  blood	  on	  the	  
doorposts	  marks	  the	  slaves	  as	  Israelites,	  a	  collective	  identity	  that	  is	  not	  bound	  in	  work,	  
but	  in	  the	  “who”	  of	  political	  identity:	  	  “The	  ‘who,’	  the	  unique	  and	  distinct	  identity	  of	  the	  
agent.”36	  	  Here	  is	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  individual	  Israelite,	  an	  identity	  in	  its	  specification	  
that	  comes	  replete	  with	  characteristics.	  	  I	  appear	  now,	  not	  as	  the	  utility	  I	  possess,	  that	  is	  
as	  a	  slave,	  but	  as	  the	  miracle	  I	  am,	  that	  is,	  as	  a	  human	  being	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  create;	  
and	  the	  human	  being	  that	  I	  am	  has	  the	  distinction	  (through	  action)	  of	  Israelite,	  not	  slave.	  	  
	   The	  posting	  of	  blood	  on	  the	  lintel	  intends	  “to	  show	  more	  than	  is	  plainly	  visible	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  production	  process.”37	  	  This	  is	  what	  makes	  it	  different	  from	  work	  and	  
labor.	  	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  that	  the	  slave,	  as	  a	  human	  what,	  merely	  produced	  results	  and	  
therefore	  was	  known	  and	  understood	  via	  his	  production	  as	  what	  he	  was.	  	  The	  posting	  of	  
blood	  does	  not	  show	  a	  particular	  production,	  but	  a	  particular	  identity,	  which	  is	  the	  
function	  of	  action	  as	  stated	  by	  Arendt.	  	  	  
This	  connection	  between	  identity	  and	  action	  is	  beautifully	  articulated	  in	  The	  
Jewish	  Writings.	  	  In	  “The	  Jewish	  War	  That	  Isn’t	  Happening,”	  Arendt	  writes,	  “you	  can	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  180.	  
37	  Ibid.	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defend	  yourself	  as	  the	  person	  you	  are	  attacked	  as.”	  	  The	  essay	  makes	  the	  argument	  that	  
the	  Jewish	  people	  are	  being	  persecuted	  because	  they	  are	  Jewish;	  that	  is,	  their	  political	  
identity	  as	  the	  collectivity	  of	  Jews	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  oppression	  they	  are	  experiencing.	  	  
Therefore,	  if	  the	  Jewish	  people	  are	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  realities	  of	  their	  public	  experiences,	  
it	  must	  be	  as	  Jews:	  	  “A	  person	  attacked	  as	  a	  Jew	  cannot	  defend	  himself	  as	  an	  Englishman	  
or	  a	  Frenchman.”38	  	  This	  was	  the	  basis	  for	  Arendt’s	  insistence	  that	  Jewish	  people	  have	  
an	  army	  of	  their	  own:	  	  it	  was	  the	  action	  that	  was	  necessary	  for	  their	  identity	  to	  be	  
maintained.	  	  Otherwise,	  Arendt	  feared,	  the	  world	  would	  conclude	  they	  are	  not	  
defending	  themselves,	  and	  the	  Jewish	  identity	  would	  be	  lost	  to	  the	  Jews	  and	  to	  the	  
world,	  the	  very	  definition	  of	  that	  dangerous	  thing—loneliness.	  	  They	  must	  present	  
themselves,	  through	  action,	  as	  the	  unique	  and	  distinct	  who	  of	  the	  Jewish	  army	  because,	  
again,	  “[w]ithout	  the	  disclosure	  of	  the	  agent	  in	  the	  act,	  action	  loses	  its	  specific	  character	  
and	  becomes	  one	  form	  of	  achievement	  among	  others.”39	  	  	  Finally,	  they	  cannot	  rely	  on	  
statesmen	  or	  influential	  Jews	  to	  form	  the	  army.	  Arendt	  believed,	  “We	  will	  never	  get	  that	  
army	  if	  the	  Jewish	  people	  do	  not	  demand	  it	  and	  are	  not	  prepared	  by	  the	  hundreds	  of	  
thousands	  with	  weapons	  in	  hand	  to	  fight	  for	  their	  freedom	  and	  the	  right	  to	  live	  as	  a	  
people.”40	  
	   Arendt’s	  point	  with	  the	  Jewish	  army	  and	  with	  defending	  themselves	  as	  Jews	  is	  
not	  nationalistic	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  pride,	  but	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  human	  disclosure.	  	  Without	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  137.	  
39	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  180.	  
40	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  138-­‐139.	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the	  banner	  of	  the	  Jewish	  flag,	  the	  Jewish	  people	  remain	  undisclosed	  and	  their	  particular	  
identity	  remains	  hidden.	  	  They	  remain	  slaves,	  in	  the	  biblical	  sense	  of	  Egypt,	  because	  they	  
remain	  achievement-­‐producers,	  they	  remain	  in	  the	  what	  of	  humanness,	  not	  the	  full	  
articulation	  of	  the	  specific	  who.	  	  Indeed,	  “Action	  without	  a	  name,	  a	  ‘who’	  attached	  to	  it,	  
is	  meaningless.”	  	  If	  the	  Jews	  cannot	  defend	  themselves	  as	  Jews	  they	  will	  remain	  hidden,	  
concealed,	  their	  identity	  and	  uniqueness	  forced	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  privacy	  of	  their	  own	  
homes,	  in	  the	  private	  realm	  where	  human	  dignity	  cannot	  exist.	  	  If	  the	  Jews	  cannot	  
defend	  themselves	  as	  Jews,	  if	  the	  Israelites	  cannot	  place	  blood	  on	  their	  lintels,	  they	  
would	  fight	  or	  be	  slaves	  and	  be	  like	  those	  “whom	  the	  war	  had	  failed	  to	  make	  known	  and	  
had	  robbed	  thereby	  .	  .	  .	  their	  human	  dignity.”41	   	  
It	  seems	  that	  one	  voice,	  one	  action,	  often	  is	  necessary	  to	  stir	  the	  volition	  of	  the	  
individuals	  who	  are	  not	  speaking	  and	  acting.	  	  Moses,	  responding	  to	  Yahweh’s	  call,	  had	  
to	  speak,	  and	  repeatedly,	  he	  had	  to	  appear	  before	  Pharaoh.	  	  He	  had	  to	  ask,	  with	  speech,	  
for	  a	  particular	  action.	  	  He	  was	  demanding	  the	  disclosure	  of	  the	  Israelite	  people.	  	  He	  was	  
demanding	  that	  they	  speak	  and	  act.	  	  Place	  the	  blood	  on	  your	  doorposts:	  	  say,	  “I	  am	  an	  
Israelite.”	  	  Articulate	  who	  you	  are	  and	  begin	  to	  see	  the	  change	  inherent	  in	  action.	  	  “This	  
disclosure	  of	  ‘who’	  in	  contradistinction	  to	  ‘what’	  somebody	  is	  .	  .	  .	  Is	  implicit	  in	  
everything	  somebody	  says	  and	  does.	  	  It	  can	  be	  hidden	  only	  in	  complete	  silence	  and	  
perfect	  passivity.”42	  	  With	  similar	  intent,	  Arendt	  is	  saying	  to	  the	  Jewish	  people	  in	  all	  parts	  
of	  the	  world,	  “Form	  an	  army.”	  	  She	  urges	  a	  self-­‐understanding	  that	  accepts	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  180,	  181.	  
42	  Ibid.,	  179,	  emphasis	  mine.	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understands	  that	  politically,	  they	  are	  Jewish,	  something	  that	  one’s	  assimilation	  into	  
French-­‐ness	  or	  German-­‐ness	  does	  not	  and	  cannot	  override.	  	  And	  yet,	  Arendt	  laments,	  
the	  Jewish	  people	  are	  not	  acting,	  but	  hiding	  in	  the	  false	  pretenses	  of	  what	  they	  believe	  
themselves	  to	  be,	  that	  is,	  assimilated	  members	  of	  society.	  	  The	  Jewish	  people	  were	  not	  
assimilated,	  regardless	  of	  what	  they	  believed	  in	  their	  hearts	  and	  minds;	  but,	  in	  this	  belief	  
they	  lost	  the	  collective	  identity	  and	  they	  were	  in	  hiding.	  	  They	  were	  in	  the	  limitedness	  of	  
the	  contraction	  that	  demands	  the	  second	  act,	  the	  un-­‐concealment,	  the	  hope	  of	  the	  
miracle.	  	  They	  were	  in	  need	  of	  meaning	  in	  a	  world	  of	  appearances,	  a	  meaning	  that	  could	  
come	  only	  through	  specific	  action.	  
The	  call	  to	  form	  a	  Jewish	  army	  was	  Arendt’s	  call	  to	  put	  blood	  on	  the	  doorposts;	  it	  
was	  the	  necessary	  step	  to	  come	  out	  of	  hiding	  and	  enter	  the	  public	  space	  of	  appearance,	  
to	  disclose	  the	  humanness	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  	  In	  the	  history	  of	  European	  Jewry	  there	  
was	  an	  antagonism	  between	  being	  Jewish	  and	  being	  European.	  	  Despite	  the	  attempts	  at	  
assimilation,	  Arendt	  makes	  the	  case	  that	  it	  was	  never	  successful.	  	  “It	  is	  the	  history	  of	  150	  
years	  of	  assimilated	  Jewry	  who	  performed	  an	  unprecedented	  feat:	  	  though	  proving	  all	  
the	  time	  their	  non-­‐Jewishness,	  they	  succeeded	  in	  remaining	  Jews	  all	  the	  same.”	  	  The	  
problem	  was	  not	  that	  Jewish	  people	  believed	  that	  they	  were	  taking	  the	  necessary	  step	  
to	  assimilate	  in	  various	  countries,	  but	  that	  the	  people	  in	  those	  countries	  did	  not	  mark	  
these	  actions	  as	  being	  “German”	  or	  “French”	  but	  as	  decidedly	  Jewish.	  	  And,	  because	  the	  
Jewish	  people	  were	  still	  politically	  Jewish,	  that	  is	  they	  were	  treated	  publically	  as	  Jews,	  
they	  tried	  all	  the	  more	  to	  repudiate	  this	  fact.	  	  The	  way	  in	  which	  they	  struggled	  with	  this	  
was	  not	  “to	  fight	  for	  a	  change	  of	  [their]	  social	  and	  legal	  status”	  but	  rather,	  “to	  try	  a	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change	  of	  identity.”	  	  The	  way	  in	  which	  they	  chose	  to	  combat	  this	  created	  a	  crisis	  
because	  “As	  long	  as	  [a	  Jew]	  can’t	  make	  up	  his	  mind	  to	  be	  what	  he	  actually	  is,	  a	  Jew,	  
nobody	  can	  foretell	  all	  the	  mad	  changes	  he	  will	  still	  have	  to	  go	  through.”	  	  Meanwhile,	  
regardless	  of	  how	  many	  “changes”	  an	  individual	  makes,	  his	  identity	  as	  a	  Jew	  is	  still	  not	  
eradicated.	  	  “The	  less	  we	  are	  free	  to	  decide	  who	  we	  are	  or	  to	  live	  as	  we	  like,	  the	  more	  
we	  try	  to	  put	  up	  a	  front,	  to	  hide	  the	  facts,	  and	  to	  play	  roles.”	  	  Because	  being	  a	  Jew	  
dictated	  certain	  political	  realities,	  then	  it	  was	  desirable	  not	  to	  be	  Jewish,	  but	  to	  create	  
another	  identity	  with	  less	  harsh	  repercussions.	  	  This	  desire	  not	  to	  be	  who	  they	  were	  
caused	  individual	  Jews	  to	  effectively	  go	  into	  hiding	  as	  they	  played	  various	  roles	  as	  
Frenchmen,	  Germans,	  Russians.	  	  But,	  as	  Arendt	  wrote,	  this	  role-­‐playing	  creates	  the	  
situation	  wherein	  “Our	  identity	  is	  changed	  so	  frequently	  that	  nobody	  can	  find	  out	  who	  
we	  actually	  are.”43	  	  
The	  disclosure	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  as	  Jews	  was,	  for	  Arendt,	  the	  honest	  
revelation	  of	  their	  identity.	  	  This	  un-­‐concealment	  did	  not	  come	  with	  any	  legal	  status.	  	  
That	  is,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Jewish	  army	  would	  not	  miraculously	  grant	  certain	  rights	  to	  the	  
Jews.	  	  What	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Jewish	  army	  would	  do,	  however,	  was	  allow	  the	  Jewish	  
people	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  drama	  of	  the	  world	  as	  viable	  agents,	  meaning	  human	  beings	  
with	  the	  full	  capacity	  to	  act.	  	  The	  Jewish	  army	  would	  be	  a	  revelation,	  not	  a	  revolution.	  	  	  
Remember	  that	  being	  a	  Jew	  does	  not	  give	  any	  legal	  status	  
in	  this	  world.	  	  If	  we	  should	  start	  telling	  the	  truth	  that	  we	  
are	  nothing	  but	  Jews,	  it	  would	  mean	  that	  we	  expose	  
ourselves	  to	  the	  fate	  of	  human	  beings	  who,	  unprotected	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  270,	  271.	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by	  any	  specific	  law	  or	  political	  convention,	  are	  nothing	  but	  
human	  beings.	  
	  
For	  Arendt,	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Jewish	  army	  was	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  humanity	  of	  
the	  Jewish	  people.	  	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  was	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  particular	  
legal	  status.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  while	  the	  Jewish	  army	  could	  change	  the	  humanness	  of	  the	  
Jewish	  people,	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  could	  change	  the	  legal	  conventions	  to	  which	  the	  Jewish	  
people	  are	  subject.	  	  This	  is,	  perhaps,	  the	  complete	  secularization	  of	  Judaism,	  and	  of	  the	  
Passover	  story,	  because	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Zionist	  movement	  were	  advocates	  of	  a	  
Judaism	  that	  “could	  no	  longer	  mean	  to	  them	  a	  religion	  .	  .	  .	  For	  them	  their	  Jewish	  origin	  
had	  a	  political	  and	  national	  significance.	  	  They	  could	  find	  no	  place	  for	  themselves	  unless	  
the	  Jewish	  people	  was	  a	  nation.”44	  	  
	  For	  Arendt,	  the	  hope	  that	  was	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  was	  lost	  when	  certain	  events	  
took	  place	  to	  establish	  Israel	  as	  the	  handmaiden	  of	  other	  countries,	  essentially	  
maintaining	  its	  dependence	  and,	  in	  effect,	  its	  concealment.	  	  Arendt	  was	  originally	  part	  
of	  the	  Zionist	  movement,	  as	  she	  saw	  in	  it	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  displaced	  Jewish	  people	  
to	  reunite	  and	  reestablish	  a	  political	  identity.	  	  The	  political	  reality	  was	  that	  the	  Jewish	  
people	  were	  dispersed	  and	  disconnected.	  	  Further,	  the	  Jewish	  people	  struggled	  for	  legal	  
protection	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  their	  dispersion,	  a	  struggle	  that	  persisted	  despite	  the	  treaties	  
of	  the	  1920s,	  which	  nominally	  protected	  the	  rights	  of	  all	  citizens	  regardless	  of	  race,	  
nationality,	  or	  ethnicity.45	  	  Arendt	  notes	  that	  even	  with	  the	  treaties,	  no	  “international	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Ibid.,	  273,	  339.	  
45	  After	  World	  War	  I,	  the	  Allied	  powers	  drew	  treaties	  with	  many	  of	  the	  newly	  formed	  countries	  of	  Eastern	  
Europe	  and	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  The	  treaties	  were	  adopted	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  protecting	  minority	  groups	  in	  
these	  countries	  from	  legal	  discrimination	  based	  on	  raced,	  religion,	  or	  language.	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guidelines	  have	  been	  able	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  stateless	  persons,”	  and	  this	  was	  
the	  Jewish	  problem.	  	  She	  laments,	  “[N]o	  provision	  was	  made	  for	  people	  without	  a	  
homeland.”46	  	  The	  Minority	  Treaties	  work	  to	  protect	  citizens	  of	  sovereign	  nations;	  but	  it	  
does	  nothing	  to	  protect	  those	  who	  belong	  to	  a	  nation	  that	  does	  not	  have	  a	  state.	  	  Thus,	  
in	  Zionism	  she	  saw	  the	  hope	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  nation-­‐state	  within	  which	  the	  
Jewish	  people	  could	  establish	  a	  legal	  status	  and,	  therefore,	  legal	  protection.	  	  	  
The	  fundamental	  problem	  with	  the	  Zionist	  cause,	  and	  with	  the	  Jewish	  question	  
altogether,	  was	  the	  recognition	  that	  there	  was	  nowhere	  on	  earth	  that	  the	  Jewish	  people	  
could	  gather	  that	  was	  not	  already	  occupied.	  	  If	  they	  were	  to	  create	  a	  nation-­‐state	  out	  of	  
their	  national	  identity,	  it	  would	  be	  replete	  with	  challenges.	  	  These	  challenges	  were	  not	  
insurmountable;	  however,	  the	  decisions	  that	  the	  Zionist	  leaders	  made	  were	  
unsatisfactory	  for	  Arendt	  and	  led	  to	  her	  eventual	  abandonment	  of	  the	  cause.	  	  Arendt	  
was	  most	  critical	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Zionist	  leaders	  to	  form	  a	  Jewish	  army.	  	  She	  
believed	  it	  was	  “the	  only	  guarantee	  [the	  Jewish	  people]	  could	  have	  created	  during	  the	  
war	  for	  [their]	  demands	  after	  the	  war.”	  	  The	  failure	  to	  form	  an	  army	  meant	  that	  the	  
Jewish	  people	  would	  not	  “have	  their	  word	  at	  the	  peace	  table.”	  	  And,	  Arendt	  concluded,	  
“[T]he	  future	  protection	  of	  Jewish	  rights	  in	  Palestine	  is	  equally	  problematic.”47	  
Arendt	  praises	  the	  father	  of	  Zionism,	  Theodor	  Herzl,	  for	  “his	  very	  desire	  to	  do	  
something	  about	  the	  Jewish	  question,	  his	  desire	  to	  act	  and	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  in	  
political	  terms.”	  	  However,	  she	  admonishes	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Herzl	  went	  about	  shifting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  140.	  
47	  Ibid.,	  331,	  332.	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the	  political	  reality	  of	  the	  Jews.	  	  The	  statelessness	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  diminished	  their	  
legal	  status:	  	  they	  did	  not	  have	  rights	  as	  Jews,	  but	  as	  Germans	  or	  Frenchmen;	  yet,	  
politically	  they	  were	  marginalized	  as	  Jews,	  therefore	  the	  status	  of	  being	  German	  or	  
French	  was	  not	  a	  guarantee	  of	  any	  legal	  protection.	  	  This	  certainly	  justified	  Herzl’s	  call	  
for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Jewish	  state.	  	  She	  believed	  Herzl	  was	  unrealistic	  in	  his	  advancement	  
of	  the	  Jewish	  state	  and	  that	  he	  displayed	  an	  opportunism	  that	  was	  detrimental	  to	  both	  
the	  Jews	  and	  other	  nations.	  	  He	  saw	  “the	  destinies	  of	  the	  Jews	  as	  completely	  without	  
connection	  with	  the	  destinies	  of	  other	  nations,	  and	  saw	  Jewish	  demands	  as	  unrelated	  to	  
all	  other	  events	  and	  trends.”	  	  Essentially,	  he	  failed	  to	  recognize	  the	  plurality	  of	  human	  
beings	  and	  the	  plurality	  of	  nations	  in	  the	  world.	  	  While	  he	  recognized	  the	  need	  to	  act,	  he	  
failed	  to	  recognize	  the	  fact	  that	  Zionist	  actions,	  like	  all	  actions,	  necessarily	  affect	  others.	  	  
Arendt	  sees	  this	  as	  an	  unrealistic	  and	  idealist	  “hope	  in	  an	  escape	  from	  the	  world.”48	  	  	  	  
Because	  he	  could	  not	  escape	  from	  the	  conditions	  of	  world,	  namely	  plurality,	  
Herzl’s	  policies	  worked	  to	  establish	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  even	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  Arab	  
Palestinians	  living	  there.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  Zionist	  policies	  fostered	  a	  state	  where	  “the	  
Jewish	  people	  are	  surrounded	  and	  forced	  together	  by	  a	  world	  of	  enemies.”	  	  But,	  Arendt	  
insists,	  “there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  solidarity	  of	  fear;	  one	  cannot	  depend,	  you	  see,	  on	  
frightened	  people	  .	  .	  .	  A	  common	  enemy	  can	  only	  awaken	  solidarity.”	  	  The	  reason	  
frightened	  people	  are	  unreliable	  is	  because	  fear	  does	  not	  create	  action.	  	  Solidarity,	  
however,	  can	  stoke	  the	  will	  to	  act.	  	  In	  solidarity,	  the	  human	  capacity	  for	  action	  can	  be	  
awakened.	  	  Solidarity	  “awakens	  the	  desire	  to	  join	  together	  in	  defense,	  instead	  of	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running	  and	  scattering.”49	  	  	  Solidarity,	  then,	  is	  the	  opposite	  of	  loneliness.	  	  Solidarity	  
prompts	  the	  unconcealment	  of	  the	  self;	  loneliness	  prompts	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  self.	  	  	  
Because	  Zionist	  policies	  created	  a	  state	  of	  fear,	  the	  Jewish	  people	  turned	  to	  
larger,	  more	  secure	  nations	  for	  protection	  and	  security.	  	  By	  turning	  to	  Great	  Britain	  and	  
the	  United	  States,	  they	  placed	  themselves	  in	  the	  spheres	  of	  interest	  of	  larger	  nations.	  	  
The	  fear,	  then,	  furthered	  the	  repression	  of	  the	  Jewish	  identity	  in	  exchange	  for	  security.	  	  
The	  same	  problem	  that	  plagued	  Europe	  in	  the	  19	  and	  20th	  centuries	  will	  plague	  Israel:	  	  it	  
will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  answer	  the	  who	  questions	  but,	  because	  it	  is	  so	  heavily	  dependent	  
upon	  foreign	  nations,	  it	  will	  continue	  to	  work	  and	  labor	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  its	  safety	  and	  
security.	  	  The	  Jewish	  people,	  according	  to	  Arendt,	  did	  not	  gain	  the	  political	  freedom	  they	  
hoped	  for	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel.	  	  	  
	   Recall	  from	  Chapter	  1	  that	  the	  narrative	  is	  essential	  for	  understanding	  the	  basic	  
human	  capacity	  of	  action	  and	  the	  stirring	  of	  the	  will	  to	  act	  so	  that	  we	  may	  reveal	  
ourselves.	  	  It	  helps	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  who	  that	  we	  wish	  to	  reveal	  so	  that	  our	  actions	  
and	  words	  can	  accurately	  perform	  the	  revelatory	  task.	  	  Thus,	  “What	  is	  at	  stake	  is	  the	  
revelatory	  character	  without	  which	  action	  and	  speech	  would	  lose	  all	  human	  relevance.”	  	  
We	  live	  in	  a	  world	  filled	  with	  words	  and	  deeds	  and	  we	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  place	  ourselves	  
in	  the	  world	  through	  past	  words	  and	  deeds.	  	  Moreover,	  “The	  disclosure	  of	  the	  ‘who’	  
through	  speech,	  and	  the	  setting	  of	  a	  new	  beginning	  through	  action,	  always	  fall	  into	  an	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already	  existing	  web	  where	  their	  immediate	  consequences	  can	  be	  felt.”50	  	  At	  this	  point,	  
it	  is	  useful	  to	  expound	  on	  the	  characteristics	  of	  action	  that	  create	  this	  web.	  
	   The	  qualities	  of	  action	  have	  been	  hinted	  at	  throughout	  this	  chapter,	  as	  they	  are	  
implicit	  in	  Arendt’s	  notion	  of	  action.	  	  First,	  action	  is	  boundless,	  unlimited.	  	  The	  effects	  
and	  consequences	  of	  any	  action	  are	  limitless—they	  could	  go	  on	  forever.	  	  Arendt	  writes,	  
“To	  do	  and	  to	  suffer	  are	  like	  opposite	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin,	  and	  the	  story	  that	  an	  act	  
starts	  is	  composed	  of	  its	  consequent	  deeds	  and	  sufferings.”	  	  The	  Jewish	  history	  starts	  
with	  the	  Passover;	  the	  story	  continues	  with	  the	  Exodus.	  	  The	  Exodus,	  for	  Arendt,	  though,	  
is	  life	  itself	  insofar	  as	  exile	  is	  implicit	  in	  birth;	  and	  all	  actions	  are	  means	  of	  revelation.	  	  
That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  limitations	  of	  human	  existence	  are	  the	  very	  things	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  
experience	  life,	  and	  the	  very	  things	  that	  prevent	  full	  disclosure	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  things.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  story	  only	  ends	  when	  people	  stop	  acting	  within	  the	  web,	  as	  it	  were.	  	  
The	  story	  remains	  alive	  and	  meaningful	  when	  people	  continue	  to	  act	  within	  it.	  	  “The	  
smallest	  act	  in	  the	  most	  limited	  circumstances	  bears	  the	  seed	  of	  the	  same	  
boundlessness,	  because	  one	  deed,	  and	  sometimes	  one	  word,	  suffices	  to	  change	  every	  
constellation.”51	  
	   Natality	  dictates	  the	  infinite	  character	  of	  action;	  it	  will	  never	  cease	  to	  effect	  
because	  it	  is	  inextricably	  part	  of	  the	  web	  of	  human	  experience.	  	  This	  is	  precisely	  why	  
human	  beings	  need	  some	  structure	  to	  maintain	  order	  in	  the	  world.	  	  Institutions,	  laws,	  
governments—they	  all	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  boundlessness	  of	  action	  as	  instruments	  intended	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to	  safeguard	  society	  against	  the	  very	  boundlessness	  that	  necessitate	  their	  existence.	  	  
The	  unlimited	  nature	  of	  action	  not	  only	  demands	  that	  these	  institutions	  be	  built,	  but	  
also	  makes	  them	  fragile.	  	  Any	  political	  structure	  can	  potentially	  be	  destroyed,	  changed,	  
replaced,	  revolutionized	  because	  it	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  action	  to	  never	  stop	  changing	  things.	  	  
“The	  limitations	  of	  the	  law	  are	  never	  entirely	  reliable	  safeguards	  against	  action	  from	  
within	  the	  body	  politic,	  just	  as	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  territory	  are	  never	  entirely	  reliable	  
safeguards	  against	  action	  from	  without.”	  	  The	  laws	  of	  a	  people	  are	  meant	  to	  “protect	  
and	  make	  possible	  its	  political	  existence”	  by	  providing	  stability,	  continuity	  and	  
legitimacy.	  	  They	  are	  the	  constructs	  that	  combat	  the	  wild	  and	  unruly	  nature	  of	  the	  
constructing	  force	  itself—action;	  yet,	  they,	  too	  are	  susceptible	  to	  the	  unlimited	  nature	  
of	  action.	  	  Laws	  cannot	  limit	  natality;	  they	  cannot	  control	  what	  an	  action	  creates.	  	  Thus,	  
“The	  frailty	  of	  human	  institutions	  and	  laws	  and,	  generally,	  of	  all	  matters	  pertaining	  to	  
men’s	  living	  together,	  arises	  from	  the	  human	  condition	  of	  natality	  and	  is	  quite	  
independent	  of	  the	  frailty	  of	  human	  nature.”52	  	  To	  wit,	  the	  conditions	  of	  man	  are	  
inherently	  fragile,	  and	  this	  is	  not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  any	  attestation	  of	  human	  nature.	  	  
For	  Arendt,	  human	  beings	  are	  imbued	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  act,	  which	  is	  in	  its	  
boundlessness	  a	  threat	  to	  stability,	  but	  also	  the	  hope	  for	  the	  world.	  	  	  
	   The	  second	  qualifying	  aspect	  of	  action	  is	  its	  unpredictability,	  which	  follows	  
naturally	  out	  if	  its	  unlimitedness.	  	  This	  characteristic	  is	  somewhat	  more	  perplexing	  
because,	  unlike	  the	  boundless	  aspect,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  prevent	  against	  its	  effects.	  	  
Where	  laws	  and	  institutions	  “may	  offer	  some	  protection	  against	  the	  inherent	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boundlessness	  of	  action,	  they	  are	  altogether	  helpless	  to	  offset	  its	  second	  outstanding	  
character:	  	  its	  inherent	  unpredictability.”	  	  This	  characteristic	  is	  a	  natural	  outcome	  of	  the	  
first:	  	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  tell	  the	  future,	  thus	  no	  way	  to	  know	  where	  the	  action	  ends,	  and	  
no	  way	  to	  know	  what	  it	  produces.	  	  This	  unpredictability	  is	  more,	  though.	  	  It	  is	  “not	  
simply	  a	  question	  of	  the	  inability	  to	  foretell	  all	  the	  logical	  consequences	  of	  a	  particular	  
act…but	  arises	  directly	  out	  of	  the	  story	  which,	  as	  the	  result	  of	  action,	  begins	  and	  
establishes	  itself	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  fleeting	  moment	  of	  the	  deed	  is	  past.”	  	  Understood	  this	  
way,	  then,	  new	  stories	  are	  always	  being	  started,	  being	  added	  to	  the	  web	  of	  human	  
actions.	  	  Thus,	  action	  is	  not	  about	  predicting	  logical	  outcomes,	  but	  imagining	  the	  infinite	  
possibilities	  based	  on	  the	  many	  stories	  that	  are	  always	  being	  told	  and	  constantly	  created	  
anew.	  	  This	  is	  further	  compounded	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  “its	  full	  meaning	  can	  reveal	  itself	  
only	  when	  it	  has	  ended.”	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  stories	  do	  not	  end,	  because	  surely	  they	  
do.	  	  But,	  “the	  light	  that	  illuminates	  processes	  of	  action,	  and	  therefore	  all	  historical	  
processes,	  appears	  only	  at	  their	  end,	  frequently	  when	  all	  the	  participants	  are	  dead.”53	   	  
	   The	  two	  characteristics	  of	  action,	  its	  limitlessness	  and	  unpredictability,	  make	  the	  
narrative	  that	  much	  more	  important.	  	  Because	  the	  actors	  will	  be	  dead	  when	  the	  story	  
ends,	  they	  cannot	  tell	  the	  meaning.	  	  It	  is	  up	  to	  the	  disseminators	  of	  the	  story	  to	  see	  the	  
meaning	  and	  pass	  the	  meaning	  on.	  	  Thus,	  the	  storyteller	  becomes	  quite	  important.	  	  
“Action	  reveals	  itself	  fully	  only	  to	  the	  storyteller,	  that	  is,	  to	  the	  backward	  glance	  of	  the	  
historian,	  who	  indeed	  always	  knows	  better	  what	  it	  was	  all	  about	  than	  the	  participants.”	  	  
The	  narrative	  allows	  the	  storyteller	  to	  learn	  from	  the	  action	  that	  created	  the	  narrative	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and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  participate	  in	  it,	  thus	  creating	  new	  stories	  and	  new	  narratives.	  	  In	  
this	  context,	  the	  annual	  retelling	  of	  the	  Passover	  story	  is	  meaningful	  when	  the	  
storytellers	  receive	  what	  the	  action	  reveals,	  that	  is,	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  	  
“Even	  though	  stories	  are	  the	  inevitable	  results	  of	  action,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  actor	  but	  the	  
storyteller	  who	  perceives	  and	  ‘makes’	  the	  story.”54	  	  The	  storyteller	  may	  reify	  the	  story,	  
thus	  “making”	  it	  in	  this	  sense;	  but,	  more	  importantly	  he	  “makes”	  the	  meaning	  by	  
perceiving	  what	  has	  been	  revealed.	  	  The	  actors,	  the	  actions	  and	  deeds,	  give	  the	  meaning	  
and	  the	  storyteller	  maintains	  the	  meaning	  as	  a	  living	  thing,	  indeed	  it	  is	  reified,	  in	  the	  
narrative	  itself.	  
Interestingly,	  it	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  action,	  there	  is	  no	  “end”	  
to	  any	  story.	  	  The	  Passover	  story	  gives	  a	  definitive	  beginning.	  	  However,	  because	  the	  
story	  does	  not	  end,	  it	  remains	  relevant	  and	  useful.	  	  This	  is	  why	  even	  a	  secular	  Jew,	  like	  
Arendt,	  can	  retell	  the	  story	  in	  light	  of	  new	  events.	  	  Even	  though	  the	  characters	  change	  
and	  the	  events	  themselves	  shift,	  the	  fundamental	  story	  remains:	  	  it	  is	  a	  story	  of	  action	  
and	  it	  teaches	  the	  difference	  between	  slavery	  and	  freedom.	  	  The	  Passover	  story	  is	  the	  
foundational	  myth	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  	  It	  is	  the	  moment	  that	  can	  be	  isolated	  as	  the	  
beginning	  and	  it	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  power	  of	  natality.	  	  So,	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Passover	  
story	  is	  dead	  to	  those	  who	  refuse	  to	  see	  the	  story	  beyond	  the	  reification,	  the	  meaning	  of	  
the	  life	  that	  was	  born	  in	  the	  story,	  not	  simply	  the	  product	  of	  an	  external	  author.	  	  The	  
Jewish	  story	  is	  not	  fictional,	  it	  is	  a	  political	  reality.	  	  Therefore,	  any	  means	  of	  
understanding	  that	  deny	  this	  are	  detrimental	  to	  the	  Jewish	  identity	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Ibid.,	  192.	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Jewish	  experience	  in	  the	  world	  because	  what	  Arendt	  and	  the	  Jewish	  people	  experience	  
are	  real.	  	  “The	  distinction	  between	  a	  real	  and	  a	  fictional	  story	  is	  precisely	  that	  the	  latter	  
was	  ‘made	  up’	  and	  the	  former	  not	  made	  at	  all.”55	  
The	  disclosure	  of	  one’s	  own	  narrative	  is	  daunting	  because	  it	  will	  put	  up	  
boundaries	  implicit	  in	  definition.	  	  It	  means	  that	  one	  cannot	  remain	  in	  the	  interminably	  
malleable	  world	  of	  the	  mind,	  free	  to	  construct	  and	  deconstruct	  oneself	  as	  one	  wills.	  	  On	  
the	  contrary,	  action	  defines	  and	  one	  can	  never	  undo	  what	  one	  has	  done.	  	  This	  is	  why	  
“The	  connotation	  of	  courage,	  which	  we	  now	  feel	  to	  be	  an	  indispensable	  quality	  of	  the	  
hero,	  is	  in	  fact	  already	  present	  in	  a	  willingness	  to	  act	  and	  speak	  at	  all,	  to	  insert	  one’s	  self	  
into	  the	  world	  and	  begin	  a	  story	  of	  one’s	  own.”	  	  Or,	  stated	  again,	  “Courage	  and	  even	  
boldness	  are	  already	  present	  in	  leaving	  one’s	  private	  hiding	  place	  and	  showing	  who	  one	  
is,	  in	  disclosing	  and	  exposing	  one’s	  self.”56	  
These	  ideas	  are	  further	  bolstered	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  Seder	  meal	  as	  it	  is	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  annually	  participate	  in	  the	  Jewish	  narrative.	  	  The	  theater	  or	  performance	  
of	  the	  story	  is	  in	  a	  sense	  inserting	  one’s	  self	  into	  the	  history	  or	  into	  that	  web.	  	  “Only	  the	  
actors	  and	  speakers	  who	  re-­‐enact	  the	  story’s	  plot	  can	  convey	  the	  full	  meaning,	  not	  so	  
much	  of	  the	  story	  itself,	  but	  of	  the	  ‘heroes’	  who	  reveal	  themselves	  in	  it.”	  	  The	  theater	  of	  
the	  Seder	  meal	  is	  performing	  the	  actions	  themselves	  and	  thereby	  inserting	  one’s	  self	  
into	  that	  particular	  revelation	  of	  that	  particular	  agent:	  	  I	  am	  a	  Jew.	  	  	  
The	  specific	  revelatory	  quality	  of	  action	  and	  speech,	  the	  
implicit	  manifestation	  of	  the	  agent	  and	  speaker,	  is	  so	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Ibid.,	  186.	  
56	  Ibid.	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indissolubly	  tied	  to	  the	  living	  flux	  of	  acting	  and	  speaking	  
that	  it	  can	  be	  represented	  and	  ‘reified’	  only	  through	  a	  kind	  
of	  repetition,	  the	  imitation	  or	  mimesis,	  which	  according	  to	  
Aristotle	  prevails	  in	  all	  arts	  but	  is	  actually	  appropriate	  only	  
to	  the	  drama,	  whose	  very	  name.	  .	  .	  indicates	  that	  play-­‐
acting	  actually	  is	  an	  imitation	  of	  acting.57	  
	  
In	  the	  act	  of	  unconcealment,	  there	  is	  a	  simultaneous	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  worldly	  space:	  	  
the	  space	  of	  appearance.	  	  The	  moment	  human	  beings	  act	  perceiving	  and	  being	  
perceived	  by	  others,	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  emerges.	  	  This	  space	  of	  appearance	  is	  
what	  Arendt	  calls	  the	  polis;	  it	  is	  the	  only	  space	  that	  is	  always	  inhabited	  by	  the	  plurality	  
of	  men,	  and	  therefore,	  it	  is	  the	  space	  of	  politics,	  the	  space	  wherein	  freedom	  is	  manifest.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Ibid.,	  187.	  
	   123	  
CHAPTER	  IV:	  
THE	  SPACE	  OF	  APPEARANCE	  
	  
To	  live	  an	  entirely	  private	  life	  means	  above	  all	  to	  be	  deprived	  of	  things	  
essential	  to	  a	  truly	  human	  life:	  	  to	  be	  deprived	  of	  the	  reality	  that	  comes	  
from	  being	  seen	  and	  heard	  by	  others,	  to	  be	  deprived	  of	  an	  ‘objective’	  
relationship	  with	  them	  that	  comes	  from	  being	  related	  to	  and	  separated	  
from	  them	  through	  the	  intermediary	  of	  a	  common	  world	  of	  things,	  to	  be	  
deprived	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  achieving	  something	  more	  permanent	  than	  
life	  itself.	  
~	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  The	  Human	  Condition	  
	  
Arendt	  begins	  The	  Human	  Condition	  by	  recalling	  a	  major	  scientific	  event	  of	  1957:	  	  
the	  projection	  of	  a	  man-­‐made	  object	  into	  space	  where	  “it	  dwelt	  and	  moved	  in	  the	  
proximity	  of	  the	  heavenly	  bodies	  as	  though	  it	  had	  been	  admitted	  tentatively	  to	  their	  
sublime	  company.”	  	  She	  notes	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  success	  of	  Sputnik	  1,	  even	  claiming	  
that	  it	  is	  the	  most	  important	  event	  in	  world	  history,	  more	  important	  than	  the	  splitting	  of	  
the	  atom.	  	  The	  importance	  for	  the	  scientists	  resided	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  marked	  the	  first	  
“step	  toward	  escape	  from	  men’s	  imprisonment	  to	  the	  earth.”	  	  Arendt	  saw	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  modern	  science	  sought	  to	  rid	  itself	  of	  the	  shackles	  of	  the	  earth	  as	  the	  final	  step	  in	  
the	  “emancipation	  and	  secularization	  of	  the	  modern	  age,	  which	  began	  with	  a	  turning-­‐
away,	  not	  necessarily	  from	  God,	  but	  from	  a	  god	  who	  was	  the	  Father	  of	  men	  in	  heaven”	  
insofar	  as	  it	  would	  culminate	  in	  the	  “even	  more	  fateful	  repudiation	  of	  an	  Earth	  who	  was	  
the	  Mother	  of	  all	  living	  creatures	  under	  the	  sky.”1	  
	   Arendt	  criticizes	  this	  modern	  desire	  for	  freedom	  from	  the	  earth	  on	  two	  premises.	  	  
First,	  she	  claims	  the	  earth	  is	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  the	  human	  condition	  because	  it	  allows	  
man	  to	  exist	  “without	  effort	  and	  without	  artifice.”	  	  Man	  exists	  without	  effort	  insofar	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  1,	  2.	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he	  is	  thrown	  into	  the	  physical	  world	  of	  existence	  upon	  birth	  and	  is	  left	  with	  the	  potential	  
to	  realize	  the	  fullness	  of	  his	  humanity.	  	  The	  effort	  of	  man	  creates	  the	  artifice	  of	  the	  
world	  and	  separates	  man	  from	  mere	  animal	  life.	  	  However,	  “life	  itself	  is	  outside	  this	  
artificial	  world,	  and	  through	  life	  man	  remains	  related	  to	  all	  other	  living	  organisms.”	  	  Her	  
second	  critique	  follows	  from	  the	  first	  and	  questions	  the	  modern	  contributions	  to	  the	  
artifice	  of	  the	  world.	  	  Specifically,	  Arendt	  criticizes	  the	  scientific	  attempt	  to	  rid	  man	  of	  
the	  earth,	  as	  was	  witnessed	  in	  the	  successful	  launching	  of	  Sputnik	  1	  and	  is	  also	  seen	  in	  
the	  endeavors	  to	  create	  human	  life	  in	  test	  tubes.	  	  She	  views	  these	  scientific	  pursuits	  as	  
the	  objective	  realization	  of	  the	  desire	  to	  escape	  the	  human	  condition.	  	  This	  wish	  to	  
ultimately	  destroy	  existential	  world	  space	  in	  favor	  of	  objective	  reality	  is	  a	  “political	  
question	  of	  the	  first	  order”	  because	  the	  destruction	  of	  world	  space	  is	  the	  final	  
destruction	  of	  man	  insofar	  as	  the	  essence	  of	  man	  lies	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  artificial	  
existence.2	  	  And,	  because	  the	  relation	  of	  man	  to	  man	  lies	  in	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  
human	  condition	  the	  final	  escape	  from	  the	  human	  condition	  would	  entail	  a	  subsequent	  
destruction	  of	  the	  polis	  because	  man	  would	  cease	  to	  be	  political.	  	  Arendt,	  then,	  wants	  to	  
rescue	  the	  earth	  and	  man	  from	  final	  obliteration	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  modern	  positive	  
science.	  	  
In	  her	  essay	  “The	  Enlightenment	  and	  the	  Jewish	  Question,”	  Arendt	  discusses	  
Johann	  Gottfried	  von	  Herder,	  an	  interpreter	  of	  Jewish	  history.	  	  Herder	  claims	  that	  
formation	  and	  tolerance	  are	  the	  two	  concepts	  that	  characterize	  humanity.	  	  He	  refutes	  
the	  Enlightenment	  claim	  that	  thinking	  characterizes	  human	  formation.	  	  By	  human	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Ibid.,	  2.	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formation	  he	  means	  the	  humanization	  of	  man,	  or	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  man.	  	  
He	  criticizes	  this	  concept	  of	  formation	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  it	  lacks	  any	  sense	  of	  reality	  
because	  it	  does	  not	  arise	  out	  of	  any	  experience	  or	  lead	  to	  action.	  	  “It	  cannot	  form	  man,	  
since	  it	  forgets	  the	  reality	  out	  of	  which	  he	  comes	  and	  in	  which	  he	  stands.”	  	  In	  much	  the	  
same	  way,	  Arendt	  asserts	  that	  modern	  positive	  science	  does	  not	  allow	  man	  to	  flourish	  
because	  in	  its	  efforts	  to	  form	  man	  anew	  it	  is	  actually	  destroying	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  
human	  life,	  which	  precedes	  the	  created	  world.	  	  Like	  Herder,	  Arendt	  rejects	  claims	  of	  
reality	  that	  are	  not	  grounded	  in	  experience	  and	  directed	  toward	  action.	  	  While	  Herder	  
himself	  was	  not	  Jewish,	  Arendt	  notes	  that	  his	  interpretation	  of	  history	  changed	  the	  way	  
in	  which	  Jewish	  history	  was	  understood	  and	  consequently	  changed	  the	  response	  to	  the	  
Jewish	  question.	  	  Arendt	  notes	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Jewish	  question,	  claiming	  that	  its	  
various	  formulations	  and	  answers	  have	  “defined	  the	  behavior	  and	  the	  assimilation	  of	  
the	  Jews.”3	  	  Thus,	  Arendt’s	  identity	  as	  a	  German	  Jew	  was	  substantially	  informed	  by	  
Herder’s	  interpretation	  of	  Jewish	  history	  due	  to	  the	  effect	  it	  had	  on	  the	  Jewish	  question.	  	  	  
	   When	  an	  individual	  acts,	  he	  appears	  to	  another	  person	  or	  people,	  thus	  
establishing	  a	  space	  wherein	  he	  appears	  to	  existing	  beings	  outside	  of	  his	  own	  subjective	  
mind.	  	  Arendt	  calls	  this	  space	  the	  “space	  of	  appearance”	  and	  it	  is	  a	  significant	  element	  in	  
her	  political	  theory.	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  explore	  Arendt’s	  concept	  of	  spatiality	  and	  the	  
ways	  in	  which	  it	  can	  be	  directly	  related	  to	  Jewish	  concepts.	  	  The	  way	  Arendt	  
understands	  both	  the	  physical	  space	  of	  the	  earth	  and	  the	  political	  space	  of	  human	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  “The	  Enlightenment	  and	  the	  Jewish	  Question”	  in	  The	  Jewish	  Writings,	  eds.	  Jerome	  Kohn	  
and	  Ron	  H.	  Feldman	  (New	  York:	  	  Schocken	  Books:	  	  2007),	  13,	  3.	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existence	  are	  crucial	  elements	  in	  her	  concept	  of	  political	  action.	  	  Her	  conception	  of	  the	  
polis	  stems	  from	  a	  careful	  investigation	  into	  Greek	  ideas;	  therefore,	  the	  chapter	  begins	  
with	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  those	  Greek	  concepts.	  	  What	  becomes	  apparent	  in	  Arendt’s	  
consideration	  of	  these	  notions	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  she	  distinguishes	  herself	  from	  them.	  	  
In	  that	  distinction,	  one	  can	  then	  see	  how	  her	  conception	  of	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  
draws	  near	  to	  Jewish	  ideas.	  	  The	  concepts	  Arendt	  constructs	  regarding	  the	  space	  of	  
appearance	  and	  politics,	  the	  realm	  of	  action,	  are	  quite	  similar	  to	  the	  Jewish	  mystical	  
account	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  earth.	  	  Once	  again,	  these	  ideas	  are	  aptly	  illustrated	  in	  the	  
Passover	  story,	  thus,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Passover	  story	  as	  a	  metaphorical	  framework	  for	  
understanding	  Arendt’s	  theory	  remains	  useful.	  	  It	  highlights	  the	  basic	  premise	  of	  
Arendt’s	  work:	  	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  exist	  in	  this	  world,	  with	  certain	  given	  conditions	  of	  
existence,	  necessitates	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  if	  we	  are	  going	  to	  
actualize	  our	  truest	  potential	  as	  human	  beings.	  	  	  
The	  earth,	  for	  Arendt,	  is	  not	  merely	  the	  physical	  construct	  of	  the	  planet	  Earth.	  	  
Rather,	  the	  earth	  is	  the	  experiential	  realm	  of	  human	  existence	  and	  the	  objective,	  
physical	  artifice	  of	  the	  world	  is	  created	  by	  man	  within	  the	  space	  of	  the	  earth	  via	  work,	  
labor,	  and	  action.	  	  Man	  exists	  prior	  to	  the	  artificial	  world	  and	  is	  marked	  by	  two	  things:	  	  
speech	  and	  action,	  the	  very	  elements	  that	  make	  men	  political	  beings.	  	  Arendt	  refers	  to	  
the	  earth	  as	  the	  “space	  of	  appearance”	  and	  claims	  it	  “predates	  and	  precedes	  all	  formal	  
constitution	  of	  the	  public	  realm	  and	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  government,	  that	  is,	  the	  
various	  forms	  in	  which	  the	  public	  realm	  can	  be	  organized.”4	  	  In	  the	  Passover	  story,	  the	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  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	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Israelites	  appeared	  to	  one	  another	  through	  the	  action	  of	  sacrificing	  a	  lamb	  and	  marking	  
their	  doorposts	  with	  blood;	  once	  they	  appeared	  to	  one	  another	  they	  became	  a	  “polis,”	  a	  
publicly	  organized	  entity	  formed	  and	  maintained	  through	  action	  and	  existing.	  	  Their	  
identity	  was	  revealed	  via	  their	  action.	  	  It	  was	  only	  later,	  after	  the	  polis	  had	  already	  been	  
established,	  when	  they	  were	  wandering	  in	  the	  wilderness	  that	  the	  formal	  constitution,	  
the	  Decalogue,	  was	  delivered.	  	  
The	  previous	  two	  chapters,	  which	  discuss	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  vita	  contemplativa	  
and	  the	  vita	  activa,	  deliver	  us,	  now,	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  polis.	  	  In	  The	  Human	  Condition,	  
Arendt	  discusses	  the	  different	  realms	  within	  which	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  vita	  
contemplativa	  and	  those	  of	  the	  vita	  activa	  operate.	  	  It	  is	  because	  of	  these	  two	  distinct	  
realms	  of	  operation	  that	  different	  conditions	  exist	  and	  necessitate	  particular	  activities.	  	  
The	  purpose	  of	  Arendt’s	  careful	  consideration	  of	  the	  two	  realms,	  however,	  is	  not	  to	  
further	  the	  bifurcation	  of	  human	  being	  into	  these	  distinct	  realms,	  but	  rather,	  to	  
recognize	  that	  the	  differentiation	  renders	  the	  activities	  of	  both	  realms	  to	  be	  
indefatigably	  necessary.	  	  She	  writes,	  “My	  use	  of	  the	  term	  vita	  activa	  presupposes	  that	  
the	  concern	  underlying	  all	  its	  activities	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  and	  is	  neither	  superior	  nor	  
inferior	  to	  the	  central	  concern	  of	  the	  vita	  contemplativa.”5	  Although	  different	  activities	  
are	  conditioned	  by	  the	  two	  realms,	  the	  activities	  of	  both,	  together,	  are	  requisite	  for	  the	  
fullness	  of	  human	  being	  which	  is	  witnessed	  only	  in	  the	  “space	  of	  appearance.”	  	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  it	  is	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  that	  provide	  
understanding	  and	  motivation	  for	  individuals	  to	  appear	  to	  others.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  through	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  Ibid.,	  17.	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willing	  that	  thinking	  and	  judging	  are	  manifested	  in	  the	  world	  to	  “spectators”	  who	  
“acknowledge	  and	  recognize”	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  actor.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  Arendt	  
insists	  that	  we	  exist	  not	  merely	  in	  the	  world,	  but	  that	  we	  are	  also	  of	  the	  world,	  
“perceiving	  and	  being	  perceived.”6	  	  As	  thinking	  beings	  we	  are	  in	  the	  world,	  perceiving	  
the	  world;	  as	  acting	  beings	  we	  are	  of	  the	  world,	  being	  perceived	  by	  it.	  	  	  
The	  activities	  of	  the	  private	  realm	  are	  forces	  that	  “lead	  an	  uncertain,	  shadowy	  
kind	  of	  existence	  unless	  and	  until	  they	  are	  transformed,	  deprivatized	  and	  
deindividualized,	  as	  it	  were,	  into	  a	  shape	  to	  fit	  them	  for	  public	  appearance.”	  	  All	  of	  the	  
inner	  workings	  of	  our	  minds	  and	  the	  experiences	  we	  have	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  privacy	  can	  
be	  transformed	  through	  word	  and	  deed,	  or	  the	  stories	  that	  tell	  of	  them.	  	  Arendt	  claims	  
that	  storytelling	  is	  the	  “most	  current	  of	  such	  transformations”	  because	  it	  allows	  for	  
words	  to	  capture	  the	  significance	  of	  particular	  deeds	  and	  calls	  to	  mind	  the	  human	  
capacity	  for	  action.	  	  All	  actions	  are	  important	  insofar	  as	  they	  signify	  two	  phenomena:	  	  
reality	  and	  the	  world.	  	  Whoever	  acts	  does	  so	  in	  public,	  meaning	  the	  words	  and	  deeds	  
that	  comprise	  the	  action	  can	  be	  seen	  and	  heard	  by	  anyone.	  	  Thus,	  the	  result	  of	  action	  is	  
appearance	  “—something	  that	  is	  being	  seen	  and	  heard	  by	  others	  as	  well	  as	  by	  
ourselves.”	  	  And,	  appearance	  “constitutes	  reality.”	  	  For	  Arendt,	  human	  being	  is	  fully	  
manifested	  when	  the	  activities	  necessitated	  by	  the	  conditions	  of	  humanness	  are	  
performed	  in	  concert.	  	  With	  action	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  are	  manifested,	  and	  from	  
action	  the	  individual	  emerges	  in	  the	  world	  of	  appearances.	  	  The	  world	  constituted	  by	  
action	  “is	  not	  identical	  with	  the	  earth	  or	  with	  nature,	  as	  the	  limited	  space	  for	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  20.	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movement	  of	  men	  and	  the	  general	  condition	  of	  organic	  life.”	  	  The	  world	  of	  action	  is	  the	  
space	  that	  emerges	  when	  human	  beings	  speak	  and	  act	  together.	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  related	  “to	  
the	  human	  artifact,	  the	  fabrication	  of	  human	  hands”	  that	  comes	  out	  of	  the	  activity	  of	  
work,	  “as	  well	  as	  to	  affairs	  which	  go	  on	  among	  those	  who	  inhabit	  the	  man-­‐made	  world	  
together.”	  	  There	  is	  a	  natural	  and	  artificial	  world	  upon	  which	  and	  within	  which	  action	  
occurs.	  	  But,	  action	  itself	  signifies	  a	  space	  that	  is	  not	  limited	  by	  these	  conditions.	  	  Rather,	  
the	  space	  of	  appearance	  “relates	  and	  separates	  men	  at	  the	  same	  time.”7	  	  It	  is	  in	  action	  
that	  individuals	  recognize	  one	  another	  as	  human	  beings,	  relating	  them	  to	  one	  another	  in	  
their	  fundamental	  likeness;	  it	  is	  in	  action	  that	  individuals	  reveal	  their	  unique,	  distinctive,	  
qualifying	  characteristics	  that	  make	  each	  of	  them	  fundamentally	  inexchangeable.	  	  	  
Arendt	  writes:	  	  “According	  to	  Greek	  thought,	  the	  human	  capacity	  for	  political	  
organization	  is	  not	  only	  different	  from	  but	  stands	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  that	  natural	  
association	  whose	  center	  is	  the	  home	  (oikia)	  and	  the	  family.”8	  	  This	  very	  basic	  distinction	  
is	  not	  only	  central	  to	  understanding	  what	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  is,	  but,	  more	  
significantly,	  it	  rests	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  her	  political	  theory.	  	  If	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory	  is	  
based	  on	  a	  concept	  of	  political	  action,	  and	  action	  is	  the	  political	  activity	  par	  excellence,	  
then	  a	  distinct	  political	  space	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  action.	  	  In	  seeking	  to	  
understand	  Arendt’s	  concept	  of	  the	  space	  of	  appearance,	  the	  present	  chapter	  will	  
explain	  what	  the	  polis	  is,	  in	  both	  its	  original	  Greek	  meaning	  and	  in	  modernity.	  	  The	  
connection	  between	  action,	  the	  space	  of	  appearance,	  and	  the	  goal	  of	  politics	  will	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  50,	  52.	  
8	  Ibid.,	  24.	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illuminated.	  	  Finally,	  narrative	  will,	  once	  again,	  prove	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  
the	  polis,	  making	  it	  a	  political	  tool	  par	  excellence.	  	  As	  mentioned,	  this	  exposition	  of	  
Greek	  ideas	  serves	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  understanding	  the	  Jewishness	  of	  Arendt’s	  thought.	  	  It	  is	  
in	  extrapolating	  Arendt’s	  differences	  from	  the	  Greek	  tradition	  that	  the	  Jewish	  ideas	  will,	  
themselves,	  have	  the	  space	  to	  emerge.	  	  Thus,	  the	  following	  lengthy	  explanation	  of	  
Greek	  ideas	  is	  a	  necessary	  precursor	  to	  the	  Jewish	  ideas	  that	  will	  subsequently	  be	  
presented.	  
	   The	  polis	  comes	  to	  exist	  within	  the	  common	  world	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  human	  
condition	  of	  plurality.	  	  Men,	  not	  man,	  exist	  and	  the	  space	  between	  them	  becomes	  the	  
polis:	  	  “action	  and	  speech	  create	  a	  space	  between	  the	  participants	  .	  .	  .	  the	  space	  of	  
appearance	  in	  the	  widest	  sense	  of	  the	  word,	  namely,	  the	  space	  where	  I	  appear	  to	  others	  
as	  others	  appear	  to	  me.”	  	  The	  space	  of	  appearance,	  then,	  is	  the	  realm	  in	  which	  man	  
recognizes	  his	  own	  existence	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  others	  through	  the	  politicizing	  
elements	  of	  speech	  and	  action.	  	  The	  space	  of	  appearance,	  the	  polis,	  “is	  not	  the	  city-­‐state	  
in	  its	  physical	  location;	  it	  is	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  people	  as	  it	  arises	  out	  of	  acting	  and	  
speaking	  together.”	  	  The	  polis,	  then,	  is	  truly	  the	  space	  that	  “lies	  between	  people	  living	  
together.”9	  	  It	  follows,	  then,	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	  understand	  man	  as	  a	  being	  which	  exists	  
only	  within	  the	  artifice	  of	  the	  world	  denies	  man	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  that	  is	  
necessary	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  human	  being	  through	  speech	  and	  action.	  	  So	  it	  is	  that	  
reality	  is	  grounded	  in	  political	  action	  because	  man	  exists	  in	  the	  space	  of	  appearance,	  a	  
space	  in	  which	  speech	  and	  action	  engender	  the	  polis.	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  198.	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The	  purpose	  of	  the	  polis	  is	  “to	  multiply	  the	  chances	  for	  everybody	  to	  distinguish	  
himself,	  to	  show	  in	  deed	  and	  word	  who	  he	  was	  in	  his	  unique	  distinctness.”10	  	  The	  polis	  is	  
dependent	  upon	  action	  that	  is	  rooted	  in	  thinking,	  willing	  and	  judging.	  	  Thus,	  the	  loss	  of	  
any	  of	  these	  activities	  transforms	  human	  beings	  as	  well	  as	  the	  public	  space	  in	  which	  they	  
act	  together.	  	  In	  The	  Human	  Condition	  Arendt	  gives	  a	  careful	  analysis	  of	  the	  
transformation	  of	  the	  public	  realm,	  an	  analysis	  that	  must	  be	  addressed	  here.	  	  Because	  
the	  transformation	  of	  public	  space	  changed	  the	  course	  of	  politics	  and,	  therefore,	  human	  
beings,	  it	  is	  absolutely	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  Arendt’s	  critique	  of	  modernity	  and	  the	  
human	  condition.	  	  The	  transformation	  of	  the	  public	  realm	  from	  the	  political	  to	  the	  social	  
is	  a	  reflection	  of	  as	  well	  as	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  continued	  loss	  of	  human-­‐ness.	  	  
Contemplating	  the	  Greek	  understanding	  of	  the	  polis,	  Arendt	  contends	  that	  the	  
public	  realm	  in	  antiquity	  was	  the	  realm	  of	  freedom,	  words	  and	  deeds.	  	  The	  private	  realm,	  
on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  the	  space	  that	  was	  confined	  to	  the	  household	  and	  where	  basic	  
needs	  and	  desires	  were	  met.	  	  The	  private	  realm,	  or	  the	  household,	  was	  the	  arena	  in	  
which	  rulership	  existed;	  it	  was	  the	  space	  wherein	  there	  existed	  a	  hierarchy,	  a	  structure	  
of	  command.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  household	  was	  not	  freedom,	  but	  
preservation	  of	  life	  and	  production	  of	  those	  things	  that	  would	  contribute	  to	  building	  the	  
world.	  	  The	  private	  realm	  was	  the	  prepolitical	  realm	  that	  was	  characterized	  by	  inequality	  
and	  whose	  conditions	  necessitated	  the	  activities	  of	  work	  and	  labor.	  	  The	  “whole	  concept	  
of	  rule	  and	  being	  ruled,	  of	  government	  and	  power	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  understand	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Ibid.,	  197.	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them	  as	  well	  as	  the	  regulated	  order	  attending	  them,	  was	  felt	  to	  .	  	  .	  	  .	  	  belong	  in	  the	  
private	  rather	  than	  the	  public	  sphere.”11	  	  
	  In	  antiquity,	  the	  word	  private	  “meant	  literally	  a	  state	  of	  being	  deprived	  of	  
something,	  and	  even	  of	  the	  highest	  and	  most	  human	  of	  man’s	  capacities.”12	  	  In	  the	  
private	  realm,	  individuals	  were	  deprived	  of	  both	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  	  It	  is	  important	  
to	  note	  that	  the	  private	  realm	  begins	  with	  households	  comprised	  of	  one	  family	  and	  any	  
slaves	  that	  may	  belong	  to	  it.	  	  Households	  can	  join	  together	  to	  form	  societies;	  societies	  
can	  join	  together	  to	  form	  nations.	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  household,	  society,	  or	  
nation,	  the	  activities	  specific	  to	  them	  remain	  the	  same:	  	  work	  and	  labor.	  	  In	  all	  of	  these	  
collective	  groupings,	  the	  third	  activity,	  action,	  is	  still	  not	  to	  be	  found	  because	  none	  of	  
these	  have	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  the	  polis	  to	  emerge,	  namely	  freedom	  and	  
equality.	  	  	  
The	  public	  realm,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  the	  space	  of	  freedom	  and	  thereby,	  the	  
space	  of	  action	  where	  individuals	  could	  speak	  and	  act,	  creating	  the	  world	  that	  lies	  
outside	  of	  the	  household	  and	  that	  was	  common	  to	  those	  who	  created	  it.	  	  The	  men	  of	  
the	  polis	  were	  both	  free	  and	  equal,	  and	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  polis	  was	  to	  maintain	  the	  
freedom	  of	  movement	  and	  freedom	  of	  speech	  that	  was	  the	  fullest	  manifestation	  of	  
human	  being.	  	  In	  the	  ancient	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  “To	  be	  free	  meant	  both	  not	  to	  be	  
subject	  to	  the	  necessity	  of	  life	  or	  to	  the	  command	  of	  another	  and	  not	  to	  be	  in	  command	  
oneself.”	  	  The	  private	  realm,	  with	  its	  hierarchical	  structure	  of	  command	  implemented	  to	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meet	  the	  biological	  and	  social	  needs	  of	  the	  individuals	  within	  it,	  is	  not	  a	  realm	  of	  
freedom.	  	  Human	  beings	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  activities	  of	  work	  and	  labor	  because	  the	  
conditions	  of	  biological	  life	  and	  worldliness	  demand	  that	  they	  be	  performed.	  	  Freedom,	  
on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  the	  ability	  “to	  move	  in	  a	  sphere	  where	  neither	  rule	  nor	  being	  ruled	  
existed”	  and	  this	  was	  fundamentally	  impossible	  in	  the	  private	  realm.13	  	  
The	  comfort	  of	  the	  private	  realm	  was	  such	  that	  the	  necessities	  of	  life	  were	  
provided	  and	  emerging	  out	  of	  the	  private	  realm	  automatically	  introduced	  certain	  
threats.	  	  In	  the	  openness	  of	  the	  public	  space,	  one	  must	  choose	  if	  and	  how	  to	  act.	  	  The	  
panic	  of	  self-­‐revelation	  is	  enough	  to	  keep	  one	  in	  the	  hidden	  confines	  of	  privacy,	  closed	  
off	  from	  the	  world	  and	  yet	  still	  living	  in	  it.	  	  It	  was	  understood	  that	  whoever	  “entered	  the	  
political	  realm	  had	  first	  to	  be	  ready	  to	  risk	  his	  life.”	  	  That	  is,	  the	  movement	  from	  the	  
private	  to	  the	  public	  space	  challenges	  not	  only	  the	  biological	  security	  found	  in	  the	  
household,	  but	  also	  the	  identity	  one	  has	  in	  that	  household.	  	  When	  an	  individual	  emerges	  
in	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  the	  very	  basic	  understanding	  of	  oneself	  is	  challenged,	  and	  if	  
one	  is	  not	  up	  to	  that	  challenge	  due	  to	  “too	  great	  a	  love	  for	  life”	  the	  consequent	  result	  is	  
“obstructed	  freedom”	  which	  “was	  a	  sure	  sign	  of	  slavishness.”14	  
The	  distinction	  between	  the	  prepolitical,	  household	  realm	  and	  the	  political	  realm	  
shrinks	  with	  modernity	  and	  the	  order	  and	  inequality	  of	  the	  household	  begins	  to	  
permeate	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  Arendt	  writes,	  “In	  the	  modern	  world,	  the	  two	  realms	  
indeed	  constantly	  flow	  into	  each	  other	  like	  waves	  in	  the	  never-­‐resting	  stream	  of	  the	  life	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process	  itself.”15	  	  The	  blurring	  of	  the	  public	  realm	  with	  the	  private	  has	  the	  detrimental	  
effect	  of	  maintaining	  the	  structure	  and	  activities	  of	  the	  household	  where	  freedom	  and	  
equality	  are	  not	  present.	  	  The	  blurring	  of	  the	  lines	  meant	  that	  because	  people	  were	  
neither	  free	  nor	  equal,	  they	  could	  not	  perform	  the	  words	  and	  deeds	  that	  constitute	  
action.	  	  Thus,	  the	  conflation	  of	  the	  two	  realms	  of	  existence	  consequently	  produced	  a	  
world	  in	  which	  the	  basic	  elements	  necessary	  for	  politics	  were	  not	  present.	  	  	  
Action	  is	  only	  possible	  where	  human	  beings	  understand	  themselves	  to	  be	  free	  
and	  equal	  in	  their	  human	  capacities.	  	  In	  the	  household,	  the	  human	  capacities	  are	  limited	  
by	  a	  utilitarian	  understanding	  of	  human	  being	  where	  individuals	  are	  merely	  tools	  of	  
production	  and	  preservation.	  	  As	  the	  lines	  between	  private	  and	  public	  realms	  blurred,	  
the	  public	  realm	  increasingly	  lost	  its	  distinct	  political	  qualities:	  	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  	  
The	  social	  realm	  eventually	  took	  over	  the	  polis	  and	  the	  activities	  associated	  with	  it,	  labor	  
and	  work,	  came	  to	  dominate	  human	  activities	  in	  the	  public	  realm.	  	  The	  public	  realm	  
became	  what	  the	  private	  realm	  once	  was:	  	  a	  realm	  of	  hierarchical	  domination,	  
inequality	  and	  slavery.	  	  The	  social	  qualities	  were	  confused	  as	  political	  because	  they	  
occurred	  in	  the	  public	  realm;	  however,	  the	  polis	  was	  effectively	  diminished	  and	  in	  its	  
place	  stood	  a	  society	  of	  workers	  and	  laborers.	  	  In	  antiquity,	  a	  “man	  who	  lived	  only	  a	  
private	  life,	  who	  like	  the	  slave	  was	  not	  permitted	  to	  enter	  the	  public	  realm,	  or	  like	  the	  
barbarian	  had	  chosen	  not	  to	  establish	  such	  a	  realm,	  was	  not	  fully	  human.”	  	  With	  the	  
social	  conquest	  of	  the	  public	  realm	  experienced	  in	  modernity,	  all	  human	  beings	  were	  
subjected	  to	  this	  deprived,	  private	  kind	  of	  existence	  where	  the	  fullness	  of	  human	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capacity	  is	  thwarted.	  	  Thus,	  “It	  is	  decisive	  that	  society,	  on	  all	  its	  levels,	  excludes	  the	  
possibility	  of	  action,	  which	  formerly	  was	  excluded	  from	  the	  household.”16	  	  	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  house	  (society,	  or	  nation)	  was	  to	  organize	  the	  house	  
so	  that	  the	  necessities	  of	  sustenance	  and	  maintenance	  were	  available.	  	  The	  members	  of	  
the	  household,	  including	  slaves,	  had	  roles	  that	  were	  assigned	  to	  them.	  	  The	  job	  of	  each	  
member	  of	  the	  household	  was	  to	  perform	  the	  various	  tasks	  assigned,	  and	  not	  to	  venture	  
beyond	  those	  assignments.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  household,	  society	  or	  nation	  can	  expect	  
“from	  each	  of	  its	  members	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  behavior	  imposing	  innumerable	  and	  various	  
rules,	  all	  of	  which	  tend	  to	  ‘normalize’	  its	  members,	  to	  make	  them	  behave,	  to	  exclude	  
spontaneous	  action	  or	  outstanding	  achievement.”	  	  With	  the	  spreading	  of	  the	  social	  
realm	  into	  the	  public	  sphere,	  social	  organization	  took	  over	  the	  public	  realm	  and,	  with	  it,	  
political	  organization.	  	  With	  the	  ever-­‐expanding	  modern	  nations,	  wherein	  many	  diverse	  
societies	  are	  joined,	  “the	  realm	  of	  the	  social	  has	  finally,	  after	  several	  centuries	  of	  
development,	  reached	  the	  point	  where	  it	  embraces	  and	  controls	  all	  members	  of	  a	  given	  
community	  equally	  and	  with	  equal	  strength.”17	  	  The	  modern	  nation-­‐state	  is	  altogether	  
different	  from	  the	  ancient	  city-­‐state.	  	  The	  city-­‐state	  indicates	  a	  clear	  separation	  between	  
private	  and	  public,	  because	  the	  activities	  that	  occur	  in	  public	  and	  that	  constitute	  the	  city	  
(the	  polis)	  cannot	  occur	  in	  private.	  	  The	  nation-­‐state,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  created	  a	  
public	  realm	  where	  social	  forms	  of	  organization	  originally	  found	  in	  the	  private	  realm	  
have	  come	  to	  dominate.	  	  Thus,	  the	  depravity,	  inequality,	  and	  slavishness	  originally	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  38,	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found	  in	  the	  private	  realm	  have	  become	  characteristic	  of	  modern	  mass	  societies.	  	  In	  this	  
development	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  created	  and	  maintained	  through	  action	  was	  
effectively	  concealed.	  
The	  equality	  of	  mass	  society	  must	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  equality	  of	  the	  
ancient	  polis.	  	  The	  equality	  of	  mass	  society	  is	  one	  that	  is	  based	  in	  necessity,	  not	  freedom.	  	  
That	  is,	  in	  mass	  society	  all	  people	  are	  equally	  enslaved	  to	  the	  biological	  and	  social	  
necessities	  of	  life	  and	  the	  nation.	  	  These	  necessities	  require	  specific	  activities;	  that	  is,	  
the	  equality	  of	  mass	  society	  is	  maintained	  only	  through	  work	  and	  labor	  and	  does	  not	  
invite	  that	  highest	  human	  capacity,	  action.	  	  Indeed,	  mass	  society	  is	  maintained	  by	  
members	  who	  execute	  the	  duties	  of	  work	  and	  labor,	  leaving	  the	  status	  quo	  untouched.	  	  
“This	  modern	  equality,	  based	  on	  the	  conformism	  inherent	  in	  society	  and	  possible	  only	  
because	  behavior	  has	  replaced	  action	  as	  the	  foremost	  mode	  of	  human	  relationship,	  is	  in	  
every	  respect	  different	  from	  equality	  in	  antiquity.”18	  	  The	  equality	  of	  the	  Greek	  polis	  was	  
concomitant	  with	  the	  freedom	  of	  choice	  and	  freedom	  of	  movement	  and	  was	  a	  
characteristic	  of	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  that	  was	  produced	  by	  action.	  	  	  
Along	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality	  that	  came	  with	  the	  transformation	  
of	  the	  public	  realm	  from	  the	  polis	  to	  the	  nation	  came	  also	  the	  loss	  of	  identity.	  	  The	  
activities	  of	  mass	  society	  do	  not	  allow	  the	  subjective	  elements	  of	  identity	  to	  be	  tested	  in	  
the	  public	  realm;	  rather,	  individuals	  are	  defined	  by	  work	  and	  labor.	  	  Identity	  is	  
prescribed	  by	  society,	  rather	  than	  experienced	  through	  individual	  action.	  	  In	  the	  political	  
realm,	  the	  realm	  of	  action,	  people	  could	  be	  distinct	  in	  their	  identities	  as	  individuals,	  “it	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was	  the	  only	  place	  where	  men	  could	  show	  who	  they	  really	  and	  inexchangeably	  were.”19	  	  
Thus,	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  polis,	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  identity,	  people	  become	  fully	  
exchangeable.	  	  In	  the	  political	  realm	  every	  individual	  is	  valued	  precisely	  because	  of	  his	  or	  
her	  individuality	  and	  uniqueness.	  	  And,	  it	  is	  because	  of	  the	  distinctions	  that	  mark	  the	  
individual	  that	  every	  human	  being	  is	  absolutely	  inexchangeable	  in	  the	  political	  sphere.	  	  
Further,	  the	  words	  and	  deeds	  of	  every	  individual	  are	  fomented	  from	  specific	  
circumstances	  and	  a	  history	  unique	  to	  each,	  so	  that	  no	  two	  human	  beings	  can	  affect	  the	  
web	  of	  relationships	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  	  Every	  word,	  every	  deed,	  every	  action	  in	  the	  
political	  realm	  marks	  the	  utter	  distinction	  and	  value	  of	  each	  human	  being.	  	  This	  is	  why	  
human	  beings	  need	  the	  space	  of	  appearance.	  	  Only	  here	  can	  individuals	  appear	  in	  their	  
own,	  distinct,	  nonreplicable,	  irreplaceable	  self.	  	  	  
	   What	  Arendt	  shows	  in	  her	  analysis	  of	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  public	  realm	  is	  
that	  the	  public	  realm	  does	  not	  have	  an	  unchanging	  nature.	  	  Rather,	  the	  public	  “must	  
change	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  activities	  admitted	  into	  it.”	  	  The	  public	  realm	  in	  
modernity	  is	  a	  space	  “in	  which	  the	  fact	  of	  mutual	  dependence	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  life	  and	  
nothing	  else	  assumes	  public	  significance	  and	  where	  the	  activities	  connected	  with	  sheer	  
survival	  are	  permitted	  to	  appear	  in	  public.”20	  	  Thus,	  the	  public	  realm	  is	  not	  inherently	  
political.	  	  At	  its	  best,	  it	  is	  political	  and	  this	  is	  when	  human	  beings	  are	  freely	  acting	  and	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  bound	  by	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  space	  itself.	  	  It	  is	  only	  the	  public	  space	  that	  is	  
characterized	  by	  action	  that	  can	  rightly	  be	  called	  the	  space	  of	  appearance.	  	  Labor	  and	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work,	  even	  when	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  public	  realm,	  do	  not	  and	  cannot	  reveal	  our	  identities.	  	  
Rather,	  in	  a	  public	  space	  dominated	  by	  labor	  and	  work,	  individual	  identities	  are	  further	  
suppressed	  behind	  the	  masks	  of	  productivity	  and	  sustenance.	  	  	  
Arendt	  draws	  upon	  the	  ancient	  understanding	  of	  the	  private	  and	  public	  realms	  
because,	  for	  her,	  both	  are	  absolutely	  distinct	  and	  necessary,	  as	  they	  were	  for	  the	  Greeks.	  	  
However,	  Arendt	  breaks	  with	  Greek	  thought	  in	  her	  understanding	  of	  the	  private	  and	  
public	  realms	  because,	  for	  her,	  one	  does	  not	  exist	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  other;	  rather,	  the	  
human	  condition	  necessitates	  both.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  ancient	  Greeks	  placed	  a	  priority	  on	  the	  
activities	  of	  the	  polis,	  as	  they	  distinguished	  the	  slaves	  from	  the	  citizens,	  the	  barbarians	  
from	  the	  civilized	  human	  beings.	  	  In	  the	  Greek	  structure	  of	  things,	  the	  freedom	  and	  
equality	  of	  the	  polis	  was	  superior	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  household	  and	  because	  of	  this	  
they	  attempted	  to	  “exclude	  labor	  from	  the	  conditions	  of	  man’s	  life.”	  	  This	  attempt	  to	  
deny	  such	  a	  fundamental	  human	  condition	  was	  not	  only	  detrimental	  to	  human	  beings,	  
but	  to	  the	  development	  of	  political	  thought	  in	  general.	  	  Further,	  while	  the	  ancient	  Greek	  
philosophers	  recognized	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  private	  and	  the	  public,	  they	  still	  
considered	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  public	  realm	  to	  be	  a	  burden,	  “that	  even	  this	  freest	  of	  all	  
ways	  of	  life	  was	  still	  connected	  with	  and	  subject	  to	  necessity.”21	  	  In	  carefully	  analyzing	  
her	  ideas	  regarding	  the	  transformation	  of	  public	  space,	  it	  is	  right	  to	  assert	  that	  for	  
Arendt,	  human	  beings	  are	  not	  political	  or	  social	  by	  nature;	  rather,	  we	  have	  the	  capacity	  
for	  both.	  	  While	  Arendt’s	  critique	  focuses	  on	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  public	  political	  realm,	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  does	  not	  equate	  to	  a	  preference	  for	  the	  political	  over	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Ibid.,	  84,	  37.	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social.	  	  Rather,	  the	  problem	  in	  modernity	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  
realms,	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  important	  activity,	  action,	  in	  the	  public	  realm.	  	  This	  is	  not	  
meant	  to	  imply	  that	  the	  activities	  that	  occur	  in	  private	  are	  not	  also	  important,	  as	  they	  
are	  certainly	  part	  of	  the	  human	  condition,	  however,	  without	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  
and	  the	  actions	  that	  create	  it,	  human	  beings	  are	  left	  without	  the	  objective	  experiences	  
of	  reality.	  
Because	  Arendt	  makes	  a	  decisive	  break	  with	  Greece	  in	  her	  understanding	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  private	  and	  public	  realms,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  look,	  once	  again,	  to	  
some	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  her	  thinking	  that	  are	  decidedly	  Jewish.	  	  To	  begin,	  the	  Hebrew	  
Bible	  and	  the	  traditions	  that	  stem	  from	  it	  are	  overtly	  preoccupied	  with	  space.22	  	  In	  the	  
classical	  Hebrew	  commentaries	  and	  philosophical	  writings,	  space	  is	  often	  times	  
connected	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  identity	  and	  home	  and	  appears	  to	  be	  physical	  or	  objective	  
in	  nature.	  	  When	  the	  Hebrew	  people	  existed	  as	  a	  community	  in	  a	  particular	  physical	  
location,	  namely	  Israel,	  it	  was	  easy	  to	  make	  such	  objective	  characterizations	  of	  spatiality,	  
particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  identity.	  	  However,	  upon	  the	  dispersion	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  
to	  various	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  concepts	  of	  space	  and	  place	  were	  challenged.	  	  Because	  
space	  and	  place	  were	  connected	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  the	  Diaspora	  
forced	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  these	  concepts	  if	  the	  Jewish	  people	  were	  to	  maintain	  their	  
identity.	  	  The	  concepts	  of	  space	  and	  place	  had	  always	  contained	  certain	  existential	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  This	  statement	  is	  true	  of	  both	  rabbinic	  and	  mystical	  Jewish	  traditions;	  both	  are	  considered	  in	  the	  
subsequent	  analysis.	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experiential	  elements,	  however,	  upon	  dispersion	  these	  elements	  came	  to	  the	  fore	  in	  the	  
Hebraic	  tradition.	   	  	  
	   In	  grasping	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  space	  in	  the	  Diaspora,	  the	  historical	  experience	  
of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  became	  prominent.	  	  While	  the	  physical	  locality	  of	  the	  Jewish	  
people	  no	  longer	  existed	  as	  the	  boundary	  of	  their	  identity	  and	  existence,	  the	  historical	  
account	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  remained.	  	  Thus,	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  
Jewish	  people	  became	  foundational	  in	  the	  new	  existential	  understanding	  of	  space.	  	  As	  
Jewish	  scholars,	  religious	  and	  philosophical,	  began	  to	  reinterpret	  the	  meaning	  of	  Jewish	  
history	  in	  light	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  spatiality	  the	  question	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  world	  
became	  quite	  important.	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  way	  in	  which	  spatiality	  directly	  
affects	  the	  political	  and	  ethical	  structure	  of	  the	  temporal	  realm	  of	  human	  existence,	  one	  
must	  first	  understand	  how	  world	  space	  came	  to	  be.	  	  	  
	   The	  main	  concepts	  underlying	  the	  Hebraic	  notion	  of	  spatiality	  are	  the	  Tsimtsum	  
and	  the	  subsequent	  Reshima.23	  	  Tsimtsum	  literally	  translates	  as	  “contraction”	  or	  
“concealment”;	  Reshima	  means	  “impression.”	  	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  
the	  universe	  God	  existed	  as	  an	  infinite	  light.	  	  The	  moment	  of	  creation	  occurred	  when	  
God	  contracted	  His	  light,	  concealing	  a	  portion	  of	  Himself.	  	  The	  empty	  space	  created	  by	  
the	  Tsimtsum	  was	  left	  with	  an	  impression	  of	  the	  light	  that	  once	  was	  there.	  	  The	  world	  
created	  within	  the	  empty	  space	  of	  the	  Tsimtsum	  and	  all	  of	  creation	  is	  left	  with	  the	  
Reshima,	  the	  impression	  of	  God’s	  light.	  	  After	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  space	  of	  the	  world,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  Tsimtsum	  was	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  3	  in	  connection	  to	  Arendt’s	  notion	  of	  action.	  	  
Here,	  the	  spatial	  aspects	  of	  the	  Tsimtsum	  are	  expounded.	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God	  continued	  to	  create	  things	  within	  the	  world.	  	  The	  way	  in	  which	  the	  story	  of	  creation	  
concludes	  in	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  man’s	  role	  in	  space	  as	  
it	  results	  from	  the	  contraction	  of	  God’s	  light.	  	  	  
	  In	  the	  Torah,	  the	  last	  verse	  of	  the	  creation	  story	  states,	  Bara	  Elohim	  la’sot,	  which	  
literally	  translated	  means,	  “God	  created	  to	  do”	  or	  “God	  had	  done	  creating.”24	  	  
Importantly,	  it	  is	  not	  simply	  written	  that	  God	  created,	  but	  rather	  the	  text	  emphasizes	  
the	  action	  of	  creating.	  	  Generally,	  Hebrew	  is	  a	  very	  systematic	  language	  in	  which	  words	  
are	  derived	  from	  three-­‐letter	  roots.	  	  However,	  the	  Hebrew	  word	  for	  “truth,”	  emet,	  is	  not	  
derived	  from	  a	  traditional	  three-­‐letter	  root,	  but	  is	  instead	  believed	  to	  have	  been	  created	  
through	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  final	  radicals	  of	  the	  last	  three	  words	  of	  Genesis	  2:3:	  	  
Bara	  Elohim	  la’sot.25	  	  This	  concept	  of	  truth	  as	  something	  located	  in	  action	  is	  transferred	  
to	  man	  in	  Genesis	  1:27:	  	  “And	  God	  created	  man	  in	  the	  image	  of	  himself,	  in	  the	  image	  of	  
God	  He	  created	  him,	  male	  and	  female	  He	  created	  them.”	  	  Thus,	  within	  the	  Hebraic	  
tradition,	  truth	  is	  found	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  God	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  man,	  as	  man	  is	  
made	  in	  the	  image	  of	  God:	  	  God	  did	  creation,	  man	  does	  the	  actions	  commanded	  by	  God	  
(mitzvoth).	  	  The	  space	  created	  upon	  the	  contraction	  of	  God’s	  light	  is	  a	  space	  for	  God’s	  
creative	  activity	  as	  well	  as	  the	  activity	  of	  those	  creations.	  	  Also,	  the	  Reshima	  of	  God’s	  
light	  exists	  within	  all	  created	  things,	  most	  important	  here,	  in	  the	  human	  being.	  	  Thus,	  
because	  God	  is	  an	  active	  Being	  and	  through	  actions	  God	  is	  known,	  so	  the	  impression	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Genesis	  2:3,	  JPS,	  translation	  mine.	  
25	  In	  Hebrew:	  “.תושעל	  םיהלא	  ארב”	  	  Thus,	  the	  word	  for	  truth,	  formed	  by	  the	  last	  letters	  of	  each	  word	  is	  “תמא,”	  
(emet).	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God	  in	  human	  beings	  moves	  man	  to	  action,	  through	  which	  one’s	  own	  humanness	  is	  
known.	  	  	  
	   We	  know	  that	  Arendt	  was	  exposed	  to	  Jewish	  stories	  of	  creation	  (Scholem	  and	  
Benjamin)	  and	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Jewish	  identity	  (Herder).	  	  Also,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Arendt	  
understood	  Jewish	  identity	  was	  greatly	  influenced	  by	  her	  childhood	  rabbi,	  Hermann	  
Vogelstein,	  who	  supported	  the	  new	  modern	  view	  that	  Jewish	  identity	  is	  something	  one	  
is	  born	  into	  and	  not	  based	  on	  any	  personal	  or	  religious	  beliefs.	  	  Indeed,	  when	  Arendt	  
declared	  that	  she	  no	  longer	  believed	  in	  God	  his	  response	  was,	  “Who	  asked	  you?”26	  	  The	  
Jewish	  connection	  between	  space	  and	  identity	  is	  intricate	  and	  is	  highly	  relevant	  to	  any	  
study	  of	  Arendt	  because	  of	  her	  account	  of	  the	  space	  of	  appearance.	  	  In	  essence,	  space	  
and	  identity	  are	  interdependent	  on	  one	  another	  and	  foster	  the	  human	  experience	  of	  
being:	  	  “The	  presence	  of	  others	  who	  see	  what	  we	  see	  and	  hear	  what	  we	  hear	  assures	  us	  
of	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  world	  and	  ourselves.”27	  	  These	  ideas	  are,	  perhaps,	  more	  clearly	  
explained	  by	  returning	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  Arendt	  and	  Gershom	  Scholem.	  	  As	  
noted	  earlier,	  Arendt’s	  close	  relationship	  with	  Gershom	  Scholem	  and	  acquaintance	  with	  
his	  Major	  Trends	  in	  Jewish	  Mysticism	  had	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  her	  thinking.	  	  	  
Returning	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  Tsimtsum,	  the	  first	  act	  of	  God,	  according	  to	  Lurianic	  
Kabbalah,	  the	  most	  significant	  sect	  of	  Jewish	  mysticism,	  was	  an	  act	  of	  limitation,	  and	  all	  
subsequent	  acts	  were	  acts	  of	  revelation.	  	  In	  order	  to	  reveal	  himself,	  God	  first	  had	  to	  
conceal	  himself.	  	  Arendt’s	  notion	  of	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  has	  comparable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Young-­‐Bruehl,	  For	  Love	  of	  the	  World,	  10.	  
27	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  50.	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components	  to	  the	  Kabbalistic	  idea	  of	  creation.	  	  Specifically,	  for	  Arendt,	  the	  first	  act	  for	  
all	  human	  beings	  is	  birth,	  an	  act	  that	  gives	  precise	  definitive	  boundaries	  to	  the	  biological	  
and	  physiological	  being.	  	  The	  human	  being,	  upon	  birth,	  is	  not	  revealed	  as	  a	  particular	  
identity	  or	  a	  unique	  life;	  rather,	  that	  can	  only	  come	  from	  the	  second	  act,	  the	  voluntary	  
activity	  of	  action,	  whereby	  the	  individual	  reveals	  himself.	  	  So,	  just	  as	  for	  Luria,	  there	  is	  a	  
primary	  act,	  birth/the	  creation	  of	  the	  world;	  and	  there	  are	  acts	  that	  follow,	  human	  
actions/divine	  revelation.	  	  The	  first	  element	  of	  the	  Tsimtsum	  makes	  the	  second	  element	  
possible.	  	  Without	  the	  first	  act,	  creation,	  the	  second	  act,	  revelation,	  would	  not	  be	  
possible.	  	  Further,	  with	  the	  first,	  the	  second	  is	  beckoned,	  prompted,	  prodded.	  	  That	  is,	  
the	  fact	  of	  existence	  naturally	  behooves	  a	  sense	  of	  self-­‐revelation,	  wherein	  an	  individual	  
can	  answer,	  “Who	  am	  I?”	  	  	  
Arendt	  notes	  that	  “our	  feeling	  for	  reality	  depends	  utterly	  upon	  appearance	  and	  
therefore	  upon	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  public	  realm	  into	  which	  things	  can	  appear	  out	  of	  the	  
darkness	  of	  sheltered	  existence.”	  	  The	  Lurianic	  notion	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  space	  and	  the	  
activities	  that	  occur	  in	  that	  space	  can	  be	  seen	  here.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  the	  public	  realm	  is	  
created	  by	  the	  fact	  of	  birth—a	  plurality	  of	  human	  beings	  exist	  in	  the	  world.	  	  The	  simple	  
fact	  that	  men,	  not	  man,	  live	  in	  the	  world,	  makes	  the	  space	  “public.”	  	  And	  it	  is	  in	  this	  
public	  space	  that	  man	  can	  act,	  thereby	  revealing	  the	  self	  that	  is	  otherwise	  hidden,	  
concealed	  within	  the	  darkness	  of	  the	  private	  realm.	  	  Emphasizing	  the	  idea	  that	  action	  is	  
dependent	  upon	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind,	  which	  are	  dependent	  upon	  the	  experiences	  
had	  within	  the	  public	  realm,	  Arendt	  continues,	  “even	  the	  twilight	  which	  illuminates	  our	  
private	  and	  intimate	  lives	  is	  ultimately	  derived	  from	  the	  much	  harsher	  light	  of	  the	  public	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realm.”28	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  the	  first	  Tsimtsum	  (birth)	  creates	  the	  conditions	  necessary	  for	  
revelation	  (natality	  and	  plurality)	  and	  it	  is	  in	  the	  subsequent	  Tsimtsum	  (action)	  that	  the	  
public	  space	  is	  transformed	  into	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  wherein	  individual	  human	  
beings	  are	  revealed.	  	  In	  Lurianic	  Kabbalah,	  this	  illuminating	  twilight	  of	  the	  private	  realm	  
is	  called	  the	  Reshima,	  “a	  vestige	  or	  residue	  of	  the	  divine	  light.”29	  	  The	  Reshima	  is	  the	  
trace	  of	  God	  that	  is	  in	  the	  space	  created	  out	  of	  the	  Tsimtsum.	  	  In	  Arendt’s	  theory,	  the	  
activities	  of	  the	  mind	  are	  dependent	  upon	  recollection	  of	  experiences	  in	  order	  to	  make	  
proper	  judgments	  about	  how	  to	  act	  in	  the	  world.	  	  That	  memory,	  then,	  holds	  the	  trace	  of	  
what	  is	  revealed	  in	  the	  public	  realm.	  	  	  
In	  Jewish	  mysticism,	  the	  Reshima	  is	  present	  after	  “the	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  
substance	  of	  the	  En-­‐Sof.”30	  	  The	  En-­‐Sof	  is,	  literally,	  the	  “Unending.”	  	  It	  is	  the	  
characteristic	  of	  God	  that	  acknowledges	  that	  there	  is	  no	  beginning	  and	  no	  end.	  	  The	  
divinity	  of	  God	  is	  the	  unending	  capacity	  to	  create,	  to	  act,	  to	  move	  in	  the	  world.	  	  In	  the	  
first	  Tsimtsum,	  the	  En-­‐Sof	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  contraction	  of	  the	  light	  of	  the	  divinity.	  	  By	  
putting	  limitations	  on	  himself,	  God	  removes	  the	  fullness	  of	  the	  capacity	  to	  act.	  	  However,	  
the	  residue	  of	  that	  capacity	  remains.	  	  Secularizing	  this	  concept	  of	  the	  En-­‐Sof	  in	  the	  
theory	  of	  Arendt	  supports	  her	  concept	  of	  natality	  and	  creation.	  	  That	  human	  beings	  can	  
create	  something	  new	  is	  the	  miracle	  of	  human	  action;	  however,	  because	  we	  cannot	  
exist	  in	  the	  public	  space	  of	  appearance	  at	  all	  times	  and	  cannot	  be	  constantly	  engaged	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Ibid.,	  51.	  
29	  Scholem,	  Major	  Trends,	  264.	  
30	  Ibid.	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the	  activity	  of	  action,	  the	  Reshima	  (memory)	  gives	  us	  the	  courage	  we	  need	  to	  emerge	  
once	  again	  into	  the	  public	  space.	  	  Further,	  the	  Reshima	  is	  the	  vestige	  of	  what	  one	  
experiences	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  revelation	  that	  is	  brought	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  hidden.	  	  The	  
memory	  holds	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  reality	  and	  continues	  to	  engender	  the	  life	  of	  the	  
mind.	  	  The	  Reshima,	  the	  trace	  of	  reality,	  is	  what	  spurs	  us	  on	  in	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind;	  
it	  is	  what	  makes	  thinking,	  willing,	  and	  judging	  persist.	  
In	  what	  Arendt	  calls	  “dark	  times”	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  is	  missing	  from	  the	  
public	  realm.	  	  The	  light	  that	  shines	  from	  revelation	  is	  absent,	  covered	  by	  the	  
“camouflage,	  emanating	  from	  and	  spread	  by	  ‘the	  establishment.’”	  	  But,	  even	  in	  the	  
darkest	  of	  times,	  the	  conditions	  of	  being	  human	  remain.	  	  Thus,	  even	  in	  the	  dim	  light	  of	  
twentieth	  century	  Europe	  or	  Russia,	  there	  is	  the	  hope	  for	  revelation.	  	  Arendt	  even	  
claims	  that	  “we	  have	  the	  right	  to	  expect	  some	  illumination”	  in	  the	  dark	  times	  and	  “that	  
such	  illumination	  may	  well	  come	  less	  from	  theories	  and	  concepts	  than	  from	  the	  
uncertain,	  flickering,	  and	  often	  weak	  light	  that	  some	  men	  and	  women”	  will	  have	  the	  
courage	  to	  shine.31	  	  It	  is	  these	  men	  and	  women	  that	  she	  discusses	  in	  Men	  in	  Dark	  Times,	  
those	  who	  recognized	  that	  “A	  free	  man	  distinguishes	  himself	  from	  the	  slave	  through	  
courage.”32	  	  These	  people	  and	  the	  narratives	  Arendt	  writes	  about	  their	  lives	  behoove	  us	  
to	  act,	  to	  join	  the	  public	  realm,	  to	  challenge	  our	  own	  identities.	  	  It	  is	  these	  people	  and	  
the	  stories	  of	  them	  that	  provide	  the	  trace	  of	  light,	  the	  Reshima,	  which	  stokes	  the	  
memory	  and	  motivates	  the	  experience	  of	  reality.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Arendt,	  Dark	  Times,	  viii,	  ix.	  
32	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  36	  f.	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As	  Arendt	  progresses	  through	  her	  analysis	  of	  the	  public	  realm	  and	  the	  activities	  
found	  in	  it,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  speaking	  only	  of	  a	  public	  realm	  is	  not	  sufficient.	  	  
Because	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  public	  realm	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  activities	  that	  occur	  
within	  it,	  the	  public	  realm	  of	  mass	  society	  is	  far	  different	  from	  the	  public	  realm	  of	  the	  
polis.	  	  At	  a	  certain	  point,	  then,	  Arendt	  begins	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  public	  realm	  that	  is	  
characterized	  by	  the	  activity	  of	  action	  as	  the	  “common	  world.”	  	  Action,	  words	  and	  deeds	  
create	  the	  common	  world,	  the	  space	  that	  is	  shared	  by	  multiple	  individuals.	  	  The	  
common	  world	  “is	  what	  we	  have	  in	  common	  not	  only	  with	  those	  who	  live	  with	  us,	  but	  
also	  with	  those	  who	  were	  here	  before	  and	  with	  those	  who	  will	  come	  after	  us.”	  	  The	  
common	  world	  is	  transcendent,	  that	  is,	  it	  transcends	  the	  mortality	  of	  the	  private	  realm	  
that	  necessarily	  dies	  with	  the	  individual.	  	  The	  common	  world,	  the	  political	  world,	  
transcends	  human	  mortality	  and	  is	  maintained	  by	  the	  ever-­‐growing	  web	  of	  actions.	  	  
Thus,	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  is	  the	  complicated	  web	  of	  actions,	  past	  present	  and	  
future.	  	  “But	  such	  a	  world	  can	  survive	  the	  coming	  and	  going	  of	  the	  generations	  only	  to	  
the	  extent	  that	  it	  appears	  in	  public.”	  	  Without	  action,	  past	  deeds	  and	  words	  are	  lost,	  but	  
can	  be	  revived	  by	  emerging	  back	  into	  that	  space.	  	  “It	  is	  the	  publicity	  of	  the	  public	  realm	  
which	  can	  absorb	  and	  make	  shine	  through	  the	  centuries	  whatever	  men	  may	  want	  to	  
save	  from	  the	  natural	  ruin	  of	  time.”33	  	  	  
The	  common	  world	  of	  the	  polis	  is	  “where	  things	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  many	  in	  a	  variety	  
of	  aspects	  without	  changing	  their	  identity”	  and	  only	  in	  this	  space	  “can	  worldly	  reality	  
truly	  and	  reliably	  appear.”	  	  The	  end	  of	  the	  common	  world,	  and	  politics,	  then,	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Ibid.,	  55.	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dependent	  upon	  suppression	  of	  individual	  identity,	  suppression	  of	  action,	  suppression	  
of	  appearance.	  	  The	  complete	  transformation	  of	  the	  political	  common	  world	  into	  mass	  
society	  is	  indicated	  by	  the	  conformity	  found	  in	  mass	  society,	  where	  the	  world	  “is	  seen	  
only	  under	  one	  aspect	  and	  is	  permitted	  to	  present	  itself	  in	  only	  one	  perspective.”34	  	  In	  
mass	  society,	  individuals	  are	  not	  permitted	  to	  reveal	  themselves	  in	  their	  uniqueness.	  	  
The	  plurality	  of	  the	  public	  realm	  and	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  which	  constitutes	  reality	  
must	  be	  concealed.	  	  Any	  emergence	  would	  challenge	  the	  absolute	  notions	  inherent	  in	  
the	  prevailing	  ideology	  of	  the	  society.	  	  Hence,	  tyrants	  such	  as	  Pharaoh,	  Hitler,	  and	  Stalin	  
all	  depended	  not	  on	  politics	  but	  on	  the	  lack	  thereof	  to	  maintain	  the	  manifestation	  of	  
their	  very	  private	  musings.	  	  They	  did	  not	  create	  politics,	  but	  forced	  human	  beings	  into	  
inaction	  so	  as	  to	  build	  the	  artifice	  of	  the	  world	  that	  they	  envisioned	  in	  their	  minds.	  	  This	  
vision,	  this	  world	  that	  they	  created,	  was	  inherently	  threatened	  by	  any	  action,	  in	  the	  
Arendtian	  sense.	  	  	  
While	  the	  atrocities	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  were	  very	  real,	  they	  did	  not	  create	  
the	  sense	  of	  reality	  that	  is	  concomitant	  with	  political	  action	  and	  the	  space	  of	  
appearance.	  	  The	  annihilation	  of	  millions	  was	  “real	  enough	  as	  it	  took	  place	  in	  public;	  
there	  was	  nothing	  secret	  or	  mysterious	  about	  it.”	  	  However,	  when	  considering	  the	  dark	  
times,	  Arendt	  is	  careful	  to	  note	  that,	  while	  these	  things	  occurred	  in	  public,	  “it	  was	  by	  no	  
means	  visible	  to	  all,	  nor	  was	  it	  at	  all	  easy	  to	  perceive	  it.”	  	  The	  space	  of	  appearance	  is	  a	  
space	  of	  perception	  and	  of	  being	  perceived.	  	  Perception	  in	  mass	  societies	  is	  difficult,	  if	  at	  
all	  possible,	  because	  the	  atrocities	  are	  “covered	  up	  not	  by	  realities	  but	  by	  the	  highly	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  Ibid.,	  57.	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efficient	  talk	  and	  double-­‐talk	  of	  nearly	  all	  official	  representatives.”35	  	  This	  is	  the	  problem	  
with	  any	  tyranny,	  any	  framework	  that	  does	  not	  permit	  variety.	  	  This	  is	  the	  problem	  with	  
Nazi	  Germany,	  Stalin’s	  USSR,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  bureaucratic	  giant	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
“The	  reality	  of	  the	  public	  realm	  relies	  on	  the	  simultaneous	  presence	  of	  innumerable	  
perspectives	  and	  aspects	  in	  which	  the	  common	  world	  presents	  itself	  and	  for	  which	  no	  
common	  measurement	  or	  denominator	  can	  ever	  be	  devised.”36	  	  Thus,	  the	  tyrant	  and	  
the	  tyrannized	  are	  deprived	  of	  reality.	  	  	  
It	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  say	  that	  Hitler	  or	  Stalin	  are	  delusional,	  holding	  to	  an	  opinion	  
of	  things	  as	  the	  absolute	  truth.	  	  Rather,	  they	  created	  a	  world	  built	  by	  that	  delusion	  and	  
forced,	  in	  totality,	  all	  human	  beings	  into	  the	  confines	  of	  that	  delusion.	  	  The	  “progress”	  of	  
National	  Socialism	  and	  the	  Leninist	  state	  required	  massive	  bureaucratic	  machines	  to	  
administer	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  state.	  	  The	  greatness	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  
administration	  was	  its	  ability	  to	  execute	  the	  orders	  of	  the	  state;	  the	  detriment	  of	  such	  
capacity	  is	  that	  “there	  is	  nobody	  left	  with	  whom	  one	  could	  argue,	  to	  whom	  one	  could	  
present	  grievances,	  on	  whom	  the	  pressures	  of	  power	  could	  be	  exerted.”	  	  The	  totality	  of	  
control	  exhibited	  by	  Germany	  and	  the	  Russia,	  despite	  the	  public	  nature	  of	  things,	  was	  
not	  political	  because	  it	  did	  not	  allow	  the	  freedom	  of	  movement	  necessary	  for	  the	  space	  
of	  appearance	  to	  exist.	  	  They	  created	  an	  apolitical	  form	  of	  government	  “in	  which	  
everybody	  is	  deprived	  of	  political	  freedom,	  of	  the	  power	  to	  act.”37	  	  The	  leaders,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Arendt,	  Dark	  Times,	  viii.	  
36	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  57.	  
37	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  “On	  Violence,”	  in	  Crises	  of	  the	  Republic	  (New	  York:	  Harcourt	  Brace	  Jovanovich,	  1972),	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themselves,	  partook	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  action,	  creating	  something	  altogether	  new;	  but	  
the	  tools	  of	  their	  production	  were	  decidedly	  non-­‐political.	  
In	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  “the	  public	  realm	  has	  lost	  the	  power	  of	  illumination	  
which	  was	  originally	  part	  of	  its	  very	  nature.”	  	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  long	  process	  of	  
transformation	  whereby	  the	  activities	  that	  were	  once	  relegated	  to	  the	  private	  sphere	  
gradually	  entered	  and	  came	  to	  dominate	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  However,	  the	  right	  to	  
expect	  illumination	  persists.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  the	  narrative	  is	  the	  most	  powerful	  tool	  not	  only	  
for	  sparking	  the	  light	  of	  remembrance	  in	  the	  life	  of	  the	  mind,	  but	  also	  for	  igniting	  the	  
action	  that	  can	  bring	  the	  public	  realm	  back	  to	  life.	  	  Hence,	  “No	  philosophy,	  no	  analysis,	  
no	  aphorism,	  be	  it	  ever	  so	  profound,	  can	  compare	  in	  intensity	  and	  richness	  of	  meaning	  
with	  a	  properly	  narrated	  story.”	  	  The	  ability	  to	  convey	  past	  words	  and	  deeds	  in	  a	  manner	  
conducive	  to	  narration	  requires	  what	  Arendt	  calls	  the	  “mastery	  of	  the	  past.”	  	  This	  is	  the	  
ability	  to	  relate	  what	  has	  happened	  and	  is,	  in	  general,	  what	  the	  storyteller/historian	  
does.	  	  The	  mastering	  of	  the	  past	  in	  itself	  does	  not	  provide	  anything	  for	  the	  listeners	  or	  
readers	  other	  than	  a	  recollection	  of	  past	  events.	  	  But,	  if	  the	  story	  has	  a	  meaning	  and	  
that	  meaning	  is	  living,	  if	  it	  is	  an	  authentic	  narrative,	  then	  it	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  foster	  far	  
more	  than	  mere	  recollection.	  	  “As	  long	  as	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  events	  remains	  alive—and	  
this	  meaning	  can	  persist	  for	  very	  long	  periods	  of	  time—‘mastering	  of	  the	  past’	  can	  take	  
the	  form	  of	  ever-­‐recurrent	  narration.”38	  	  	  
The	  power	  Arendt	  ascribes	  to	  the	  authentic	  narrative	  is	  also	  seen	  in	  the	  Jewish	  
mystical	  tradition.	  	  According	  to	  Scholem,	  the	  Jewish	  mystics	  viewed	  the	  Torah	  as	  “a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	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  4,	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living	  organism	  animated	  by	  a	  secret	  life	  which	  streams	  and	  pulsates	  below	  the	  crust	  of	  
its	  literal	  meaning.”	  	  The	  stories	  of	  the	  Torah	  are	  understood	  to	  be	  “the	  living	  
incarnation	  of	  the	  divine	  wisdom	  which	  eternally	  sends	  out	  new	  rays	  of	  light.”	  	  The	  
power	  of	  the	  stories	  found	  in	  the	  Torah	  is,	  for	  a	  Jewish	  mystic,	  “the	  secret	  of	  his	  life	  and	  
of	  his	  God.”39	  	  Jewish	  mysticism	  “had	  always	  prepared	  its	  followers	  for	  action”	  and	  
Lurianic	  Kabbalah	  “raised	  every	  Jew	  to	  the	  rank	  of	  protagonist.”40	  	  This	  is,	  likely,	  one	  of	  
the	  reasons	  Arendt	  was	  attracted	  to	  this	  particular	  tradition;	  the	  power	  of	  any	  narrated	  
story	  lies	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  be	  relevant	  in	  any	  time	  and	  place,	  so	  there	  are	  “those	  aspects	  
which	  are	  discovered	  by	  later	  generations”	  and	  which	  are	  often	  “of	  greater	  importance	  
than	  their	  original	  meaning.”41	  	  For	  Arendt,	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  narrative,	  in	  general,	  
lies	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  provoke	  action,	  the	  consequent	  space	  of	  appearance	  and	  the	  
freedom	  that	  corresponds	  with	  the	  political	  realm.	  
The	  Jewish	  mystic	  is,	  ultimately,	  concerned	  with	  an	  experience	  of	  reality.	  	  The	  
purpose	  of	  the	  Torah	  was	  to	  help	  the	  individual	  to	  ascend	  to	  the	  highest	  experience	  of	  
reality,	  which	  is	  God.	  	  Arendt,	  too,	  is	  concerned	  with	  an	  experience	  of	  reality,	  and	  the	  
highest	  reality	  human	  beings	  can	  experience	  is	  one	  of	  self-­‐revelation	  that	  occurs	  only	  in	  
the	  space	  of	  appearance.	  	  The	  space	  of	  appearance,	  or	  the	  common	  world,	  is	  common	  
to	  all	  people	  at	  all	  times,	  thus	  its	  immortality	  is	  established.	  	  Scholem	  points	  out	  that	  a	  
story	  “cannot,	  according	  to	  the	  mystic,	  have	  come	  to	  pass	  once	  only	  and	  in	  one	  place.”	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With	  this	  understanding,	  stories	  “cease	  to	  be	  an	  object	  of	  learning	  and	  acquire	  the	  
dignity	  of	  immediate	  religious	  experience.”42	  	  Likewise,	  Arendt	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  
fact-­‐gaining	  that	  historical	  accounts	  provide,	  but	  rather	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  reality	  
that	  an	  authentic	  narrative	  can	  engender.	  	  	  
The	  experience	  of	  reality	  can	  only	  occur	  in	  the	  public	  space	  that	  is	  characterized	  
by	  action.	  	  The	  Passover	  story,	  then,	  is	  the	  fundamental	  narrative	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  
because	  it	  is,	  quite	  literally,	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  Israelites	  from	  the	  household	  into	  the	  
public	  space.	  	  In	  this	  story,	  individuals	  act	  and	  by	  that	  action	  they	  emerge	  into	  public	  
space.	  	  The	  location	  of	  the	  act,	  on	  the	  very	  doorway	  of	  their	  homes,	  is	  a	  powerful	  
symbol	  of	  revelation.	  	  By	  placing	  blood	  on	  their	  lintels,	  the	  individuals	  remove	  the	  cloak	  
that	  shrouds	  them	  in	  slavery.	  	  The	  moment	  of	  the	  Passover	  is	  an	  emergence	  out	  of	  the	  
private	  realm	  of	  social	  affairs,	  where	  one	  is	  relegated	  to	  particular	  tasks	  that	  contribute	  
to	  the	  overall	  well-­‐being	  and	  health	  of	  the	  community,	  but	  who	  has	  no	  individual	  
identity	  that	  is	  distinct.	  	  It	  is	  only	  upon	  that	  action	  that	  the	  Israelites	  are	  free,	  not	  merely	  
from	  slavery	  and	  the	  grips	  of	  Pharaoh,	  but	  from	  the	  private	  realm	  altogether.	  	  It	  is	  only	  
with	  that	  action	  that	  they	  emerge	  in	  the	  space	  of	  appearance.	  	  	  
As	  can	  be	  seen,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  is	  critically	  important	  for	  
Arendt’s	  understanding	  of	  politics.	  	  Thus,	  when	  Arendt	  claims	  that	  the	  Jewish	  reform	  
movement	  “ruthlessly	  and	  nonchalantly	  removed	  all	  national,	  all	  political	  meaning”	  
from	  the	  Passover	  tradition	  and	  “robbed	  it	  of	  its	  living	  meaning,”	  she	  is	  essentially	  
pointing	  out	  that	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  reform	  was	  the	  diminishing	  of	  the	  public	  space	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of	  appearance.43	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  problematic	  if	  one	  understands	  the	  Passover	  
narrative	  to	  be	  the	  foundational	  narrative	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people.	  	  What	  the	  reform	  
movement	  did,	  then,	  in	  removing	  the	  living	  meaning,	  was	  to	  make	  the	  Jewish	  people	  
impotent.	  	  Without	  the	  illumination	  that	  comes	  by	  way	  of	  authentic	  narrative,	  without	  
the	  stirring	  of	  the	  potential	  greatness	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human,	  the	  narrative	  loses	  
its	  evocative	  value.	  	  	  
The	  “immediate	  religious	  experience”	  that	  the	  Jewish	  mystic	  receives	  from	  the	  
sacred	  stories,	  the	  experience	  of	  self-­‐revelation	  that	  the	  human	  being	  experiences	  
through	  the	  motivation	  of	  the	  authentic	  narrative—these	  are	  not	  guaranteed	  
experiences.	  	  Arendt	  acknowledges	  that	  because	  “it	  is	  always	  the	  ‘dead	  letter’	  in	  which	  
the	  ‘living	  spirit’	  must	  survive”	  there	  is	  an	  inherent	  difficulty	  in	  the	  role	  of	  narrative.	  	  
This	  difficulty	  is	  one	  of	  impotence;	  that	  the	  story	  remains	  dead	  and	  mute	  is	  a	  possibility.	  	  
However,	  this	  is	  “a	  deadness	  from	  which	  it	  can	  be	  rescued	  only	  when	  the	  dead	  letter	  
comes	  again	  into	  contact	  with	  a	  life	  willing	  to	  resurrect	  it.”44	  	  The	  deeds	  and	  words	  of	  
those	  who,	  in	  the	  past,	  created	  the	  web	  of	  action	  that	  constitutes	  the	  common	  world	  
are	  rescued	  and	  revived	  when	  the	  narrative	  comes	  to	  have	  relevant	  meaning	  in	  the	  
present.	  	  When	  the	  story	  inspires	  the	  courage	  needed	  for	  individuals	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  
space	  of	  appearance,	  the	  common	  world,	  then	  they	  are	  able	  to	  contribute	  to	  that	  web	  
of	  action.	  	  The	  narrative	  is	  “dead”	  when	  it	  is	  whittled	  to	  a	  mere	  history,	  a	  recounting.	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  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  149,	  emphasis	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  Ibid.,	  169.	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The	  living	  spirit	  of	  the	  narrative	  is	  the	  action	  of	  those	  who	  are	  inspired	  to	  the	  highest	  
humanness	  because	  of	  it.	  
	   The	  narrative	  is	  not	  the	  only	  means	  of	  transforming	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  
into	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  common	  world;	  but,	  according	  to	  Arendt,	  it	  is	  the	  most	  
accessible.	  	  The	  narrative	  helps	  individuals	  to	  recognize	  their	  potent	  capacity	  for	  
revelation	  and	  immortal	  existence	  in	  the	  common	  world.	  	  The	  narrative	  illustrates	  a	  
perspective	  that	  illuminates	  what	  “the	  world	  is	  always	  meant	  to	  be,	  a	  home	  for	  men	  
during	  their	  life	  on	  earth.”	  	  The	  only	  way	  that	  the	  world	  can	  be	  a	  home	  for	  men	  is	  in	  the	  
space	  of	  appearance;	  otherwise,	  there	  is	  no	  identification	  with	  the	  world,	  no	  connection	  
to	  it.	  	  The	  “human	  artifice	  must	  be	  a	  place	  fit	  for	  action	  and	  speech”	  because	  it	  is	  only	  in	  
that	  space	  that	  individuals	  can	  find	  their	  place.45	  	  Human	  beings	  are	  at	  home	  when	  they	  
are	  fully	  revealing	  their	  unique	  identities,	  and	  that	  occurs	  only	  in	  the	  space	  of	  
appearance.	  
	   The	  significance	  of	  the	  Passover	  story	  is	  further	  indicated	  by	  two	  important	  
elements.	  	  First,	  it	  was	  individuals	  who	  acted.	  	  Second,	  it	  was	  the	  actions	  of	  individuals	  
that	  set	  a	  precedent,	  an	  example,	  for	  future	  generations.	  	  The	  retelling	  of	  the	  Passover	  
story,	  like	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  polis,	  guarantees	  that	  “without	  assistance	  from	  others,	  
those	  who	  acted	  will	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  together	  the	  everlasting	  remembrance	  of	  their	  
good	  and	  bad	  deeds,	  to	  inspire	  admiration	  in	  the	  present	  and	  future	  ages.”	  	  Thus,	  if	  the	  
Passover	  narrative	  has	  lost	  its	  living	  meaning,	  then	  the	  story	  does	  not	  have	  practical	  
relevance	  for	  the	  present	  time.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  memory	  of	  the	  actions	  accounted	  for	  in	  the	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Passover	  story	  no	  longer	  inspires	  the	  admiration	  that	  spurs	  people	  to	  act,	  even	  in	  the	  
darkest	  of	  times.	  	  “The	  polis	  was	  supposed	  to	  multiply	  the	  occasions	  to	  win	  ‘immortal	  
fame.’”46	  	  The	  narrative	  continues	  this	  immortality	  by	  prompting	  the	  emergence	  into	  the	  
space	  of	  appearance	  that	  maintains	  the	  polis.	  	  The	  value	  of	  the	  narrative,	  then,	  is	  not	  a	  
dead	  remembrance,	  but	  a	  remembrance	  that	  is	  alive	  and	  that	  contributes	  to	  the	  
everlasting	  realm	  of	  appearance.	  
The	  power	  of	  the	  Passover	  story,	  like	  any	  narrative,	  is	  that	  it	  reminds	  the	  teller	  
and/or	  listener	  of	  the	  human	  capacity	  for	  action	  and	  the	  consequent	  creation	  of	  an	  
entirely	  new	  public	  space.	  	  Because	  the	  ability	  to	  speak	  and	  act	  is	  always	  potent,	  the	  
space	  of	  appearance	  “never	  altogether	  loses	  its	  potential	  character.”47	  	  That	  is,	  because	  
the	  space	  of	  appearance	  is	  created	  by	  speech	  and	  action,	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  
individual	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  public	  space	  characterized	  by	  action	  always	  exists.	  	  It	  is	  that	  
possibility	  that	  makes	  the	  public	  space	  dynamic	  and	  ever-­‐changing.	  	  Because	  it	  is	  
created	  by	  action,	  which	  is	  limitless	  and	  unpredictable,	  the	  polis	  can	  never	  be	  absolutely	  
defined.	  	  It	  is	  never	  absolute,	  but	  always	  potentially	  appearing.	  
The	  emergence	  of	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  “predates	  and	  precedes	  all	  formal	  
constitution	  of	  the	  public	  realm	  and	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  government,	  that	  is,	  the	  
various	  forms	  in	  which	  the	  public	  realm	  can	  be	  organized.”48	  	  The	  type	  of	  activities	  that	  
take	  place	  in	  the	  public	  realm	  determine	  what	  type	  of	  organization	  is	  needed	  to	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  Ibid.,	  200.	  
48	  Ibid.,	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maintain	  that	  particular	  space.	  	  So,	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  household	  is	  hierarchical	  with	  
rulers,	  workers,	  and	  slaves.	  	  The	  organization	  of	  mass	  society,	  because	  it	  is	  like	  the	  
household	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  types	  of	  activities	  that	  take	  place,	  also	  has	  a	  hierarchical	  
organization.	  	  The	  polis	  is	  altogether	  different	  because	  the	  purpose	  of	  organization	  in	  
the	  space	  of	  appearance	  is	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  freedom	  and	  equality	  that	  permit	  the	  
action	  that	  maintain	  the	  public	  space.	  	  	  
	  Once	  in	  the	  public	  space	  of	  appearance	  we	  are	  confronted	  with	  the	  “burden	  of	  
jurisdiction,	  defense	  and	  administration.”	  	  This	  is	  illustrated	  not	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  
Passover,	  but	  in	  what	  follows.	  	  In	  the	  Passover	  story,	  the	  Israelites	  appeared	  to	  one	  
another	  through	  the	  action	  of	  sacrificing	  a	  lamb	  and	  marking	  their	  doorposts	  with	  blood;	  
once	  they	  appeared	  to	  one	  another	  the	  polis	  emerged.	  	  Their	  identity	  was	  revealed	  by	  
their	  activity.	  	  Upon	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  polis,	  while	  they	  were	  wandering	  in	  the	  
desert	  wilderness,	  they	  received	  a	  very	  basic	  code	  of	  conduct	  that	  was	  meant	  to	  govern	  
their	  affairs	  in	  public.	  	  The	  Israelites	  emerged	  in	  a	  public	  space	  that	  was	  maintained	  
through	  action	  and	  organized	  through	  law.	  	  Thus,	  “action	  not	  only	  has	  the	  most	  intimate	  
relationship	  to	  the	  public	  part	  of	  the	  world	  common	  to	  us	  all,	  but	  is	  the	  one	  activity	  
which	  constitutes	  it.”49	  	  	  
With	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  established	  via	  the	  manifestation	  of	  the	  activities	  
of	  the	  mind	  in	  action,	  we	  can	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  politics:	  	  freedom	  and	  justice.	  	  
The	  following	  chapter	  will	  look	  into	  these	  concepts,	  which	  often	  appear	  to	  be	  vague	  and	  
ambiguous	  in	  Arendt’s	  work.	  	  The	  hope	  is	  that	  by	  uncovering	  the	  Jewish	  aspects	  of	  her	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political	  theory	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  powerful	  role	  of	  narrative,	  a	  spark	  of	  illumination	  can	  
be	  brought	  to	  her	  work.	  	  If	  the	  meaning	  of	  politics	  is	  freedom,	  and	  justice	  is	  the	  product	  
of	  freedom,	  then	  it	  is	  important	  to	  know	  how	  that	  freedom	  is	  to	  be	  maintained.	  	  It	  is	  to	  










“Freedom	  of	  movement	  is	  also	  the	  indispensable	  condition	  for	  action,	  an	  
it	  is	  in	  action	  that	  men	  primarily	  experience	  freedom.”	  
~Hannah	  Arendt,	  Men	  In	  Dark	  Times	  
	  
In	  the	  Passover	  story,	  when	  the	  Lord	  delivered	  the	  commands	  to	  Moses,	  he	  said,	  
“This	  day	  shall	  be	  to	  you	  one	  of	  remembrance.”	  	  Thus	  far,	  this	  dissertation	  has	  
remembered	  the	  significance	  of	  that	  day.	  	  However,	  the	  final	  element	  that	  must	  be	  
considered	  is	  how	  the	  actions	  of	  that	  day	  changed	  all	  the	  days	  that	  would	  follow	  it.	  	  
Because	  the	  Israelites	  put	  blood	  on	  their	  lintels,	  they	  were	  passed	  over	  by	  the	  Lord	  and	  
“[t]he	  Egyptians	  urged	  the	  people	  on,	  impatient	  to	  have	  them	  leave	  the	  country.”	  	  With	  
that,	  the	  Israelites	  “had	  been	  driven	  out	  of	  Egypt.”1	  	  The	  Egyptians	  exiled	  the	  Israelites;	  
however,	  it	  is	  an	  important	  caveat	  to	  note	  that	  it	  was	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Israelites	  that	  
rendered	  their	  exile	  necessary.	  	  Taking	  Arendt’s	  ideas	  into	  account,	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  
exile	  was	  born	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Israelites	  created	  a	  political	  space	  that	  could	  not	  be	  
sustained	  in	  the	  public	  space	  already	  existing	  in	  Egypt.	  	  Arendt	  asserts	  that	  political	  
space	  is	  marked	  by	  equality	  and	  freedom;	  thus,	  the	  only	  way	  the	  Israelites	  could	  
maintain	  their	  new	  political	  reality	  and	  remain	  in	  Egypt	  would	  be	  if	  they	  were	  
understood	  to	  be	  equals	  within	  the	  existing	  Egyptian	  order.	  	  With	  the	  Egyptians	  
unwilling	  to	  recognize	  such	  equality,	  leaving	  Egypt	  was	  the	  only	  means	  by	  which	  the	  
Israelite’s	  could	  preserve	  their	  newly	  established	  political	  existence.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Exodus	  12:	  14,	  33,	  37,	  JPS,	  emphasis	  mine.	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   Using	  the	  Passover	  story	  as	  a	  metaphorical	  framework	  for	  understanding	  Arendt	  
affords	  an	  altogether	  different	  understanding	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  wandering	  in	  the	  
wilderness.	  	  By	  looking	  at	  Arendt’s	  theory	  alongside	  the	  Passover	  story,	  one	  comes	  to	  
recognize	  that	  exile,	  for	  Arendt,	  is	  necessary.	  	  Exile	  occurs	  when	  one	  emerges	  from	  the	  
home;	  that	  is,	  in	  order	  to	  create	  and	  maintain	  the	  political	  realm,	  one	  must	  necessarily	  
leave	  the	  home.	  	  In	  that	  departure,	  one	  leaves	  the	  comforts	  of	  predictability	  and	  order.	  	  
The	  exile	  is	  from	  subjective	  ideas	  to	  objective,	  experiential	  reality.	  	  The	  exile	  is	  from	  the	  
comfort	  of	  one’s	  mind	  and	  one’s	  home	  to	  the	  unpredictable	  expanse	  of	  the	  polis.	  	  The	  
exile	  is	  founded	  by	  courage	  and	  in	  it	  alone	  can	  one	  experience	  truly	  the	  essence	  of	  
freedom	  and	  justice.	  	  Arendt	  claims	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  politics	  is	  freedom	  and	  that	  
only	  in	  the	  space	  of	  political	  freedom	  is	  justice	  possible.	  	  This	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  explain	  
Arendt’s	  conceptions	  of	  freedom	  and	  justice,	  how	  these	  are	  the	  fundamental	  political	  
ideals,	  and	  how	  they	  can	  be	  preserved.	  	  It	  will	  consider	  politics	  as	  the	  denouement	  of	  
the	  narrative,	  one	  that	  is	  never	  absolutely	  concluded,	  but	  always	  writhing	  with	  
possibility.	  	  	  
	   The	  Israelites,	  according	  to	  the	  story,	  were	  freed	  from	  a	  spatial	  locality	  and	  
emerged	  in	  an	  entirely	  new	  space	  of	  appearance:	  	  the	  wilderness.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  this	  
means	  that	  through	  the	  human	  condition	  of	  natality,	  the	  individuals	  acted,	  and	  because	  
of	  that	  action,	  they	  experienced	  the	  freedom	  that	  is	  inherent	  in	  the	  space	  of	  appearance.	  	  
The	  Israelites,	  now	  free	  from	  the	  house	  of	  bondage,	  began	  a	  journey	  of	  wandering	  that	  
would	  last	  for	  forty	  years.	  	  Immediately	  upon	  exile	  the	  Israelites	  were	  given	  a	  law—the	  
law	  of	  the	  Passover	  offering—which	  maintained	  the	  public	  space	  that	  was	  created	  by	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the	  offering	  itself.2	  	  The	  law	  was	  created	  after	  and	  because	  of	  the	  action.	  	  The	  
articulation	  of	  this	  law	  indicates	  that	  the	  Israelites	  were	  a	  separate	  political	  entity.	  	  It	  
stipulates	  who	  and	  who	  is	  not	  a	  citizen	  of	  this	  newly	  formed	  polis.	  	  And,	  it	  determines	  
the	  means	  by	  which	  outsiders	  can	  be	  admitted	  to	  the	  community.	  	  The	  law	  of	  the	  
Passover	  offering,	  essentially,	  commemorates	  the	  actions	  that	  brought	  forth	  the	  space	  
of	  appearance	  and	  sets	  the	  criteria	  for	  maintaining	  the	  equality	  necessary	  for	  freedom	  
of	  movement	  in	  that	  space.	  
	   Moses’	  role	  in	  the	  Passover	  story	  is	  one	  of	  instigation:	  	  he	  calls	  to	  mind	  the	  
capacity	  for	  volition	  and	  the	  necessity	  for	  action.	  	  Whilst	  in	  the	  wilderness,	  Moses	  
continued	  to	  remind	  the	  Israelites	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  action	  for	  maintaining	  their	  
freedom.	  	  When	  his	  role	  became	  too	  demanding,	  his	  father-­‐in-­‐law	  said	  to	  him,	  “The	  
thing	  you	  are	  doing	  is	  not	  right;	  you	  will	  surely	  wear	  yourself	  out,	  and	  these	  people	  as	  
well.	  	  For	  the	  task	  is	  too	  heavy	  for	  you;	  you	  cannot	  do	  it	  alone.”	  	  Moses	  was	  acting	  as	  
chief	  magistrate	  and	  judge,	  maintaining	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  political	  community.	  	  
Because	  the	  task	  of	  maintaining	  the	  polis	  was	  too	  much	  for	  him,	  he	  established	  an	  
administration	  of	  leaders	  who	  “judged	  the	  people	  at	  all	  times.”3	  	  After	  the	  
administrative	  system	  was	  put	  in	  place,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  have	  a	  standard	  by	  which	  all	  
the	  leaders	  could	  make	  judgments.	  	  Hence,	  after	  the	  third	  new	  moon,	  or	  approximately	  
ninety	  days	  into	  their	  wandering,	  a	  law,	  including	  the	  Ten	  Commandments,	  was	  given.	  	  
The	  law	  provided	  the	  citizens	  of	  the	  Israelite	  community	  with	  standards	  by	  which	  they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Exodus	  12:	  43-­‐49	  contains	  the	  specific	  stipulations	  of	  the	  law	  of	  the	  Passover	  offering.	  
3	  Exodus	  18:	  17-­‐18,	  26,	  JPS.	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could	  judge	  the	  benefit	  of	  their	  own	  actions	  and	  a	  standard	  by	  which	  all	  actions	  could	  be	  
judged.	  	  In	  Exodus	  and	  Revolution,	  Michael	  Walzer	  considers	  the	  law	  to	  be	  “the	  
discipline	  of	  freedom.”	  	  He	  explains,	  the	  law	  obliged	  the	  Israelites	  to	  “live	  up	  to	  a	  
common	  standard	  and	  to	  take	  responsibility	  for	  their	  own	  actions.”	  	  The	  Hebraic	  notion	  
of	  freedom,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  the	  Passover	  narrative,	  is	  not	  merely	  liberation	  from	  
bondage.	  	  Rather,	  “[t]rue	  freedom,	  in	  the	  rabbinic	  view,	  lies	  in	  servitude	  to	  God.”4	  	  The	  
Israelites	  are	  freed	  from	  the	  bondage	  of	  slavery;	  however,	  they	  are	  now	  bound	  to	  act	  in	  
accordance	  with	  God’s	  commands.	  	  The	  paradox	  of	  law	  is	  that	  although	  it	  is	  binding,	  it	  
serves	  to	  maintain	  the	  freedom	  that	  brings	  about	  justice,	  that	  is,	  right	  action.	   	  
The	  Passover	  narrative	  is	  a	  story	  that	  tells	  of	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  political	  community.	  	  
This	  narrative	  holds,	  in	  a	  nutshell,	  all	  of	  what	  Arendt	  is	  trying	  to	  say	  because	  it	  answers	  
the	  most	  important	  question:	  	  the	  question	  of	  political	  freedom.	  	  In	  order	  to	  better	  
understand	  political	  freedom,	  it	  is	  first	  important	  to	  understand	  politics.	  	  When	  asked	  
about	  the	  meaning	  of	  politics,	  Arendt	  is	  clear	  and	  concise:	  	  “The	  meaning	  of	  politics	  is	  
freedom.”5	  	  Arendt	  is	  not	  speaking	  about	  the	  purpose	  of	  politics.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  polis	  is	  not	  
created	  so	  that	  human	  beings	  can	  experience	  freedom.	  	  Rather,	  the	  polis	  is	  the	  
experience	  of	  freedom.	  	  Freedom	  is	  not	  the	  end	  of	  politics;	  freedom	  is	  politics.	  	  In	  the	  
previous	  chapter,	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  was	  discussed,	  along	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  
freedom	  of	  action	  that	  creates	  this	  space.	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  what	  creates	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Walzer	  	  Exodus	  and	  Revolution,	  53.	  
5	  Arendt,	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  108.	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maintains	  the	  polis,	  then,	  it	  is	  right	  to	  look	  further	  into	  the	  notion	  of	  freedom,	  how	  it	  is	  
maintained,	  and	  how	  law	  can	  promote	  it.	  	  	  
	   Arendt	  speaks	  of	  freedom	  frequently	  in	  her	  writings	  that	  specifically	  address	  
Jewish	  concerns,	  such	  as	  those	  collected	  in	  The	  Jewish	  Writings,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  essays	  
found	  in	  The	  Promise	  of	  Politics.	  	  What	  is	  most	  interesting	  about	  this	  is	  that	  while	  so	  
many	  of	  her	  ideas	  shifted,	  evolved,	  and	  expanded	  throughout	  her	  life	  and	  career	  as	  a	  
political	  thinker,	  the	  place	  of	  freedom	  remained	  constant.	  	  From	  the	  start	  and	  through	  
the	  end,	  freedom	  is	  the	  essential	  human	  characteristic.6	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  imply	  that	  human	  
beings,	  by	  nature,	  experience	  freedom;	  but,	  rather,	  human	  beings	  can	  experience	  
freedom.	  	  Arendt	  avoids	  any	  notions	  of	  human	  nature	  and	  any	  theories	  that	  posit	  such	  
definitions.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  definitions	  are	  anathema	  to	  freedom.	  	  It	  is	  problematic,	  then,	  
that	  when	  the	  Western	  tradition	  seeks	  to	  answer	  what	  the	  meaning	  of	  politics	  is	  it	  
results	  in	  definitions	  that	  “are	  essentially	  justifications.”	  	  And,	  all	  of	  the	  justifications	  
“end	  up	  characterizing	  politics	  as	  a	  means	  to	  some	  higher	  end.”	  	  We	  are	  told	  that	  the	  
purpose	  of	  politics	  is	  “to	  safeguard	  life	  in	  the	  broadest	  sense.”7	  	  For	  Arendt,	  though,	  the	  
safeguarding	  of	  life	  is	  the	  task	  of	  labor	  and	  is	  not	  necessarily	  public	  and	  certainly	  not	  
political.	  	  Thus,	  any	  theory	  or	  philosophy	  that	  posits	  freedom	  or	  sustenance	  as	  the	  goal	  
of	  politics	  is	  fundamentally	  at	  odds	  with	  Arendt’s	  understanding	  of	  politics,	  human	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Examples:	  	  In	  “A	  Way	  Toward	  the	  Reconciliation	  of	  Peoples,”	  written	  in	  1942,	  she	  asserts	  that	  all	  politics	  
are	  based	  on	  the	  concepts	  of	  freedom	  and	  justice	  (JW	  p.259).	  	  In	  “Paper	  and	  Reality,”	  written	  in	  1942,	  she	  
criticizes	  some	  scholars	  who	  became	  “unpolitical”	  as	  they	  separated	  themselves	  from	  truth,	  which	  is	  
freedom	  and	  justice	  (JW	  p.153).	  	  In	  “From	  Army	  to	  Brigade,”	  written	  in	  1944,	  she	  equates	  “the	  real,”	  
freedom	  and	  justice,	  with	  the	  political	  (JW	  p.258).	  	  
7	  Arendt,	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  114,	  115.	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beings,	  and	  the	  world.	  	  The	  conception	  of	  the	  world,	  which	  is	  undeniably	  focused	  on	  and	  
rooted	  in	  freedom,	  separates	  Arendt	  from	  many	  in	  the	  Western,	  European	  tradition,	  
and	  draws	  her	  more	  near	  to	  the	  Jewish	  tradition	  where	  “every	  solution	  is	  subject	  to	  
further	  analysis.”8	  
	   Arendt	  posits	  “the	  most	  important	  of	  all	  questions”	  is	  “the	  question	  of	  political	  
freedom.”9	  	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  primacy	  of	  political	  freedom	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  only	  this	  
freedom	  signifies	  the	  fullness	  of	  human	  being.10	  	  That	  is,	  political	  freedom	  is	  the	  space	  
of	  appearance,	  the	  space	  where	  human	  beings	  reveal	  who	  they	  are.	  	  The	  question	  of	  
political	  freedom,	  then,	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  human	  beings	  have	  the	  necessary	  space	  
within	  which	  their	  unique	  identities	  can	  be	  revealed,	  and	  therefore,	  objectified	  in	  the	  
realm	  of	  experiential	  plurality.	  	  It	  is	  the	  freedom	  that	  comes	  by	  way	  of	  manifesting	  all	  of	  
our	  human	  capacities,	  including	  and	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  natality.	  	  By	  acting	  and	  
manifesting	  the	  power	  to	  create	  new	  beginnings,	  human	  beings	  move	  into	  a	  realm	  of	  
experiential	  reality	  that	  is	  freedom.	  	  Here,	  freedom	  is	  “identical	  with	  beginning.”11	  	  	  
This	  understanding	  of	  freedom	  is	  “strange	  to	  us	  because,	  according	  to	  our	  
tradition	  of	  conceptual	  thought	  and	  its	  categories,	  freedom	  is	  equated	  with	  freedom	  of	  
the	  will,	  and	  we	  understand	  freedom	  of	  the	  will	  to	  be	  a	  choice	  between	  givens	  or,	  to	  put	  
it	  crudely,	  between	  good	  and	  evil.”	  	  Given	  Arendt’s	  understanding	  of	  will,	  this	  notion	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Fishbane,	  “Reading	  Rabbinic	  Texts,”	  liv.	  
9	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  334.	  
10	  Arendt	  discusses	  various	  other	  types	  of	  freedom	  in	  The	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  including	  the	  freedom	  of	  
movement,	  freedom	  of	  opinion,	  and	  freedom	  of	  choice.	  	  
11	  Arendt,	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  113.	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freedom	  is	  not	  applicable	  in	  her	  theory.	  	  Arendt	  understands	  the	  will	  to	  be	  a	  mental	  
faculty	  responsible	  for	  the	  activity	  of	  willing,	  whereby	  judgments	  incurred	  by	  thinking	  
about	  the	  world	  are	  manifested.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  individual	  is	  responsible	  for	  willing	  
action.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  individual	  is	  responsible	  for	  beginning,	  which	  is,	  in	  essence,	  identical	  
with	  freedom.	  	  Thus,	  political	  freedom	  is	  not	  about	  choosing	  between	  good	  and	  evil;	  
perhaps	  that	  could	  be	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  activity	  of	  judging.	  	  And,	  insofar	  as	  the	  
activities	  of	  the	  mind	  are	  essential	  in	  the	  process	  of	  political	  action,	  it,	  too,	  could	  be	  a	  
part	  of	  political	  freedom.	  	  But,	  if	  freedom	  is	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  freedom	  of	  will,	  which	  is	  
purely	  private,	  then	  what	  is	  the	  place	  of	  freedom	  in	  the	  light	  of	  day?	  	  In	  understanding	  
freedom	  as	  beginning,	  Arendt	  is	  infusing	  the	  political	  realm	  with	  the	  characteristics	  
inherent	  in	  action	  itself:	  	  it	  is	  unpredictable	  and	  limitless.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  	  
[I]n	  this	  realm—and	  in	  no	  other—we	  do	  indeed	  have	  the	  
right	  to	  expect	  miracles.	  	  Not	  because	  we	  superstitiously	  
believe	  in	  miracles,	  but	  because	  human	  beings,	  whether	  or	  
not	  they	  know	  it,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  can	  act,	  are	  capable	  of	  
achieving,	  and	  constantly	  do	  achieve,	  the	  improbable	  and	  
unpredictable.12	  	  
	  
	   In	  discussing	  the	  concept	  of	  freedom	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  polis,	  Arendt	  turns,	  
once	  again,	  to	  the	  Greeks.	  	  “What	  distinguishes	  the	  communal	  life	  of	  people	  in	  the	  polis	  
from	  all	  other	  forms	  of	  communal	  life—with	  which	  the	  Greeks	  were	  most	  certainly	  
familiar—is	  freedom.”	  	  The	  freedom	  that	  characterized	  the	  Greek	  polis,	  however,	  was	  
not	  altogether	  the	  same	  as	  the	  freedom	  that	  Arendt	  establishes	  as	  the	  polis.	  	  The	  
freedom	  of	  the	  ancient	  Greek	  polis	  is	  interesting	  because	  “to	  be	  able	  to	  live	  in	  a	  polis	  at	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all,	  man	  already	  had	  to	  be	  free	  in	  another	  regard—he	  could	  not	  be	  subject	  as	  a	  slave	  to	  
someone	  else’s	  domination,	  or	  as	  a	  worker	  to	  the	  necessity	  of	  earning	  his	  daily	  bread.”	  	  
The	  freedom	  of	  ancient	  Greece	  was	  one	  that	  could	  not	  possibly	  be	  enjoyed	  by	  all	  people	  
because	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  polis	  was	  dependent	  upon	  the	  subjugation	  of	  at	  least	  a	  
portion	  of	  the	  society.	  	  The	  only	  means	  by	  which	  any	  person	  could	  be	  free	  from	  the	  
necessity	  of	  earning	  one’s	  daily	  bread,	  that	  is,	  of	  the	  biological	  necessities,	  is	  to	  ensure	  
that	  someone	  else	  will	  be	  earning	  them	  in	  one’s	  stead.	  	  The	  freedom	  found	  in	  the	  Greek	  
polis	  was	  born	  out	  of	  a	  liberation	  from	  “domination	  by	  life’s	  necessities.”	  	  The	  crucial	  
point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  polis	  came	  only	  when	  individuals	  (men	  who	  were	  
not	  slaves)	  were	  liberated	  from	  the	  conditions	  of	  work	  and	  labor	  and	  could,	  therefore,	  
enjoy	  “leisure”	  time.	  	  It	  was	  the	  leisure	  time	  that	  permitted	  these	  free	  beings	  to	  act	  in	  
the	  public	  space.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  “free	  life”	  for	  the	  Greeks	  was	  the	  liberated	  life	  of	  the	  
few;	  but,	  this	  liberation	  was	  dependent	  upon	  slavery,	  “the	  brute	  force	  by	  which	  one	  
man	  compelled	  others	  to	  relieve	  him	  of	  the	  cares	  of	  daily	  life.”13	  	  
	   According	  to	  Arendt,	  the	  types	  of	  actions	  that	  are	  performed	  and	  experienced	  in	  
the	  slave-­‐master	  relationship	  are	  not	  real	  actions.	  	  She	  explains,	  “To	  speak	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
commanding	  and	  to	  hear	  in	  the	  form	  of	  obeying	  were	  not	  considered	  actual	  speech	  and	  
hearing.”	  	  The	  words	  and	  deeds	  of	  both	  the	  master	  and	  the	  slave	  lack	  the	  fundamental	  
element	  that	  characterizes	  all	  actual	  action—freedom.	  	  The	  actions	  of	  both	  master	  and	  
slave	  “were	  not	  free	  because	  they	  were	  bound	  up	  with	  a	  process	  defined	  not	  by	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  116,	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speaking	  but	  by	  doing	  and	  laboring.”14	  	  In	  trying	  to	  understand	  the	  polis	  and	  whether	  
politics	  has	  any	  meaning	  in	  the	  modern	  world,	  we	  must	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  politics	  is	  
born	  out	  of	  action,	  which	  Arendt	  previously	  describes	  as	  words	  and	  deeds	  spoken	  or	  
performed	  in	  the	  plurality	  of	  men.	  	  The	  question	  is	  raised,	  then,	  why	  modern	  society	  is	  
not,	  in	  Arendt’s	  view,	  political.	  	  After	  all,	  human	  beings	  are	  indeed	  speaking	  and	  
performing	  deeds	  in	  the	  company	  of	  one	  another.	  	  	  
Just	  as	  it	  was	  important	  to	  note	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  narrative	  and	  an	  
authentic	  narrative	  in	  chapter	  one,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  realize	  the	  distinction	  between	  words	  
and	  deeds,	  in	  general,	  and	  those	  that	  constitute	  political	  action.	  	  To	  wit,	  only	  words	  and	  
deeds	  that	  are	  performed	  out	  of	  careful	  thought	  and	  judgment	  and	  out	  of	  the	  freedom	  
of	  the	  individual	  performing	  them,	  without	  the	  subjugation	  of	  another	  human	  being,	  are	  
in	  actuality	  political	  actions.	  	  The	  leader	  of	  the	  household,	  or	  the	  leader	  of	  any	  
hierarchical	  order	  in	  which	  the	  person	  at	  the	  top	  determines	  the	  activities	  of	  those	  
beneath,	  commands	  work	  and	  labor,	  but	  action	  cannot	  ever	  be	  commanded.	  	  This	  is	  
why	  any	  form	  of	  government	  that	  has	  a	  ruler	  over	  people	  cannot	  be	  considered	  political.	  	  
Arendt	  writes,	  “The	  despot,	  who	  knows	  only	  commands,	  finds	  himself	  in	  the	  same	  
situation	  [as	  slaves];	  in	  order	  to	  speak,	  he	  would	  need	  others	  who	  are	  his	  equals.”15	  	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  political	  phenomena	  that	  the	  world	  witnessed	  in	  the	  twentieth	  
century,	  Arendt	  ponders	  whether	  politics	  retains	  any	  meaning	  at	  all.	  	  She	  writes,	  “Our	  
question	  nowadays	  arises	  out	  of	  the	  very	  real	  experiences	  we	  have	  had	  with	  politics;	  it	  is	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  Ibid.,	  118.	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ignited	  by	  the	  disaster	  politics	  has	  wrought	  in	  our	  century.”	  	  If,	  theoretically,	  the	  
meaning	  of	  politics	  is	  freedom	  and	  this	  freedom	  is	  the	  characteristic	  of	  human	  beings	  
who	  are	  thinking	  what	  they	  are	  doing,	  then	  what	  are	  we	  to	  make	  of	  the	  totalitarian	  
modes	  of	  government	  that	  have	  come	  to	  exist	  in	  the	  world?	  	  And,	  not	  just	  the	  
totalitarian	  modes,	  but	  what	  of	  massive	  bureaucracies	  where	  thinking	  is	  sacrificed	  to	  
routine?	  	  These	  very	  real	  political	  phenomena	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  question,	  “Does	  politics	  
still	  have	  any	  meaning	  at	  all?”16	  	  	  
The	  loss	  of	  political	  meaning	  has	  significant	  consequence,	  something	  Arendt	  
recognized	  early	  on.	  	  She	  notes,	  in	  an	  article	  written	  in	  1942,	  that	  when	  the	  Reform	  
rabbis	  sought	  to	  reform	  the	  Passover	  tradition,	  they	  removed	  all	  political	  meaning	  from	  
the	  story,	  and	  consequently	  “robbed	  it	  of	  its	  living	  meaning.”	  	  The	  power	  of	  the	  
Passover	  narrative	  is	  the	  very	  meaning	  of	  the	  story.	  	  This	  is	  why,	  in	  in	  the	  same	  article,	  
she	  warns:	  	  	  
As	  long	  as	  the	  Passover	  story	  does	  not	  teach	  the	  difference	  
between	  freedom	  and	  slavery,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  Moses	  
legend	  does	  not	  call	  to	  mind	  the	  eternal	  rebellion	  of	  the	  
heart	  and	  mind	  against	  slavery,	  the	  ‘oldest	  document	  of	  
human	  history’	  will	  remain	  dead	  and	  mute	  to	  no	  one	  more	  
than	  the	  very	  people	  who	  once	  wrote	  it.17	  
	  
Because	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Passover	  narrative	  lies	  in	  its	  capacity	  to	  awaken	  the	  reader	  (or	  
teller)	  to	  the	  human	  capacity	  for	  freedom,	  its	  meaning	  is	  inherently	  political.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  
the	  Passover	  narrative	  is	  powerfully	  instructive	  for	  Arendt’s	  investigation	  into	  whether	  
or	  not	  politics	  has	  meaning	  in	  the	  modern	  world.	  	  What	  she	  is	  looking	  for,	  in	  essence,	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Ibid.,	  108.	  
17	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  150.	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whether	  or	  not	  the	  experience	  of	  politics	  does	  exactly	  what	  the	  Passover	  story,	  in	  its	  
living	  richness	  does.	  	  Is	  politics	  the	  revelatory	  experience	  of	  freedom?	  
In	  seeking	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  politics	  has	  meaning	  in	  the	  
contemporary	  world,	  Arendt	  turns	  to	  “our	  experience	  with	  totalitarian	  governments,	  in	  
which	  the	  totality	  of	  human	  life	  is	  claimed	  to	  be	  so	  totally	  politicized	  that	  under	  them	  
there	  is	  no	  longer	  any	  freedom	  whatsoever.”	  	  In	  modern	  societies	  where	  these	  types	  of	  
governments	  have	  come	  to	  exist,	  Arendt	  questions	  “whether	  politics	  and	  freedom	  are	  at	  
all	  compatible.”	  	  If	  the	  political	  has	  taken	  the	  shape	  of	  something	  so	  completely	  
opposed	  to	  freedom,	  then	  it	  has	  lost	  its	  essentially	  political	  character.	  	  Arendt	  continues	  
her	  investigation	  into	  these	  political	  arrangements	  pondering	  whether	  “freedom	  does	  
not	  first	  begin	  precisely	  where	  politics	  ends,	  so	  that	  freedom	  cannot	  exist	  wherever	  
politics	  has	  not	  yet	  found	  its	  limit	  and	  its	  end.”18	  The	  totalitarian	  mode	  of	  governance	  is	  
fundamentally	  unacceptable	  for	  Arendt	  because	  it	  separates	  politics	  from	  freedom.	  	  
Insofar	  as	  the	  political	  is	  only	  found	  in	  the	  space	  of	  freedom,	  then	  any	  circumstance	  
wherein	  freedom	  is	  what	  comes	  after	  politics	  is	  problematic.	  	  	  
Understanding	  how	  totalitarian	  modes	  of	  government	  destroy	  the	  space	  of	  
appearance	  is	  crucial	  for	  Arendt	  because,	  again,	  “the	  most	  important	  of	  all	  questions”	  is	  
“the	  question	  of	  political	  freedom.”19	  	  This	  notion	  of	  political	  freedom	  is	  completely	  
dependent	  upon	  the	  space	  of	  appearance.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  is	  the	  
locality	  within	  which	  political	  freedom	  is	  manifest.	  	  Thus,	  political	  freedom	  “is	  a	  spatial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Arendt,	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  108,	  109.	  
19	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  334.	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construct.	  	  Whoever	  leaves	  his	  polis	  or	  is	  banished	  from	  it	  loses	  not	  just	  his	  hometown	  
or	  his	  fatherland;	  he	  also	  loses	  the	  only	  space	  in	  which	  he	  can	  be	  free—and	  he	  loses	  the	  
society	  of	  his	  equals.”20	  	  The	  reason	  political	  freedom	  is	  the	  most	  important	  question	  is	  
because	  it	  is	  only	  this	  kind	  of	  freedom	  that	  allows	  human	  beings	  to	  experience	  the	  
fullness	  of	  their	  unique	  identities;	  further,	  it	  is	  only	  in	  political	  freedom	  that	  justice,	  the	  
articulation	  of	  freedom	  and	  equality,	  is	  possible.	  	  	  
Arendt	  seems	  to	  be	  somewhat	  inconsistent	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  totalitarian	  regimes	  
and	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  political.	  	  Are	  these	  versions	  of	  politics	  really	  political?	  	  On	  
one	  hand,	  because	  she	  contends	  that	  what	  is	  real	  is	  political,	  then	  in	  order	  to	  respect	  
the	  experiences	  of	  the	  oppressed	  under	  totalitarian	  regimes	  as	  real,	  she	  must	  admit	  that	  
they	  are	  political.	  21	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  what	  is	  political	  is	  fundamentally	  grounded	  in	  
freedom	  and	  equality,	  then	  the	  totalitarian	  governments	  cannot	  possibly	  be	  considered	  
political.	  	  Thus,	  how	  are	  we	  to	  understand	  the	  totalitarian	  regimes	  of	  the	  twentieth	  
century?	  	  Are	  they	  political?	  	  Are	  they	  defined	  by	  political	  action?	  	  What,	  exactly,	  is	  real	  
in	  these	  circumstances?	  	  	  
In	  an	  effort	  to	  understand	  what	  Arendt	  is	  saying	  across	  texts	  and	  through	  time,	  I	  
present	  the	  following	  as	  a	  possibility	  for	  how	  Arendt	  accounts	  for	  this	  apparent	  
contradiction.	  	  The	  totalitarian	  regimes	  were	  at	  least	  initially	  political,	  but	  the	  space	  of	  
the	  polis	  was	  extremely	  limited.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  space	  of	  the	  polis,	  which	  was	  defined	  
by	  equals	  acting	  and	  speaking	  together,	  eventually	  ceased	  to	  exist	  as	  the	  tyrant’s	  power	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Arendt,	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  119.	  
21	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  228.	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grew.	  	  This	  is	  the	  type	  of	  political	  structure	  Arendt	  describes	  when	  she	  writes,	  “Freedom	  
does	  not	  require	  an	  egalitarian	  democracy	  in	  the	  modern	  sense,	  but	  rather	  a	  quite	  
narrowly	  limited	  oligarchy	  or	  aristocracy,	  an	  arena	  in	  which	  at	  least	  a	  few	  or	  the	  best	  can	  
interact	  with	  one	  another	  as	  equals	  among	  equals.”	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  
equality	  of	  the	  polis	  “has,	  of	  course,	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  justice.”22	  	  Accepting	  that	  
totalitarian	  leaders	  like	  Hitler	  and	  Stalin	  gradually	  attained	  power,	  to	  the	  point	  at	  which	  
they	  held	  total	  control	  of	  society	  in	  all	  aspects,	  the	  argument	  can	  be	  made	  that,	  at	  least	  
at	  the	  beginning,	  they	  and	  their	  associates	  were	  acting	  in	  concert	  with	  one	  another	  in	  a	  
shared	  space	  of	  movement	  and	  speech.	  	  
The	  polis	  of	  totalitarian	  regimes,	  while	  having	  the	  character	  of	  equality,	  was	  in	  
no	  way,	  and	  it	  need	  not	  be,	  concerned	  with	  justice.	  	  At	  some	  point	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  
tyrant	  outweighs	  all	  other	  factors	  and	  the	  polis	  shrinks	  until	  it	  is	  gone.	  	  This	  is	  because	  
there	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  shared	  public	  space,	  defined	  by	  equality,	  which	  is	  necessary	  for	  
the	  polis	  to	  continue.	  	  Thus,	  Arendt	  contends	  that,	  “with	  the	  tyrant	  came	  an	  end	  to	  
freedom.”23	  The	  political	  is	  based	  on	  a	  free	  space	  that	  is	  defined	  by	  an	  equality	  of	  
movement.	  	  Thus,	  without	  equality,	  freedom	  was	  further	  diminished	  and	  true	  
experience	  lost.	  	  Humanness	  is	  lost.	  	  And	  with	  this,	  justice	  is	  impossible.24	  	  The	  political	  
problem	  with	  totalitarian	  forms	  of	  government	  is	  manifold.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  basic	  
problems,	  however,	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  space	  within	  which	  equals	  interact.	  	  Without	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Arendt,	  Promies	  of	  Politics,	  118.	  
23	  Ibid.,	  119.	  
24	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  258.	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space	  of	  appearance,	  “that	  meant	  that	  political	  freedom	  no	  longer	  existed.”25	  	  What	  
totalitarian	  modes	  of	  governance	  do,	  in	  essence,	  is	  whittle	  down	  the	  original	  space	  of	  
politics	  to	  a	  space	  in	  which	  there	  is	  only	  one	  inhabitant—the	  tyrant.	  	  This	  space,	  
inherently,	  is	  not	  political	  because	  it	  lacks	  plurality—a	  necessary	  element	  for	  politics.	  	  	  
In	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  this	  type	  of	  experience	  could	  develop,	  Arendt	  turns	  
back	  both	  to	  philosophy	  and	  the	  creation	  myth.	  	  Arendt	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  ways	  
in	  which	  the	  creation	  myth	  can	  be	  understood	  and	  employed.	  	  In	  the	  Western	  
philosophical	  tradition,	  there	  is	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  man,	  a	  singular	  entity.	  	  
Arendt,	  however,	  is	  more	  interested	  in	  a	  tradition	  that	  emphasizes	  the	  creation	  of	  men,	  
a	  plural	  collective.	  	  This	  is	  because,	  “Politics	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  of	  human	  plurality.”	  	  In	  
the	  Western	  creation	  myth,	  God	  created	  man;	  an	  emphasis	  that	  is	  problematic	  because	  
in	  the	  singularity	  of	  man,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  politics,	  no	  relationships	  between	  multiple	  
men.	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  Western	  tradition	  posits	  that	  there	  is,	  in	  fact,	  something	  political	  
in	  man.	  	  Arendt’s	  response	  to	  this	  claim	  is	  quite	  matter-­‐of-­‐fact;	  she	  writes,	  “This	  simply	  
is	  not	  so;	  man	  is	  apolitical.”	  	  Elaborating	  this	  further,	  “Politics	  arises	  between	  men,	  and	  
so	  quite	  outside	  of	  man.”	  	  Indeed,	  the	  emphatic	  study	  of	  man	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  
the	  Western	  tradition	  has	  no	  political	  value;	  it	  leaves	  man	  isolated	  in	  “the	  likeness	  of	  
God’s	  aloneness.”	  	  If	  “there	  were	  only	  one	  or	  two	  men	  or	  only	  identical	  men”	  these	  
philosophical	  and	  theological	  “pronouncements	  would	  be	  correct.”26	  	  However,	  because	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Arendt,	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  119.	  
26	  Ibid.,	  93,	  95,	  emphasis	  mine.	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men,	  not	  man,	  exist	  in	  the	  world,	  neither	  philosophy	  nor	  theology	  has	  been	  able	  to	  do	  
anything	  more	  than	  justify	  the	  presence	  of	  politics,	  as	  opposed	  to	  explain	  what	  it	  is.	  	  
As	  noted	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  Arendt	  understands	  the	  human	  likeness	  to	  God	  to	  
be	  the	  capacity	  to	  create	  new	  things	  through	  word	  and	  deed.	  	  Further,	  action	  itself	  is	  
dependent	  upon	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind;	  that	  is,	  thinking,	  willing	  and	  judging	  conceive	  
of,	  determine,	  and	  motivate	  the	  manifestation	  of	  every	  word	  and	  deed.	  	  Thus,	  if,	  in	  
natality,	  human	  beings	  share	  the	  image	  and	  likeness	  of	  God,	  then	  that	  likeness	  is	  
grounded	  in	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind.	  	  Maimonides,	  the	  great	  medieval	  theologian	  and	  
philosopher,	  explains	  that	  what	  is	  meant	  “in	  the	  scriptural	  dictum,	  let	  us	  make	  man	  in	  
our	  image	  .	  .	  .	  is	  intellectual	  apprehension.”27	  Arendt	  rejects	  the	  Western	  creation	  myth	  
that	  focuses	  on	  the	  image	  and	  likeness	  of	  God	  that	  leaves	  man	  isolated	  and	  alone,	  and,	  
instead,	  understands	  creation	  much	  as	  Maimonides	  himself	  did.	  	  The	  intellectual	  
apprehension	  of	  human	  beings	  that	  Maimonides	  speaks	  of	  was	  expanded	  when	  Adam	  
and	  Eve	  ate	  the	  fruit	  of	  the	  tree	  of	  knowledge.	  	  It	  is	  written	  that	  man	  became	  like	  the	  
divine	  being,	  “knowing	  good	  and	  bad.”28	  	  Arendt	  posits	  that	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  thinking	  
human	  beings	  determine	  what	  is	  good	  and	  bad.	  	  Thus,	  Arendt	  is	  making	  the	  same	  claim	  
that	  Maimonides	  made:	  	  human	  beings	  are	  made	  in	  the	  likeness	  of	  God	  insofar	  as	  
through	  apprehending	  the	  world	  they	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  determine	  what	  is	  good	  and	  
what	  is	  bad	  and	  to	  act	  according	  to	  those	  determinations.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Maimonides,	  The	  Guide	  of	  the	  Perplexed,	  Volume	  1,	  trans.	  Shlomo	  Pines	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  
Press,	  1963),	  22.	  
28	  Genesis	  3:22,	  JPS.	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The	  conception	  of	  political	  freedom	  as	  interaction	  between	  men	  is	  incompatible	  
with	  the	  Western	  conception	  of	  human	  beings	  where	  man	  isolated	  by	  nature	  (in	  the	  
likeness	  to	  God)	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  political.	  	  A	  reconciliation	  of	  man’s	  political	  nature	  
with	  his	  God-­‐likeness	  “would	  mean	  man,	  created	  in	  the	  likeness	  of	  God,	  has	  received	  
the	  procreative	  energy	  to	  organize	  men	  into	  the	  likeness	  of	  divine	  creation.”	  	  While	  this	  
proposition	  holds	  logical	  consistency,	  Arendt	  claims	  it	  is	  “probably	  nonsense.”	  	  For	  
Arendt,	  man’s	  “procreative	  energy”	  is	  not	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  politics,	  it	  is	  politics.	  	  In	  
other	  words,	  man	  does	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  create	  in	  order	  to	  act	  as	  a	  tyrant	  over	  
other	  individuals;	  men	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  create	  in	  order	  to	  emerge	  as	  equals	  amongst	  
one	  another.	  	  Because	  the	  West	  has	  assumed	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  philosophical	  and	  
theological	  assertions	  regarding	  man	  and	  his	  likeness	  to	  God,	  any	  philosophy	  that	  does	  
not	  construct	  politics	  as	  a	  necessary	  end	  in	  human	  organization	  is	  difficult	  to	  
comprehend.	  	  Yet,	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  Arendt	  does.	  	  She	  posits,	  “there	  is	  a	  realm	  in	  
which	  we	  can	  truly	  be	  free,	  that	  is,	  neither	  driven	  by	  ourselves	  nor	  dependent	  on	  the	  
givens	  of	  material	  existence.”	  	  This	  realm	  of	  freedom	  is	  understood	  to	  be	  politics:	  	  
“Freedom	  exists	  only	  in	  the	  unique	  intermediary	  space	  of	  politics.”29	  	  This	  understanding	  
of	  politics	  and	  freedom	  is	  impossible	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  Western	  creation	  
myth.	  	  	  
Arendt’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  creation	  myth	  is	  important	  for	  two	  reasons.	  	  One,	  the	  
procreative	  power	  that	  men	  have	  is	  not	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  organizing;	  rather,	  it	  is	  for	  
the	  purpose	  of	  creating	  the	  space	  of	  appearance,	  which	  is	  defined	  by	  freedom	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Arendt,	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  95,	  96.	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equality.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  organizing	  this	  space	  will	  not	  be	  necessary,	  as	  indeed,	  
this	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  the	  law	  is	  delivered	  to	  the	  Israelites.	  	  However,	  organization	  is	  not	  
the	  motivating	  factor	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  political	  realm.	  	  Second,	  only	  if	  the	  
procreative	  powers	  were	  for	  organizing	  could	  there	  be	  said	  to	  be	  a	  natural	  law	  because,	  
in	  his	  likeness	  to	  God,	  man	  organizes	  men.	  	  This	  sets	  up	  a	  framework	  wherein	  individuals	  
are	  subjected	  to	  the	  organizer.	  	  While	  this	  is,	  indeed,	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  West,	  and	  
what	  was	  experienced	  under	  the	  totalitarian	  regimes,	  it	  is	  fundamentally	  at	  odds	  with	  
the	  Hebraic	  tradition.	  	  Saadya	  Gaon,	  the	  great	  Geonic	  Jewish	  philosopher,	  recounting	  
the	  covenant	  the	  Israelites	  made	  with	  God	  whilst	  wandering	  through	  the	  wilderness,	  
writes,	  “God	  .	  .	  .gave	  man	  the	  ability	  to	  obey	  Him,	  placing	  it	  as	  it	  were	  in	  his	  hands,	  
endowed	  him	  with	  power	  and	  free	  will,	  and	  commanded	  him	  to	  choose	  that	  which	  is	  
good.”30	  	  Thus,	  while	  there	  was	  the	  obligation	  to	  follow	  the	  law,	  each	  individual	  was	  free	  
to	  choose	  how	  to	  act.	  	  In	  totalitarian	  modes	  of	  governance,	  the	  freedom	  to	  think	  is	  
limited,	  therefore,	  the	  freedom	  to	  will	  and	  to	  act	  are	  also	  suppressed.	  
Because	  it	  is	  so	  difficult	  to	  comprehend	  the	  free	  realm,	  the	  Western	  tradition	  has	  
left	  the	  discomfort	  of	  freedom,	  with	  its	  uncertainties	  and	  unpredictability,	  and	  opted	  
instead	  for	  “the	  ‘necessity’	  of	  history.”	  	  Arendt	  considers	  this	  to	  be	  a	  “ghastly	  absurdity,”	  
as	  substituting	  politics	  with	  history	  not	  only	  destroys	  the	  polis,	  but	  with	  it,	  human	  beings.	  	  
In	  the	  transformation	  of	  politics	  into	  history,	  “the	  multiplicity	  of	  men	  is	  melted	  into	  one	  
human	  individual,	  which	  is	  then	  also	  called	  humanity.”31	  	  In	  ancient	  Greece,	  the	  free	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Saadya	  Gaon,	  Book	  of	  Doctrines	  and	  Beliefs,	  trans.,	  Alexander	  Altmann	  (Indianapolis:	  Hackett	  Publishing	  
Company,	  Inc.,	  2002),	  116.	  
31	  Arendt,	  Promise	  of	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realm	  of	  the	  polis	  was	  separate	  from	  the	  necessity	  that	  defined	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  
household.	  	  Freedom	  and	  necessity	  occupied	  exclusive	  realms.	  	  In	  modernity,	  freedom	  is	  
sacrificed	  for	  necessity	  and	  the	  necessity	  that	  once	  dominated	  the	  private	  realm	  has	  
come	  to	  dominate	  the	  public	  realm.	  	  Freedom	  loses	  its	  place	  in	  the	  world.	  	  Arendt	  does	  
not	  accept	  the	  ancient	  dichotomy,	  nor	  does	  she	  accept	  the	  modern	  dismissal	  of	  freedom.	  	  
Both	  necessity	  and	  freedom	  are	  parts	  of	  the	  human	  condition.	  	  To	  subject	  one	  to	  the	  
other	  is	  to	  dismiss	  part	  of	  our	  humanness.	  	  	  
The	  sacrifice	  of	  freedom	  to	  history	  is	  what	  “makes	  totalitarianism	  truly	  new	  and	  
terrifying.”	  	  Totalitarianism	  was	  not	  the	  first	  political	  theory	  to	  bring	  the	  value	  of	  
freedom	  into	  question,	  but	  it	  was	  the	  first	  to	  posit	  “the	  notion	  that	  human	  freedom	  
must	  be	  sacrificed	  to	  historical	  development.”	  	  Somehow,	  the	  movement	  of	  world	  
history	  toward	  some	  end	  was	  more	  valuable	  than	  the	  individual	  lives	  that	  constitute	  
humanity.	  	  If	  history	  is	  to	  progress	  along	  smoothly,	  total	  control	  must	  be	  exercised	  over	  
all	  human	  beings.	  	  The	  process	  of	  historical	  progress	  is	  innately	  threatened	  by	  freedom;	  
it	  “can	  be	  impeded	  only	  when	  human	  beings	  act	  and	  interact	  in	  freedom.”32	  	  Thus,	  for	  
the	  sake	  of	  the	  historical	  oneness	  of	  humanity,	  freedom	  must	  be	  suppressed.	  	  The	  task	  
before	  totalitarian	  leaders,	  then,	  is	  the	  total	  domination	  of	  society	  so	  as	  to	  perfectly	  
inhibit	  any	  expression	  of	  human	  freedom.	  	  
	  The	  totalitarian	  regimes	  discovered	  an	  effective	  means	  of	  political	  suppression	  
in	  the	  integration	  of	  	  “human	  beings	  into	  the	  flow	  of	  history	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  are	  
so	  totally	  caught	  up	  in	  its	  ‘freedom,’	  in	  its	  ‘free	  flow,’	  that	  they	  can	  no	  longer	  obstruct	  it	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  Ibid.,	  120.	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but	  instead	  become	  impulses	  for	  its	  acceleration.”	  	  The	  tactics	  employed	  by	  the	  
totalitarian	  regimes	  to	  control	  the	  “free	  flow”	  of	  history	  were	  brutally	  suppressive.	  	  The	  
regimes	  accomplished	  the	  total	  control	  of	  the	  flow	  of	  history	  “by	  means	  of	  coercive	  
terror	  applied	  from	  outside	  and	  coercive	  ideological	  thinking	  unleashed	  from	  within.”33	  	  
This	  ideological	  thinking	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  totality	  of	  control.	  	  	  
It	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  that,	  for	  Arendt,	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  are	  all	  
essential	  elements	  in	  free,	  political	  action.	  	  Thus,	  to	  control	  thought	  processes	  was	  yet	  
another	  extension	  of	  total	  dominion.	  	  The	  ideological	  thinking	  was	  “a	  form	  of	  thinking	  
that	  joins	  the	  current	  of	  history	  and	  becomes,	  as	  it	  were,	  an	  intrinsic	  part	  of	  its	  flow.”	  	  
That	  is	  to	  say,	  this	  ideological	  thinking,	  or	  the	  control	  over	  thought	  processes,	  was	  
absolutely	  necessary	  for	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  “free	  flow”	  of	  history.	  	  Thinking,	  judging,	  
and	  willing	  pose	  an	  immediate	  threat	  to	  the	  current	  of	  history	  that	  the	  regime	  has	  set	  in	  
motion	  insofar	  as	  these	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  lead	  to	  political	  
freedom	  (action).	  	  Thus,	  infiltrating	  not	  just	  the	  public	  world	  of	  society,	  but	  also	  the	  
private	  world	  of	  individual	  minds,	  was	  requisite	  for	  total	  domination.	  	  That	  totalitarian	  
regimes	  accomplished	  this	  is	  a	  remarkable	  phenomenon.	  	  Arendt	  says	  this	  control	  over	  
thinking	  “is	  the	  decisive	  step	  on	  the	  path	  toward	  abolishing	  freedom	  in	  the	  real	  
world.”34	  	  	  
Arendt	  considers	  the	  totalitarian	  mode	  of	  control	  to	  be	  an	  “ideological	  political	  
movement.”	  	  In	  this	  classification	  she	  makes	  the	  space	  for	  a	  political	  reality	  that	  is	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Ibid.,	  121.	  
34	  Ibid.	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characterized	  by	  political	  freedom,	  but	  rather	  is	  manifested	  in	  the	  purportedly	  free	  
movement	  of	  history.	  	  All	  of	  these	  ideological	  movements	  remove	  the	  procreative	  
power	  of	  human	  beings,	  asserting,	  “freedom	  is	  not	  localized	  in	  either	  human	  beings	  in	  
their	  action	  and	  interaction	  or	  in	  the	  space	  that	  forms	  between	  men.”	  	  By	  removing	  the	  
element	  of	  natality	  from	  human	  beings,	  men	  are	  subjected	  to	  the	  flow	  history.	  	  Thus,	  
while	  history,	  at	  least	  theoretically,	  is	  moving	  freely	  through	  time,	  human	  beings	  are	  
stripped	  of	  all	  notions	  of	  freedom.	  	  In	  these	  ideological	  movements	  human	  beings	  are	  
not	  responsible	  for	  creating	  their	  own	  experiences	  of	  reality.	  	  Rather,	  history	  assigns	  
human	  beings	  “to	  a	  process	  that	  unfolds	  behind	  the	  backs	  of	  those	  who	  act	  and	  does	  its	  
work	  in	  secret,	  beyond	  the	  visible	  arena	  of	  public	  affairs.”35	  	  While	  Arendt	  calls	  these	  
political	  movements,	  they	  lack	  all	  of	  the	  requisite	  elements	  of	  politics.	  	  The	  ideological	  
political	  movements	  strip	  the	  public	  realm	  of	  freedom,	  equality	  and	  action	  and	  
simultaneously	  strip	  the	  private	  realm	  of	  thought.	  	  In	  this	  totality	  of	  domination,	  history	  
is	  free	  to	  create	  the	  world	  of	  experience.	  	  	  
Arendt’s	  understanding	  of	  totalitarianism	  is	  further	  illustrated	  in	  her	  analysis	  of	  
Adolf	  Eichmann.	  	  What	  she	  discovered	  at	  the	  trial	  of	  Eichmann	  was	  that	  he	  was	  not	  a	  
significant	  man.	  	  The	  psychiatrists	  who	  analyzed	  him	  found	  him	  to	  be	  normal—“More	  
normal,	  at	  any	  rate	  than	  [the	  examiner	  was]	  after	  having	  examined	  him.”36	  	  How	  could	  a	  
seemingly	  normal,	  healthy	  individual	  not	  know	  right	  from	  wrong?	  	  How	  could	  Adolf	  
Eichmann,	  a	  man	  “medium-­‐sized,	  slender,	  middle-­‐aged,	  with	  receding	  hair,	  ill-­‐fitting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Ibid.,	  120.	  
36	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Eichmann	  in	  Jerusalem	  (New	  York:	  The	  Viking	  Press,	  1963),	  25.	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teeth,	  and	  nearsighted	  eyes,”	  be	  the	  executor	  of	  such	  despair?	  	  In	  answering	  these	  
questions,	  Arendt	  investigates	  the	  nature	  of	  totalitarian	  control	  as	  it	  manifested	  in	  this	  
particular	  man	  and	  his	  role	  in	  “history.”	  	  	  
The	  totalitarian	  ideology,	  which	  worked	  through	  an	  inner	  means	  of	  control,	  
seized	  Eichmann.	  	  At	  a	  certain	  point,	  Eichmann	  recalls	  pondering,	  “Who	  was	  he	  to	  
judge?”	  	  He	  accepted	  the	  ideology	  of	  National	  Socialism	  so	  completely	  that	  he	  willingly	  
forfeited	  his	  role	  as	  judge	  in	  his	  own	  actions,	  thereby	  forging	  the	  process	  forward.	  	  He	  
questioned,	  “Who	  was	  he	  to	  have	  [his]	  own	  thoughts	  in	  this	  matter?”	  	  In	  forgoing	  his	  
ability	  to	  judge	  he	  subjected	  himself	  to	  the	  ideological	  political	  movement	  completely.	  	  
By	  subjecting	  his	  thoughts	  and	  ability	  to	  judge	  to	  the	  ideology,	  what	  is	  right	  is	  what	  the	  
ideology	  demands.	  	  What	  is	  morally	  correct	  is	  what	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  “free	  flow	  of	  
history”	  to	  continue.	  	  The	  ideology	  worked	  internally	  to	  control	  Eichmann’s	  basic	  human	  
faculties	  of	  thinking	  and	  judging.	  	  Therefore,	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  issue,	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  Eichmann	  was	  “obviously	  no	  case	  of	  moral	  let	  alone	  legal	  insanity.”37	  	  	  
The	  same	  means	  of	  control	  and	  manipulation	  was	  utilized	  on	  the	  Jewish	  
leadership.	  	  As	  the	  Nazi	  army	  expanded	  its	  domain	  of	  control,	  conquering	  more	  areas	  in	  
Eastern	  Europe,	  they	  became	  dependent	  upon	  the	  local	  communities	  in	  the	  
implementation	  of	  their	  final	  solution.	  	  In	  the	  areas	  they	  invaded,	  they	  demanded	  that	  
the	  local	  Jewish	  communities	  form	  “Councils	  of	  Elders”	  who	  would	  act	  as	  liaisons	  
between	  the	  Jews	  and	  the	  Nazis.	  	  These	  Councils	  of	  Elders	  were	  tasked	  with	  collecting	  
information	  from	  fellow	  Jews,	  information	  that	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  the	  regime.	  	  “The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Ibid.,	  114,	  26.	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Jews	  registered,	  filled	  out	  innumerable	  forms,	  answered	  pages	  and	  pages	  of	  
questionnaires	  regarding	  their	  property	  .	  .	  .	  then	  they	  assembled	  at	  the	  collection	  points	  
and	  boarded	  the	  trains.”38	  	  All	  of	  this	  was	  organized	  by	  the	  Jewish	  Councils,	  albeit	  under	  
severe	  threat	  from	  the	  Nazi	  invaders.	  	  	  
	  Arendt	  was	  vehemently	  criticized	  for	  her	  portrayal	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Councils.	  	  
Although	  this	  segment	  of	  Eichmann	  in	  Jerusalem	  accounts	  for	  about	  twelve	  out	  of	  nearly	  
three	  hundred	  pages,	  her	  analysis	  was	  troubling	  to	  many	  in	  the	  Jewish	  community,	  
particularly	  in	  America	  where	  a	  “kind	  of	  excommunication	  seemed	  to	  have	  been	  
imposed	  on	  the	  author.”39	  	  Arendt	  speaks	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Jewish	  Councils	  of	  
Elders	  complied	  with	  the	  commands	  of	  the	  Nazi	  regime.	  	  This	  notion	  of	  compliance	  was,	  
for	  many,	  construed	  to	  be	  an	  articulation	  of	  blame,	  as	  if	  Arendt	  was	  blaming	  the	  victims	  
for	  the	  crimes	  perpetrated	  against	  them.	  	  This	  is	  an	  insufficient	  reading	  of	  the	  text,	  
however.	  	  The	  reason	  she	  addresses	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Jewish	  leaders	  was	  to	  further	  
illustrate	  the	  depth	  and	  magnitude	  of	  totalitarian	  control.	  	  She	  writes,	  “To	  a	  Jew	  this	  role	  
of	  the	  Jewish	  leaders	  in	  the	  destruction	  of	  their	  own	  people	  is	  undoubtedly	  the	  darkest	  
chapter	  of	  the	  whole	  dark	  story.”	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  indictment	  of	  the	  
Jewish	  leaders.	  	  Rather,	  this	  is	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  light	  that	  
illuminates	  the	  public	  realm	  of	  the	  polis,	  the	  light	  of	  reality,	  had	  been	  extinguished.	  	  The	  
great	  power	  of	  the	  totalitarian	  ideology	  was	  most	  poignantly	  seen	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  Jewish	  
leaders	  performed	  the	  actions	  they	  did.	  Those	  actions	  were	  not,	  and	  could	  not	  be,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Ibid.,	  115.	  
39	  Amos	  Elon,	  “Introduction,”	  in	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Eichmann	  in	  Jerusalem,	  vii.	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political	  action	  born	  out	  of	  both	  equality	  and	  freedom.	  	  This	  darkest	  chapter	  “offers	  the	  
most	  striking	  insight	  into	  the	  totality	  of	  moral	  collapse	  the	  Nazis	  caused	  in	  respectable	  
European	  society.”40	  	  Morality	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  judge	  right	  from	  wrong.	  	  However,	  
morality	  is	  irrelevant	  in	  circumstances	  where	  thinking	  and	  judging	  are	  absent.	  	  The	  
moral	  collapse	  of	  society	  was	  the	  internal	  destruction	  of	  the	  minds	  of	  individuals,	  which	  
only	  reinforced	  the	  extensive	  levels	  of	  control	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  light	  of	  day.	  	  The	  
totality	  of	  control	  and	  collapse	  extended	  beyond	  the	  regime	  and	  its	  men	  to	  the	  victims	  
themselves,	  rending	  thoughtful	  action	  all	  but	  lost	  in	  a	  public	  space	  where	  freedom	  and	  
equality	  had	  no	  place.	  
In	  the	  darkest	  of	  the	  dark	  times,	  such	  as	  these,	  what	  is	  man	  to	  do?	  	  Arendt	  writes,	  
“If	  politics	  brings	  disaster,	  and	  if	  one	  cannot	  do	  away	  with	  politics,	  then	  all	  that	  is	  left	  is	  
despair.”41	  	  Despair	  comes	  in	  the	  totalitarian	  mode	  of	  things	  because	  human	  beings	  are	  
subjected	  to	  politics.	  	  However,	  the	  hope	  for	  action	  remains	  and	  true	  politics,	  defined	  by	  
freedom	  and	  equality,	  is	  always	  a	  possibility.	  	  Even	  in	  the	  darkest	  times,	  when	  the	  light	  
seems	  to	  be	  cast	  out	  of	  the	  public	  realm	  completely,	  there	  is	  still	  hope	  because	  human	  
beings	  are	  still	  human,	  with	  the	  potent	  capacity	  to	  remember	  and	  to	  manifest	  their	  
humanness.	  	  Totalitarianism	  abolishes	  the	  space	  needed	  for	  action,	  the	  political	  space	  of	  
freedom.	  	  It	  integrates	  the	  plurality	  of	  men	  into	  the	  singular	  entity	  of	  humanity.	  	  What	  it	  
cannot	  do,	  however,	  is	  abolish	  natality.	  	  And	  insofar	  as	  human	  beings	  always	  have	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Arendt,	  Eichmann,	  117,	  125.	  
41	  Ibid.,	  109.	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innate	  capacity	  for	  beginning,	  they	  have	  they	  consequent	  capacity	  to	  manifest	  a	  new	  
space	  of	  freedom.42	  	  	  
In	  a	  world	  in	  which	  an	  ideological	  political	  movement	  has	  seized	  control	  of	  the	  
hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  foes	  and	  allies	  alike,	  the	  individual	  who	  recognizes	  and	  insists	  upon	  
the	  ability	  to	  think,	  judge,	  and	  act	  differently	  would	  still	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  actually	  do	  so.	  	  
To	  interrupt	  the	  flow	  of	  things	  takes	  daring.	  	  This	  is	  why,	  for	  Arendt,	  courage	  is	  the	  
cardinal	  virtue	  of	  politics.	  	  It	  is	  “only	  by	  stepping	  out	  of	  our	  private	  existence”	  that	  “we	  
make	  our	  way	  into	  the	  common	  public	  world	  that	  is	  our	  truly	  political	  space.”	  	  The	  
Passover	  story	  aptly	  illustrates	  the	  place	  of	  courage	  in	  the	  transformation	  of	  experience	  
and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  polis.	  	  The	  Israelites	  exemplify	  human	  beings	  who,	  filled	  with	  
courage,	  “dared	  to	  cross	  the	  threshold	  of	  their	  houses.”	  	  Once	  they	  emerged	  from	  the	  
concealment	  of	  the	  home,	  “they	  were	  among	  equals,	  who	  were	  capable	  of	  seeing	  and	  
hearing	  and	  admiring	  one	  another’s	  deeds.”43	  	  	  
What	  Arendt	  makes	  clear	  is	  that	  how	  we	  understand	  freedom	  has	  significant	  
impact	  on	  how,	  or	  even	  if,	  politics	  manifests	  in	  the	  world.	  	  Her	  notion	  of	  freedom	  can	  be	  
traced	  back	  to	  Kant,	  who	  defines	  spontaneity	  as	  “the	  ability	  of	  every	  human	  being	  to	  
initiate	  a	  sequence,	  to	  forge	  a	  new	  chain.”	  	  Despite	  Kant’s	  genius	  in	  understanding	  
freedom	  of	  movement	  in	  this	  way,	  “it	  is	  only	  in	  our	  own	  time	  that	  we	  have	  come	  to	  
realize	  the	  extraordinary	  political	  significance	  of	  a	  freedom	  that	  lies	  in	  our	  being	  able	  to	  
begin	  anew.”	  	  The	  total	  domination	  of	  thought	  and	  action	  experienced	  in	  the	  twentieth	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Arendt,	  Origins,	  466,	  479;	  Arendt,	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  113.	  
43	  Arendt,	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  122,	  123,	  emphasis	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century	  has	  prompted	  people	  in	  this	  age	  to	  consider	  that	  freedom	  is	  far	  more	  than	  
freedom	  of	  opinion	  or	  the	  freedom	  will.	  	  To	  understand	  freedom	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  
create—to	  start	  new	  things—this	  opens	  the	  world	  to	  immeasurable	  possibilities.	  	  In	  
summary,	  	  
This	  freedom	  of	  movement,	  then—whether	  as	  the	  
freedom	  to	  depart	  and	  begin	  something	  anew	  and	  
unheard-­‐of	  or	  as	  the	  freedom	  to	  interact	  in	  speech	  with	  
many	  others	  and	  experience	  the	  diversity	  that	  the	  world	  
always	  is	  in	  its	  totality—most	  certainly	  was	  and	  is	  not	  the	  
end	  purpose	  of	  politics,	  that	  is,	  something	  that	  can	  be	  
achieved	  by	  political	  means.	  	  It	  is	  rather	  the	  substance	  and	  
meaning	  of	  all	  things	  political.	  	  
	  
This	  means,	  “politics	  and	  freedom	  are	  identical.”	  	  And,	  further,	  “wherever	  this	  kind	  of	  
freedom	  does	  not	  exist,	  there	  is	  no	  political	  space	  in	  the	  truest	  sense.”44	  	  	  
	   In	  the	  “Epilogue”	  of	  The	  Promise	  of	  Politics,	  Arendt	  makes	  a	  very	  interesting	  
statement	  about	  politics	  and	  the	  modern	  world.	  	  In	  this	  brief	  essay,	  she	  speaks	  of	  “the	  
withering	  away	  of	  everything	  between	  us.”	  	  The	  space	  between	  us	  is	  the	  polis;	  therefore,	  
the	  political	  realm	  “can	  also	  be	  described	  as	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  desert.”	  	  She	  claims	  that	  
Nietzsche	  recognized	  this	  desert,	  but	  made	  a	  “decisive	  mistake	  in	  diagnosing	  it.”	  	  He	  
understood	  the	  desert	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  how	  one	  understands	  and	  relates	  to	  the	  world.	  	  
This	  Nietzschean	  perspective	  has	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  individuals	  because	  “we	  begin	  to	  
think	  that	  there	  is	  something	  wrong	  with	  us	  if	  we	  cannot	  live	  under	  the	  conditions	  of	  
desert	  life.”	  	  That	  is,	  we	  begin	  to	  think	  something	  is	  wrong	  with	  us	  if	  we	  find	  it	  difficult	  
to	  live	  without	  the	  space	  of	  appearance,	  without	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  	  Modern	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psychology	  and	  philosophy,	  then,	  try	  to	  help	  us	  adjust	  to	  these	  conditions,	  “taking	  away	  
our	  only	  hope,	  namely	  that	  we,	  who	  are	  not	  of	  the	  desert	  though	  we	  live	  in	  it,	  are	  able	  
to	  transform	  it	  into	  a	  human	  world.”45	  	  For	  Arendt,	  the	  desert	  conditions	  must	  not	  be	  
transformed.	  	  To	  wit,	  it	  is	  the	  very	  conditions	  of	  the	  desert	  that	  beckon	  the	  emergence	  
of	  the	  individual	  human	  being.	  	  The	  desert	  world,	  the	  space	  wherein	  there	  is	  but	  one	  
lonely	  inhabitant,	  cannot	  be	  fully	  human	  because	  it	  does	  not	  have	  the	  basic	  human	  
condition	  of	  plurality.	  	  It	  is	  only	  in	  emerging	  from	  the	  desert	  that	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  self	  
is	  revealed	  and	  true	  experience	  is	  manifest.	  	  
The	  power	  of	  the	  desert	  is	  considerable:	  	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  that	  occur	  in	  
the	  solitude	  of	  individual	  existence	  behoove	  the	  actions	  that	  create	  the	  political	  realm.	  	  
Thus,	  “Precisely	  because	  we	  suffer	  under	  desert	  conditions	  we	  are	  still	  human	  and	  still	  
intact;	  the	  danger	  lies	  in	  becoming	  true	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  desert	  and	  feeling	  at	  home	  in	  
it.”	  	  That	  is,	  if	  one	  feels	  at	  home	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  singular	  existence,	  there	  is	  no	  impetus	  
to	  brave	  the	  public	  realm	  of	  plurality,	  unpredictability,	  and	  uncertainty.	  	  Indeed,	  “Only	  
those	  who	  can	  endure	  the	  passion	  of	  living	  under	  desert	  conditions	  can	  be	  trusted	  to	  
summon	  up	  in	  themselves	  the	  courage	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  root	  of	  action,	  of	  becoming	  an	  
active	  being.”46	  	  	  
In	  modernity,	  as	  everything	  between	  us	  is	  withering	  away,	  the	  desert	  conditions	  
create	  a	  barren	  public	  space.	  	  The	  gradual	  transformation	  of	  public	  space	  has	  created	  a	  
“political”	  realm	  that	  is	  defined	  by	  inequality	  and	  that	  is	  controlled	  by	  historical	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46	  Ibid.,	  201,	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processes.	  	  The	  Passover	  narrative	  is	  powerful	  in	  these	  dark	  times;	  it	  reminds	  us	  that	  
suffering	  under	  these	  conditions	  must	  not	  determine	  how	  we	  exist	  in	  the	  world.	  	  All	  
human	  beings	  can	  be	  reminded	  of	  their	  potential	  greatness	  by	  the	  example	  of	  the	  
Israelites	  who,	  because	  they	  had	  the	  courage	  to	  act,	  created	  an	  altogether	  new	  political	  
reality.	  	  Thus,	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  the	  space	  of	  freedom	  never	  goes	  
out	  completely.	  	  Because	  human	  beings	  have	  the	  potent	  capacity	  for	  action,	  that	  is,	  to	  
start	  new	  beginnings,	  to	  manifest	  our	  inherent	  freedom,	  the	  promise	  of	  politics	  remains	  
ever	  possible.	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CONCLUSION:	  
WHAT	  OF	  JUSTICE?	  
Freedom	  .	  .	  .	  is	  not	  a	  reward	  for	  sufferings	  endured	  and	  one	  does	  not	  
accept	  justice	  as	  if	  it	  were	  crumbs	  from	  the	  table	  of	  the	  rich.	  
	   ~Hannah	  Arendt,	  “A	  Way	  toward	  the	  Reconciliation	  of	  Peoples”	  
	   Scholars	  often	  turn	  to	  The	  Human	  Condition	  as	  Arendt’s	  clearest	  political	  
statement.	  	  However,	  The	  Human	  Condition	  was	  but	  the	  first	  part	  of	  a	  protracted	  
discourse	  about	  human	  beings	  and	  the	  world	  in	  which	  we	  live.	  	  Just	  a	  year	  after	  its	  
publication,	  Arendt	  would	  come	  to	  describe	  The	  Human	  Condition	  as	  “a	  kind	  of	  
prolegomena”	  to	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  work	  of	  political	  theory	  she	  was	  planning	  to	  
write.	  	  She	  believed	  her	  discussion	  of	  the	  vita	  activa	  in	  The	  Human	  Condition	  was	  
important,	  as	  “the	  central	  political	  activity	  is	  action.”	  	  Further,	  she	  found	  it	  necessary	  “to	  
separate	  action	  conceptually	  from	  other	  human	  activities	  with	  which	  it	  is	  usually	  
confounded,	  such	  as	  labor	  and	  work.”1	  	  As	  Arendt	  investigated	  the	  specific	  character	  of	  
action,	  she	  came	  to	  understand	  that	  action	  was	  itself	  grounded	  in	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  
mind.	  	  Thus,	  a	  complete	  understanding	  of	  political	  action	  required	  a	  thorough	  
investigation	  into	  the	  vita	  contemplativa.	  
In	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  Arendt	  set	  out	  to	  provide	  a	  meticulous	  analysis	  of	  the	  
three	  mental	  faculties:	  	  thinking,	  willing,	  and	  judging.	  	  As	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  
necessarily	  precede	  action,	  the	  three-­‐part	  treatise	  was	  intended	  to	  be	  Arendt’s	  final	  
statement	  on	  politics.	  	  In	  it,	  she	  planned	  a	  careful	  investigation	  of	  the	  other	  activities,	  
the	  activities	  that	  go	  on	  in	  the	  private	  realm	  of	  the	  mind.	  	  These	  activities,	  while	  private,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Arendt,	  “Correspondence	  with	  the	  Rockefeller	  Foundation,”	  The	  Hannah	  Arendt	  Papers	  at	  the	  Library	  of	  
Congress	  (Series:	  Correspondence	  File,	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  n.d.),	  Image	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are	  no	  less	  important	  for	  politics	  than	  the	  activity	  of	  action,	  described	  in	  The	  Human	  
Condition.	  	  In	  explaining	  why	  she	  was	  writing	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  Arendt	  says,	  “The	  
immediate	  impulse	  came	  from	  my	  attending	  the	  Eichmann	  trial	  in	  Jerusalem.”	  	  At	  the	  
trial,	  Arendt	  was	  confronted	  by	  “a	  manifest	  shallowness	  in	  the	  doer	  that	  made	  it	  
impossible	  to	  trace	  the	  uncontestable	  evil	  of	  his	  deeds	  to	  any	  deeper	  level	  of	  roots	  or	  
motives.”	  	  It	  was	  her	  coverage	  of	  the	  trial	  that	  led	  to	  Arendt’s	  conclusion	  that	  Eichmann	  
was	  not	  evil,	  but,	  rather,	  thoughtless.	  	  “It	  was	  this	  absence	  of	  thinking—which	  is	  so	  
ordinary	  an	  experience	  in	  our	  everyday	  life,	  where	  we	  have	  hardly	  the	  time,	  let	  alone	  
the	  inclination,	  to	  stop	  and	  think—that	  awakened	  my	  interest.”2	  	  Ultimately,	  Arendt	  was	  
interested	  in	  discovering	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  action,	  
or	  politics	  itself.	  	  	  
	   As	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  II,	  Arendt	  did	  not	  complete	  The	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind.	  	  Perhaps	  
this	  is	  fitting,	  as	  finalities	  and	  definitions	  were	  something	  to	  which	  Arendt	  was	  so	  
opposed.	  	  Yet,	  the	  fact	  that	  “Judging”	  was	  not	  written	  has	  important	  consequences:	  	  
Arendt’s	  	  political	  theory	  is	  incomplete.	  	  In	  seeking	  to	  bring	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory	  to	  a	  
conclusion,	  some	  scholars,	  logically,	  turn	  to	  the	  essays	  and	  lectures	  where	  Arendt	  
addresses	  the	  topic	  of	  judging.	  	  The	  final	  four	  essays	  in	  Responsibility	  and	  Judgment	  are	  
concerned	  with	  judging	  and	  the	  edited	  work,	  Lectures	  on	  Kant’s	  Political	  Philosophy,	  
brings	  together	  the	  main	  texts	  that	  speak	  to	  the	  topic.	  	  Arendt’s	  essays	  and	  lectures	  on	  
judgment,	  however,	  are	  not	  consistent.	  	  Seyla	  Benhabib	  rightly	  comments	  that	  
“Arendt’s	  incomplete	  reflections	  on	  judgment	  .	  .	  .	  are	  puzzling.”	  	  As	  one	  reads	  Arendt’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  3,	  4.	  
	   186	  
works	  on	  the	  topic,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  she	  is	  wrestling	  with	  the	  concept,	  trying	  to	  
understand	  it	  herself.	  	  On	  one	  thing,	  however,	  Arendt	  is	  clear:	  	  “with	  some	  justification,”	  
judging	  can	  be	  considered	  “the	  most	  political	  of	  man’s	  mental	  abilities.”3	  	  Thus,	  a	  
statement	  on	  judging	  would	  have	  contributed	  greatly	  to	  understanding	  what	  Arendt	  
was	  saying	  about	  politics.	  	  
Scholars	  employ	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  means	  to	  elucidate	  Arendt’s	  political	  
theory.	  	  I	  have	  adopted	  a	  phenomenological	  method,	  specifically	  utilizing	  the	  narrative	  
for	  its	  phenomenological	  value.	  	  In	  1958,	  Hannah	  Arendt	  gave	  a	  speech	  honoring	  the	  life	  
and	  works	  of	  Karl	  Jaspers.	  	  She	  said,	  “In	  the	  works	  of	  a	  great	  writer	  we	  can	  almost	  
always	  find	  a	  consistent	  metaphor	  peculiar	  to	  him	  alone	  in	  which	  his	  whole	  work	  seems	  
to	  come	  to	  a	  focus.”4	  	  I	  believe	  the	  Passover	  narrative	  has	  this	  focusing	  capacity	  for	  the	  
work	  of	  Hannah	  Arendt.	  	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  that	  story	  has	  been	  used	  as	  a	  metaphorical	  
framework	  for	  understanding	  what	  it	  is	  that	  Arendt	  is	  trying	  to	  say	  about	  the	  world	  and	  
about	  politics.	  	  Tracing	  Arendt’s	  political	  ideas	  alongside	  the	  Passover	  narrative	  was	  
useful	  for	  two	  reasons.	  	  First,	  Arendt	  was	  a	  brilliant	  thinker	  and	  prolific	  writer,	  not	  to	  
mention,	  she	  saved	  a	  great	  majority	  of	  her	  lectures	  notes,	  essays,	  and	  correspondences,	  
all	  of	  which	  are	  available	  through	  the	  Library	  of	  Congress.	  	  With	  so	  much	  to	  draw	  from,	  
the	  Passover	  story	  served	  to	  highlight	  the	  significant	  elements	  of	  Arendt’s	  political	  
theory,	  thereby	  focusing	  her	  work.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  Arendt’s	  theory	  came	  more	  
into	  focus,	  the	  various	  sources	  of	  influence	  became	  more	  apparent.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  well-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Arendt,	  Responsibility	  and	  Judgment,	  188.	  
4	  Arendt,	  Men	  in	  Dark	  Times,	  75.	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known	  and	  oft-­‐discussed	  influences,	  such	  as	  Heidegger,	  Jaspers,	  Kant,	  and	  Nietzsche,	  
were	  easily	  noted.	  	  In	  addition,	  though,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  her	  Jewish	  experiences	  
informed	  the	  development	  of	  her	  political	  ideas	  also	  came	  into	  focus.	  	  Granted,	  the	  
Jewish	  aspects	  of	  her	  work	  may	  be	  more	  subtle,	  and	  they	  are	  certainly	  more	  nuanced;	  
but,	  this	  does	  not	  make	  them	  any	  less	  relevant.	  	  Of	  particular	  importance	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  
Arendt’s	  Jewish	  experiences	  do	  not	  simply	  inform	  the	  biographical	  details	  of	  her	  life,	  but	  
also	  the	  substantive	  work	  of	  her	  political	  theory.	  	  Further,	  as	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  project	  is	  to	  
understand	  what	  Arendt	  is	  doing	  in	  her	  political	  theory,	  the	  Jewish	  aspects	  help	  to	  
address	  some	  of	  the	  perplexities	  derived	  from	  the	  incomplete	  nature	  of	  Arendt’s	  theory.	  	  
As	  noted	  throughout,	  Arendt	  criticizes	  the	  Western	  political	  tradition	  for	  its	  
failure	  to	  account	  for	  action.	  	  Drawing	  upon	  the	  phenomenological	  method	  of	  her	  
teacher,	  Jaspers,	  Arendt	  defines	  action	  as	  the	  words	  and	  deeds	  that	  pass	  between	  
human	  beings	  and	  that	  create	  the	  space	  of	  appearance.	  	  Thus,	  her	  political	  work	  is	  an	  
investigation	  into	  both	  action	  and	  appearance.	  	  Arendt’s	  mode	  of	  investigation	  has	  clear	  
roots	  in	  the	  Western	  tradition;	  however,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  she	  conceives	  of	  political	  
action	  markedly	  differentiates	  her	  political	  thought	  from	  that	  tradition.	  	  And	  it	  is	  in	  that	  
distinction	  that	  many	  of	  the	  Jewish	  aspects	  of	  her	  work	  appear.	  	  The	  preceding	  chapters	  
illuminate	  an	  understanding	  of	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory	  that	  admits	  the	  presence	  of	  
these	  Jewish	  ideas	  and	  concepts.	  	  In	  my	  opinion,	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  simply	  to	  
acknowledge	  that	  Arendt’s	  experiences	  as	  a	  Jew	  are	  what	  ultimately	  caused	  her	  to	  turn	  
her	  attention	  from	  philosophy	  to	  politics.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  the	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possibility	  that	  her	  Jewish	  experiences	  also	  significantly	  contribute	  to	  her	  political	  
formulations.	  	  	  
After	  setting	  the	  phenomenological	  foundation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  narrative	  in	  
Chapter	  I,	  Chapter	  II	  turned	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind.	  	  Beginning	  with	  
thinking,	  Arendt	  finds	  that	  the	  Western	  tradition	  is	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  intellect	  and	  
knowledge.	  	  The	  Platonic	  attainment	  of	  knowledge	  is	  not	  something	  Arendt	  is	  ultimately	  
concerned	  with.	  	  She	  is	  far	  more	  Socratic	  in	  her	  method	  of	  inquiry.	  	  Her	  insistence	  upon	  
continued	  questioning	  not	  only	  draws	  her	  nearer	  to	  Socrates	  than	  Plato,	  it	  also	  points	  to	  
the	  possibility	  of	  Jewish	  influence.	  	  The	  Talmudic	  tradition	  is	  one	  that	  uses	  the	  
authoritative	  texts	  and	  commentaries	  to	  continuously	  interpret	  correct	  action	  according	  
to	  the	  revelation.	  	  That	  is,	  in	  seeking	  to	  understand	  how	  to	  act	  in	  the	  world,	  writers	  in	  
the	  Talmudic	  tradition	  are	  constantly	  refining,	  interpreting,	  and	  commenting	  on	  God’s	  
revealed	  directives,	  which	  are	  recorded	  in	  the	  Hebrew	  Bible.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  thinking	  is	  the	  
activity	  wherein	  human	  beings	  consider	  the	  world	  as	  they	  experience	  it.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  
activity	  of	  the	  mind	  that	  considers,	  interprets,	  and	  comments	  upon	  that	  which	  action	  
creates.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  unpredictable	  and	  limitless	  nature	  of	  action,	  then,	  thinking	  is	  never	  
complete.	  	  The	  endless	  nature	  of	  action	  makes	  thinking	  an	  endless	  task.	  	  	  
While	  it	  was	  acknowledged	  that	  accounting	  for	  Jewish	  experiential	  influences	  in	  
Arendt’s	  concept	  of	  thinking	  is	  a	  difficult	  task,	  her	  understanding	  of	  the	  will	  more	  
explicitly	  admits	  to	  Jewish	  influence.	  	  She	  claims	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  will	  are	  
specifically	  “Hebrew	  in	  origin”	  insofar	  as	  “we	  are	  dealing	  with	  experiences	  that	  men	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have	  not	  only	  with	  themselves,	  but	  also	  inside	  themselves.”5	  	  She	  refers	  to	  the	  will	  as	  
the	  small	  space	  of	  freedom	  that	  exists	  inside	  every	  human	  being.	  	  The	  will	  does	  not	  
cause	  volition	  in	  order	  to	  attain	  freedom;	  rather	  it	  operates	  in	  complete	  freedom	  itself.	  	  
The	  Passover	  narrative	  demonstrates	  this	  freedom	  of	  will.	  	  God,	  through	  Moses,	  
instructed	  each	  Israelite	  family	  to	  slaughter	  a	  lamb	  and	  place	  the	  blood	  of	  the	  lamb	  on	  
the	  doorpost;	  yet,	  every	  Israelite	  family	  had	  to	  choose	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  that	  
command.	  	  Arendt	  asserts	  that	  there	  can	  be	  no	  coercion	  in	  action;	  using	  the	  faculty	  of	  
the	  will,	  one	  freely	  chooses	  to	  act.	  	  	  
Finally,	  it	  was	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  II	  that	  there	  is	  a	  connection	  to	  be	  made	  between	  
Arendt’s	  notion	  of	  judgment	  and	  Jewish	  mysticism.	  	  The	  school	  of	  Jewish	  mysticism	  
understands	  judgment	  as	  the	  “imposition	  of	  limits.”6	  	  The	  imposition	  of	  limits	  can	  only	  
occur	  outside	  of	  the	  individual,	  as	  actions	  reveal	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  individual	  to	  others.	  	  
In	  order	  for	  the	  human	  being	  to	  really	  answer	  the	  question,	  “Who	  am	  I?”	  the	  self-­‐
constructed	  identity	  must	  be	  challenged	  by	  the	  uncertainty	  and	  unpredictability	  of	  the	  
world	  of	  appearances.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  judging	  involves	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
subjective	  self,	  created	  in	  the	  mind	  (the	  person	  I	  think	  I	  am),	  and	  the	  objective	  self	  that	  
is	  revealed	  in	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  via	  action	  (the	  person	  I	  appear	  to	  be).	  	  
As	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind,	  the	  Jewish	  
aspects	  of	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory	  come	  primarily	  from	  two	  Jewish	  lineages:	  the	  
mystical	  Judaism	  of	  the	  Kabbalists	  and	  the	  rabbinic	  Judaism	  of	  Orthodox	  Jews.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Arendt,	  Life	  of	  the	  Mind,	  63,	  emphasis	  mine.	  
6	  Scholem,	  Major	  Trends,	  263.	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Repeatedly,	  the	  analysis	  herein	  has	  turned	  to	  the	  Jewish	  mystical	  tradition.	  	  Arendt’s	  
close	  friendship	  with	  Gershom	  Scholem	  and	  her	  close	  reading	  of	  his	  work,	  Major	  Trends	  
in	  Jewish	  Mysticism,	  seems	  to	  have	  had	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Arendt	  
understands	  the	  world.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  mystical	  concepts	  of	  the	  Tsimtsum	  and	  the	  
Reshima	  bear	  close	  proximity	  to	  Arendt’s	  notions	  of	  creation	  and	  natality.	  	  As	  such,	  
these	  ideas	  were	  discussed	  in	  Chapters	  III	  and	  IV,	  as	  they	  contribute	  to	  understanding	  
Arendt’s	  notions	  of	  action	  and	  appearance.	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  promise	  of	  politics	  is	  
maintained	  by	  the	  ability	  to	  remember	  that,	  as	  human	  beings,	  we	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  
create	  new	  political	  realities.	  	  
Arendt’s	  Jewishness	  can	  also	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  orthodox	  Jewish	  tradition.	  	  The	  
different	  formulations	  of	  the	  creation	  myth	  were	  expounded	  in	  Chapter	  V.	  	  Most	  
important	  for	  understanding	  the	  experiential	  influence	  of	  Arendt’s	  Jewishness	  was	  the	  
idea	  that	  in	  the	  West,	  the	  dominant	  understanding	  of	  the	  creation	  myth	  contributed	  to	  
the	  exile	  of	  action	  from	  the	  public	  realm.	  	  The	  power	  of	  the	  creation	  myth,	  as	  Arendt	  
understands	  it,	  draws	  upon	  the	  Hebraic	  conception	  of	  truth	  and	  revelation.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  
“truth”	  is	  not	  a	  definitive	  notion	  of	  transcendent	  principles,	  but	  rather,	  truth	  is	  that	  
which	  is	  experienced	  in	  objective	  reality.	  	  As	  such,	  truth,	  like	  action,	  is	  dynamic	  and	  
ever-­‐changing.	  	  Thinking	  and	  inquiring	  about	  truth,	  or,	  for	  Arendt,	  experiential	  reality,	  
are	  essential	  to	  being	  human.	  	  The	  “only	  gain	  one	  might	  legitimately	  expect	  from”	  the	  
activities	  of	  the	  mind	  “is	  not	  a	  result,	  such	  as	  a	  definition,	  or	  the	  attainment	  of	  a	  goal,	  
such	  as	  a	  theory,	  but	  rather	  the	  slow,	  plodding	  discovery	  and,	  perhaps,	  the	  mapping	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survey	  of	  the	  region	  which	  some	  incident	  had	  completely	  illuminated	  for	  a	  fleeting	  
moment.”7	  	  	  
The	  Passover	  story	  is	  one	  such	  incident.	  	  The	  power	  of	  the	  Passover	  narrative,	  
like	  all	  authentic	  narratives,	  is	  that	  it	  reveals	  something	  about	  the	  conditions	  of	  being	  
human.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  the	  Passover	  narrative	  teaches	  the	  difference	  between	  freedom	  
and	  slavery	  and	  awakens	  our	  hearts	  and	  minds	  to	  the	  potential	  of	  human	  action.	  	  The	  
Passover	  narrative	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  and,	  as	  such,	  it	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  
to	  Hannah	  Arendt.	  	  However,	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Passover	  narrative	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
is	  an	  authentic	  narrative.	  	  That	  is,	  regardless	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Passover	  narrative	  is	  
directed	  toward	  a	  particular	  group,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  narrative	  supersedes	  those	  
boundaries.	  	  Insofar	  as	  the	  narrative	  reveals	  the	  human	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐revelation	  
through	  political	  action,	  it	  has	  a	  universal	  applicability.	  
In	  Chapter	  IV,	  the	  relationship	  between	  action,	  rooted	  in	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  
mind,	  and	  freedom,	  as	  the	  meaning	  of	  politics,	  was	  articulated.	  	  Arendt	  has	  stringent	  
criteria	  for	  the	  activities	  of	  thinking,	  willing,	  judging,	  and	  action.	  	  All	  of	  these	  activities	  
must,	  by	  necessity,	  be	  performed	  in	  complete	  freedom.	  	  Because	  political	  action	  is	  
comprised	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  activity	  of	  action	  that	  are	  all	  necessarily	  
free,	  the	  meaning	  of	  politics,	  then,	  is	  freedom.	  	  Arendt	  does	  not	  think	  that	  politics	  exists	  
in	  order	  to	  liberate	  human	  beings;	  rather,	  politics	  is	  the	  un-­‐concealment	  of	  the	  innate	  
freedom	  of	  human	  beings.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Arendt,	  “Pursuit	  of	  Happiness,”	  1,	  2.	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In	  Arendt’s	  musings	  on	  freedom,	  we	  get	  some	  insights	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  justice.	  	  
So	  often	  in	  her	  works,	  Arendt	  speaks	  of	  freedom	  and	  justice	  together.	  	  For	  example,	  
there	  are	  two	  “concepts	  on	  which	  all	  politics	  are	  based:	  freedom	  and	  justice.”	  	  Also,	  to	  
become	  “unpolitical”	  is	  to	  separate	  oneself	  “from	  the	  cause	  of	  freedom	  and	  justice.”	  	  
And,	  “The	  only	  political	  ideals	  an	  oppressed	  people	  can	  have	  are	  freedom	  and	  justice.”	  	  
In	  statements	  such	  as	  these,	  one	  is	  left	  to	  ponder	  whether	  Arendt	  sees	  freedom	  and	  
justice	  as	  the	  same	  thing.	  	  However,	  it	  seems	  apparent	  in	  other	  places	  that	  the	  two	  
ideas	  are,	  indeed,	  different.	  	  More	  specifically,	  freedom	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  politics	  and	  
justice	  the	  purpose	  of	  politics.	  	  Stated	  another	  way,	  the	  reason	  we	  experience	  freedom	  
is	  to	  experience	  justice.	  	  This	  conclusion	  regarding	  justice	  is	  drawn	  from	  a	  particularly	  
revealing	  passage	  in	  an	  article	  written	  for	  Aufbau	  in	  1945.	  	  In	  this	  article,	  Arendt	  
discusses	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  to	  determine	  how	  they	  will	  establish	  
their	  national	  homeland.	  	  She	  writes,	  “Now	  we	  have	  our	  chance	  to	  help	  ourselves	  
politically	  .	  .	  .	  This	  is	  only	  just,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  sole	  justice	  that	  politics	  offers.”8	  	  Justice,	  then,	  
is	  something	  that	  comes	  out	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  freedom.	  	  	  
It	  is	  clear	  that,	  for	  Arendt,	  justice	  does	  not	  bear	  the	  mark	  of	  the	  Western	  
tradition.	  	  That	  is,	  justice	  is	  not	  simply	  right	  conduct.	  	  Perhaps	  drawing	  a	  closer	  affinity	  
to	  the	  Jewish	  tradition,	  Arendt’s	  notion	  of	  justice	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  what	  is	  just	  is	  that	  
which	  maintains	  the	  world	  of	  appearances,	  that	  is,	  the	  realm	  of	  action	  that	  is	  created	  
and	  maintained	  by	  freedom.	  	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Passover	  
narrative	  indicates.	  	  The	  free	  act	  of	  the	  Israelites	  creates	  a	  new	  political	  reality;	  however,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  259,	  153,	  241,	  238,	  emphasis	  mine.	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in	  order	  to	  maintain	  that	  space,	  free	  action	  must	  continue.	  	  First,	  they	  must	  choose	  to	  
flee	  the	  land.	  	  Once	  in	  the	  wilderness,	  they	  must	  choose	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  maintains	  
equality	  and	  freedom.	  	  The	  law	  was	  sent	  to	  assist	  Moses	  and	  the	  community	  in	  this	  task	  
of	  political	  maintenance.	  
The	  polis	  is	  overwhelmingly	  dependent,	  then,	  upon	  the	  free	  choice	  to	  act.	  	  That	  
is	  to	  say,	  the	  polis	  is	  heavily	  dependent	  upon	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind	  as	  all	  action	  is	  
necessarily	  rooted	  in	  thinking,	  willing	  and	  judging.	  	  In	  distancing	  herself	  from	  the	  
Western	  tradition,	  and	  specifically	  objecting	  to	  any	  universal	  principles,	  including	  moral	  
principles,	  Arendt	  seemingly	  leaves	  us	  with	  a	  conception	  of	  justice	  that	  lacks	  any	  
content.	  	  Does	  Arendt	  really	  intend	  to	  posit	  that	  so	  long	  as	  human	  beings	  are	  thoughtful	  
their	  actions	  will	  naturally	  maintain	  the	  political	  space	  that	  is	  both	  free	  and	  equal?	  	  
Without	  a	  religiously	  revealed	  moral	  code	  or	  a	  Kantian	  categorical	  imperative,	  what	  is	  it	  
that	  guides	  human	  behavior?	  	  Does	  Arendt	  truly	  believe	  that	  human	  beings	  are	  so	  alike	  
in	  the	  basic	  human	  condition	  that	  thinking,	  without	  any	  reference	  point	  for	  how	  to	  think,	  
or	  what	  to	  think,	  is	  sufficient	  for	  eliciting	  ethically	  responsible	  behavior?	  	  	  
	   On	  this	  issue	  of	  justice,	  the	  Jewish	  tradition	  is	  once	  again	  instructive.	  	  In	  Book	  III	  
of	  Maimonides’	  The	  Guide	  of	  the	  Perplexed,	  he	  states	  that	  justice	  applies	  to	  “every	  good	  
action.”9	  	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  this	  that	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  is	  “good”	  is	  necessary.	  	  For	  
Maimonides	  the	  process	  of	  moral	  perfection	  is	  reserved	  for	  the	  few,	  talented,	  and	  
committed.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  though,	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  determine	  
what	  is	  good	  is	  implicit	  in	  all	  human	  beings.	  	  This	  is	  why	  thinking	  is	  supremely	  important,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Maimonides,	  Guide	  of	  the	  Perplexed,	  631.	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and	  why	  thoughtlessness	  is	  such	  a	  heavy	  charge.	  	  What	  is	  good	  is	  what	  the	  faculty	  of	  
thinking	  determines.	  	  What	  is	  right	  is	  what	  the	  faculty	  of	  judgment	  determines.	  	  Justice	  
comes	  when	  the	  will	  moves	  one	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  thinking	  and	  judging	  have	  
determined	  to	  be	  best	  (that	  is,	  these	  actions	  are	  both	  good	  and	  right).	  	  Without	  the	  
activities	  of	  the	  mind,	  not	  only	  is	  the	  manifestation	  of	  our	  inherent	  freedom	  impossible,	  
but	  also	  the	  possibility	  for	  justice	  is	  abolished.	  	  	  
	   Herein	  lies	  the	  problem.	  	  We	  are	  left	  to	  assume	  that	  anything	  we	  do	  or	  say,	  so	  
long	  as	  it	  is	  done	  freely	  and	  thoughtfully,	  is	  just.	  	  Has	  Arendt	  been	  defeated	  by	  the	  very	  
conditions	  of	  her	  project?	  	  In	  seeking	  to	  ground	  politics	  in	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind,	  has	  
she	  ultimately	  uprooted	  politics	  altogether?	  	  There	  is	  a	  line	  of	  thought	  that	  allows	  for	  
the	  possibility	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  It	  is	  not	  merely	  thinking	  and	  the	  consequent	  free	  
actions	  that	  create	  justice.	  	  Rather,	  it	  is	  the	  revelation	  of	  human-­‐ness	  implicit	  in	  the	  
world	  of	  appearances	  that	  prompts	  just	  actions.	  	  Let	  me	  explain.	  
In	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  this	  line	  of	  thought,	  I	  return,	  once	  again,	  to	  The	  Jewish	  
Writings.	  	  In	  “A	  Way	  Toward	  the	  Reconciliation	  of	  Peoples,”	  Arendt	  explains	  that	  the	  
crisis	  of	  World	  War	  II	  was	  a	  crisis	  of	  humanity;	  it	  challenged	  nations	  to	  act,	  to	  enter	  into	  
the	  public	  space	  inhabited	  by	  suppressive	  tyrants	  such	  as	  Hitler	  and	  Stalin.	  	  It	  challenged	  
nations	  to	  act	  as	  viable	  agents	  of	  the	  human	  condition,	  complete	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  
change	  the	  experience	  of	  reality	  by	  interrupting	  the	  historical	  process	  as	  it	  was	  
unfolding.	  	  All	  nations,	  including	  the	  disparate	  Jewish	  nation,	  had	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  space	  
of	  appearance	  and,	  together,	  as	  equals,	  reclaim	  and	  re-­‐determine	  political	  reality.	  	  This	  
equality	  of	  nations	  fighting	  side	  by	  side	  with	  one	  another	  was	  the	  only	  “real	  criterion	  for	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the	  justice	  of	  this	  war.”	  	  The	  justice	  of	  the	  war	  was	  “the	  degree	  to	  which	  other	  nations	  
[were]	  prepared	  to	  fight	  their,	  our,	  and	  humanity’s	  battle	  shoulder	  to	  shoulder	  with	  
Jews.”	  	  The	  justice	  of	  the	  war	  could	  be	  found	  only	  in	  the	  global	  polis	  created	  by	  the	  
actions	  of	  many	  nations	  working	  as	  equals	  to	  reassert	  and	  preserve	  the	  fundamental	  
freedom	  of	  human	  beings.	  	  This	  justice	  is	  why	  Arendt	  was	  vehemently	  adamant	  on	  her	  
stance	  regarding	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Jewish	  army:	  	  “We	  do	  not	  want	  promises	  that	  our	  
sufferings	  will	  be	  ‘avenged,’	  we	  want	  to	  fight;	  we	  do	  not	  want	  mercy,	  but	  justice.”	  	  
Justice	  is	  only	  possible	  in	  the	  polis,	  and	  that	  requires	  that	  all	  people	  in	  the	  public	  space	  
move	  about	  freely,	  together,	  as	  equals.	  	  For,	  “Freedom	  .	  .	  .	  is	  not	  a	  reward	  for	  sufferings	  
endured	  and	  one	  does	  not	  accept	  justice	  as	  if	  it	  were	  crumbs	  from	  the	  table	  of	  the	  
rich.”10	  
	   In	  action	  that	  is	  ontologically	  rooted	  in	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  mind,	  the	  individual	  
human	  being	  appears	  in	  the	  plurality	  of	  human	  existence	  as	  a	  unique,	  differentiated	  
entity.	  	  Paradoxically,	  however,	  free	  thinking,	  willing,	  judging,	  and	  acting	  also	  allows	  the	  
individual	  to	  emerge	  into	  the	  space	  of	  appearance	  as	  a	  human	  being	  exactly	  like	  all	  
other	  human	  beings.	  	  The	  space	  of	  appearance,	  or	  politics,	  then,	  facilitates	  both	  
individuated	  differentiation	  and	  a	  collective	  identity.	  	  For	  Arendt,	  the	  fact	  that	  free	  
action	  is	  unpredictable	  and	  limitless	  facilitates	  a	  reliance	  on	  human	  plurality.	  	  “Man’s	  
inability	  to	  rely	  upon	  himself	  .	  .	  .	  is	  the	  price	  human	  beings	  pay	  for	  freedom.”	  	  That	  is	  to	  
say,	  in	  a	  space	  where	  “everybody	  has	  the	  same	  capacity	  to	  act,”	  and	  yet,	  where	  it	  is	  
impossible	  to	  “[foretell]	  the	  consequences	  of	  an	  act,”	  the	  community	  of	  equals	  becomes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Arendt,	  Jewish	  Writings,	  263,	  emphasis	  mine.	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interdependent.	  	  Further,	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  plurality	  allows	  “for	  the	  joy	  of	  inhabiting	  
together	  with	  others	  a	  world	  whose	  reality	  is	  guaranteed	  for	  each	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  
all.”11	  	  Arendt’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  being	  human	  revealed	  within	  her	  
psyche	  a	  deep,	  convicted	  love	  of	  the	  world.	  	  As	  Elisabeth	  Young-­‐Bruehl	  writes,	  “What	  
united	  [Arendt’s]	  thought	  was	  the	  love	  she	  had	  come	  to	  understand	  as	  the	  one	  that	  
unites	  self	  and	  others—Amor	  Mundi.”12	  	  	  Vehemently	  rejecting	  the	  philosophical	  
impulse	  of	  contemptus	  mundi	  (contempt	  of	  the	  world),	  Arendt	  even	  proposed	  to	  call	  her	  
treatise	  on	  the	  vita	  activa,	  Amor	  Mundi,	  love	  of	  the	  world.	  	  At	  the	  most	  extensive	  level,	  
this	  is	  the	  love	  that	  comes	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  revelation	  that	  we	  are	  all	  human	  beings.	  	  
That	  recognition,	  for	  Arendt,	  came	  from	  understanding	  and	  accepting	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is.	  	  
We	  must	  learn	  to	  love	  the	  world,	  complete	  with	  its	  conditions,	  complete	  with	  the	  
suffering	  we	  experience	  in	  it,	  because	  as	  human	  beings	  we	  are	  reliant	  upon	  it	  for	  our	  
very	  existence.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory	  is	  grounded	  in	  a	  love	  of	  the	  
world	  and	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  human-­‐ness	  in	  the	  self	  and	  in	  others.	  	  	  
	   	  Arendt’s	  deep	  love	  of	  the	  world	  allows	  us	  to	  remember	  her	  Jewishness,	  once	  
again.	  	  Judaism	  is	  a	  religion	  of	  law.	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  IV,	  when	  the	  Israelites	  left	  
Egypt,	  after	  they	  had	  created	  a	  new	  political	  space,	  they	  were	  given	  a	  law.	  	  The	  purpose	  
of	  the	  law	  was	  to	  maintain	  the	  polis.	  	  Throughout	  the	  Torah,	  God	  continues	  to	  issue	  
decrees	  to	  the	  Hebrew	  people.	  	  Thus,	  there	  are	  many	  legal	  codes	  in	  Judaism,	  all	  based	  
on	  the	  commandments	  that	  have	  been	  delivered	  by	  God,	  which	  are	  called	  “mitzvoth.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Arendt,	  Human	  Condition,	  244.	  
12	  Young-­‐Bruehl,	  For	  Love	  of	  the	  World,	  327.	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While	  there	  are	  mitzvoth	  that	  speak	  to	  dietary	  laws	  and	  mitzvoth	  that	  determine	  
conduct	  during	  Shabbat,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  Jewish	  law	  that	  commands	  love.	  	  
In	  the	  Mishnah	  (Avot	  1:2)	  it	  is	  written,	  “Shimon	  the	  Righteous	  was	  one	  of	  the	  last	  from	  
the	  Great	  Assembly.	  	  He	  used	  to	  say:	  Upon	  three	  things	  the	  world	  stands:	  upon	  the	  
Torah,	  upon	  worship,	  and	  upon	  acts	  of	  kindness.”13	  	  The	  acts	  of	  kindness	  (g’milut	  
chasidim)	  are	  considered	  mitzvoth.	  	  The	  Talmud	  emphasizes	  these	  acts	  of	  kindness,	  
saying	  that	  they	  are	  superior	  to	  other	  acts	  of	  charity	  because	  anyone,	  regardless	  of	  
wealth,	  age,	  or	  other	  limitations,	  can	  perform	  these	  types	  of	  mitzvoth.14	  	  Acts	  of	  
kindness	  have	  become	  so	  honored	  in	  Judaism	  that	  the	  word	  “mitzvah”	  has	  come	  to	  
mean	  any	  good	  deed.	  	  	  
	   Taking	  Maimonides’	  notion	  of	  justice	  (that	  which	  applies	  to	  every	  good	  action)	  
and	  the	  Rabbinic	  notion	  of	  commandment	  (an	  act	  of	  loving-­‐kindness),	  one	  can	  see	  that	  
justice	  is	  action	  in	  accordance	  with	  this	  loving-­‐kindness.	  	  Of	  course,	  in	  Judaism,	  there	  is	  a	  
source	  that	  guides	  all	  action,	  God	  and	  the	  revealed	  laws.	  	  Arendt’s	  notion	  of	  justice	  
might	  appear	  to	  be	  Kantian,	  based	  in	  a	  categorical	  imperative.	  	  However,	  insofar	  as	  the	  
notion	  of	  an	  imperative	  strips	  the	  inherent	  quality	  of	  freedom,	  I	  believe	  Arendt’s	  notion	  
of	  justice	  is	  more	  Jewish	  in	  character.	  	  Leviticus	  19:18	  tells	  us,	  “Love	  your	  fellow	  as	  
yourself.”15	  	  There	  is	  a	  great	  Talmudic	  story	  that	  highlights	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  
commandment.	  	  A	  man	  came	  to	  Rabbi	  Hillel	  and	  asked	  if	  he	  could	  teach	  him	  the	  Torah	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  William	  Berkson,	  Pirke	  Avot	  (Philadelphia:	  	  Jewish	  Publication	  Society,	  2010),	  185.	  
14	  Talmud	  Sukkah,	  49b.	  Accessed	  online	  at	  http://juchre.org/talmud/sukkah/sukkah.htm.	  	  Charity,	  or	  
donating	  to	  those	  in	  need,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  requires	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  wealth	  and	  is,	  therefore,	  
limited	  to	  those	  with	  some	  measure	  of	  abundance.	  
15	  Leviticus,	  19:18,	  JPS.	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in	  the	  time	  that	  he	  could	  stand	  on	  one	  foot.	  	  Rabbi	  Hillel	  replied:	  "What	  is	  hateful	  to	  
yourself,	  do	  not	  do	  to	  your	  fellow	  man.	  	  That	  is	  the	  whole	  Torah;	  the	  rest	  is	  just	  
commentary.	  	  Go	  and	  study	  it."16	  	  The	  foundation	  of	  the	  Jewish	  legal	  code,	  then,	  is	  love.	  	  
The	  foundation	  of	  Arendt’s	  political	  theory	  may	  be,	  perhaps,	  this	  same	  love.	  	  In	  loving	  
one	  another,	  human	  beings	  are	  free	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  world.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Talmud	  Shabbat,	  31a.	  Accessed	  online	  at	  http://juchre.org/talmud/shabbath/shabbath2.htm#31a.	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